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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation analyzes the careers of three Afrikaner missionaries, David 
Bosch, Carel Boshoff, and Nico Smith, who gained international reputations for 
pioneering alternatives to the South African Nation Party’s (NP) policy of apartheid over 
the second half of the 20th century. Afrikaners looked to missionaries to be moral leaders 
on questions of race relations, and missionaries’ public theologies carried significant 
moral weight. While numerous historians have argued that from the 1930s through the 
1950s Afrikaner missionaries played a key role in developing and promoting the moral 
basis of apartheid in South Africa, they have not, however, addressed how Afrikaner 
missionaries responded to the political, social, and moral failure of apartheid. 
 By the 1970s, the dissonance between the ideal and the actual implementation of 
apartheid led Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff—by that time leading public theologians—to a 
crisis of confidence in the NP, and they began to endorse divergent moral visions for the 
country’s future. David Bosch and Nico Smith embraced racial unity while Carel Boshoff 
pursued ethnic separatism. By the mid-1970s, Bosch became a leading proponent of 
“reconciliation,” which gave Afrikaners new moral language for thinking about 
		 vi 
themselves as part of a non-racial society. By the mid-1980s, both Bosch and Smith were 
key leaders in ecumenical and interracial organizations that endorsed a negotiated end to 
apartheid. They helped to form a growing interracial solidarity of Christians that 
encouraged and facilitated the democratic transition of 1990/1994. Conservative 
theologians, like Boshoff, attempted to stem the popularity of reconciliation in Afrikaner 
political and civil organizations. He was unable to successfully coordinate efforts with 
other conservatives, and he was increasingly marginalized. Ultimately, Boshoff opted for 
negotiated ethnic separatism with the African National Congress.  
This study demonstrates that far from being monolithic, Afrikaner religiosity and 
racial morality were dynamic and contested. Secondly, it shows that a number of 
Afrikaner public theologians and moral leaders were actively involved in ending white 
minority rule in South Africa. Conversely, it also shows that conservative religious 
leaders were able to transform Afrikaner nationalism, thereby prolonging its influence 
into the 21st century.
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INTRODUCTION 
This study analyzes the shifting relationship between Afrikaner missionaries and the 
apartheid state in South Africa from 1948 until 1994. Numerous scholars have 
convincingly argued that in the mid 20th century, Afrikaner missionaries promoted the 
idea of apartheid as a moral political arrangement for South Africa’s various ethnic and 
racial groups.1 During the first half of the 20th century, the majority of Afrikaners 
belonged to one of three Dutch Reformed Churches, the largest of which was the 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK).2 As Christians, Afrikaners looked to 
missionaries in the NGK to be moral experts on race relations, and missionaries’ ideas 
had a direct impact on political policies. From the 1930s through the 1950s, NGK 
mission leaders like J.G. Strydom and G.B.A. Gerdener asserted that different ethnic 
groups required culturally specific churches, schools, societies, and economies. The 
National Party (NP) adopted apartheid as its political platform in the 1940s, building on 
the NGK’s moral language. Mission thinkers like Gerdener hoped that apartheid would 
be a nation-building project, giving each ethnic group a chance to develop its highest 
potential without impeding the development of other groups. In reality, apartheid was a 
																																																								
1 Nico Smith, “Die planting van afsonderlike kerke vir die nie-blanke bevolkingsgroepe deur die 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Suid-Afrika” (The planting of separate churches for the non-white 
population groups by the NGK), Annale Universiteit van Stellenbosch, vol. 34 series B, no. 2 (1973); J.C. 
Adonis, Die Afgebreekte skeidsmuur weer opgebou (The broken wall of separation built up again), 
(Rodopi, 1982); Johan Andries Lombard, “Ontwikkelinge in die sendingbeleid en –praktyk van die 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk gedurende die tydperk 1932-1962,” (Doctoral Diss., University of the 
North, 1985); Richard Elphick, Equality of Believers: Protestant Missionaries and the Racial Politics of 
South Africa (University of Virginia Press, 2012); Richard Elphick, “Missions and Afrikaner Nationalism: 
Soundings in the Pre-History of Apartheid,” Missions, Nationalism, and the End of Empire, ed. Brian 
Stanley (Eerdmans, 2003); Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (University of 
Virginia Press, 2009), 458-464. 
2 The other major churches were (and are) the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (NHK) and the 
Gereformeerde Kerk (GKSA).  
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horrendous crime against humanity.   
This begs the question, which scholars have not yet sufficiently answered: how 
did missionaries respond to the political failure of their initial moral vision? And also, did 
their responses have any impact on civil society or politics? This study argues that from 
1948 until 1970, the dissonance between the moral vision of apartheid and its actual 
implementation created a growing crisis of confidence in NP leadership. Many factors 
heightened this crisis of confidence, including international ecumenical criticism 
beginning in the 1960s, the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement and black 
theology in the 1970s. This coincided with the growing realization that South Africans 
were too economically interdependent to be ethnically separate. As missionaries lost 
confidence in apartheid, they were unable to agree on what had gone wrong, and they 
could not articulate a coherent moral alternative. Some missionaries suggested that the 
policy itself was deeply flawed, and they opted to embrace ecumenism and racial 
reconciliation. Others believed that the policy was sound, but the NP had not 
implemented it properly. As it became increasingly clear that apartheid could not be 
reformed in the 1980s, reconciliation gained increasing moral traction, while separation 
was pushed to the moral margins of the NGK. Missionaries who supported racial unity 
helped formed interracial solidarities in civil society that encouraged and facilitated the 
democratic transition of 1990/1994. Conservatives begrudgingly opted for a negotiated 
separatism, which transformed the nature of Afrikaner nationalism and prolonged its 
influence into the 21st century. Thus, a crisis of confidence led to a moral breakdown 
among Afrikaner mission thinkers in the 1970s and 1980s, after which point some 
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promoted the morality of reconciliation and a non-racial South Africa, while others 
pursued Afrikaner separatism.     
To make this argument, this study will compare the careers of three leading 
Afrikaner mission thinkers: David Bosch (1929-1992), Nico Smith (1929-2010), and 
Carel Boshoff (1927-2011). Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff all began their careers at the same 
ideological baseline. As students at the University of Pretoria in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, they supported the NP and they believed that apartheid, as a nation-building 
project, was moral. They were the inheritors of the tradition that Strydom and Gerdener 
began. In the late 1950s through the mid-1960s, they all worked as missionaries within 
South Africa’s borders, cooperating with the NP to build separate institutions for black 
people. They each became leading professors of mission: Boshoff at the University of 
Pretoria (1966), Smith at the Stellenbosch University (1966), and Bosch at the University 
of South Africa (UNISA, 1972). These three men were important because they were 
positioned to exert significant influence on Afrikaner racial morality. They trained NGK 
leaders and were key voices in the moral debate. They built organizations and institutions 
to promote their moral visions, inculcating their political theologies on the wider 
community. Each man’s political theology, however, would take profoundly distinct 
turns. Comparing these three specific leaders reveals the extent to which Afrikaners’ 
sense of racial morality splintered over the apartheid years. Likewise, they demonstrate 
that Afrikaner moral leaders were not able to agree on a single way forward, but rather 
pushed in completely different directions.  
Already in the early 1950s, Bosch began to lose confidence in the NP. By the 
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middle of the 1950s, he was no longer able to defend apartheid as a biblical policy in 
ecumenical settings, and he was uncomfortable with the NP’s removal of Coloured voters 
from the common roll in the Cape Province.3 As a graduate student under the direction of 
Oscar Cullmann and Karl Barth at the University of Basel, Bosch came to object to 
overtly nationalistic impulses in Christian theology and missionary work. In spite of these 
misgivings, he continued to accept apartheid as a practical policy through the mid-1960s.  
It was only after the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement and black 
theology in the early 1970s that Bosch began to advocate a new public theology. He 
would adopt the idea that the Christian church ought to be an “alternative community.” 
Instead of replicating the ethnic particularities of the world, he argued that the church 
ought to reconcile various groups into a single new community. This language of 
reconciliation would give Afrikaner moral leaders a new way of thinking about 
themselves as part of a non-racial society. Bosch would promote reconciliation within the 
Afrikaner community through letters, lectures, newspaper articles, and books. He would 
work with a range of Christian leaders to build an interracial and ecumenical solidarity 
around reconciliation. At interracial mission conferences like the Pan African Christian 
Leadership Assembly (PACLA, 1976) and the South African Christian Leadership 
Assembly (SACLA, 1979), he shared the stage with radical black theologians like Manas 
Buthelezi and Desmond Tutu as well as white evangelicals like Michael Cassidy. By the 
mid-1980s, Cassidy, Bosch, and Tutu would all be founding members of the National 
Initiative for Reconciliation, which promoted the idea of freeing political prisoners and 																																																								
3 Kevin Livingston, A Missiology of the Road: Early Perspectives in David Bosch’s Theology of 
Mission and Evangelism (James Clarke & Co., 2012), 45.  
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beginning political negotiations. Bosch would not, however, live to see the “new South 
Africa.” His life was cut tragically short by a car accident in 1992.      
While committed to life as a public theologian in South Africa, Bosch would also 
gain immense influence on the international ecumenical stage. International mission 
leaders looked to Bosch to expound on theological and political developments within 
South Africa. Both “evangelicals” and “ecumenicals” appreciated Bosch’s “holistic” 
view of mission.4 Evangelicals tended to avoid social work in favor of evangelism, while 
ecumenicals tended to focus on social work to the exclusion of overt evangelism. Bosch 
believed both aspects were necessary. He was a key speaker at the evangelical Grand 
Rapids Consolation on the Relationship Between Evangelism and Social Responsibility 
in 1982, and he participated in drafting the 1983 document “Transformation: The Church 
in Response to Human Need.”5 The document attempted to expand the concept of 
mission beyond personal salvation to include concerns about social justice and human 
liberation. Bosch likewise drafted the ecumenical movement’s statement of the “Stuttgart 
Consultation on Evangelism.” While rooting mission in calling people to faith in Christ 
(“a ‘silent’ Christian lifestyle…is not sufficiently explicit”), it also maintained a sense of 
																																																								
4 “Ecumenicals,” in this context, refers to those Christian bodies associated with the World 
Council of Churches. They became increasingly uncomfortable with the idea of converting people and 
tended to direct mission work as social projects. “Evangelicals” refers to a loose organization of Christians 
who maintained individual conversion as central to missionary activity. They were associated with the 
Lausanne Movement. For more perspective on the ecumenical/evangelical divide, see Emilio Castro, 
“Ecumenism and Evangelicalism: Where are we?” The Ecumenical Review vol. 70 no. 1 (March 2018), 53-
62.   
5 Kevin Livingston, A Missiology of the Road: Early Perspectives in David Bosch’s Theology of 
Mission and Evangelism (James Clarke & Co., 2012), 56. For text of “Transformation: The Church in 
Response to Human Need,” see. https://www.lausanne.org/content/statement/transformation-the-church-in-
response-to-human-need.  
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mission as standing against oppression and injustice.6 His book, Transforming Mission, 
which explored the creative tension between opposed missionary paradigms, remains 
standard reading for seminarians throughout the world, and his ideas continue to spur 
further academic studies.7 By the 1970s, Bosch was both cosmopolitan and irenic, which 
were not qualities that many in the NGK shared at the time. His objective was to use his 
broader perspective to build bridges between people with diametrically opposed 
ideological outlooks, and he was instrumental in promoting reconciliation as a 
meaningful concept within both the NGK and larger ecumenical circles.   
Like Bosch, Smith also gained an international reputation. In particular, 
evangelicals viewed him as a “safe” ally in the fight against apartheid. In the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, Fuller Theological Seminary, Wheaton College, and the Southern 
Baptist Theological Seminary invited Smith to give lectures. He also spoke on a panel at 
the evangelical Lausanne II meeting. In his early years, however, Smith was so zealous 
about ethnic particularity that he refused to eat with black evangelists and nurses working 
on mission stations. In the early 1960s, he became a member of the Afrikaner 
Broederbond, a secret men’s organization devoted to promoting Afrikaner interests in 
South Africa, and he quickly ascended the ranks of Afrikaner society, becoming a 
professor at Stellenbosch. Smith, however, would also experience a crisis of confidence. 
He began to view the Broederbond as unfairly advantaging Afrikaners while cloaking 																																																								
6 Livingston, 56. See “Statement of the Stuttgart Consultation on Evangelism,” in Proclaiming 
Christ in Christ’s Way: Studies in Integral Evangelism, eds. Vinay Samuel and Albercht Hauser (Wipf and 
Stock, 1989), 212-227. 
7 See for example: Girma Bekele, The In-Between People: A Reading of David Bosch through the 
Lens of Mission History and Contemporary Challenges in Ethiopia (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 
2011) 
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their actions in the language of Christian charity. He likewise began having conversations 
with philosopher Johan Degenaar, who convinced him that apartheid was not the only 
option for South Africa’s future. In the early 1970s, Smith left the Broederbond and 
became increasingly convinced that Afrikaners were committing a grave injustice to the 
black majority.  
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, like Bosch, Smith also began promoting 
reconciliation, though in a decidedly more pointed way. Many of his neighbors and 
colleagues began to find him obnoxious and made his life rather uncomfortable. He 
would leave his position as professor of mission in the early 1980s, accepting a call to 
work as a pastor in Mamelodi, a black township in Pretoria. There, Smith witnessed the 
oppression of apartheid first hand, as well as the political violence of the 1980s. These 
experiences radicalized Smith, and his Afrikaner nationalism became an African 
nationalism. He worried that whites were attempting to use reconciliation to shortchange 
black concerns about liberation. Smith’s own ministry, however, remained very 
conciliatory. He initiated Koinonia, an organization that brought white and black couples 
together for meals and fellowship. He cooperated with the NIR in sponsoring these 
events. By the end of the 1980s, 20,000 people had participated in these programs, and it 
won international acclaim.8 While Bosch promoted reconciliation at the level of 
leadership, Smith worked at the grassroots. While their egos could clash, their efforts 
dovetailed to promote racial unity. Smith’s final project in ministry was the formation of 
																																																								
8 Beyond War Foundation, “Beyond War Award, 1989, Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam, The Carter 
Center, and Koinonia South Africa,” 1989. Video recording, 58 min. 
https://archive.org/details/BeyondWarAward-1989-NeveShalomwahatAl-salamTheCarterCenter.  
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Melodi ya Tshwane, an interracial congregation in a formerly “whites-only” church 
building.  
Carel Boshoff remained an Afrikaner nationalist throughout his entire life, but the 
shape of his nationalism changed. In 1991, sociologist Brian M. du Toit rightly wrote, “it 
would…be safe to label Boshoff as one of the most influential Afrikaners during the early 
1980s outside parliamentary politics.”9 This was largely because Boshoff had very 
important social ties and leadership positions. He married Anna Verwoerd, the daughter 
of Minister of Native Affairs and later Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd (1901-1966)—
the so-called “architect of apartheid.” In 1973, Boshoff would become the chairman of 
the highly influential pro-apartheid think-tank, the South African Bureau for Racial 
Affairs (SABRA). He rose through the leadership ranks of the Broederbond, and became 
chairman in 1980. He was a member of the executive committee of the Federasie van 
Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK), which promoted Afrikaans culture in South 
African society. In 1981, he was elected as the national leader of the Voortrekkers—a 
very popular Afrikaner scouting movement. In 1982, Boshoff was placed on the NGK’s 
committee for drafting a new racial policy.  
In spite of his positions of influence, Boshoff had his own crisis of confidence. 
Unlike Bosch and Smith, Boshoff believed that there was nothing wrong with the policy 
of apartheid, but rather the government’s implementation of the policy. As NP Prime 
Minister and later State President P.W. Botha began initiating reform in the early 1980s, 
which offered some representation to Coloured and Indian people as well as urban black 																																																								
9 Brian M. du Toit, “The Far Right in South Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies vol. 
29 no. 4 (December 1991), 643.  
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people, Boshoff came to believe that the government had put the Afrikaners’ political 
independence in jeopardy. When it became clear that he did not support Botha’s reforms, 
Boshoff became increasingly isolated. He was forced out of leadership of the 
Broederbond in 1983, and sources of funding for SABRA began to evaporate. He formed 
a myriad of new organizations to promote Afrikaner separatism, which aimed to create an 
Afrikaner homeland or Volkstaat. He worked with a number of politicians and (often 
unsavory) extra-parliamentary groups on the right, but they were never able to effectively 
coordinate their efforts. While some on the right wanted to fight for their independence, 
Boshoff opted for political negotiations. Boshoff founded Orania, a small town in the 
isolated Karoo which he hoped might grow into a city of 200,000 people. Its population 
remained below 1000 for the first 20 years of its existence. Yet, it was not completely 
insignificant. Apart from being an object of fascination for journalists and documentary 
filmmakers, Boshoff was part of a group that transformed Afrikaner nationalism to such 
an extent that it could find a place, albeit isolated, within the new South Africa.  
Research  
A Boston University Graduate Research Abroad Fellowship funded the main 
portion of the research for this project in South Africa during February and March 2016. 
During February, I stayed in Gauteng, where I was able to interview many of Bosch, 
Smith, and Boshoff’s living family members and colleagues, including Annemie Bosch 
(David Bosch’s widow), Murray Hofmeyer (Smith’s son-in-law), Maretha Laubscher 
(Smith’s daughter), Abraham Viljoen (Bosch and Smith’s colleague), Klippies Kritzinger 
(Bosch’s student and colleague), Jacob Ntakhe (Smith’s colleague), and Willem Boshoff 
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(Boshoff’s son). Annemie Bosch hosted me for a week, during which time she introduced 
me to many of David’s friends and colleagues, and provided me with a number of his 
unpublished papers and journals. These provided new insight into Bosch’s racial politics 
during the 1960s. Also in Gauteng, I consulted the archive at the UNISA, where Smith’s 
papers are held, the University of Pretoria archives that hold Boshoff’s correspondence, 
and the archives of the University of the Witwatersrand, which houses the papers of 
Koinonia.  
At the beginning of March, I spent a brief time in Orania. There, I interviewed 
two of Boshoff’s sons, Carel Boshoff IV and Wynand Boshoff, and I was given an 
extensive tour of Orania (in Afrikaans). I spent my remaining time in South Africa in 
Stellenbosch. There, I spent the majority of my time in the NGK archives, which has 
extensive collections of Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff’s papers, including Bosch’s 
handwritten missionary journal. I was also able to interview many colleagues and experts 
at that time, including Jaap Durand, Hermann Giliomee, and Dirkie Smit. Durand is of 
particular importance because he worked closely with Bosch to promote reconciliation 
within the Afrikaner community and beyond. After spending time as a missionary, he 
became a systematic theologian at the University of the Western Cape, which was 
designated for Coloured students in the apartheid years.  
Apart from archival materials and interviews, a wide range of materials assisted in 
filling out the story of Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff’s careers. Smith and Boshoff both 
wrote memoirs, which provide a great deal of insight into their lives and work. Later in 
life, Smith became rather prolific, publishing three full-length books in Afrikaans on the 
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various aspects of his life.10 Smith’s daughter Maretha Laubscher sent the unpublished 
English language manuscripts of these documents to me. She also sent me an unpublished 
manuscript dealing with his time as a missionary in Venda.11 These works provided an 
excellent window into Smith’s memory of his life and work. While a sincere man who 
was devoted to building institutions to promote racial unity and justice in South Africa, 
Smith also could be decidedly self-promotional and self-aggrandizing. He often unfairly 
accuses colleagues of taking positions that they did not actually take (e.g. he said Johan 
Heyns defended apartheid in 1989, which profoundly misrepresented Heyn’s actual 
position at the time). Smith’s work is also frequently contradictory. His son-in-law 
Murray Hofmeyer noted that Smith might tell the same story in many different ways to 
serve different purposes.12 Smith also got basic timelines wrong (he suggested that 
PACLA came after SACLA).13 Rebecca de Saintonge wrote a biography of Smith, which 
was also useful in filling out the elements of Smith’s life. This laudatory account praised 
Smith for leaving Stellenbosch to move to Mamelodi. It stopped just short of the time 
when Smith actually left Mamelodi, citing reasons of ill health and family, and it also 
reflected much of his bias.14   
																																																								
10 Nico Smith, Mosaïek van mense: ontmoetings wat my denke en lewe radikaal verander het 
(Bybel-media, 2012). In English: “In Conversation With...” (unpublished manuscript, 2010). Obtained from 
Smith’s daughter, Maretha Laubscher; Nico Smith, Die dood van die God van my vaders: hoe die lewe in 
die township Mamelodi my godsbeskouing verander het (Griffel Media, 2010). In English: “The God of my 
fathers died in Mamelodi” (unpublished manuscript, 2010), also obtained from Richard Elphick; Nico 
Smith, Die Afrikaner Broederbond: belewinge van die binnekant (LAPA Uitgewers, 2009). Translated into 
several documents, not yet edited into a single manuscript. Obtained electronically from Smith’s daughter, 
Maretha Laubscher.  
11 Nico Smith, Christelike sending in ‘n apartheidskonteks (unpublished manuscript, n.d.). In 
English: “Tshilidzini: Christian Missionary Work in an Apartheid Context” (unpublished manuscript, n.d.) 
12 Interview with Murray Hofmeyer, February 2016.  
13 Smith, “In conversation with…,” 160.  
14 Rebecca de Saintonge, Outside the Gate: A White Man’s Fight for Black Justice in South Africa 
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Boshoff’s family had encouraged him to write three books: one on his life, 
another on his missionary and church work, and a final book on his thoughts on Afrikaner 
freedom and the Volkstaat. Boshoff refused, saying that “no one will want to buy more 
than one book.”15 He wrote one autobiography in 2012 entitled Dis nou ek (Now that’s 
me). He wrote it at the end of his life after receiving a cancer diagnosis, and it was 
therefore written in some haste. While it is not an edited and streamlined narrative, and 
while the dates of certain events are not always clear, it is a significant repository of 
Boshoff’s thought. It quoted many documents at some length both throughout the body of 
the autobiography and in a significant appendix. He died in 2011, a year before the book 
was published. In many ways, the book was an apologia for Orania, discussing why 
Boshoff thought it was necessary first to break with mainstream Afrikaner institutions 
(the Broederbond and the NP) and then begin the project of building a Volkstaat.   
When using Smith and Boshoff’s work as primary source material, one becomes 
keenly aware of their biases. Boshoff had a romantic view of the Afrikaners, often seeing 
their life through rose-colored glasses. The account of his activities, even those which 
involved notorious firebrand politicians, could be almost quaint. Smith, on the other 
hand, went to great lengths to portray his fellow Afrikaners in a negative light. He 
believed that the Afrikaners needed to undergo a conversion as far as their racial attitudes 
were concerned. While Afrikaners claimed to be Christian, Smith argued that they were 
deeply immoral and oppressive. He frequently wanted to portray himself as the most 
																																																																																																																																																																					
(Spire, 1989). 
15 Carel Boshoff, Dis nou ek (LAPA Uitgewers, 2012), 10.  
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radical of the Afrikaners, even more so than famous dissident Beyers Naudé.16 Their 
interpretation of events was also very different. Boshoff’s tone made it seem like whites 
lost power at the beginning of Botha’s reforms, while Smith’s tone made it seem like 
whites would never cede power (and maintain as much privilege as possible in the new 
South Africa). Everything they write must be taken with a grain of salt. Otherwise, 
Boshoff could appear blameless, or Smith would gain a heroic tint. One could also 
present the Afrikaners as noble or contemptible. This study hopes to avoid these kinds of 
categories and judgments. 
Bosch did not have a chance to write an autobiography. A number of scholars, 
such as Kevin Livingston, had a chance to conduct extensive interviews with Bosch. 
Likewise, Willem Saayman and Klippies Kritzinger have compiled various people’s 
memories of Bosch in their David J. Bosch: Prophetic integrity, cruciform praxis.17 Of 
decisive value for Bosch’s biographical details is his widow Annemie Bosch’s 
contribution, “My best friend, my husband.” These works, quite naturally, also have their 
biases. Annemie Bosch even recognized this in her own work, writing that nobody would 
ever think her husband was as wonderful as she made him out to be. She wrote, “They 
would only think, ‘These can only be the selective memories of a grieving widow!’ But 
he was! I believe he really was an outstanding person.”18 Bosch was a highly regarded 
theologian, and many people who write on him do so from a position of great respect. 
Kritzinger and Saayman’s work, as well as that of Cobus van Wyngaard, wants to rescue 																																																								
16 Ibid., 70-72.  
17 Klippies Kritzinger and Willem Saayman, David J. Bosch: Prophetic integrity, cruciform praxis 
(Cluster Publications, 2011).  
18 Annemie Bosch, “My Best Friend, My Husband,” in Krtizinger and Saayman, 36.  
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Bosch’s legacy from being accused of lacking a prophetic voice. Bosch refused to 
endorse radical positions, leading some to accuse him of tacitly giving support to the 
status quo.19 Yet these accounts often attempt to divide Bosch from apartheid thinking at 
an early age. Evidence from his journals suggests that he remained convinced of the 
morality of “separate development” through the mid 1960s.    
Bosch was a prolific academic writer. Beginning in the 1970s, Bosch began 
publishing a wellspring of academic articles and books. These works reveal his 
perspective, and also provide a glimpse into how his positions were changing. His works 
are decidedly verbose, quoted other theologians extensively, and tended to be very 
repetitive. This makes it challenging to decide when to introduce an idea in the narrative 
arc of his life, how much of that idea to repeat, and how best to capture it succinctly.  
In reading these documents, I attempted to find the points at which their public 
theology shifted. Public theology is Christian engagement with larger social issues. Moral 
arguments for apartheid, racial reconciliation, and ethnic separatism all constitute 
different public theologies. Their minds changed gradually in response to growing crises 
of confidence. Changes in public theology were more like tipping scales than light 
switches; they moved (sometimes surprisingly slowly) over time. There was nothing 
inevitable about their movement either. I was also hoping to find that mission work in the 
“homelands” would change some of their minds about apartheid. On the contrary, as 
young missionaries in the 1950s and early 1960s, they were all still quite optimistic that 
																																																								
19 Livingston, 43; Bekele, The In-Between People; Cobus Wyngaard, “The church as alternative 
community and the struggle for liberation in the work of David Bosch,” Nederduitse Gereformeerde 
Teologiese Tydskrif vol. 54 no. 3&1 (September and December, 2013).  
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“separate development” was a feasible nation-building policy. I was expecting to find 
that the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, in which police killed 69 protestors, would have 
changed their opinions about apartheid. While they may have been uncomfortable with 
excessive state violence, all three still embraced some argument for “self-defense.” They 
really only began to look for new political options in the 1970s, after it became clear that 
apartheid would not work for economic reasons, and that black people were deeply 
injured by the system. Their work responded to a shifting context. Bosch, Smith, and 
Boshoff were an important part of that context in as much as they promoted different 
ideas and built different institutions to encourage different political options. Their work 
was in a dialectic relationship with the larger society; while it did not define what was 
happening, they hoped to engender moral responses to broader changes, which would in 
turn inform the context.         
The Contribution of This Study 
 
My study hopes to make several scholarly contributions. In the first place, I seek 
to further the research about the relationship between Afrikaner missionaries and 
apartheid ideology. Previous studies were a quest for origins; they wanted to know how 
missionaries contributed to apartheid. My study approaches the question from the 
opposite direction, asking how missionaries responded to the failures and weakness of the 
apartheid state. Afrikaner moral leaders had no coherent response to these failures. On 
the contrary, they had a moral breakdown that contributed to the unraveling and end of 
apartheid. Crises of confidence in the NP led one group of moral leaders to actively seek 
the end of apartheid, while the other attempted to reorganize efforts for Afrikaner 
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separatism. In the second place, my study hopes to demonstrate that a missiological shift 
from separation to reconciliation gave Afrikaners new moral language for thinking about 
themselves as part of a non-racial society, and in so doing, helped to facilitate democratic 
transition in the early 1990s. By demonstrating the ideological divisions and struggle 
over the direction of the NGK, my study will also argue that rather than being 
ideologically beholden to “Calvinism” or a “chosen people” narrative, the NGK was 
theologically diverse and contested. Finally, I hope to add to the conversation about the 
nature of Afrikaner and white nationalism.  
Mission History 
There is now a significant body of scholarship that connects NGK mission policy 
to the policy of apartheid. Much of the foundational work on this question was done in 
Afrikaans. Smith’s own 1972 doctoral dissertation, which was advised by Carel Boshoff, 
dealt with the NGK’s formation of separate churches for different ethnic groups.20 At that 
point, Smith’s assessment of the situation was rather matter of fact—separate churches 
were, he argued, necessary for the “effective existence and functioning of this church [i.e. 
the NGK] in a differentiated society.” The history of separation began on the frontier 
when the white minority feared that any form of equality (gelykstelling) with their 
servants of color would be a threat to their security. While NGK leadership was initially 
reluctant to segregate churches, in 1857, it famously declared that “due to the weakness 
of some,” it would provide for the formation of separate congregations. Smith then 
argued that by the 20th century, missionaries attempted to add layers of theological 																																																								
20 Smith, “Die planting van afsonderlike kerke vir die nie-blanke bevolkingsgroepe deur die 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in Suid-Afrika,” see n. 1.  
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justification to the policy of separation, which then became important for the formation of 
state policy. He wrote that the NGK attempted to justify “differentiation between White 
and Non-White—not only in church life, but also over the entire spectrum of South 
African life…In this respect the policy of separate development [i.e. apartheid] may 
correctly be termed a ‘church policy.’”21 
Later Afrikaans-speaking scholars fleshed this connection out in greater detail and 
were more critical of the association. In his 1982 dissertation, “Die afgebreekte 
skeidsmuur weer opgebou (The broken wall of separation built up again),” J.C. Adonis 
provided a timeline charting the development of the 1935 NGK mission policy, which 
advocated separation in both church and society, and how that came to influence later 
National Party policy.22 J.A. Lombard, who began his doctoral work with Nico Smith, 
explored the 1935 mission policy and its ramifications in greater detail in his 1985 
dissertation, “Ontwikkelinge in die sendingbeleid en -praktyk van die Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Kerk gedurende die tydperk 1932 tot 1962 (Developments in the mission 
policy and practice of the NGK during the time period of 1932 to 1962).”23  
Historian Richard Elphick picked up this line of research, demonstrating the 
moral appeal that apartheid held for many Afrikaans Christians. In his Equality of 
Believers, Elphick argued that the idea of “separate development” attempted to reconcile 
Christian concerns for impoverished blacks with the impulse for white, and specifically 
Afrikaner survival. Given the racism and brutality of the apartheid regime, this may, 
																																																								
21 Ibid., 172.  
22 Adonis, see n. 1.   
23 Lombard, see n. 1. 
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Elphick admitted, seem trivial. Nevertheless, he argued, apartheid’s “enduring appeal to 
DRC [NGK] churchmen and pious laypersons is inexplicable apart from its ability to tap 
into a paternalist concern that many Afrikaner Christians shared with their English-
speaking counterparts, an obligation to foster ‘development’ among impoverished 
blacks.”24 Historian Hermann Giliomee, who is perhaps the leading authority on the 
history of the Afrikaners, likewise placed missionaries at the center of his account of the 
origins of apartheid. He noted that the first recorded instance of the word came from the 
mission field: apartheid described the formation of separate churches.25 Christian mission 
undeniably provided language to ethically justify and sustain “separate development,” or 
apartheid.  
Historians, however, have largely neglected the shifts and developments in 
missiology that occurred after the 1970s, and how these may have affect Afrikaner 
Christians’ moral vision of race relations. A number of Afrikaner missiologists noted 
some of the changes. Willem Saayman, for example, in his Being Missionary, Being 
Human, identified four missiological “waves” in the NGK, which included early mission 
efforts (17th and 18th century), crossing foreign boundaries to the north (late 19th century), 
crossing inner boundaries in the apartheid state (mid 20th century), and finally a new 
wave in “the new South Africa” (post-apartheid). Saayman’s work was more a discussion 
of what motivated missionaries and the practices they embraced rather than an analysis of 
how changing ideas might have had political consequences.26 By following the trajectory 
																																																								
24 Elphick, Equality of Believers, 320. Elphick, “Missions and Afrikaner Nationalism.”  
25 Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 458-464. 
26 Willem A. Saayman, Being Missionary, being human: an overview of Dutch Reformed Mission 
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of “reconciliation,” this study hopes to demonstrate that missiological shifts during the 
apartheid years had important political ramifications.  
Reconciliation and Transition 
A number of scholars have asked why it was that apartheid ended in political 
negotiation rather than civil war. Historian Dan O’Meara claimed that the end of 
apartheid was inevitable owing to the twin pressures of black protest and international 
sanctions.27 Similarly, in his massive overview of African history, John Reader wrote, 
“There was nothing ideological about the [white] relinquishing of power. It was not 
inspired by a sudden awakening to the injustices of apartheid, but rather the move was 
strictly pragmatic: apartheid was no longer affordable.”28 For these scholars, it was 
largely a question of economics.  
Other scholars have been more nuanced in their view of the democratic transition. 
In his 2011 “Resistance and Reform,” Tom Lodge argued that there were five decisive 
reasons why apartheid ended in democratic transition. In the first place, there were 
changes in elite perception. The fall of the Berlin Wall heralded the eclipse of global 
communism and traditional conservative allies from the United States and the United 
Kingdom began putting more pressure on South Africa for change. Lodge’s second 
argument was largely economic. During the apartheid years, Afrikaners went from being 
largely poor and working class to firmly middle-class, and therefore less nationalistic. 
They began to envision sharing resources in a unitary South Africa state. In the third 																																																																																																																																																																					
(Cluster Publications, 2007).  
27 Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 
1948-1994 (Ravan, 1996), 463. Cited in Giliomee, “Surrender Without Defeat,” Daedalus vol. 126 no. 2 
(Spring, 1997), 117.  
28 John Reader, Africa: A Biography of the Continent (Vintage, 1999), 680. 
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place, the African National Congress (ANC) was able to utilize skills of union 
negotiators, in particular Cyril Ramaphosa, who had the expertise and experience 
necessary to finalize favorable deals. Fourth, Lodge noted that the violence of the early 
1990s made both sides eager to find a settlement. While the violence was in large part 
between supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC, there were also 
accusations that NP was acting as a “Third Force,” escalating a conflict in which 14,000 
to 16,000 people died.29 All parties were eager to settle to avoid further conflict. Finally, 
Lodge noted that the leadership of both sides controlled the extent to which conflict could 
escalate. Both the NP and the ANC recognized that neither side was sufficiently 
militarized to win a decisive victory, and therefore they avoided armed violence.30 For 
Lodge, economic and pragmatic concerns drove the negotiated settlement toward a 
relatively quick conclusion.    
Hermann Giliomee, however, has argued that the negotiated settlement could not 
be reduced to just pragmatic or economic concerns. In his 1997 article “Surrender 
without Defeat,” Giliomee contended that there were two major internal factors that led 
Afrikaners to relinquish power. On the one hand, there was an ideological collapse. The 
NP, with its legacy of domination and oppressive measures, lacked the moral authority of 
the ANC, which insisted on human rights and non-racialism. On the other hand, the NP 
misjudged the strength of its hand in negotiation. De Klerk believed that the NP would 
come out with more power than it actually did. The NP had no moral alternative to 																																																								
29 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission estimated 14,000 deaths, while Rubert Taylor and 
Mark Shaw estimated 16,000. Rupert Taylor and Mark Shaw, “The Dying Days of Apartheid,” South 
Africa in Transition, eds. David R. Howarth and Aletta J. Norval (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 13-30.  
30 Tom Lodge, “Resistance and Reform,” The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol. 2, eds. 
Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 481-86.  
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majority rule, they were a weaker negotiating party than the ANC, and thus they 
relinquished power. Giliomee wrote, “Once the apartheid idea had collapsed there was no 
alternative ideology that could justify Afrikaner or white supremacy or even significant 
minority protection as distinct from individual rights.”31  
In his later book, The Afrikaners, Giliomee further highlighted the political and 
ideological divide within the Afrikaner community. On the one hand, a growing number 
of writers, journalists, academics, professionals, and members of the business community 
increasingly worried that white minority rule was morally untenable, practically 
unfeasible, and economically damaging (thus there were moral, pragmatic, and economic 
concerns). This group was frequently called verligte, or enlightened. Writers like Jaap 
Steyn exposed the horrors that young white conscripts faced during the Border War, and 
Ilse Joubert attempted to sensitize Afrikaners to the legal restrictions that South Africans 
of color faced on a daily basis.32 There was a growing sense that demographically, whites 
comprised an increasingly smaller portion of the population, making total economic and 
territorial segregation impossible. Professionals and business leaders increasingly sought 
a climate of peace, stability, and competent governance.33 The traditional bastions of 
Afrikaner unity—the NP, the NGK, and the Broederbond—all sided with these 
concerns.34 On the other hand, some Afrikaner cultural leaders, farmers, workers, and 
low-level bureaucrats felt alienated and threatened by the movement toward dismantling 
apartheid. Between 40 and 50 percent of Afrikaners (and between 7 to 10 percent of the 																																																								
31 Giliomee, “Surrender without defeat,” 118-119.  
32 Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 593-595. 
33 Ibid., 595-601. 
34 Ibid., 620-622.  
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English-speaking whites) would give their support to the Conservative Party, which 
aimed to maintain apartheid along the lines originally envisioned in the 1960s.35 While 
South Africa was not “democratic,” the white community acted as a democracy, and 50 
to 60 percent of Afrikaners would come to embrace a negotiated settlement.   
For the most part, scholars have downplayed or ignored the role of reconciliation 
in the 1990/1994 transitions. Theologian John de Gruchy has made a number of 
important contributions on the concept and meaning of reconciliation in South Africa.36 
He tended, however, to focus on reconciliation as a post-apartheid phenomenon. While 
Dubow rightly argued that “Ecumenical and synodical debates were part of a larger moral 
conversation that helped to condition the institutional climate of political negotiations and 
reconciliation,” he placed those debates in the mid to late 1980s.37 He suggested that they 
were a response to the “Kairos Document,” a theological statement that supported the 
liberation struggle. While Johan Heyns disapproved of the statement, Dubow wrote that 
he was “evidently affected by it,” because he went on to lead the NGK to repent of 
apartheid in 1990.38 Heyns, however, had participated in the National Initiative for 
Reconciliation (NIR), which came just before the publication of the “Kairos Document.” 
While decidedly more moderate than the Kairos theologians, Afrikaner ministers at the 
NIR repented of apartheid on their own initiative (i.e. as individuals and not in the 
official capacity of the NGK) and promised to work for equal citizenship and voting 
rights for all South Africans. All NIR delegates wanted to promote the release of political 																																																								
35 Ibid., 606-609; Giliomee, “Surrender without defeat,” 129-130.   
36 John de Gruchy, Reconciliation: Restoring Justice (Fortress Press, 2002); John de Gruchy and 
Steve de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa (Fortress Press, 2005).   
37 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford University Press, 2014), 246.  
38 Ibid., 246.  
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prisoners and the beginning of political negotiation. This language was rooted in previous 
conversations about reconciliation that began in the 1970s. Institutionally, the NGK was 
not able to move as quickly as many of its clergy and members—its synods only met 
every four years and frequently limited discussions to the findings of committees. The 
moral shift among NGK leaders was well underway in advance of the 1986 and 1990 
synods.  
To be sure, black and white leaders frequently disagreed over the meaning of 
reconciliation. For white theologians, reconciliation could sometimes mean promoting 
peace without changing the status quo, while for black theologians reconciliation could 
only happen between fully equal persons.39 For his part, Bosch maintained that 
reconciliation would have to be “costly,” meaning that it would require white 
vulnerability. As reconciliation gained political significance in the early 1990s, the NP 
would associate it with amnesty for government officials and “power sharing,” while the 
ANC believed that reconciliation could only occur in the context of majority rule. The 
fact, however, that black and white leaders were willing to argue over the terms of 
reconciliation meant that they were establishing a new common civic language. Patti 
Waldmeir was not wrong when she wrote that racial reconciliation had become “the new 
civil religion” of South Africa;40 it was a powerful ideal that created a united nation out 
of hitherto divided people. Reconciliation provided the moral force necessary to curb 																																																								
39 Judith Renner, Discourse, Normative Change and the Quest for Reconciliation in Global 
Politics (Manchester University Press, 2013). 
40 Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle (W.W. Norton, 1997), 283. The use of “new Civil 
Religion” is an allusion to Dunbar Moodie’s 1975 argument that Afrikaner nationalism was a “civil 
religion.” Elsewhere in the same book, Waldmeir referred to “non-racialism” as the new civil religion of 
South Africa (p. 268). 
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both the violent impulses of the far left and right. It gave people who had been deeply 
wounded a way to find healing without retribution. It provided an ideal that, because it 
was vague at times, could be used to promote broad conceptions of unity, making all 
South Africans feel welcome in the new political dispensation.  
Reconciliation was not without its limits. Waldmeir argued that this new civil 
religion “rapidly came under strain as competition increased between the races for jobs, 
resources, and wealth.”41 Not everyone was on board with “the new South Africa.” Many 
whites and blacks talked about their leaders “selling out” to the other side. While 
reconciliation was a vital component of the transition, it did not solve the problems of 
economic injustice, and for many black South Africans, daily life in the “new South 
Africa” looked very much like the old. This study, therefore, does not attempt to suggest 
that reconciliation was the triumphant solution to South Africa’s problems, but rather that 
it helped push whites toward non-racial democracy.  
The NGK 
There was an often repeated adage that the NGK was “the National Party at 
Prayer,” meaning not only that most members of the NP belonged to the NGK, but also 
that the church sanctified what the government did.42 Indeed, there was some measure of 
truth to the statement before the 1980s. John Vorster’s term as Prime Minister (1966-
1978) was nearly coterminous with his brother Jakobus “Koot” Vorster term as 																																																								
41 Ibid., 283. 
42 See, for example, Bruce Buursma, “Apartheid’s roots nourished by religion,” Chicago Tribune, 
January 19, 1985; Michael Parks, “Dutch Reformed Church Calls Apartheid Morally Wrong,” Los Angeles 
Times, October 23, 1986; Bob Bilheimer, “The Cry of Reasons: Beyers Naudé, an Afrikaner Speaks Out,” 
1988, YouTube Video, 56 minutes, posted November 2, 2015,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPsv-
YKeTYQ. 
		
25 
moderator of the NGK (1966-1979).43 Nevertheless, there were significant divides within 
the NGK, putting religious leaders at odds with the NP from both the left and the right. 
Bosch and Smith were critical of NGK leadership for not embracing trans-ethnic 
Christian unity, while Boshoff clashed with leaders seeking to open the church.  
The role of the NGK in the transformation to democracy needs to be nuanced. 
Numerous scholars and observers have portrayed the NGK as a hindrance to change, 
lagging behind the government. June Goodwin and Ben Schriff went to South Africa as 
journalists shortly after the NGK voted to no longer support racial separation in 1986. 
They hoped to find that the church was leading Afrikaners toward reform, but later 
admitted, ¨We decided our initial guess was wrong; the church was not leading; rather, it 
was a drag on change, grudgingly following the lead of the National Party.”44 In her 1999 
book, State, civil society, and apartheid in South Africa, Tracy Kuperus followed a 
similar line of argument.45 The idea of the NGK reluctantly following change was 
reiterated in a 2001 symposium, “Maintaining apartheid or promoting change.” In his 
contribution, Willem Nicol—who himself had been at loggerheads with NGK 
leadership—wrote, “I would like to show that the church was leading as, for instance, the 
influential northern newspaper, Beeld, was, but I cannot.”46 He argued that NGK leaders 
turned a blind eye to South Africa’s problems, while most Afrikaners (as well as 
																																																								
43 The NGK has an executive body of four “moderamen,” the chairman is the moderator, who 
works with the assessor, the scribe, and the actuary. 
44 June Goodwin and Ben Schiff, Heart of Whiteness (Scribner, 1995), 13-14.  
45 Tracy Kuperus, State, civil society, and apartheid in South Africa (Palgrave, 1999), xiv.  
46 Willem Nicol, quoted by Carel Anthonissen and Wolfram Weisse, “Introduction,” Maintaining 
Apartheid or Promoting Change, eds., Carel Anthonissen and Wolfram Weisse (Waxmann Münster, 2004), 
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intellectuals) “had to live closer to realities.”47 These arguments do not do justice to the 
fact that the divisions within Afrikaner society also cut across NGK leadership and lay 
membership.  
Rather than seeing the church as a unified institution, there were multiple parties 
vying to take the NGK in different directions—some wanted to maintain separation while 
others wanted to promote unity and reconciliation. The church, as many theologians point 
out, was a “site of struggle.”48 Etienne de Villiers rightly noted that divisions within the 
NGK mirrored society at large, but he argued that these divisions made the church weak 
and ineffectual.49 In hindsight, the question of whether the church was leading or halting 
society’s progress is somewhat misguided. The NGK was engaged in a larger dialectic, in 
which some parties were pushing for reconciliation, while others were attempting to slow 
that movement.     
Other scholars have been more positive about the role of the NGK in the 
transition without always grasping its internal struggles. Lodge, for example, wrote,  
the Dutch Reformed Church’s rejection of apartheid in 1986 affected white 
political beliefs decisively. The church’s reversal of its earlier doctrine was in 
reaction to its expulsion from the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) 
and subsequent condemnation by Coloured ministers of the Sendingkerk [DRMC] 
of its role in supplying apartheid with its moral foundations.50  
 
According to Lodge’s line of argument, the criticism from the DRMC precipitated 																																																								
47 Ibid., 7.  
48 Cobus van Wyngaard, “Responding to the challenge of Black Theology: Liberating Ministry to 
the White Community—1988-1990,” Hervormde Teologiese Studies vol 72, no. 1 (2016),  
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49 Etienne de Villiers, “The influence of the Dutch Reformed Church on public policy during the 
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change in the NGK, which then affected white society’s political beliefs more broadly. 
While there is a large degree of truth in this, it neglects conversations about reconciliation 
within the NGK that preceded the WARC condemnation of apartheid. While the 
WARC’s decision and the condemnations of the DRMC may have pushed more NGK 
leaders and members toward the side of reconciliation, the conversation was already 
underway.  
Many observers made hugely dramatic claims for the 1986 NGK decision to open 
church membership. In uncharacteristically imprecise language, Giliomee wrote,  
[In 1986] the Dutch Reformed Church, by far the largest of the Afrikaner 
churches, finally abandoned its support for apartheid as a system that it had long 
justified theologically. It decided it would follow the New rather than the Old 
Testament, pointing out that the idea of race plays no part whatsoever in the New 
Testament while the idea of the diversity of peoples is always presented within 
the context of unity. The church also abandoned some other cherished ideas: that 
it was as one with the Afrikaner people, that it was the moral conscience of the 
Volk and state, and that the Scriptures presented any specific model for race 
relations. For the first time it specifically stated that racism was a sin. Implicitly 
this meant that the vaunting of any group was racism and a sin. Afrikaners could 
no longer think of themselves as a chosen people, the idea of the covenant was 
dead.51  
 
One struggles to find any justification for these statements in the NGK’s 1986 
documents. The 1986 synod did not actually repent of apartheid, but rather its negative 
effects. It noted that the original idea was based on the pious concerns of trusteeship, but 
had failed to be a true expression of neighborly love. The document hoped to bridge the 
internal divide within the NGK, attempting to embrace unity by opening the church while 
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not condemning the conservative’s cherished idea of ecclesial separation. Rather than 
being a complete change, it was more like the scales had tipped. Nico Smith and David 
Bosch, among others, had been calling for church unity since the late 1970s, and their 
ideas obtained majority support in the late 1980s. When Johan Heyns became moderator 
in 1986, it was clear that he would support all efforts geared toward reconciliation.      
Giliomee’s reading of the NGK relied heavily on the highly popular “Calvinist 
motif.” Beginning in the 1950s, scholars began claiming that Afrikaners oppressed the 
black majority because as “Calvinists,” they believed that they were God’s chosen 
people. They had a special bond, or covenant, with God, which entitled them to dominate 
the people and resources of Africa.52 The idea of Afrikaner Calvinism being responsible 
for Afrikaner’s brutal policy took on a life of its own in popular and scholarly work. In 
Peter David’s 1977 film “The White Laager,” the narrator said that the Afrikaner’s “rigid 
Calvinism told him that his mission in Africa was to protect white, Christian civilization 
from the barbarian.” The narrator went on to say that Afrikaners got their faith “directly 
from the Bible,” in which they were the “chosen people” or children of Israel, while 
blacks were the Canaanites, who were destined to be “hewers of wood and drawers of 
water.”53 
Dunbar Moodie, Irving Hexham, and André du Toit all cast doubt on the idea that 
Calvinism is the root of all Afrikaner evil. Instead, as Hexham noted, there were 
numerous religious influences on Afrikaners that included Calvinism, evangelicalism, 																																																								
52 Sheila Patterson, The Last Trek: A Study of the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation 
(Routledge, 1957), 177; W. A. de Klerk, Puritans in Africa (London: Rex Collings, 1975), 12-33, 149, 174-
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53 Peter David, “South Africa: The White Laager,” 1977, YouTube Video, 56 minutes, posted 
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and even a dose of liberal theology.54 Du Toit argued that British evangelical 
missionaries, in their polemics against settler populations, invented the negative 
association between Afrikaners and Calvinism.55 Calvinism influenced Afrikaner self-
identity, Moodie noted, only from the 1930s, when nationalist theologians at 
Potchefstroom University used it to unite a hitherto disorganized people. Other historians 
nuanced the “Calvinist motif.” Jonathan Niel Gerstener and Elizabeth Elbourne 
convincingly demonstrated a connection between frontier Calvinism and the feelings of 
racial exclusivity.56 While Afrikaners themselves identified as “Calvinist,” this was 
frequently shorthand for theologically and socially conservative. 
In spite of scholarly critiques of the “Calvinism motif,” it remained very popular. 
In fiction, James A. Michener popularized Afrikaner Calvinism in his 1980 book The 
Covenant.57 In 1995, the economist Francis Fukuyama argued that “the failure of the 
Calvinist Afrikaners to develop a thriving capitalist” system requires explanation.58 In 
2013, South African Minister for Women, Children and Persons with Disabilities Lulu 
Xingwana said that “Afrikaner Calvinism” explained why athlete Oscar Pistorius killed 																																																								
54 Irving Hexham, “Dutch Calvinism and the Origins of Afrikaner Nationalism,” African Affairs 
(Spring 1980), 96-208.  
55 André du Toit, “No Chosen People: The Myth of the Calvinist Origins of Afrikaner Nationalism 
and Racial Ideology,” The American Historical Review vol. 88 no. 4 (October 1983), 921-22. 
56 Jonathan Neil Gerstner, The Thousand Generation Covenant (Leiden: Brill, 1991).  Elizabeth 
Elbourne, Blood Ground: Colonialism, Mission, and the Contest for Christianity in the Cape Colony and 
Britain, 1799-1853 (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002).  
57 James Michener, The Covenant (Fawcett Crest, 1980). 
58 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free 
Press, 1995), 44. Some work had already been done on this question. Randall G. Stokes, “Afrikaner 
Calvinism and Economic Action: The Weberian Thesis in South Africa,” The American Journal of 
Sociology vol. 81 no. 1 (1975). Here, he argues that while European Calvinists were concerned about their 
salvation, motivating them to work, Afrikaners believed they were saved as a group and thus did not feel 
the need to develop beyond a pastoral life. This argument has virtually no evidence and demonstrates little 
understanding of Afrikaner religion. M. R. Begg, “A Weberian Analysis of Afrikaner Calvinism and the 
Spirit of Capitalism,” Doctoral Diss., Stellenbosch University, 2011 argues that dormant Calvinist virtues 
gave Afrikaners the ability to modernize quickly in the 20th century.   
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his girlfriend, model Reeva Steenkamp.59 The motif proves powerful and persuasive right 
up to the present. In a 2017 article, the highly respected sociologist Peter L. Berger 
described the Afrikaners as “that small white tribe, speaking an antique Dutch and 
haunted by a dark Calvinism, clinging fiercely to their hold on the southernmost tip of a 
huge black continent.”60  
My study hopes to move beyond the “Calvinist motif” for understanding 
Afrikaner religiosity. There were several streams that influenced NGK theologians. Some 
of these, such as the German missionaries’ insistence on building ethnically distinctive 
Volkskirchen (peoples’ churches), had nefarious connections to Nazi ideology. Yet there 
were also connections to evangelicalism, moderate Anglo-American trends in mission, 
the neo-Calvinism of Abraham Kuyper, and the radical orthodoxy of Karl Barth. Given 
the wide range of influences Afrikaner theologians used to build their arguments, the 
quest for origins is futile. The question is not so much what their influences were, but 
rather how they made their influences operative in order to answer contemporary 
questions. Rather than presenting the NGK as ideologically captive to a “dark 
Calvinism,” this study views Afrikaner religion as inherently diverse and dynamic, using 
a range of theological arguments to promote often-contradictory concerns.  
Normalizing White Nationalism?  
 Any study that deals with Afrikaner Nationalism is, in essence, a study of white 
Nationalism. The NP, while claiming the morality of a nation-building project, enacted 
																																																								
59 “Outcry at Xingwana’s Afrikaner comments,” News24 February 27, 2013. 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Outcry-at-Xingwanas-Afrikaner-comments-20130227. 
60 Peter L. Berger, “South Africa is News Again,” The American Interest, April 19, 2017.  
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legislation that protected the interests of white South Africans. The moral basis of 
apartheid was frequently couched in ethnic terms (i.e. different people require different 
societies and institutions), but the legislative outcomes were always racial. During the 
second half of the 20th century, Afrikaner Nationalists came to see their interests 
increasingly aligned with the broader interests of the white community; to protect 
Afrikaners, they protected “the whites.”61 The very word apartheid conjures images of 
racial oppression. In the first few years of NP rule, black South Africans were 
systematically classified and disenfranchised. Black people were treated like foreign 
workers in their own country, unable to move freely without a “reference book” 
commonly called a dompas (stupid pass). At the stroke of a pen, black people could be 
forcibly removed from their homes and relocated to squalid resettlement camps hundreds 
of miles away, in desolate places that carried the ironic designation of “homelands.” 
While white South Africans enjoyed the highest standard of living on the African 
continent, black people were legally restricted to inferior education, housing, and 
employment. Wages were so low that many black people, and in particular infants, 
suffered from malnutrition. The 1973 documentary film The Last Grave at Dimbaza 
chillingly highlighted the disparity. In one scene, a pregnant black domestic worker fed a 
white child, while the narrator said that her own previous child had died of starvation. 
Her children that survived were forced to live with relatives in a “homeland,” while her 
husband had to live in a single-sex workers’ hostel in Soweto.62  
																																																								
61 Dubow, 30. 
62 Chris Curling and Pascoe Macfarlane, “The Last Grave at Dimbaza,” 1973. Video recording, 48 
min.  
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By attempting to understand how white nationalists think, scholars run the risk of 
“normalizing” their beliefs or even creating sympathy for them. In attempting to 
understand Orania on its own terms, this study does not seek to promote a moral model 
for white nationalists and separatists to follow. Rather, the goal is to understand how 
Afrikaner nationalists were able to transform their political program so that it maintained 
marginal influence in the “new South Africa.” In the same way that reconciliation was 
not an unqualified triumph, neither was Afrikaner nationalism completely vanquished. It 
is important to understand how it survived.  
Boshoff couched Afrikaner nationalism in terms that were congenial to the new 
South Africa. He carefully avoided any racial qualifications in his movements. Boshoff 
claimed that his goal was the establishment of a geographic area where Afrikaners could 
live, learn, work, worship, and relax using their own cultural resources. Given the 
dominance of the English language in education, business, and entertainment, concerns 
about the future of Afrikaans culture were not totally unfounded, though they were 
decidedly exaggerated. It was, however, clear that by “Afrikaner,” Boshoff envisioned an 
Afrikaans-speaking white South African. While many Coloured people shared the 
Afrikaans language and culture with Afrikaners, Boshoff argued that this group was 
distinct. He argued that any attempt at integrating the Afrikaners with Coloured people 
would only lead to violence.63 Much like the policy of apartheid, Boshoff defended his 
movement using the language of ethnic or cultural nationalism, but the practical 
implications were always racial.  																																																								
63 Carel Boshoff, “Die Kluerlinge ‘n volk in wording?” Carel Boshoff en Sy Afrikaner Denking, 
ed. Koos Kemp (Oranjewerkers Promosies, 1984), 89-91. 
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Racial, ethnic, and cultural language overlapped in apartheid South Africa. White 
South Africans claimed a common “Western civilization” or “European culture,” and 
these terms carried racial significance. Their usage in South Africa terms was the product 
of the colonial legacy. In the 19th century, many European and North American 
anthropologists began to rank racial groups on the basis of their supposed civilizational 
attainment, with Western Europeans (i.e. whites) as fully civilized, many Asian groups as 
“half-civilized,” and Africans, Micronesians, and American Indians as “primitive.” This 
racial/cultural hierarchy became part of the justification for the colonial enterprise. 
According to this worldview, European colonizers “civilized” “primitive” or even 
“barbarous” Africans.64 Hendrik Verwoerd adopted this language, arguing that “the white 
man of Africa” was the one who “brought civilization here, who made possible the 
present development of black nationalism by bringing the natives education, by showing 
them the Western way of life, by bringing to Africa industry and development, by 
inspiring them with the ideals which Western civilization has developed for itself.”65 
Boshoff would also pick up on this language in 1991, saying “The fact that we [i.e. the 
Afrikaners/whites] tamed this country for civilization does give us a claim to part of it, 
and that is the view of the conservative Afrikaner.”66 Likewise, according to the colonial 
worldview, any connection between “European/white civilization” and Africans had to be 
carefully guarded. Boshoff argued that Afrikaners people could not maintain their 
Western culture as a minority within a black demographic majority; they would be 																																																								
64 For an introduction to “levels of civilization,” see Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Race and Racism: An 
Introduction (Rowman and Littlefield, 2019), 81-98.  
65 Verwoerd Speaks: Speeches 1948-1966, ed. A.N. Pelzer (ABA Publishers, 1966), 338.   
66 Brian M. du Toit, 642-643.   
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“overrun.” These fears were based on an essentialist understanding of culture and proved 
to be gross exaggerating. Nevertheless, they still exerted influence within South Africa 
and around the world. While they are marginal, such ideas can gain prominence during 
times of economic or cultural insecurity. And it must be mentioned that while Boshoff 
and Orania sought peaceful means, the quest for a white homeland can inspire disaffected 
whites to acts of violence.67        
Overview 
The first four chapters explore the extent to which Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff 
embraced the National Party and document their respective crises of confidence. Chapter 
one locates Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff within their particular cultural milieu. They were 
the inheritors of a theological and political tradition that understood ethnic separation to 
be in line with God’s plan for humanity. The next chapter analyzes the way in which the 
government-commissioned Tomlinson Report channeled their pious drive for missionary 
activity in a direction that overlapped with state policy, while also highlighting Bosch’s 
emerging moral uncertainty. Chapter three evaluates their mission work as part of the 
apartheid project. While they worked closely with the state, followed ethnic contours in 
their mission work, and acted as “trustees” of Black Christians, they also had a range of 
pious and practical concerns that pushed them beyond the boundaries of total separation. 
In chapter four, the Sharpeville Massacre challenged the moral basis of apartheid, but 
religious leaders remained committed to self-defense and “separate development.” In 
chapter five, their growing crises of confidence began to have political and religious 																																																								
67 For a summary of literature on white nationalism, see Jens Rydgren, “The Sociology of the 
Radical Right,” Annual Review of Sociology vol. 33 (2007), 241-262. 
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significance. It became clear that Bosch and Smith began to look for new political 
visions, while Boshoff remained committed to Afrikaner distinction.  
The last four chapters deal with the outcome of the new moral directions Bosch, 
Smith, and Boshoff took. Chapter six opens in the wake of the Soweto Uprising, at which 
time the religious idea of reconciliation began to gain traction as a political concept. 
Bosch would put reconciliation at the center of his message at the Pan African Christian 
Leadership Assembly (PACLA) in 1976, and it would be central at the South African 
Christian Leadership Assembly (SACLA) in 1979. In chapter seven, Boshoff rose to the 
height of Afrikaner influence, only to be increasingly sidelined as he rejected P.W. 
Botha’s reforms. Boshoff would form new organizations, attempting to stop the 
movement toward a non-racial society. Bosch and Smith, on the other hand, would 
attempt to push the NGK further toward racial unity. The fact that moral leaders could no 
longer agree undermined the legitimacy of the apartheid regime. In chapter eight, the 
NGK came to a crossroad. Having to decide whether it would maintain its insistence on 
ethnic separation, or move toward greater openness, it opted for the latter in 1986. Owing 
to violence and state repression, the second half of the 1980s was a very uncertain time in 
South Africa, and it was not always clear which way the political winds would blow. In 
chapter nine, reconciliation gained dominance in South African religious and political life 
in the early 1990s, while white separatism was increasingly marginalized.  
From their time together at the University of Pretoria to their ultimate parting of 
ways, Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff would undergo profound theological and ideological 
conversions that would mimic the changing political landscape of the country they loved. 
		
36 
As the economic and political realities of South Africa changed, so too did Bosch, Smith, 
and Boshoff. They pioneered new moral options when the old ones proved untenable. 
They built institutions, hoping to promote new ways of living, and they attempted to 
build communities that might even survive in an uncertain future.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
THE MISSION OF APARTHEID (1930-1955) 
 
Image 1: Theology Students, University of Pretoria, 1952. Nico Smith is second row from the front, on the 
right. Carel Boshoff is in the same row, fourth from the right. David Bosch is in the fifth row, nineth from 
the right. ACC 417, Nico Smith, UNISA Archives, Pretoria, South Africa. 
 
In 1952, David Bosch, Nico Smith and Carel Boshoff gathered with their fellow theology 
students at the University of Pretoria for a photograph. Smith and Boshoff were seniors, 
and they sat in line with their professors wearing sober black ties and suits. Bosch was in 
his middle year, and he stood in the back, taller than the rest. The young men wore a 
variety of expressions; some smiled, some were stoic, while still others seemed to look 
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nervously into the camera. When taken together, however, the students gave the 
impression of confidence. They stood with their shoulders overlapping almost in a 
defensive formation, an impression that was only heightened by the stone building behind 
them. Though they grew up hundreds of kilometers apart, they were all confident in their 
Christian faith and their national identities. They were on the cusp of becoming ministers, 
or dominees, in the Dutch Reformed Church, known in Afrikaans as the Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK). As dominees, they would be expected to exert moral 
influence on the most pressing concerns of their day, and nothing would be more vital to 
this generation than the question of race relations in South Africa. On the one hand, 
Afrikaner religious leaders embraced a nationalism that viewed any challenge to white 
political or economic control as a threat to their survival. On the other hand, they 
recognized that Christian justice demanded that black South Africans not be permanently 
denied rights and opportunities. How could they reconcile these seemingly irreconcilable 
impulses? 
From the 1930s through the 1950s, NGK leaders used multi-ethnic mission as a 
moral model for justifying ethnic separation. In the same way that different ethnic groups 
required different church structures that took into account their language and cultural 
particularities, so too would different ethnic groups require separate schools, societies, 
economies, and governments. By 1950, most Afrikaner intellectuals as well as moral, 
cultural, and political leaders agreed that apartheid or “separate development” was the 
only solution for race relations in South Africa. Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff began their 
careers in this milieu. They grew up steeped in Afrikaner nationalism and evangelical 
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Christian piety. Their professors at the University of Pretoria were frequently the ones 
who provided the moral justifications for apartheid; they argued that it was a Christian 
policy that squared their nationalistic demands for ethnic exclusivity with Christian 
concerns about racial justice. Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff began their careers at the same 
ideological baseline; they were Christian Nationalists who affirmed the morality of the 
National Party’s policy of apartheid.  
1948 Election 
In 1948, David Bosch, Carel Boshoff, and Nico Smith all became residents of 
Sonop—a men’s hostel for students at the University of Pretoria. The NGK founded the 
hostel in 1916 for young Christian men.1 Smith was beginning his third year, having just 
completed a grueling course of preliminary study.2 He became fast friends with Carel 
Boshoff, a second-year student who shared his pious inclinations. While Bosch had been 
registered at the teacher training institute a year before, an experience at a Student 
Christian Movement summer camp set him on a course for ministry.  
That same year, the students at Sonop were abuzz with excitement about the 
upcoming election. They had a strong sense of Afrikaner identity, rooted largely in anti-
British and anti-Imperial sentiment. They found their political voice in D.F. Malan’s 
National Party (NP). Prime Minister Jan Smut’s governing United Party (UP) was closely 
																																																								
1 For history of Sonop, see A.P. Viljoen, “Die rol van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk in 
Sonop Christelike Tehuis 1916-2016” (Doctoral Diss., University of Pretoria, 2017). English abstract 
available at:  http://scholar.ufs.ac.za:8080/xmlui/handle/11660/7742. For briefer details, see “Timeline” and 
“Influential Figures of Sonop,” http://www.sonoptehuis.co.za/en/.  
2 Smith described just how grueling his initial two years of study were in an interview with his 
biographer Rebecca de Saintonge. He was the only one of his peers who managed to pass his academic 
workload while funding his own studies. Rebecca de Saintonge, Outside the Gate: A White Man’s Fight for 
Black Justice in South Africa (Spire, 1989), loc 425.    
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aligned with imperial interests, having just involved South Africa in the Second World 
War against many Afrikaners’ plea for neutrality. There was also a major racial 
component in the election. White South Africans were anxious about the pace of black 
African urbanization, and they frequently expressed concerns of being “overrun” or 
“ploughed under.” The NP played the racial fears of the white electorate to its advantage. 
It accused the UP of being too soft on “influx controls,” going as far as calling Smut’s 
apparent successor Jan Hofmeyr a “kaffirboeite.”3 Against their political straw man, the 
NP promised to keep South Africa “a white man’s country.”4 The two parties really 
differed more in degree than direction; the UP merely supported a less severe form of 
segregation.  
On May 28, 1948, Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff gathered with their peers to listen to 
the election returns. Someone carried a radio onto the lawn in front of Sonop, where the 
young men listened with rapt attention. The urban districts were the first to report results, 
and they heavily favored the UP, which actually won the popular vote that year.5 But 
once the rural districts began reporting, it became clear that the NP was gaining a 
significant number of seats in Parliament. The Sonnoppers’ disappointment changed into 
excitement. They began to shout loudly and cheer as each district reported its results. 
They raised such a racket that residents in the nearby Brooklyn neighborhood, a UP 
stronghold, complained to the police. The police warned the young men to quiet down, 
but they unabashedly ignored the authorities. Their enthusiasm came to a head when 																																																								
3 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford University Press, 2014), 8. This racial slur is highly 
derogatory and offensive; it suggests a white person who preferences black peoples’ interests.  
4 Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (University of Virginia Press, 2009), 
479-482. 
5 Carel Boshoff, Dis nou ek (LAPA Uitgewers, 2012),103.  
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Smuts lost his own district. Unable to contain themselves any longer, they marched to the 
women’s residence, where they all sang nationalist anthems until the early hours of the 
morning.6  
The next morning, students skipped class and gathered in front of the Ou Letter 
Building. As their professors approached, students asked them to deliver speeches. After 
hearing encouraging words from their professors, who were themselves giddy with 
excitement, they marched en masse to Pretoria’s Church Square.7 Many years later, 
Smith recalled the excitement. The students went to Prime Minister-designate Malan’s 
home and marched alongside his car while he drove to Church Square to deliver a speech. 
Smith remembered Bosch sitting on the hood of Malan’s car, waving the old flag of the 
Transvaal Republic—a nationalist symbol.8  
Annemie Bosch argued that Smith actually confused this event with another. She 
said Bosch led the students to Church Square after the 1953 election, not in 1948. Indeed, 
there is a newspaper clipping that shows Bosch waving the old Transvaal flag. He was 
leading a small group as student council president. There was no official government car, 
but rather a few student scooters.9 Perhaps Smith was confused, or perhaps he never let 
the truth get in the way of a good story. It could also be that Bosch participated in both 
marches. The important point was that Bosch was an outspoken and vocal supporter of 
the NP. Remembering the 1948 election, Bosch later recalled, “it was to us like a dream 
come true when the Nationalist Party won that victory. We had no reservations 																																																								
6 Boshoff, 103; Smith, “In Conversation With” (unpublished manuscript, 2010), 157.  
7 Boshoff, 103-104.  
8 Smith, 157.  
9 Interview with Annemie Bosch, February 2016.  
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whatsoever.”10 These young Afrikaners were confident that NP would safeguard their 
future while allowing other groups to build their own futures too.   
A Common Heritage 
The young Afrikaners at Sonop were convinced of the righteousness of their 
cause. They had a heavy sense of past injustice, and they hoped the NP would redeem 
their future. In large measure, the pain and humiliation of the Anglo-Boer War or South 
African War had fanned the flames of Afrikaner nationalism. The war was the result of 
increased tension between an expanding British Empire and the two independent, but 
mineral-rich, “Boer Republics.” The Boer Republics had refused to give rights to British 
citizens residing there, and as a result, the British government sent their military to the 
border. After the British ignored an ultimatum from President Paul Kruger to withdraw 
troops, the “Boers” besieged British military posts at Ladysmith, Mafeking, and 
Kimberley. While the “Boers” initially enjoyed the upper hand, the British sent 
reinforcements and captured Pretoria in June 1900.11 A number of “Boers” were reluctant 
to accept defeat, and fought as bittereinders (bitter enders) in a protracted guerilla 
struggle that lasted until May 1902. Women, children, and some black workers on farms 
supplied the bittereinders with resources. In an attempt to cut the supply line, the British 																																																								
10 Bosch quoted in Kevin Livingston, “The Legacy of David J. Bosch,” International Bulletin of 
Missionary Research (January, 1999), 26. 
11 Shula Marks, “Class, Culture, and Consciousness in South Africa, 1899-1910,” The Cambridge 
History of South Africa, eds. Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011),158-59. For a detailed and popular account of the South African War, see Thomas Pakenham, 
The Boer War (HarperCollins, 1992). For revisionist accounts, see Peter Warwick, Black People and the 
South African War 1899-1902 (Longman, 1982), and The South African War Reappraised, ed. Donald 
Lowry (Manchester University Press, 2000). Many Afrikaans academics have also written extensively 
about the war. G.D. Scholtz, Die Oorsake van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog (1947) in two volumes and J.H. 
Breytenbach, Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, 1899-1902 (Pretoria: Government Printer, 
1969-1996) is a six-volume work. Note Afrikaans historians call the event the “Second War of Freedom.”  
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imprisoned the bittereinders wives and children in concentration camps and burned their 
family farms. The British also interned black workers in segregated camps.12 Conditions 
in the camps were notoriously dreadful. The British welfare campaigner Emily Hobhouse 
famously exposed the pervasive overcrowding, insufficient food, clothing, and shelter, as 
well as unhygienic conditions in the camps.13 
Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff received firsthand accounts of concentration camps 
from their parents. Bosch later recalled, “my own mother could tell me stories about the 
concentration camp to which she was taken at the age of eight.”14 When he heard these 
stories as a child, he became convinced of the arrogance of the British Empire and the 
righteousness of the Afrikaners’ cause. Smith’s maternal grandmother lost her life in a 
concentration camp. As a boy, his mother told him that the English poisoned his 
grandmother by adding ground glass and blue vitriol to the maize meal she was given—a 
common accusation. Smith later noted that the story could not possibly have been true, as 
everyone ate the same product. Nevertheless, as a child, it served to confirm the belief 
that Afrikaners had suffered in the hands of a cruel British empire.15  
Families shared stories of heroic and tragic deeds. Smith’s paternal grandfather 
lived in the Cape Colony, but during the war he sided with Boers and fought as a “Cape 
Rebel.”16 Boshoff’s grandfather and three of his uncles fought as bittereinders. A group 
of “joiners” (those Afrikaners who sided with the British) killed Boshoff’s uncle Fritsie 																																																								
12 Giliomee, 252-253.  
13 Emily Hobhouse, The Brunt of the War (Methuen & Co., 1902), 140.  
14 Kevin Livingston, A Missiology of the Road: Early Perspectives in David Bosch’s Theology of 
Mission and Evangelism (James Clarke & Co., 2012), 43.  
15 Nico Smith, “Afrikaner Broederbond, Ch. 1” (unpublished manuscript, 2009), 1.  
16 Ibid., 5.  
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when they tricked him into believing they were his allies. The British caught Boshoff’s 
father Willem, then just a boy, supplying Boer guerillas. Following their standard 
protocol, the British burned the Boshoff homestead at Doornfontein and placed the 
family in a concentration camp. Like so many others, Willem and his sister Lettie became 
terribly sick. While Willem recovered, Lettie died.17 Stories like these reinforced a sense 
of collective trauma and convinced Afrikaners that they had to protect their own 
interests.18  
Anti-British sentiment was furthered in Afrikaans schools. Bosch recalled, “at a 
very early stage already our minds were influenced by teachers and other cultural and 
political leaders to see the English as perpetrators of all kinds of evil and as oppressors of 
the Afrikaner.”19 They read F.W. Reitz’s Century of Wrong (1900), which chronicled the 
perceived injustices of the British Empire against the Afrikaners. For Smith and his 
friends, even speaking English smacked of treason. Smith’s father, though a supporter of 
the National Party, was a school headmaster, and he saw the value in learning English. 
He forced his son to read English books, a task that Smith not only found arduous but 
also embarrassing. For one hour every Sunday afternoon, he hid himself in his room, 
afraid that one of his friends might see him, and painstakingly worked his way through 
various English volumes.20 Like Bosch and Smith, Boshoff and his classmates regarded 
the British as the enemies of the Afrikaners. As students at the lower school, Boshoff and 
																																																								
17 Carel Boshoff, Dis nou ek (LAPA Uitgewers, 2012), 31-32.  
18 For a further discussion of “collective trauma,” see Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, 
eds. Jeffery C. Alexander et al. (University of California Press, 2004).  
19 Livingston, A Missiology of the Road, 43.  
20 Smith, “Afrikaner Broederbond, Ch. 1,” 10.  
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his classmates were kicked out of a theater in Pretoria for refusing to stand while God 
Save the King was playing.21  
The tension between Afrikaner Nationalists and Pro-British South Africans came 
to a head during the Second World War. When Britain declared war on Germany, other 
members of the Commonwealth decided whether or not to follow. The question was hotly 
contested in South Africa. Then Prime Minister J.B.M. Herzog made a motion for 
neutrality, which was defeated. After receiving this vote of no confidence, he resigned 
and Smuts formed a government, which declared war on Germany.22 While most 
English-speaking white South Africans supported the war effort, the Afrikaners were 
divided. South Africa had a volunteer army (i.e. no conscription), which many Afrikaners 
freely joined. They notably supported Allied efforts in East Africa, North Africa, 
Madagascar, and Italy.23 Smuts and Winston Churchill, former enemies in the South 
African War, became trusted confidants. Malan was leader of the loyal opposition and a 
voice for neutrality. Other Afrikaners, however, worked to actively sabotage the war 
effort. Under the leadership of Hans van Rensburg, the Ossawabrandwag (Ox Wagon 
Sentinel; OB), hitherto a cultural organization, undermined the war effort by bombing 
South African military operations. Van Rensburg advocated the formation of an 
																																																								
21 Boshoff, 83.  
22 Giliomee, 439-445. 
23 For a discussion of the military aspect of South Africa in the Second World War, see David 
Brock Katz, South Africans Versus Rommel (Stackpole Books, 2018). For a discussion of the racial 
limitations during the war, see Louis Grundlingh, “The Military, Race, and Resistance: The Conundrums of 
Recruiting Black South African Men during the Second World War,” and Suryakanthie Chetty, “‘A White 
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independent Afrikaner Republic built on National Socialist principals.24 
Various family members could find themselves on opposite sides of the divide. 
Smith’s father took Malan’s neutral position while his mother secretly supported the OB. 
In Smith’s memory, however, they all rooted against the British. He later remembered the 
whole family listened to German radio broadcasts at a neighbor’s house. Smith’s father, 
as a government employee, did not want to play the broadcast in his own home. Gathered 
around the radio, Smith’s family and neighbors celebrated the news whenever German U-
Boats torpedoed British ships.25   
There certainly was some Nazi influence among Afrikaner nationalists during this 
time, as in the case of van Rensberg.26 There were heightened incidences of anti-
Semitism, which culminated in legislation that blocked Jews from entering South Africa. 
Likewise, a number of Afrikaner intellectuals, like Nico Diederichs, studied in Germany 
and promoted an anti-democratic totalitarian ideology.27 For many other Afrikaners, 
however, pro-German sentiment grew out of their collective anger toward the British, not 
from an ideological commitment to National Socialism. Boshoff later recalled that he and 
his peers had no particular grievance against the Germans, but the English had put their 
relatives in concentration camps and burned their farms. Boshoff wrote, “As 
Waterburgers, we had not yet forgotten what the English did to our volk during the 																																																								
24 Beinart 136-137; Giliomee, 442-443. For a full account of the OB, see Christoph Marx, 
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Anglo-Boer War, and we were certain that the day of reckoning had come for them.”28  
When officers from the South African military came his school in Nylstroom, 
Boshoff and his peers were actively inattentive. As the officer discussed the importance 
of opposing Hitler and the Nazis, the students twiddled their thumbs and looked out the 
windows. Those Afrikaners who joined the war effort were often pejoratively called rooi 
lussies (red loops), named for the red epaulettes that South African soldiers wore.29 Many 
considered “rooi lussies” to be traitors to their own people, and some ministers in the 
NGK even barred them from the Lord’s Supper and refused to baptize their children. 
Those who supported the war effort could also be cruel, accusing those who did not 
volunteer for military service of cowardice. Many found white feathers in their 
mailboxes, and fistfights broke out over the question of war.30 
The OB had its own paramilitary force called the stormjagers, an obvious allusion 
to Hitler’s storm troopers, and there was a corresponding youth force called the 
Boerejeug, which Boshoff joined along with many of his friends. In complete secret, they 
gathered at OB leader Jan van Rensberg’s farm, where they conducted military 
exercises.31 Under the influence of his zealously nationalistic (and profoundly anti-
British) mother and friends, Smith also joined the OB. He remembered reporting to a 
small wooden shack in a field every fortnight to receive “military training.” When 
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Smith’s father found out, he forbade his son from attending.32 The war ended before 
Boshoff graduated into adult membership.  
Throughout the war and after, the hardline ideological commitments of the OB 
began to alienate many Afrikaners, as did their lackluster military drills. Its influence 
waned during the war years.33 The UP, which attracted many Afrikaner voters in the 
1930s, led South Africa into a “British war,” and thereby alienated much of its Afrikaner 
constituency. By 1945, therefore, the NP emerged as the leading political champion of 
Afrikaner interests. The Afrikaner Broederbond recognized this, and it asserted that the 
NP was the only party that could help the Afrikaners achieve their political goals.34 The 
Broederbond was a secrete men’s organization that drew its membership from various 
leaders in society (farmers, teachers, doctors, businessmen, dominees, politicians, etc.). 
Founded in 1918, the Broederbond hoped to promote Afrikaner interests in a society that, 
in its estimation, tended to favor English-speaking whites. Journalists and historians alike 
have found the organization guilty of being the puppet master behind white minority rule 
in South Africa. Writing in the late 1970s, Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom called the 
Afrikaner Broederbond “the most exclusive and influential underground movement in the 
Western world.” They understood the Bond as having such a firm grasp on South African 
politics that they argued “the South African Government is today the Broederbond and 
the Broederbond is the government.”35 Along similar lines, Allister Sparks wrote that the 
Broederbond was “unequalled in the world for its pervasive back-room power wielded 																																																								
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over nearly every aspect of national life.”36 In his Christian Nationalism and the Rise of 
the Afrikaner Broederbond Charles Boomberg argued that the Broederbond drew 
membership from the ranks of leading Afrikaners, such as educators, farmers, clergy, 
public servants, the news media, lawyers, bankers, and businessmen. The Broederbond 
was the “central policy-making organ” and these members were responsible for 
implementing policy decisions through their cells in every town and city in the country.37  
Historian Herman Giliomee, however, argued that such statements “attributed an 
importance to the organization that is out of all proportion.”38 He cited Broederbonder 
E.L.P. Stals, who argued that the organization struggled to gain an influential voice. The 
Broederbond often reflected divisions within the Afrikaner nationalist movement more 
than a monolithic Afrikaner voice. This was certainly true by the early 1980s, when 
Boshoff’s chairmanship put those divisions into stark contrast. According to Stals, the 
Broederbond was a platform in which members who disagreed could find some sort of 
consensus. Stals also pointed out that the organization did not make final decisions, nor 
did it offer firm guidance on policy matters.39   
Stals depicted the organization as more impotent than it was. Historian Dan 
O’Meara more closely approximated the role of the Broederbond when he called it “an 
immense informal network of influence.”40 Though it was not exactly the puppet master 
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of South African politics, it was also not simply a cultural institution or debate club. It 
engaged in close conversation with the government, offered feedback on policy 
suggestions as a kind of “think tank,” and provided new ideas in “working papers.” 
Members were kept abreast of new developments through circular letters, which the 
executive council sent to all cells, or divisions, throughout the country to be read at their 
monthly meetings. Members also used their influential positions to prepare local 
communities for new policy changes and ideas. While it had no formal function, the 
Broederbond did exert considerable influence.41 It was certainly one organization that 
helped unite Afrikaners behind the National Party after World War II. The Sonop 
student’s excitement in 1948 has to be read in this context.   
Beyond anti-imperial sentiment, Bosch, Smith and Boshoff’s nationalism was 
fueled by an acute sense of poverty. Not even privileged landowners were immune from 
economic collapse and natural disaster.42 During the drought of 1933, Bosch’s father’s 
herd died, and he had to sell the farm and relocate the family.43 The government provided 
some relief measures. They loaned oxen and cattle to farmers, and men were also able to 
work on South Africa’s increasingly expanding highway system. As the situation at the 
Boshoffs’ farm in Waterburg became dire, Willem decided that he would have to work 
on the highways. As he set out, he happened to meet J.G. Strijdom. Strijdom was the only 
NP Member of Parliament in the Transvaal at the time. He was known as the Lion of the 
North, and would eventually serve as Prime Minister of South Africa. When Strijdom 																																																																																																																																																																					
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found that “Oom Willie,” who had been a UP voter before the war, had fallen on hard 
times, he gave him work as a foreman overseeing the construction of a small dam.44 
Poverty plagued many Afrikaner imaginations. Resources were very scarce, and 
survival was an immediate concern.  Bosch grew up in a house with a pounded dirt floor 
that used animal dung as insulation.45 Boshoff told stories about the children gathering 
together naked under one sheet as the clothes dried on the line.46 As a school headmaster, 
Smith’s father had a steady income, but his mother was keenly aware of their limits. She 
had a taste for fine clothes and furniture. She always ensured that her children were well 
dressed, even if it meant they could not have other luxuries like toys.47 Smith later 
recalled, “I was part of a generation of Afrikaners born during the years of the 
depression. As children of the depression we apparently all strived to rise about our 
circumstances of poverty and subordination.”48 All three men maintained this drive and 
determination throughout their lives, though they would carry it in very different 
directions.   
The NP and NGK joined forces to combat white poverty. In 1925, the NP passed 
several bills designed to privilege white workers at the expense of black labor. Whites 
were afforded better opportunities, and they came to dominate mid-level and managerial 
positions in mines and on the railways. The expanding civil service, which required 
Afrikaans-speakers, and a new utilities sector further absorbed many unemployed whites. 																																																								
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45 Klippies Kritzinger and Willem Saayman, David J. Bosch: Prophetic integrity, cruciform praxis 
(Cluster Publications, 2011), 65.  
46 Interview with Wynand Boshoff, March 2016.  
47 de Saintonge, loc 235. 
48 Smith, “Afrikaner Broederbond, Ch. 1,” 25.  
		
52 
Better positions for whites naturally came with better wages. But for those whites without 
education or skill, the government enacted a “Civilized Labor Policy,” giving preference 
to white applicants in low-level positions.49 When Frank Keppel from the Carnegie 
Corporation came to South Africa in 1929 to investigate potential grant opportunities, the 
NGK submitted an application for research into the causes of and remedies for white 
poverty. It resulted in a massive and highly influential study on the “poor white 
problem,” which encouraged further legislation and efforts designed to help poor 
Afrikaners.50  
Beyond pain and poverty, Afrikaners developed a strong sense of pride. Afrikaner 
nationalists also promoted a deep love for their history, traditions, and language. As 
Afrikaner students learned about the Century of Wrong, they also learned to love their 
language and their ancestors. Afrikaans was a relatively new language, having just been 
standardized in early 20th century.51 Bosch remembered reading poems by Totius that 
romanticized the figure of the voortrekker, or pioneer, who settled the interior. In Toitus’ 
poems, the voortrekker struggled to “preserve himself” against all odds with only his ox 
wagon, his rifle, and his bible. The young Bosch read that the Afrikaner volk was like a 
thorn bush (doringboom), trampled by a wagon. Though it bent, it was not broken and it 																																																								
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would rise again, healed by its own sap. Totius compared the Afrikaners to the hardy 
besembos, which grows where other plants would fail. If one cuts it down or burns it, it 
only sprouts a new shoot and grows back.52 Though they were broken in the South 
African War, they hoped to sprout again in their own republic, free from the British 
crown. In another poem, Totius wrote that Afrikaners had to be on guard against the 
“spirit of Africa,” which was known for “swallowing civilizations.” Totius insinuated 
that the great civilizations of Africa, like Egypt, had been destroyed by forces beyond 
their control. According to the colonial worldview, Africa had the potential to degrade 
“higher levels” of civilization. This became part of the justification for white people 
remaining separate. The voortrekkers carried the light of the gospel into the interior of the 
“dark continent,” and if they remained true to themselves (which is to say separate), then 
that light would continue to shine.53  
Smith remembered the first time he felt the full-blown pangs of pride in his 
Afrikaner identity. In 1938, the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK) 
hosted a centenary celebration of the Great Trek. The goal of the event was to unite the 
Afrikaners around a common origin myth. Like their forefathers, who left the Cape 
Colony to found their own countries apart from British rule, Afrikaners from all over the 
country, and even those in South West Africa (Namibia) and Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) would hitch up wagons and drive their oxen (and their automobiles) to 
Pretoria, where they would watch the cornerstone ceremony founding the Voortrekker 																																																								
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Monument.54 The event would take place on December 16—the “Day of the Vow”—
when 100 years earlier Sarel Cilliers promised that if God were to grant the voortrekkers 
victory over the Zulu, future generations would remember the day as a Sabbath.55   
Smith’s father announced to the school children that an ox wagon would be 
coming through their small town of Koppies.56 Ox wagons caused a great rush of 
excitement in all of the sleepy towns they passed through on their way to Pretoria. Men 
grew their beards long and women put on bonnets in anticipation of their arrival. People 
lit campfires, told trekker stories, and sang psalms. Couples got married and parents had 
their children baptized in front of the wagons. Streets were renamed to commemorate the 
event. Wagons were pulled through wet concrete and women dipped the corners of their 
garments in axel grease to have a lasting memorial of the event.57  
In Koppies, the barefoot school children led the welcome party for the wagon. 
Smith and the boys in his class wore white shirts and gray pants while the girls wore 
bonnets and voortrekker dresses. Seeing the heavy wagons drawn by a team of sixteen 
oxen made a stirring impression on the children. Smith recalled, “I still remember the 
beautiful red Afrikaner oxen58 with their long, curved horns that pulled the wagon” as it 
came down the town’s main street.59 The school children followed along, singing 
Afrikaner nationalist songs. Their march culminated at the town’s rugby field, a symbol 
of Afrikaner nationalism in itself. There, the children learned about the dangers their 																																																								
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ancestors faced on their trek into the interior, and they were taught that they had to 
overcome great hardships to make the land habitable for “civilization.” The students were 
told never to forget that they were Afrikaners. Three times, the speaker shouted, “who are 
you?” and each time more loudly, the students beat their chests with closed fists and 
shouted, “We are Afrikaners!” Smith could barely contain his pride as the children 
enjoyed cold drinks and cake at the reception.60 Thus, pain, poverty, and pride all served 
to buttress their youthful nationalism.  
Afrikaner nationalism was also rooted in racial prejudice. Bosch, Smith, and 
Boshoff also inherited a sense of racial hierarchy. In its benevolent machination, colonial 
prejudice was the assumption that whites were the trustees of blacks. It envisioned a 
vertical relationship, in which blacks were at a lower level of religious, educational, 
social, and economic development than whites. It was the responsibility of the whites, 
according to this idea, to elevate black people’s level of “civilization.”61 In its negative 
machinations, colonial prejudice led to the violent abuse and exploitation of blacks by 
whites. Living conditions and food for black workers were substandard. Language 
reinforced the hierarchy, as black people addressed every white man as “my baas.” 
Elderly black men and women referred to white toddlers as the “little boss,” while whites 
frequently addressed black adults as “boy” or “girl.”62 Rural South Africa was replete 
with cases in which whites abused blacks. Racial slurs were common, and the use of 
corporal punishment administered with a sjambok (a whip made of rhino hide) was not 																																																								
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infrequent.  
Some black people were able to achieve a level of success in spite of difficulties. 
In his The Seed is Mine, Charles van Onselen followed the life of the sharecropper Kas 
Maine, who found success for a time but died in poverty.63 Many Africans found 
themselves hopelessly impoverished and vulnerable to abuse on white farms. Pass laws 
required Africans to find employment quickly, meaning that they often had to settle for 
low wages. Once they signed a contract, they were often at the mercy of their 
employers.64 Whether benevolent or violent, whites were confident that their religious, 
political, and economic answers were right for South Africa. Black people provided the 
labor to fulfill white aspirations. To be sure, this was the common racial assumption that 
undergirded the entire project of European colonialism. Afrikaners were less a racist 
aberration and more part of major Western trends in the early 20th century.   
Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff all eventually rejected the race relations of their 
childhoods, but for very different reasons. Bosch and Smith came to see Afrikaner racial 
attitudes as dehumanizing. As Bosch noted, black people were treated as non-persons. On 
a rural South African farm, he said blacks were “a part of the scenery but hardly part of 
the human community.” Black people were treated like “farm implements” rather than 
“fellow human beings.”65  These statements were made in the 1980s as way of narrating 
the change he went through in his life. Bosch wanted to say that he came to see black 																																																								
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people as brothers and sisters in Christ, and not the object of either white charity or 
domination. Smith likewise recalled, “In my experience, blacks were simply the workers 
in white people’s homes and on their farms. They had no status, and therefore no rights. 
They were dependent on the goodwill of whites.”66  
 The colonial supposition of black inferiority did not preclude relationships of trust 
and love. Smith recounted at some length the textured racial relationships that developed 
in their childhoods. Smith remembered that as a young child, he had a terrible earache, 
and the family’s domestic servant, known as “Ayah Lena,” was able to make medicine 
for him out of freshwater crabs.67 Shortly thereafter, Smith chatted with Lena as she was 
doing the family’s laundry. He felt a sense of gratitude to her for healing his sore ear. 
Seeing their meeting through the kitchen window, Smith’s mother immediately called 
him into the house. Smith remembered her saying, “Nico, one does not just stand and talk 
to a black person. You talk to them when you require that they must do something for 
you.”68 There was to be no social or physical contact with black people beyond labor 
relations. When Smith and his sisters played “Ring Around the Rosie” with Lena’s 
children, their mother called them into the house, and told them that white people must 
never touch the hand of a black person, as they were not clean and disease laden. The 
Smiths kept a separate set of enameled dishes under the sink for Lena. Smith once took 
them out to look at them, and after his sister caught him, he was roundly rebuked. 
Smith’s mother told him if he touched “those things,” he might very well catch 
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tuberculosis.69 Smith’s later writings attempted to show the pervasive racism among 
Afrikaners. He chose language that highlighted the dehumanizing aspects of race 
relations that kept people apart.   
 Boshoff took a very different tone in his autobiography. His nationalistic vision of 
South Africa saw blacks and whites as distinctive but equitable groups. Boshoff, 
therefore, attempted to show that there was some equity between whites and blacks on his 
family’s farm. He said that the relationship between his family and the workers was 
“gracious, courteous, and friendly.”70 He remembered specific workers as well as 
interactions with them. The Makwela and Seleka families, for example, lived on the 
Boshoffs’ farm for years with the right of occupancy, giving them the right to use 
portions of the farm as they saw fit. Boshoff also remembered wage laborers, specifically 
naming Daniël, Johannes, and Piet.71 The Boshoffs hired a Coloured domestic servant 
named Tabieta, who lived on the farm with her children September and Tom. Like Smith, 
Boshoff remembered playing with black children on the farm, and he said that while 
there were occasional fights, they always made amends. According to Boshoff, there was 
no such thing as “white work” or “black work” on the farm, “everything was everyone’s 
work, and we had to learn to do it from a young age.”72 Boshoff argued that all people on 
the farm shared in times of poverty and prosperity, eating a similar diet. When there was 
sickness or new birth, the Boshoffs attempted to provide the workers with blankets and 																																																								
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clothing. Boshoff also suggested that whites had much to learn from blacks on the farm. 
Piet knew of a mixture of roots and herbs that reduced the inflammation of a cow’s 
afterbirth, which if left untreated could lead to serious consequences for the animal. Piet 
graciously taught the young Boshoff how to make the mixture, and he then took over the 
job from Piet.73  
Boshoff attempted to paint a picture of racial parity in all areas except for one: 
white people owned the land, and black people provided the lion’s share of the labor on 
the land. Boshoff rejected this economic arrangement later in his life, not because it was 
unjust or dehumanizing, but because he came to believe that if Afrikaners were to have a 
future in South Africa, they would have to do their own work. He was fond of saying 
“Those who work the land, own the land.”74 That is why Afrikaner labor was so central to 
his vision for Orania. He wrote, “In those years, labor was not yet part of the freedom 
struggle and the survival question of the Afrikaner volk was not yet seen in light of black 
numbers—how shortsighted it all was.”75  
Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff’s memories of race relations in their childhood 
reflected just as much about their later understandings of themselves as they did racial 
relationships. Bosch and Smith portrayed race relations negatively, highlighting the fact 
that they had made significant changes in their understanding. Their memories also have 
to be read in the context of a larger moral argument. Writing from the vantage point of a 
democratic South Africa, Smith wanted to argue that Afrikaners had committed 																																																								
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numerous injustices against the black majority. Justice would, therefore, demand that 
Afrikaners abandon their own self-serving aspirations to support the goals of the black 
majority. Boshoff, on the other hand, painted a positive image of race relations. By 
displaying the Afrikaners as a just, fair, and perhaps even charitable people, he wanted to 
support the idea that Afrikaners were entitled to their own political aspirations.  
Keeping the Heritage Alive 
On December 16, 1950, a confident Bosch delivered a speech at a festival on the 
Day of the Vow. He hoped to keep the spirit and energy of nationalism alive. He opened 
his speech, proclaiming that the volk’s history was in danger. While the Afrikaners had 
been united after the centenary celebration of the great trek in 1938, they became divided 
over the question of the Second World War. In 1949, the volk was united once again by 
the opening of the Voortrekker Monument, that “mighty cathedral…against the white 
clouds.”76 For Bosch, it was now vital for the Afrikaners to maintain their unity in order 
to preserve the heritage of their forefathers. He spoke of Frederick Bezuidenhout (“the 
first Martyr of the Afrikaner volk”), and those who undertook Great Trek (when “every 
Afrikaner became a hero or heroine”).77 Bosch praised the Afrikaners who struggled to 
maintain their independence during “the First War of Freedom,” the Jameson raid, and 
the South African War, which David called “the crown on…Afrikaner glory.” During 
those struggles, the Afrikaner nation gained its own litany of saints including Koos de la 
Rey, Christiaan de Wet, and president Paul Kruger. While “the martyr’s crown was 
placed on many heads” in battle, the “dark night” of the concentration camps “made a 																																																								
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hero of the Afrikaner woman.”78 He quoted Afrikaans poetry extensively to emphasize 
his points.  
Bosch argued that revenge would do nothing for the cause of Afrikaner survival. 
They had to forgive the British because forgiveness “is the holy duty of a Christian volk,” 
but they could not forget their past, “for a volk that loses its national memory loses its 
personal identity and soon falls apart.”79 If they hoped to survive, they would have to 
remember their heritage while deepening their present cultural and moral life. Bosch said, 
“A volk that remains true to its best traditions and which does not neglect its highest 
moral interests is virtually indestructible.” He called down an anathema upon those who 
had wandered from the fold, saying  
If you, dear festivalgoer, have already given up the heritage of your fathers, then 
you have sold or exchanged or trampled a heritage that was bought with blood 
and tears. In that case, do not shed a tear for the deceased heroes and heroines of 
your volk, but weep rather for yourself! The Women’s Monument in 
Bloemfontein is a testimony against you. And so is the Voortrekker 
Monument…If you give up the principles of those ancestors—you do them a 
greater dishonor than the uncivilized kaffirs who murdered them because the 
kaffirs unwittingly placed a martyr’s crown on the heads of our ancestors, 
whereas you are consciously trampling on their ideals, which are part of their 
spirit.80 
 
Bosch’s use of the word “kaffir” is particularly noteworthy. It was already a deeply 
offensive term by the 1950s. In the 19th century, it was used incorrectly to refer to the 
Xhosa people. Indeed, the Frontier Wars (Xhosa Wars) were referred to as the “Kaffir 
Wars” in both English and Dutch/Afrikaans.81 Bosch’s statement, however, also played 																																																								
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with the colonial hierarchy—Afrikaners who abandon their own people were lower than 
those black people who formerly killed their ancestors. His meaning was clear: 
Afrikaners’ first loyalty had to be to the volk. In his later life, Bosch would reject this 
view entirely. For now, he was a loyal Afrikaner.  
Christian Identity  
 Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff were not just nationalists, but Christian nationalists. 
Evangelical piety infused their childhood homes. Smith’s father practiced a rather dour 
religion, believing that life was to be endured and not enjoyed. He woke up every 
morning at 4:30 to say his own prayer, and was never seen without a necktie. In order to 
experience salvation, one had to contend with the real possibility of damnation and show 
evidence of conversion.82 Smith would later come to reject the piety of his youth, saying 
it blinded him the reality of black people’s suffering. He portrayed his family’s pious 
practices as rather empty and pointless. At the mid-day meal, the family knelt around the 
table in prayer and listened as the patriarch read from the Bible. After concluding, he 
would ask his children what they remembered from the text. Rather than being a useful 
pedagogical tool to ensure that his children were listening, Smith remembered it had quite 
the opposite effect. The children would listen to a few sentences, latch on to one detail, 
and repeat it in their heads so they would have something to say when eventually asked. 
The rest of the details would be lost. The children would also make faces at one another 
during their father’s seemingly interminable prayers, and then tattle on each other 
afterwards. This was much to the chagrin of the patriarch, who would cast disapproving 
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glances at the young offenders.83  
 Unlike Smith, Boshoff remembered family devotionals having a deep impact on 
him. Boshoff’s father was a deeply religious man who led the family’s daily worship. 
Both morning and evening, Willem read from the Bible, pairing it with a lesson from Uit 
die beek, an NGK devotional, and on Sunday mornings, he read the sermon printed in the 
church’s weekly newspaper, Die Kerkbode. Like the Smiths, the Boshoff children had to 
tell their father what they remembered after he finished reading. The family’s worship 
also included hymn singing, based largely on the Dutch hymnal until 1944, after which 
the NGK published its own collection of Afrikaans hymnody.84 Boshoff’s mother Anna 
Maria led the family in song, and she made sure that all of her children knew their 
prayers, and she also led family worship in her husband’s absence.85 
Smith’s narrative his religious life in typical evangelical fashion; he had a 
conversion experience born of inner turmoil. When Smith was confirmed, he said the 
formal ceremony meant nothing to him. After the service, a neighbor stopped Smith to 
congratulate him and offer him a warning. He said, “Nico, by becoming a member of the 
church you’ve become a good citizen of the country, [and] a good member of the 
Afrikaner nation, but that doesn’t necessarily mean you’ve become a member of God’s 
people, of God’s nation.”86 Notice that being confirmed in the NGK made Smith a “good 
member” of the Afrikaner nation. One wonders whether the man actually used these 
terms, or if Smith was attempting to highlight nationalistic fervor. Regardless, Smith 																																																								
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came away from the conversation wondering if he really was part of God’s people.   
Smith played the question over in his mind for a month, wondering if he belonged 
to God, and wondering if anyone at all really loved him. Distraught, he went to visit an 
elderly dominee. The old minister read the following passage from Isaiah, “All we like 
sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid 
on him the iniquity of us all” (Isaiah 53:6). The dominee then said, “I can’t give you any 
other guarantee than that. I can only say what the Bible says; that Christ…took your 
punishments on himself so you needn’t be afraid of punishment anymore. If you believe 
that, and accept that Christ himself died for your sins, then you belong to God’s people. 
There is no other guarantee.”87  Smith burst into tears, dropped to his knees in prayer, and 
felt touched by the Holy Spirit. Standing up, he felt liberated from his burden and a sense 
of inner peace. The date was May 5, 1945, and Smith would remember it for years to 
come.88  
Smith eagerly wrote to his sister about his conversion experience. She responded 
saying that he ought to consider becoming a minister. It had not occurred to him before, 
but it made perfect sense to him. He announced to his family that he intended to pursue 
ordination. His father, who was always cautious of any gladness or passion (even if it 
appeared pious), said that the young man should test his convictions first. After all, his 
father reminded him, only several weeks before he had announced that he wanted to be a 
scientist. His father told him that perhaps he should work for a while first, and then if he 
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still had the calling, he should pursue it.89 
In his autobiography, Boshoff did not describe the same kind of inner turmoil and 
crisis of faith that Smith had. For Boshoff, there was an organic connection between his 
love for his religious heritage, his family, and ethnic identity. To be sure, his religious life 
was still very evangelical. His father took a leading role in the annual Pentecost Prayer 
Service, which was a weeklong prayer meeting held between Pentecost and Ascension 
with its roots in the 19th century Evangelical revivals that swept through southern 
Africa.90 Yet unlike Smith, Boshoff said he found meaning and significance in the formal 
(and folksy) ceremonies of the NGK. Boshoff was confirmed in April of 1945 (roughly 
around the same time as Smith), and he recalled the experience as deeply moving. Over 
sixty years later, he recalled a line from a hymn that made a deep impression on him: 
“Your word is tested through and through, and your servant loves it.”91  
For Boshoff, folkways and religion overlapped most clearly in the quarterly 
gatherings of rural peoples for the Lord’s Supper, or nagmaal.92 In his autobiography, 
Boshoff painted a charming and bucolic scene. Four times a year, the Boshoffs assembled 
with the rest of the Waterberg Congregation at the town square in Nylstroom (now 
Modimolle). Those coming from outlying farms spent the entire weekend in a tent 
village, so by necessity it required a great deal of preparation. Women baked rusks, 
cookies, and small pies, and they washed the family’s “Sunday best.” Men slaughtered 																																																								
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animals, dried meat for biltong, and fitted the family wagon with a tent. Much as their 
forefathers had done for the past two and a half centuries, farming families travelled to 
church in their wagons slowly pulled by a team of oxen.93  
At the nagmaal, Boshoff remembered making friends and playing games with 
other children. Older people visited one another, catching up on the news and gossip of 
the past season. Men who were not used to wearing their formal clothes for so long 
fidgeted uncomfortably, while young people found themselves in love for the first time. 
The minister and his wife visited each tent, inspiring farmer’s wives to present their best 
baked goods made of the finest meal, hoping to make a positive impression. Sunday 
morning was the apex of the gathering, as the congregation shared the Lord’s Supper, 
reaffirming their connection to one another and to Christ.94  
Boshoff found his call to ministry in his love for his family. In October of 1944, 
Boshoff’s father suffered a heart attack and went into a coma. He stayed at his father’s 
bedside constantly, until his family sent him to a neighboring farm with an urgent 
message. He did not want to go, because he worried that his father would die before he 
returned. As Boshoff came to the first turn in the road, he dropped to his knees by a thorn 
bush (doringboom) and prayed to God, saying, “If you spare my father and make him 
healthy, I will dedicate my life to you and to the proclaimation of your gospel.”95 Coming 
home, Boshoff found his father wide-awake, sitting up in bed. Willem looked at his son, 
and simply asked, “Where have you been?” Boshoff later remembered, “That was a 																																																								
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turning point in my life.”96 While he was originally going to become a farmer,97 he 
decided to pursue the ministry. For Boshoff, religion, family, and his volk were bound 
together as part of his core identity throughout his life. For Smith, religion tended to be 
more a question of inner examination and personal change. These differences in emphasis 
would later become vital. Boshoff would remain doggedly committed to Afrikaner 
interests, while Smith attempted to formulate his own, distinct path.  
Like Boshoff and Smith, Bosch’s childhood home was filled with daily Bible 
readings and psalm singing. The Bosches attended church roughly once a month by 
wagon or buggy. They set out from their farm early on Saturday and returning late on 
Sunday.98 In later interviews with theologian Kevin Livingston, Bosch said that he had 
wanted to be a minister from the age of 10, but he did not think himself qualified—as a 
child he had a tremendous inferiority complex.99 Finding a zeal for Afrikaans, Afrikaner 
history, and his people’s future, he enrolled at the teacher-training institute, hoping to 
pass that passion on to the next generation.100 During his first year of study, he boarded 
with the Delport family in Sunnyside, Pretoria. Their son, Christo, was a theology student 
along with Boshoff and Smith, and he had conversations with Bosch about his potential 
aptitude for ministry. Smith later wrote that Christo Delport was the one who “launched 
the ship” of David Bosch onto the “ocean of theology.”101  
There was, however, more to the story. Like so many pious students around the 																																																								
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world in the middle of the twentieth century, Bosch became a member of the Student 
Christian Movement (SCM). After a year at the teaching college, he gained confidence in 
his mental faculties, and a spiritual boost after attending a two-week SCM summer camp. 
He later remembered,  
At camp during those two weeks, although I cannot pinpoint a time, I know that I 
could do it [be a pastor]. I knew now that I had the intellectual capacity to make 
the grade. By then I had shed some of the inferiority feelings I think I had as a 
child. And then surely it was a spiritual experience…It was not a conversion 
experiences…I only knew that when I went away from there I knew I had to 
change my plans.102  
 
So the next year, when he returned in 1948, he took up a course of study that reflected 
both of his interests: an M.A. in Language and a Bachelor of Divinity.  
Theology and Race 
The young religiosity of Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff was at once warm and 
exclusive. It solidified the bonds between the various members of the congregation, but it 
excluded “non-whites.” According to NGK policy, people of color were to attend their 
own ethnically based churches. Beginning in the 18th century, dark-skinned Christians 
presented a problem for many white members of the NGK. Whites viewed themselves as 
“born Christian,” and they did not want to take communion with people of color.103 When 
brought to the attention of the church synod in 1829, the church declared that separating 
Christians was contrary to the word of God. While “natives” were permitted to join 
“mother” churches, the NGK made provision for founding separate churches for people 
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of color in 1834. In 1857, however, the church made concessions to those white people 
who wanted to segregate communion. While it noted that Christian unity was the ideal, 
leaders accommodated the “weakness of some” white Christians by following a pattern of 
separate churches.104 When the voortrekkers formed a government in the Transvaal 
Republic (ZAR), they made it absolutely clear in the constitution that they wanted “no 
equality (gelijkstelling) in church or state” between whites and “non-whites.” Afrikaans 
church bodies sought to exclude people of color from using “white” church buildings, 
and white missionaries were not given the same privileges as white dominees. For a 
missionary to preach to whites was often seen as the first step toward “gelykstelling.”105  
For Afrikaner Christian intellectuals, however, racial exclusivity presented a 
problem. They had to reconcile their nationalistic impulse for ethnic and racial separation 
with the universal horizons of their Christian faith. They simultaneously wanted to affirm 
that all people could be members of the universal church, but they used legal measures to 
ensure that their churches were specifically for Afrikaners.106 This was baldly insulting to 
many black Christians. In the words of African Nationalist D.D.T. Jabavu, these policies 
indelibly stamped the NGK “as an anti-Native church.”107 How could Christian Afrikaner 
claim to have the special mission of spreading the Gospel of Africa, while at the same 
time excluding black people from their churches? As the NGK leader Frans O’Brien 
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Geldenhuys later reflected, “For the church [NGK] … the central problem that had to be 
solved was this: How can we maintain our own (white) people’s identity without causing 
damage to the cause of the Gospel among non-whites?” Geldenhuys continued, “The 
answer came from the [NGK] mission policy.”108 Mission thinkers provided the moral 
basis for ethnic separation: separation respected people’s different cultural requirements. 
Rather than being “anti-native,” separation allowed various ethnic groups to use their 
own languages and cultures in worship. Missionaries would begin to apply this idea to all 
social institutions.  
In the 1920s, Stellenbosch mission professor Johannes du Plessis led the way in 
addressing questions about racial equality and exclusion in both church and society. He, 
along with ten other NGK missionaries, presented the 1921 General Missionary 
Conference with a pamphlet entitled The Dutch Reformed Church and the Native 
Problem. It advocated the formation of separate churches for different ethnic groups, but 
did not yet advocate total separation of races. While they thought total separation was “a 
most excellent theory,” they wondered “whether, and to what extent, it lies within the 
scope of practical politics.”109 Blacks and whites depended on one another economically, 
and therefore total separation seemed (and indeed would be) impossible. Nevertheless, 
their pamphlet endorsed urban segregation as a means of avoiding the “quite 
unthinkable” possibility of “race fusion.” Anxieties about interracial sex, and hence 
mixed-race children, were never far from the discourse of racial separation. The 
segregation it endorsed was moderate; it envisioned exempting “educated natives” from 																																																								
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the pass laws. While the pamphlet rejected equal rights, it endorsed “equal 
opportunities…[for blacks] to develop themselves along their own national lines, and in 
accordance with the highest ideals which their national consciousness, suffused and 
transformed by the spirit of Christianity, shall create for them.”110 The pamphlet argued 
that whites would have to make sacrifices of land in order to expand the “native 
reserves.” As of 1921, less than 10 percent of the country was set-aside for black people. 
The expansion of “native reserves” (later “homelands”) would be picked up by later 
apartheid ideologues like Boshoff, but the government was always reluctant to adopt it as 
a policy.111 
While African and Afrikaner Nationalists initially found some promise in 
segregation, their paths began to diverge by the end of the 1920s. Jabavu began to doubt 
that white Christian charity was sincere enough to make the proposed segregation plans 
just. He said,  
The key to the whole Native Question is territorial segregation. If the white 
people of South Africa were Christian enough to do the Bantu justice in a 
thoroughgoing scheme of territorial segregation then the future would be 
promising. But unfortunately Christianity has not yet been practiced to that 
extent....We Natives are…frank in our belief that present-day Christianity is not 
going to prove influential enough to induce Parliament to provide the land needed 
for Native development.112  
 
He went on to note that rather than acting out of Christian charity, it seemed that the 
government was increasing restrictions on blacks, attempting to make South Africa “a 
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white man’s country.”113 Jabavu reasserted African Nationalist demands, saying, “The 
black man does not ask for much, only for justice, justice in land distribution, justice in 
economic opportunity, and justice in political representation.”114  
Du Plessis’ more conciliatory voice was effectively silenced after a 1930 heresy 
trial, and he died five years later. In the meantime, Afrikaner mission thinkers had 
embraced a more defensive if not pugnacious ethnic nationalism. In 1929, Orange Free 
State mission secretary J.G. Strydom (not to be confused with Prime Minister J.G. 
Strijdom) convened a congress in Kroonstad. There, he warned against the forces that 
“threaten the natives directly and us indirectly.” His litany was extensive, including 
African Independent Churches, African nationalists, communists, white “negrophilists,” 
African Americans, and others. He asked his audience to imagine what would become of 
the Afrikaners if Roman Catholics had the “black masses” in their power. These threats 
were largely invented. There is some irony in Strydom’s statements; he was building a 
sense of threat when there were not in fact any credible threats facing the Afrikaners at 
the time. The sense of an enemy, however, encouraged unity and action.115 Strydom 
argued that it was “not too late.” If the Afrikaners would engage in Christian mission 
among black people, then they could keep the threats at bay.116 Missions would be a tool 
for self-defense; or in the words of Strydom, “a blessing to ourselves and salvation for 
volk and fatherland.”117   
																																																								
113 Ibid., 224.  
114 Ibid., 226.  
115 Dubow, 30.  
116 Elphick, 226-227.  
117 Ibid., 227.  
		
73 
As historians Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee note, the first recorded use 
of apartheid occurred at the Kroonstad Conference. J.C. du Plessis (note, this is a 
different du Plessis) agreed with Strydom that African and Afrikaner nationalisms might 
come into conflict, but he also believed that the rise of national consciousness was an 
important stage in any people’s development. Therefore, missionaries ought to encourage 
the black people’s national aspiration, but apart from white society. The church, he 
argued, already had a model for doing this. He argued that the NGK’s “spirit of 
apartheid…never allowed the convert from heathendom to mix with our members in 
church of social life.”118 By building separate churches for separate racial groups, they 
avoided “friction.” Black and white national development could take place without 
tension if apartheid were applied to all realms of life. Over the next 20 years, Afrikaner 
moral leaders, intellectuals, and politicians would reach the consensus that apartheid was 
not just a political option, but the only solution for South Africa.119  
After the congress, Strydom and Du Plessis drafted large portions of the 1931 
Free State NGK mission policy. While the policy noted that all souls were of equal worth 
in the eyes of God, it also asserted that not all people had achieved an equal level of 
Christian civilization. Rather, it was the responsibility of Afrikaners to act as trustees 
over less developed people. As a “Christian and civilized volk,” they were to lift the black 
ethnic groups out of “poverty and barbarism” with the leavening of the gospel (adding 
that this was to be done slowly). To that end, missionaries were to build ethnically-based 
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separate churches, which would eventually be self-governing, self-sustaining, and self-
extending.120 The language of “three-selfs” was consistent with often quite progressive 
Anglo-American mission policies. In the context of South Africa, however, this policy 
would be retooled to promote racial separation.  
The NGK policy went on to declare that schools should prepare students to be 
members of their own particular ethnic group rather than participants in an integrated 
South African society, a later feature of the notorious Bantu education policy (1953).121 
Missionaries asserted that blacks and whites required separate societies, in which each 
group could maintain and develop its own distinctive national life. Like previous 
generations of NGK leaders, they rejected gelykstelling, but they defined this term as 
placing blacks and whites on an equal footing in the same cultural area. In place of 
gelykstelling, the document adopted billikheid—that is “parity” or “equity” between 
groups.122 Thus, in the same way that a black person could not claim rights and privileges 
in white society, neither could a white person claim rights and privileges in a black 
society. The document made several limited remarks about economics, dealing with the 
formation of Christian labor unions and black people building their own economies. Du 
Plessis was a strong advocate of developing the “native reserves,” believing it would 
reduce the number of Africans entering the “white economy”—a belief that Boshoff 
would espouse his entire life.123  
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Mission leaders in the Cape NGK followed suit, making their own mission policy. 
Theirs was a decidedly less nationalistic document, taking a more evangelical tone. It 
based its missionary activity not on the “equal worth of all men” and the “duty of a 
Christian volk,” but in Christ’s command to “Go into all the world” (Mathew 28:16-20). 
Its model of mission was rooted in the conversion of individuals, who were gathered into 
churches that would become self-sustaining and self-governing. Interestingly, the policy 
lacked “self-extending,” implying (perhaps) that drafters could not envision black 
Christians doing mission work of their own. They discussed the formation of “helpful 
means to assist missions,” such as schools and hospitals. The drafters of this policy were 
also more concerned with pragmatic matters, such as what to do about the missions they 
already had, where to form new missions, and how NGK missionaries ought to relate to 
churches and government institutions. Much like the Free State policy, the drafters of the 
Cape policy also argued that various racial groups ought to be able to develop their own 
distinctive national lives. It also rejected gelykstelling while embracing billikheid.124     
The 1935 Federal Mission Policy fused the two documents. The drafters of the 
Federal Policy rooted mission work in Christ’s commission and the conviction that all 
souls “are of equal worth in the eyes of God.” It added that God ordained the first white 
inhabitants “of this southern corner of Dark Africa” to be a people of deep religious 
conviction, “so that they and their posterity could become the carriers of the light of the 
Gospel to the heathen nations of this Dark Continent.” They associated Africa with 
darkness, danger, heathendom, and black people, while whites brought the “light” of 
																																																								
124 “Die sendingbeleid van die NGK in Suid-Afrika,” in Lombard, 308-313.  
		
76 
Christianity and “civilization.” Yet the Federal Policy did not claim that the Afrikaners 
were a “Christian volk,” but instead suggested that the NGK had the “privilege and 
responsibility…to bring the Gospel to the heathen of this land.”125   
Like the Cape policy, the Federal policy rooted missionary work in the conversion 
of individuals, brought into ethnically based churches. It read,  
The Gospel is not supposed to denationalize. Christianity must not rob the native 
of his language and culture, but eventually run through and purify his whole 
national life. For this reason, a volk’s desires that are not specifically in conflict 
with Christian principles must not be prejudiced, but rather preserved and 
ennobled by the influence of Christianity.126 
 
This was a strong claim for indigenization. It was, however, a “top down” form of 
indigenization. In the same way that missionaries were to direct those aspirations for the 
higher things in life (such as decent employment and participation in representative 
government), missionaries would also decide how to form the cultural contours of 
indigenous Christianity. Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff would all attempt to indigenize the 
gospel in their mission work—often with varying degrees of success.  
The mission policy drew the line of separation through both church and society. 
In the same way that the church was not supposed to denationalize, neither were schools. 
Thus, black and white students would require separate schools. The Federal Policy rooted 
its social statement in “the Afrikaner’s traditional fear of gelykstelling,” which was born 
out of his “revulsion” to race mixing.127 While the drafters did not use the word 
billikheid, they argued that “each nation has a right to be itself and to try to develop and 
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uplift itself.” All people could reach their highest potential from within their own cultural 
group. Finally, its economic statement discussed the development of “self-respecting 
Christian volks,”128 and it also advocated just labor arrangements and living conditions 
for black workers in “white” areas.129     
There was something of an inconsistency in the policy. How could whites claim a 
model of parallel freedoms while still asserting their influence on almost every detail of 
black people’s lives? The answer was that whites were “trustees” of black people. It was 
a form of soft white power, which would ostensibly only govern black people until they 
were able to govern themselves (though there were no criteria as to when that might be). 
The Federal Policy declared, “The policy of trusteeship as currently practiced, must 
gradually proceed toward a policy of full independence and self-determination for the 
Coloured man and the native in his own society, school, and church.”130 They couched 
white domination not in terms of oppression, but in terms of guidance.  
During the first half of the 20th century, “trusteeship” was central to the Western 
worlds understanding or itself in relation to non-Western peoples. Colonial powers were 
seen as trustees of their subject peoples. In 1924, the League of Nations endorsed 
trusteeship as a “sacred trust” or “covenant” between “civilized” nations and “peoples not 
yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”131 
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J.H. Oldham endorsed trusteeship in his Christianity and the Race Problem.132 He would 
come to view education as central to preparing subject peoples for independence, and 
spearheaded the Phelps-Stokes Commission on mission education in Africa. This 
commission endorsed industrial education for Africa, drawing inspiration from Booker T. 
Washington.133 Oldham was also an organizer of the Le Zoute Conference, in which 
missionaries and colonial governments discussed the possibility of cooperation.134 They 
advocated a model in which European governments and missionaries guided colonial 
subjects toward an eventual independence. Apartheid ideologues applied this model to 
South Africa. They argued that white South Africans were the trustees of black South 
Africans, and would guide them to independent national lives.     
The missionary policy was not a coherent plan for total apartheid. It did not 
necessarily envision complete separation of the country, and its language would have 
been consistent with patters of segregation. Though it spoke of developing the African 
peoples in reserves to self-respecting Christian volks, it still envisioned a permanent 
presence of black South Africans as laborers in the “white” economy. It also lacked any 
statements about separate political destinies of black South Africans. Nevertheless, it 
articulated an ideal in which different ethnic groups required separate churches, schools, 
societies, and economies. As a Christian missionary policy, the largely Christian 
Afrikaners could be confident that this was a moral policy. The best way to assist black 																																																								
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peoples was to help them achieve their highest potential from within their own cultural 
groups. White people would, likewise, maintain their own cultural integrity as well. 
There was a sense of parity in apartheid, which they understood as a kind of justice: the 
Afrikaners offered to other groups what they claimed for themselves.135 
The National Party Adopts Apartheid  
The National Party began to talk about apartheid in the early 1940s. Hansie 
Kleynhans, the sexton at the Pretoria East Congregation, told Nico Smith that a group of 
NP politicians held a meeting at the church to discuss their electoral platform. In the 1943 
election, Malan’s party had won 43 seats to the United Party’s 89. While they had gained 
a significant number of seats since the last election, they still needed to expand their base. 
One participant allegedly said, “Why don’t we adopt apartheid as a policy to present to 
the volk? The NGK has already prepared the minds of most Afrikaners well for such a 
policy. It wouldn’t be foreign to them, and they might be prepared to vote for a policy 
like that.”136 Smith noted that there is no documentary evidence for this event, and stories 
like this smack of rumor. Nevertheless, it does point to the fact that the NGK and the 
National Party were willing to work along the same lines in terms of racial policy.   
It was certainly true that NGK members would have learned about the mission 
policy through Die Kerkbode, where it was the subject of great debate. In 1940, Ben 
Marais, who served as the Chaplain for University Students at the Pretoria East 
Congregation, weighed in on the mission policy. He called the policy experimental, 
suggesting that while there were pragmatic reasons for separation, there was no scriptural 																																																								
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basis for dividing Christians.137 Immediately, many ministers fired letters to Die 
Kerkbode, supporting both sides of the argument. Those who were in favor of the mission 
policy drew up a list of scriptures evidencing separation. Marais responded that while the 
Bible noted difference, it did not require difference, least of all in the church. It is vital to 
note that Marais was not rejecting apartheid as a nation-building program, but rather its 
justification as a scriptural policy.138 For many in the NGK, however, if the policy did not 
have scriptural support, it would have to be abandoned. And so, in 1942, the Transvaal 
NGK set up a commission “to show that the policy of the church is grounded on the 
principles of God’s word which teaches that racial apartheid and trusteeship of the whites 
over the native must be maintained.”139 “Apartheid” was fresh in many minds in the early 
1940s, and it also seemed to garner a great deal of support.   
The timeline of the NP’s adoption of apartheid also fits with Kleynhans’ story. 
Historian Saul Debow noted that Malan began using apartheid in common parlance only 
in 1943.140 Malan himself noted that the policy was not invented by the National Party, 
but rather came from the churches. He stated, “It was not the state but the church who 
took the lead with apartheid. The state followed the principle laid down by the church in 
the field of education for the native, the colored, and the Asian. The result? Friction was 
eliminated. The Boer church surpasses other churches in missionary activity. It is the 
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result of apartheid.”141 Though he perhaps claimed too much for “the Boer church’s” 
mission activity, he was candid that apartheid was a religious idea first.142    
Volkskongress 
Throughout the 1940s, missionaries worked with academic, cultural, and political 
elites to build widespread confidence in apartheid. The Federal Mission Commission of 
the NGK and the FAK jointly organized a conference in 1944 to discuss “The Race 
Policy of the Afrikaner.” (Note that the use of the singular implies a quest for unity 
among all Afrikaners). At the congress, it became clear that influential Afrikaner 
politicians, intellectuals, religious leaders, and social scientists had all come to embrace 
apartheid. Nationalist politician E.G. Jansen, who would serve as Malan’s Minister of 
Native Affairs, defended a vision of religious, educational, and social separation that was 
consistent with the missionary policies. He also envisioned even more robust economic 
and political separation, so that South Africa could truly be a “white man’s country.”143 
The poet Totius gave a paper on “the religious foundation of the racial policy of the 
Afrikaner.” He argued that as creator, God was known by the Hebrew name, Hammabdil, 
which means “the maker of separation” (“skeidingsmaker”). For Totius, separation and 
distinction were consistently upheld throughout the biblical narrative. 144  He dramatically 
said when advocates of equality asked him for a text supporting ethnic separation, he 
would respond, “There is no proof…I have no text, but I have the Bible—the whole 																																																								
141 Malan in Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 460.  
142 Elphick, 232-233. Hermann Giliomee pointed out that Malan tended to focus on older 
nationalist issues, such as Afrikaner/English relations and the poor white problem. He only infrequently 
discussed apartheid. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 488-489. 
143 Adonis, 83.  
144 Lombard, 38-39. Adonis, 82-83.  
		
82 
Bible.”145 His sanctimonious utterance implied the whole biblical narrative supported 
ethnic separation.  
Sociologist Geoff Cronjé delivered the third paper at the congress entitled “The 
Question of Blood Mixing.” Cronjé would be Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff’s sociology 
professor at the University of Pretoria and Boshoff’s master’s thesis adviser. It is worth 
noting, however, that they differed from Cronjé even during their most nationalistic 
stages. In their student work, Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff avoided making any claims that 
whites were intrinsically superior to blacks. Instead, they focused on cultural differences. 
Cronjé, while embracing culture and history as the main reason for racial separation in 
South Africa, was also eager to cite “scientific” findings on intelligence as evidence that 
blacks and whites could not form a common society. 146 He came from the German 
tradition of eugenics, and was plagued by a fear of racial miscegenation. Again, there was 
a sexual anxiety with concerns about mixed-race children.147  
J.G. Strydom and J.H. Greyvenstein gave a paper entitled “The Afrikaner’s 
mission policy.” Strydom repeated his list of threat to the Afrikaner’s future, though he 
now included an increasing number of black migrants to “white” cities (reflecting the 
worry over “influx control”), “ill-disposed books and writings,” white poverty, race 
mixing, birth control (which he called the “sin of genocide”), Indian merchants in Natal, 
and “an extremely undesirable class of white people flooding into our country, that 
consists mainly of Jews from Eastern Europe” (reflecting the heightened anti-Semitism of 
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the time). Missionary work remained Strydom’s preferred self-defense strategy. “Give 
him [“the Bantu”] the right religion, the right education, the right enlightenment, so that 
he will also be proud of his nation, his language, his heroes, and his particular 
property—give him pride of nation, and pride of race, and you save him and you save 
yourself.”148  By the end of the Volkskongress, it was clear that leading members of the 
Afrikaner elite had come to embrace apartheid not only as a mission policy, but also as a 
political policy.  
Internal Misgivings 
While there was growing consensus among Afrikaner intellectual elites that 
apartheid would solve South Africa’s racial problems, not all leaders in the NGK were as 
confident. Ben Marais continued to voice his concern that biblical support for the policy 
was arbitrary, as did Stellenbosch professor and Bible translator B.B. “Bennie” Keet. 
Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff’s New Testament professor, E.P. Groenewald, and their 
dogmatics professor, A.B. du Preez countered these arguments. They believed that 
apartheid had to be justified scripturally; the church could not support it merely for 
pragmatic reasons. Groenewald drafted a policy statement for the NGK in his “Apartheid 
and Trusteeship in the Light of the Holy Scripture.”149 He reiterated Totius’ argument 
that God is a God of separation, adding that there could be no peace among nations if 
borders were extinguished between different ethnic groups. Groenewald selected biblical 
evidence to support apartheid, emphasizing God’s command for Israel to remain separate 
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from their neighboring ethnic groups.150 Jesus and the apostles also recognized different 
ethnic groups, as the case of the Syrophoenician woman and Pentecost demonstrated.151 
These were strange examples. The story of the Syrophoenician woman could just as 
easily (and if not more accurately) be read as biblical support for transcending racial 
borders (Matthew 15:21-28), as could the story of speaking multiple languages on 
Pentecost (Acts 2: 1-14). Regardless, Groenewald unambiguously concluded, “God’s 
blessing rests on the observance of apartheid.”152  
Groenewald admitted he had greater difficulty finding biblical evidence for white 
trusteeship. He argued, however, that it could be inferred from two “cardinal scriptural 
truths.” The first truth was that scripture accepts the morality of one group being subject 
to another. The Gibeonites were “hewers of wood and drawers of water” for the Israelites 
(Joshua 9:27). The parallel between this working arrangement and the colonial patterns of 
life and labor in South Africa, in which blacks performed menial tasks for whites, was 
not difficult to see. When the Israelites conquered Canaan, they made the Gibeonites a 
subject people. The second truth was that scripture recognized the morality of one man 
having responsibility for another; greater people ought to have charge over lesser people. 
For Groenewald, European civilization was more advanced than the civilizations of 
Africa, and therefore whites had a responsibility for blacks. Trusteeship, therefore, could 
be considered biblical.153  
Groenewald’s arguments were accepted by the Transvaal NGK in 1947. The next 																																																								
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year, however, Marais raised an objection to the report. He argued that Israel was not a 
volk but rather a religious community. Biblical injunctions for separation were made in 
order to protect their religious purity (foreign wives bring foreign Gods), not their racial 
or ethnic integrity. He also noted that Jews made proselytes, in which non-Jews could 
become Jews. In the church, therefore, where all shared a common religion, differences 
must not be overemphasized to the point that they obscured unity. After Marais’ motion 
was seconded, the synod became very tense. Groenewald accused Marais of casting 
doubt on his exegetical competence—a sensitive matter for a biblical scholar. This led to 
closed-door talks, where the argument came to a head. When the synod finally 
reconvened, the gathering took note of Groenwald’s findings, and it claimed that the 
mission policy was based on scripture, and Marais was not named for a new commission 
on contemporary questions.154 Clearly, the rank and file was falling in line behind 
apartheid.  
 A.B. du Preez added his voice to the argument. His students and colleagues 
remembered him as a fiery and confident man. The University of Pretoria’s Rector once 
said of him, “He may be right or he may be wrong, but he is never in doubt.”155 
Preaching among factory workers, he came into a conflict with famous trade unionist 
Solly Sachs, who charged him with libel. Sachs won the case, and du Preez paid a large 
settlement. He taught dogmatics and ethics, and once a month had students over to his 
house to answer questions and to serve them his wife’s famous cakes.156 Du Preez argued 
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that if apartheid was not based on scripture, then it would (quite tellingly) be a “small, 
selfish attempt at self-maintenance that is built on human considerations and is alien to 
the will of God.”157 Du Preez reiterated much of the evidence cited by Groenewald, 
defending it with additional quotes from Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper.158 God, du 
Preez argued, ordained nations for the sake of ordering the chaos of human relations. The 
stories of Pentecost and the Great Commission demonstrate that God wanted people to 
hear the gospel in their own, separate languages. Groenewald and du Preez asserted that 
human divisions were important for the maintenance of God’s creation, while all 
Christians share a spiritual (i.e. not necessarily physical) unity.159 These arguments 
would be reiterated repeated throughout the apartheid years to avoid any conversation of 
structural unity between white and black Christians.  
Theologians who supported “separate development” frequently cited the tower of 
Babel as evidence that God willed the separation of human races. Theologians Klippies 
Kritzinger and Willem Saayman called it the “locus classicus” for apartheid theology.160 
In Genesis 11, an unnamed group of people attempted to build “a tower with its top in the 
heavens” in order to “make a name” for themselves. This was threatening to God, who 
said, “Look, they are one people, and they all have one language; this is only the 
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beginning of what they will do; nothing that they propose to do will now be impossible 
for them” (Genesis 11:6). Worried that they would become too powerful and transcend 
the limits between humanity and the divine, God confused their language and “scattered 
them abroad from there over the face of all the earth” (Genesis 11:8).161 For apartheid 
theologians, this was proof that God willed separate nations. In his 1950 speech, the 
young Bosch adopted the argument, saying “It sometimes seems as if the story of the 
Tower of Babel was told deliberately to express the big idea that humans sometimes 
desire to have one large uniform world empire, whereas God determined that there should 
be many separate nations and languages.”162 Not all theologians found it satisfying. It 
was certainly a weak point in the NGK account of separate nations, because it made 
God’s punishment for human pride an essential aspect for ordering society. Opponents of 
apartheid theology would frequently attack the “tower of babel argument.”163  
The NGK eventually found a settlement between moderates like Marais and 
Keet164 and apartheid theologians like Groenewald and du Preez. After a series of ad-hoc 
councils and semantic revisions, the churches of the Federal Council of the NGK adopted 																																																								
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a new racial policy in 1955. Rather than discussing the scriptural grounds of apartheid, it 
argued for a biblical basis of race relations. Scripture, they noted, discussed both the 
unity and diversity of humanity, and both concepts were important in the South African 
situation. Like the mission policies, it argued that different groups required different 
churches, but no one acting in good faith could be barred from any church of God. It 
avoided all the comparisons between the Afrikaner volk and Israel, and it called on 
Christians to live out koinonia, or expressions of Christian unity. By this, they envisioned 
occasional interracial gatherings of church members, but certainly not structural 
interracial church unity. Complete Christian unity would only come with the complete 
conquest of sin, which was not due until Christ’s return. In the meantime, Afrikaner 
church leaders could be satisfied with a more moderate racial policy that still affirmed 
separation.165 Moderate leaders like Marais said they had no opposition to the wording 
“in principle.”166 The compromise favored those who supported the morality of 
separation, and it would remain virtually unchallenged for over 20 years.    
SABRA and National Party Policy 
As the NGK debated the biblical foundations of apartheid, missionaries continued 
to embrace and defend “separate development.” Stellenbosch mission professor G.B.A. 
Gerdener worked with P.O. Sauer, E.G. Jansen, J.J. Serfontein, and M.D.C. de Wet Nel 
on what would become the National Party’s 1948 racial platform.167 Jan Smuts had noted 
that segregation had “fallen on hard times,” and appointed the Fagan Commission to 
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devise a plan of action for managing race relations. It called for relaxed influx controls 
and a more stable urban African population. The National Party rejected their proposal as 
far too lax, and their own Sauer Commission advocated total apartheid and increased 
influx measures. Gerdener’s influence on the commission was very clear. The document 
asserted that the NP would support “healthy” missions, meaning those that subscribed to 
the NGK policy of racial separation rather than Anglo-American liberalism. It also 
claimed that under NP leadership, “Non-whites are to be actively and powerfully led to 
make the Christian Religion the foundation of their whole life, so that a healthy 
Christian-National life-view is also built up among them.”168 Apartheid was able to 
appeal to both the pious and the racist sensibilities of the electorate. It was advanced as a 
policy that would further the “Christian national life” of blacks, but at it the same time it 
would keep blacks away from whites.169  
 In September of 1948, Gerdener and a handful of colleagues at Stellenbosch 
formed the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs (SABRA), often described as the 
pro-apartheid counterpart of the liberal South African Institute of Racial Affairs 
(SAIRR). From its founding in 1948 through the 1960s, the leadership of both the 
National Party and the Broederbond took SABRA’s research program seriously, often 
discussing and debating its policy suggestions. All leading members of SABRA were 
prominent Broeders.170 Other organizations criticized SABRA for making policy 																																																								
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suggestions that would have far-reaching impact on black communities without 
consulting black leaders.171 According to SABRA, there were only two options for South 
Africa’s political future: complete separation or integration, any middle path would only 
fall one way or the other. SABRA intellectual W.E. Barker argued that integration, even 
through a carefully guarded process of assimilation, would lead to the loss of white 
political power and the end of the white race in South Africa. Complete separation, on the 
other hand, would allow whites and blacks to develop on parallel courses, eliminating 
friction between the two groups.172  
Idealistic intellectuals at SABRA spilled a great deal of ink criticizing migratory 
labor and urban segregation (as opposed to total separation). They were critical of the fact 
that whites demanded cheap black labor while also demanding separation from blacks in 
order to preserve their “own racial purity.” This led to a situation in which “reserves 
would only exist as a source of even more of this cheap labor, and a dumping-ground for 
the used-up labor from the cities.”173  They believed that total apartheid, or “separate 
development” (as they preferred to call it), was the moral alternative. For Gerdener and 
the SABRA intellectuals, the “native reserves” had to be developed into “homelands” 
where black people could exercise their independent social, political, and economic life 
on an equitable basis with white population. This would require the white population to 
sacrifice land to consolidate the reserves. Missionaries and other apartheid ideologues 																																																																																																																																																																					
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constantly suggested expanding the “native reserves.” Strydom, for example, argued that 
the government ought to set aside several extensive “black provinces.” These provinces 
would also provide spaces for Africans to enjoy full citizenship apart from white South 
Africans.174 SABRA intellectuals argued that whites would also have to sacrifice a great 
deal of capital to fund new economic ventures. It would also mean sacrificing black 
labor, as Gerdener wrote, “Albeit gradually, we must be willing to find a substitute for 
the present so-called cheap labor in the kitchens, on the farms, and in the factories.”175 
For Gerdener, apartheid gained moral legitimacy because it required major white 
sacrifices on behalf of blacks.  
Gerdener attempted to convince the ecumenical world of “separate 
development”’s benevolent underpinnings, and he lobbied the government to make 
sacrifice a central aspect of their policy. He was not very successful on either count. 
From April 4 to 6, 1950, Gerdener acted as chair of the “Church Congress on the Native 
Question” in Bloemfontein. The Congress included representatives from all three Dutch 
Reformed sister churches, and it also included foreign observers like the Dutch mission 
professor J.C. Hoekendijk. Only whites were invited. There were six papers at the 
congress, dealing with the religious, educational, sociological, economic, political, and 
medical dimensions of race relations respectively. The influence of previous missionary 
documents and thinking was clear. Speakers envisioned mission as the conversion of 
black individuals into separate, ethnically based churches. Each volk had the right to 
express its own religious life in its own area, serve its own people, formulate its own 																																																								
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confession, and develop its own goals. The maintenance of a group’s own language was 
essential for the survival of both that group and the gospel.176  
Much like SABRA, the delegates declared that integration would lead to 
“unnecessary friction between the two races and to the undermining of the future of the 
white race, which would greatly disadvantage the development of Christian civilization in 
Africa.” The destruction of white Christian civilization in Africa would also, the report 
argued, “have detrimental consequences for the growth of the Bantu volke.”177 The use of 
the plural implied that missionaries were now envisioning separate “Bantu people 
groups.” Note that the use of “Bantu” gradually began to replace “Native,” reflecting the 
ethnolinguistic basis of the apartheid vision. “Bantu,” however, was not a neutral term, 
and many black people increasingly found it odious and offensive. Partial integration 
whereby blacks would work in the lower echelons of white economy while living in 
segregated neighborhoods did not offer a just solution. As congress report read, “we 
cannot keep the natives in service, teach them and develop them and then pin them to 
unschooled callings.”178 Integration, whether total or partial, would lead to the 
detribalization of “the Bantu.” This was seen not only as a cultural problem, but also as a 
social issue. Sociologists and religious leaders argued that the lack of ethnic ties led to an 
increase in crime. They also argued that unjust working arrangements would make black 
people easy prey for communists.179 Siding with Afrikaner elite opinion, the Congress 
report found that the only just solution to race relations in South Africa was total 																																																								
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separation and development along ethnically distinctive lines.   
The report couched the apartheid project in the self-sacrificial language of a 
missionary task (sendingdaad). In light of the “dire conditions among the Bantu 
population,” the Afrikaner volk was called to “a renewed, powerful all-sacrificing 
missionary task” in which “each member of the church and volk will place everything on 
the altar to bring the Gospel message to each heathen heart.”180 Sacrificing for the sake of 
maintaining a “white South Africa” while making sacrifices for the development black 
volke was the “precious duty (dure plig) of the whites as trustees of the natives.”181 The 
congress encouraged the government to forge ahead with total apartheid, making the 
requisite sacrifices to ensure the plan’s success. It also recommended that a commission 
be established to gather facts, conduct research, and to make recommendations.182  
The Congress leaders naïvely assumed that the white electorate would be willing 
to make necessary sacrifices and that blacks would find their political and economic 
aspirations in “homelands.” Malan was skeptical. Addressing Parliament after the 
conference, Malan recognized apartheid as the “ideal situation,” but stated emphatically, 
“complete territorial separation is unpractical under our current situation in South Africa 
where our whole economic structure is in great part dependent on Native Labor. It is not 
possible, and it does not help any party to try to achieve the impossible.”183  
Other members of the National Party were more ambitious than the aging Malan. 
Hendrik Verwoerd replaced E.G. Jansen as Minister of Native Affairs in October 1950. 																																																								
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Verwoerd would serve as Minister of Native Affairs until 1958, when he became Prime 
Minister of South Africa. Verwoerd would articulate the homeland policy, and he would 
lead South Africa to become a republic. He, more than any other, is remembered as the 
“architect of apartheid.” Carel Boshoff would become the architect’s son-in-law. Boshoff 
married Anna Verwoerd in 1954. There was, perhaps, something Freudian in Boshoff’s 
choice of Anna Verwoerd. He had such zeal for Afrikaner nationalism and “separate 
development” that he married into its leading family. Boshoff’s sister, Annatjie, would 
become the private secretary to Verwoerd’s wife, Betsie. The Verwoerds and the 
Boshoffs would enjoy an intense personal connection as well as significant ideological 
overlap for years to come.  
In May 1951, Verwoerd announced that the National Party’s policy was in line 
with the findings of the Bloemfontein Congress. In November 1950, the government 
formed the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within 
the Union of South Africa, largely in response to the Bloemfontein Congress’ request for 
such a study group.184 In a speech to the Native Representative Council on December 5, 
1950, Verwoerd echoed many of the arguments used by intellectuals at SABRA and the 
Bloemfontein Congress. He claimed there were two possibilities for South Africa’s 
future: “intermixed communities” or “separate communities.” Verwoerd argued that 
white opponents of apartheid did not actually wish to extend full franchise rights, but 
only limited communal representation. Verwoerd argued that “the Bantu” would not be 
satisfied with this, and soon “he will desire the same [extended rights] in the social, 
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economic and other spheres of life, involving in due course intermixed labor, intermixed 
living, and, eventually, a miscegenated population.”185 For Verwoerd, there was a hint of 
sexual anxiety in this statement, but it also reflected demographic worries. According to 
the white South African sense of race, mixed race children were “non-white.” The more 
mixed race relationships there were, the smaller the white population would eventually 
become, and it would become more difficult to assert white political interests. Apart from 
anxiety about “miscegenation,” Verwoerd argued that the struggle for equality would also 
create “friction and conflict,” and it would lead to “the most terrific clash of interests 
imaginable” as blacks demanded more and whites wanted to cede less.186 
For Verwoerd, reiterated the point that the only alternative was apartheid, or “a 
plan to provide the two population groups with full opportunities for the full development 
of their respective powers and ambitions without coming into conflict.” Verwoerd told 
the Native Representative Council that apartheid offered black South Africans much 
more than the “vague chimera” of equality and integration. He said, separation created  
a situation which has never existed for the Bantu; namely, that, taking into 
consideration their languages, traditions, history and different national 
communities, they may pass through a development of their own…[In which] 
they need not be the imitators and henchmen of the [Europeans].187   
 
Interestingly, while he began to adopt the moral language of parity, Verwoerd was 
reluctant to discuss white sacrifice. Rather than territorial expansion of “Native 
Reserves,” for example, he called for soil improvements. Thus, the NP would defend 
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apartheid by using language that missionaries developed in conjunction with a range of 
Afrikaner intellectuals, but it would never pursue the policy in a way that would demand 
sacrifices from the white electorate.  
Legislating Apartheid 
While total territorial separation may have seemed impractical, the NP 
aggressively pursued a legislative agenda that reified the legal boundaries between whites 
and people of color. In July 1949, it passed the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, 
fulfilling a campaign promise. It amended the Immorality Act in May 1950, making 
sexual intercourse between “Europeans and non-Europeans” illegal. One month later, it 
passed the Population Registration Act, which required every South African to be 
classified as “a white person, a Coloured person or a native.” Coloured and black South 
Africans were further classified according to “ethnic or other group.” In July 1950, the 
NP passed the “Group Areas Act,” which legally restricted the areas where people of 
various races could live and work.188  
In 1951, the government passed the Bantu Authorities Act, which created “tribal 
authorities” and abolished the Native Representative Council. According to the logic of 
apartheid, “tribal authorities” would give black people some form of self-governance in 
the reserves. Rather than giving any real representation, however, this law gave the white 
government the ability to appoint whichever chiefs and councilors it wanted, even if they 
did not enjoy local support. Fufilling another campaign promise, the NP built stronger 
“influx control” measures in 1952. The Native Laws Amendment Act gave the 
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government the authority to arrest black people who were deemed idle and/or disorderly. 
It only allowed black people 72 hours to find work in urban areas, unless they met steep 
residence requirements. Finally, it required black people seeking employment to register 
with a government labor bureau. That same year, the government passed the “Abolition 
of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act.” Ironically, this act actually put in place a 
more restrictive pass system. Whereas previously only black men had previously had to 
carry passes, now both men and women over 16 had to carry a “reference books,” which 
included information about their age, sex, race, residency, tribe, and employment. 
Africans were required to produce their “reference books,” colloquially called a 
“dompas,” when asked by any government official, or they risk imprisonment and/or 
fines.189    
In 1953, the government passed the “Bantu Education Act,” which brought all 
education under state oversight.190 This meant that church, mission, and independent 
schools that were educating black people either had to conform to the state syllabus or 
shut their doors. The educational program was so ethnically based and restrictive that 
many schools opted to close. Hundreds of Methodist Schools, for example, ceased 
operation rather than have their language and curriculum dictated by the state.191 Mission 
education had hitherto supported the growth of a black elite who challenged white 
ascendency, and the government now attempted to stamp out this source of opposition. 
Verwoerd defended the policy with apartheid’s moral language of parity, saying, “The 																																																								
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Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for 
him in the European community above certain forms of labour. Within his own 
community, however, all doors are open.”192 While black people would no longer be able 
to challenge whites, they could direct their aspirations toward their own community. Such 
arguments were insulting to black intellectuals. I.B. Tabata famously called Bantu 
Education “education for barbarism.”193  
Verwoerd would put all of these laws into effect as Minister of the Department of 
Native Affairs. Under his administration, the department became a “state within a state.” 
It attempted to control the pace and speed of urbanization. The “labour bureaux” were 
under the purview of the Department of Native Affairs. The department also attempted to 
collect and coordinate vast amount of information about black people. The Central 
Reference Bureau collected fingerprints and photographs of over 10 million black people. 
Beginning in 1953, the Department of Native Affairs also took charge of black students’ 
education. The Department of Native Affairs oversaw leadership in “Native Reserves,” 
where it frequently imposed both leaders and unpopular “betterment” schemes.194  
As Prime Minister, Verwoerd would carry the policy of apartheid further than any 
other Prime Minister before of after him. In the late 1950s, Verwoerd began to talk about 
apartheid as a kind of internal decolonization. In the same way that Britain and France 
were granting independence to their subject African peoples, so too would “white South 
Africa” give independence to its subject black people. He hoped that it would relieve 																																																								
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pressure from international critics, who were increasingly adamant that black South 
Africans be granted increased rights. It would also serve as the basis for disenfranchising 
Africans in “white” South Africa. Verwoerd began to discuss a “commonwealth of 
African states,” in which ethnic nation states governed their own affairs, while 
cooperating economically and militarily. The 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-government 
act laid the legal foundation for carving eight (and later 10) independent Homelands or 
“Bantustans” out of South Africa. The government presented the policy as the logical and 
moral outcome of its previous policies. Then Minister of Native Affairs M.D.C. de Wet 
Nel defended the policy with a version of the same moral arguments for apartheid; he 
claimed that it was the will of God for every nation to be independent and realize its 
cultural destiny.195 On this point, Afrikaner missionaries, religious leaders, and politians 
were in agreement.  
Missions and Moral Defense 
 As the NP unrolled its legislative program, missionaries and NGK leaders 
continued defending the policy as just and Christian. In 1953, Gerdener chaired the 
“Conference of Church Leaders” in Pretoria. This meeting brought English-speaking 
and Afrikaans-speaking church leaders together. NGK leaders reiterated their previous 
positions. Interestingly, C.B. Brink claimed that he was not defending the “policy of 
apartheid,” but rather the church’s mission policy. They overlapped to such an extent 
that he was really doing both.196 English leaders at the meeting were critical of 
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apartheid, but they were far from radical. While critiquing South Africa for not 
unreservedly subscribing to the Charter of Human Rights, the Rev. Dr. J.B. Webb also 
argued that “Rome was not built in a day, and full citizenship rights [for black people] 
cannot be universally accorded overnight.” Among themselves, whites were arguing 
about whether to develop “separate freedoms” or expand a “qualified franchise.” 197 
There was little sense that any white moral leaders were envisioning a non-racial South 
Africa.  
The next year, the Cape and Transvaal NGK synods hosted the “Inter-Racial 
Conference of Church Leaders” in Johannesburg, under the theme “God’s Kingdom in 
Multi-Racial South Africa.” Again, Afrikaner moral leaders reiterated their assertion that 
apartheid aimed at positive goals—freedom and self-determination (albeit separate) for 
all. G.B.A. Gerdener agreed that unity could not be forced on Christians from different 
cultural groups; instead it would have to develop organically. In the meantime, different 
people ought to attend churches that serve their different needs. He quoted R.H.W. 
Shepherd of the Bantu Presbyterian Church,  
Happy is the apartheid in which the self-government is real…happy is the 
apartheid in which the highest office in the church is open, not merely in theory 
but in fact, to Africans. Happy is the apartheid which reckons the black man as a 
man and as a partner—in his own sphere more than an equal partner.198  
 
Gerdener concluded, “We cannot put it better than that.”199 
Much like the 1953 Conference, there were no radical challenges to “apartheid.” 																																																																																																																																																																					
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British Congregationalist Norman Goodall, who was head of the International Missionary 
Council, also addressed the meeting, specifically calling for racial reconciliation. He 
noted that “empires are not won by men who can see both sides of a question,” and that 
the present situation called for decisive action. Yet Goodall was quick to point out that it 
could be just as dangerous to not see both sides of a question. He added that if Christians 
cared about “the empire of Christ,” and if they wanted to “act for Him as ministers of 
reconciliation in a divided world,” then Christians would have to continue to come 
together to talk about their differences.200 Goodall argued that if one is inhibited from 
treating a person of another race as he would treat Christ, “then there is something wrong 
in one or other of these inhibiting causes.”201 For Goodall, the ministry of reconciliation 
would require an encounter between Christians with deep differences. Reconciliation 
would gain meaning as a new solution for South Africa’s racial divisions over the course 
of the next half-century. For the time being, however, the idea of separation rather than 
reconciliation held sway with Afrikaners. 
Conclusion 
Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff were confident that the Afrikaners’ cause was 
righteous. They believed that they had a culture worth preserving, and that it was 
threatened by “miscegenation” or “race fusion.” They also had a sincere faith that pushed 
them toward the ministry. As students at the University of Pretoria, they learned to square 
their pious inclinations and their nationalistic impulses. Their professors were frequently 
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the leading advocates of apartheid as a moral policy. Smith’s undergraduate thesis 
reflected this intellectual and moral milieu. Under the title, “An Analysis of the Term 
‘Self-Love’ with Special Reference to its Connection with ‘Blood Mixing’ and 
Apartheid,” Smith wrote that in South Africa, racial proximity was leading to the 
possibility of “blood mixing.” At the same time, Afrikaners wanted to maintain their own 
“racial purity” through apartheid. Smith asked if there was an ethical ground for this kind 
of self-love.202 He rejected biological racism, saying that new research demonstrated that 
whites were not inherently superior to blacks; their differences were cultural. If whites 
did not mix with blacks on the basis of a superior attitude, this would be selfish and 
haughty rather than an expression of true self-love. Nor, he argued, could the biological 
or social urge for self-preservation be a principle argument against race mixing.203 Self-
preservation (i.e. self-love) would only be consistent with neighborly love if one 
protected oneself in order to better serve a neighbor. In order to best serve the needs of 
black people, white people had to maintain their own distinctive life. Racial separation, 
the argument went, would make white people better missionaries.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
“BECOME A MISSIONARY” (1950-1958) 
As students in the early 1950s, David Bosch, Nico Smith, and Carel Boshoff began to 
engage in mission activity. Boshoff and Smith distributed bibles in various African 
languages, visited hospitals, and preached at “garage services” for black domestic 
workers. Bosch became interested in mission work after organizing a service for black 
workers on his father’s farm, and hoped to go beyond South Africa to work as a 
missionary. The Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas 
within the Union of South Africa (Tomlinson Commission) was formed to make practical 
suggestions for making apartheid work. When it published its findings in 1954, it would 
ignite and channel new missionary energies. The report envisioned an important place for 
missionaries in making the apartheid plan work. It highlighted the fact that many black 
people in the northern Transvaal were not Christians, and it suggested many areas in 
which churches could cooperate with the state. Bosch read a summary of the report while 
a graduate student at Basel. It inspired him to shift his focus from Africa north of the 
Limpopo to the Transkei, where he would establish the Madwaleni Mission Station. After 
reading the report, Boshoff decided to found a mission station among Northern Sotho-
speakers at Meetse-a-Bophelo. He would use his connection with his father-in-law, 
Minister of Native Affairs Hendrik Verwoerd, to help Nico Smith build a new mission 
station at Tshilidzini among Venda speakers. The National Party’s project of “separate 
development” as envisioned by the Tomlinson Commission directed Bosch, Smith, and 
Boshoff’s missionary impulses to “black homelands.”   
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Mission Fever 
As devout Christians, Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff had joined the Student Christian 
Movement (SCM). The SCM was, at that point, still an ecumenical movement that 
crossed racial and linguistic barriers. When the World Student Christian Federation 
repudiated segregation in 1964, the South African branch withdrew, splitting into four 
separate movements along racial and linguistic lines, and yet another interracial body was 
formed.1 During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the South African SCM still hosted a 
variety of international speakers, including the Canadian evangelist Oswald Smith. When 
he visited the University of Pretoria, Oswald made a great impression on the students, 
asking them “Why should anybody hear the Gospel twice if so many haven’t heard it 
once.” Students were also called on to sign the “volunteer declaration,” which read, “It is 
my purpose, if God permit, to become a foreign missionary.”2 Oswald Smith’s words hit 
home with the students. They were already invested in mission work, and Oswald Smith 
fired them up even more.   
 Students had been working on a number of their own mission projects. Shortly 
after deciding that he wanted to become a minister, Bosch organized a service for the 
black workers on his father’s farm. He later recalled, “I still can’t quite understand today 
why I did that, because there was no preparation for it in my own background. I felt I had 
to do something about the state of affairs among the black people and so I organized 																																																								
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services on a Sunday afternoon.”3 He told a head worker that he would like to preach to 
some of the workers, and the head worker enthusiastically gathered a group of listeners. 
When Bosch arrived, all of the workers came forward, extending their hands. Bosch was 
hesitant; he not quite sure what was happening. He remembered, “It was one of the most 
difficult moments in my life.” Seeing his discomfort, they told him that it was the habit of 
Christians to shake hands with one another. Bosch had not considered that they might be 
Christians before. In fact, he had never really considered the workers at all.4 He 
remembered, “I had never known them as anything but farm-laborers, and now, all of a 
sudden, even those who were not confessing Christians, were now put into a new context 
and into a different relationship with me.”5 He later remembered this as a turning point in 
his life. Though he still retained much of his previous racial attitudes, he said this was 
when his horizon began to broaden. He said, “I began to see people who were different 
from me with new eyes, always more and more clearly. I began to discover the simple, 
self-evident fact, that the things we have in common are much more than the things 
which divide us.”6 To be sure, Bosch was reading that experience from his vantage point 
in the late 1980s. Bosch remained optimistic about the prospects of “separate 
development” through the mid-1960s, but he would become incrementally less confident. 
This experience made him begin to rethink his conception of race relations.  
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 Boshoff also became passionate about mission activities, and he dragged Smith 
along with him. Smith later remembered not being terribly comfortable with the 
proximity to black people, but kept those reservations to himself as a student. Boshoff 
and Smith, along with several classmates, conducted garage services for black domestic 
workers in Pretoria on Thursday evenings.7 These services were initiated by Willie 
Theron, who (like Strydom) thought that the only way to secure the Afrikaner’s future 
was to conduct mission work among black Africans. Black Christians converted by 
Afrikaners would make potential allies.8 Rather than sharing church buildings with white 
congregations, which was very much taboo, Theron managed to secure a number of white 
families’ garages for services on Thursday. They backed their cars out, benches were 
brought in, and there, among the oilcans, white theology students delivered sermons that 
were translated into African languages.9  
Smith later noted that much was lost in translation, which led to some humorous 
cross-cultural mishaps. Boshoff once warned a congregation that the entire world was full 
of “darkness.” In Afrikaans, however, the word for “darkness” (duisternis) is very close 
to that for “Germans” (Duitsers). In a moment of confusion, or perhaps subversion, the 
translator began warning the congregation about the dangers of a world full of Germans. 
After Boshoff was well into his sermon, he realized that while he was talking about the 
problem of darkness, the translator was talking about Germans. There was laughter and 
embarrassment as they tried to sort the problem out. In another instance, Smith preached 																																																								
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about the great power of Jesus, but the Afrikaans word for power, “mag,” is nearly 
identical to that for stomach, “maag.” Needless to say, as Smith preached, the 
congregation chuckled to hear about Jesus’ big belly.10  
Saturday mornings, Boshoff and Smith along with several other students peddled 
their bicycles into central Pretoria where they distributed Bibles to black people.11 They 
were all impressed that Boshoff had studied Northern Sotho (Sipedi) during high school, 
earning his highest grades in the subject. His school was the first in the country that 
offered Northern Sotho to Afrikaans students. Boshoff wrote a matric exam in the 
subject, noting with pride that he had the same questions as they asked in Northern 
Sotho-speaking schools.12 He was able to read aloud from a Northern Sotho Bible on the 
street, astonishing his classmates even more.13  
On Sunday afternoons, the students visited the black wards of the hospital. There, 
they had conversations with the sick, comforting those who were Christians and 
converting those who were not. Boshoff remembered enjoying the real human 
connections and conversations that developed.14 Smith, however, would later confess that 
he was somewhat uncomfortable in the hospital. He wrote, “I felt bad about forcibly 
converting people who were ill. It felt to me that I was abusing their situation by forcing 
my desire on them.”15 Beyond this moral quandary, he could hear the voice of his mother 
telling him that black people were dirty; he was terrified that he would catch 																																																								
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tuberculosis.16 Smith never told Boshoff, who was so inspired by hospital work that he 
also began conducting an evening Sunday School for black farm workers on the 
University of Pretoria’s test farm.17  
Smith’s experiences of Sunday mission trips to the hospital were not completely 
painful. In the early 1950s, Beyers Naudé was working as a minister and student 
counselor at Pretoria East. Naudé’s father, Jozua François, was a founder of the Afrikaner 
Broederbond, the secret men’s organization that sought to further Afrikaner interests in 
society. Naudé would one day come to be recognized as a leading critic of apartheid, but 
in his early career, he was still in the center of Afrikaner power and influence. He, as a 
member of the Broederbond, would very quickly ascend through the ranks of NGK 
hierarchy. While Naudé was congenial with all students, he took a liking to Smith, which 
made the latter feel extremely special. It boosted Smith’s ego tremendously when Naudé 
lent him his elegant Buick to drive female students to the hospital on Sunday 
afternoons.18   
 The students formed the Mission Circle (Sendingkring), which hosted a number of 
gatherings and lectures. Albertus Smuts was the first chairman and Boshoff was his 
successor. During Boshoff’s tenure, the Mission Circle organized a number of bus trips to 
mission stations. Students could spend the weekend getting “hands-on” experience. It 
was on one such trip that David Bosch felt a call to mission in the Northern Transvaal 
among the Venda in particular. When he talked about the possibilities, he was told that 																																																								
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there was no money for mission work there.19 Bosch was not deterred. He had been 
reading various accounts of mission work in the NGK, and he made up his mind to be a 
missionary. He remembered, “I just knew then that I had to go into ‘black’ work, either in 
Nigeria or Malawi.”20 If there was no money for mission work among the Venda, he 
would just as soon go elsewhere. Bosch became head of the Mission Circle after 
Boshoff.21 
 Bosch’s father, Evert, was deeply upset by his son’s desire to become a 
missionary. Evert refused to allow his son to come home during school vacations for 
three years. At long last, Bosch’s mother, Hester, got her husband to change his mind. 
Evert was deeply convinced that whites were superior to blacks, and for a young man to 
work for blacks was a waste of time.  Even more than this, Evert believed that there was 
too much work to be done among the Afrikaners for his son to work for blacks.22 Many 
Afrikaners shared Evert Bosch’s prejudice against white charity for black people. When 
Smith announced that he was going into the mission field, and elder asked him, 
“Dominee, what the hell got into you to take this decision? You are going to bury your 
talents there under the kaffirs who will not value it. And there is in any way enough 
missionary work to do here with the white Afrikaners you are preaching to on 
Sundays.”23 Boshoff, who himself encountered some “anti-missionary” bias, argued that 
this prejudice had institutional roots. Historically, pastors (who carried the title 																																																								
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dominee—abbreviated ds.) were trained at Stellenbosch, and missionaries (who carried 
the title of reverend, eerwaarde—abbreviated eerw.) were trained at Wellington. Some 
white churches were reluctant to allow missionaries (specifically eerws.) to preach to 
their congregations; they thought it was tantamount to gelykstelling.24 Likewise, foreign 
missionaries from Johannes van der Kemp to Trevor Huddleston championed the cause 
of black people over and above the claims of whites.25 While Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff 
may have believed in separate racial destinies, their outlook was markedly different from 
many in the earlier generations, who eschewed any charitable work for black people.   
The student’s passion for mission even began to have an impact on the syllabus. 
At the University of Pretoria, mission theology and history was only taught to seniors, but 
Boshoff and his peers did not want to wait. They approached church history professor D. 
Keet, asking if he would conduct two lectures per week on mission history and theory 
respectively. The students’ eagerness delighted the elderly Keet, and he agreed 
immediately. Along with Boshoff and Smith, Willie Jonker, Andrew Murray Hofmeyer, 
R D de Villiers, Joël Herholt, and Boos Bornman attended the lectures. 26 Boshoff did not 
mention Bosch in his account of these lectures; perhaps they were conducted by class 
year. Boshoff remembered three books by Dutch missiologists as central to their studies: 																																																								
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J.H. Bavinck’s, Zending in een Wereld in Nood, J.C. Hoekendijk’s Kerk en Volk in de 
Duitse Zendingswetenschap, and H. Kraemer’s The Christian Message in Non-Christian 
World.27  
Afrikaans missiology is often described as being heavily influenced by German 
missiology, particularly the work of Gustav Warneck, Bruno Gutmann, and Christian 
Keysser. Indeed, one can detect the influences, especially when Afrikaner missiologists 
placed heavy emphasis on maintaining “tribal” roots. Later, Keysser would be directly 
influential in Smith’s work in Venda. The connection to German missiology was all the 
more troubling considering Gutmann and Keysser later had Nazi sympathies.28 Yet the 
books that Boshoff noted as most influential were by scholars who were highly critical of 
German missiology. In particular, this was true of Hoekendjik’s work. He said that the 
formation of indigenous churches led some German missiologists to form a “blood and 
soil” theology. Boshoff, with Hoekendijk, rejected this theology, saying that the church is 
not “rooted in the soil,” but rather “rooted in Christ and related to the soil.”29 Boshoff’s 
gloss captured the balance between the NGK’s evangelical and ethnic missiological 
tendencies perfectly: they were saving souls who were to remain members of particular 
ethnic groups.  
Likewise, Boshoff was deeply influenced by Kraemer’s insistence that mission is 
central to the very nature of the church. Boshoff noted that this idea had profound 
implications for the NGK. Mission work was previously conducted only by a subset of 
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congregants called “friends of missions.” These “friends” gathered funds for mission, 
which were then administered by a separate mission commission at the synod level. The 
students were taught to bring the work of mission back to the level of the congregation, 
giving every Christian a direct sense of responsibility for mission work. Boshoff recalled, 
“Our message was that the church cannot be the church without its mission work, and 
that held for every congregation.”30 Rather than blindly promoting a volkisch ideology, it 
seems that the lectures in mission theory attempted to reconcile wider trends in 
missiology with the work of the NGK. Their ideology, therefore, was adaptable. Ethnic 
separation could find new ways of expressing itself in response to new global trends. By 
the end of their studies in the early 1950s, Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff all had a sincere 
interest, if not passion, for Christian missionary work.    
Dominees and Husbands 
Coming to the end of his studies, Boshoff ascended the pulpit at the Groote Kerk 
in Central Pretoria to deliver his senior sermon. This church, much like its counterpart in 
Cape Town, served something of a theocratic function, hosting state-sponsored events 
with religious components. Only two years before, Jan Smuts’ state funeral had been held 
there. It was also rumored that cabinet ministers had secret meetings in its belfry.31 Now 
Boshoff stood in its pulpit, addressing a gathering comprised of his professors, nearly all 
the members of his family, and of course an assortment of his supportive friends. It was 
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just after Easter, and he preached on the significance of the resurrection.32 No doubt, 
when Boshoff looked out over the congregation he would have seen Smith’s smiling and 
supportive face. Though no one would have known it at the time, Smith would lead that 
church building through something of its own resurrection. He would one day stand 
exactly where Boshoff stood, not addressing the congregation of the Groot Kerk, but 
“Melodi ya Tshwane.” Nor would he be looking out over a gathering of white Afrikaners, 
but rather an intentionally interracial and multilingual congregation. His coworkers 
would include ministers from various racial backgrounds. In 1952, however, such a 
possibility would have seemed so remote as to be utterly unthinkable.  
The University of Pretoria professors and the Transvaal NGK examining 
committee joined forces to conduct the students’ final exams. Smith and Boshoff did 
well, and they were among the students that year who were legitimated for ordination by 
C.B. Brink. After turning down several job offers, Boshoff received a call to the rural 
Transvaal town of Belfast (now in Mpumalanga), where his position would include 
pastoring the white church with a “missionary task” to the local black population.33 
Boshoff was received in Belfast on March 7, 1953, where Groenewald delivered the 
sermon. He was ordained by the laying on of hands, knelling on a pillow, on which his 
fiancée Anna embroidered with the words, “You are my servant, I am with you.” The 
next week, Boshoff was received at the mission church, where he and the evangelist 
Daniel Masinga mainly worked with farm laborers.34  
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Smith did not receive a call right away, and decided to embark on a master’s 
degree in sociology. Both he and Boshoff enjoyed sociology immensely during their 
undergraduate studies. They were fascinated by the structures of society, “deviant” 
behavior, and ethnography. But only a month into writing his thesis, Smith scrapped the 
work, never to complete it. He received a call to work at the Boksburg-Noord 
Congregation.35 He would not spend very long there. He received an offer to work with 
Beyers Naudé as youth minister at the Potchefstroom Congregation. Smith was flattered 
and deeply honored to get a chance to work with such a respected man. He immediately 
jumped at the opportunity.36  
Boshoff and Smith began their calls without that one essential feature of old 
fashioned patriarchal protestant ministry—the pastor’s wife. Dominees were not expected 
to remain single. On the contrary, they were expected to marry a woman who would 
become the minister’s helpmeet, and by extension a leading servant of the congregation. 
A minister’s wife was to be pious, intelligent, and industrious. She needed to be able to 
teach a class on either scripture or the domestic arts, she patiently needed to suffer the 
demands of a congregation, and she had to serve as an extra (and frequently the only) set 
of hands for any odd job that needed to be done. While well mannered, a minister’s wife 
ought not to be too extravagant. Ben Marais’ wife was once criticized for wearing 
lipstick. A young woman wondered if the gospel could truly be preached through crimson 
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lips.37 A minister’s wife was to be a gifted person, but the assumption was that her gifts 
would always be put in the service of her husband’s work.38 
 Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff all married women who were up to the challenge. 
Their wives require some introduction because they were so incredibly central to their 
husband’s ministries. These women made their husband’s careers possible. Out of all 
Hendrik Verwoerd’s children, friends and acquaintances said that Anna was most like her 
father. With his keen intellect, religious zeal, and passion for the Afrikaners, she could be 
a formidable. Especially later in life, Anna took significant leadership roles in the 
nationalist movements that Carel founded. The couple would have seven children 
together.  
Nico Smith married Helen “Ellen” Faul. There was an openness and naturalness 
about Ellen which balanced Nico’s shyness and repressed upbringing. She found Nico a 
very good listener, and she could confide a great deal in him.39 Ellen was not thrilled by 
the prospect of being a “minister’s wife.” She was a medical doctor with her own degree, 
her own money, and her own career. Smith expected Ellen to use her gifts to support his 
career, which could be challenging. Making matters more difficult, Smith had trouble 
expressing the love that he so desperately sought. While he was effusive and gregarious 
with friends and potential friends, he could be cold and withdrawn with his own family.40 
The Smiths had three daughters together. They were, perhaps more than the others, 
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honest about the difficulties in their marriage. Smith’s sense of call and Ellen’s vision for 
her life could come into conflict, causing some tension.   
David Bosch met Annemie Roberts while they were students. Annemie had a 
profound interest in theology, and she no doubt would have been a minister had the 
option been open to women at the time. As a student, she made a point of reading 
everything that David read, and engaged in conversation with him. She had a keen 
intellect and could be formidable in her own right. Throughout her life, she frequently 
resented being dismissed as a minister’s wife, because she had theological thoughts and 
wanted to make contributions of her own. She was unafraid to speak her mind, and 
occasionally touted the patriarchal norms of her society. While most students politely 
addressed Beyers Naudé as “Oom Bey,” Annemie would candidly disagree with him by 
colloquially exclaiming, “ag, nee man! (no way, man).” When David took her aside and 
said, “You can’t speak to Oom Bey like that!” she responded, “I’ll speak to Oom Bey 
however I please.”41 Annemie and David were both pious, and they both hoped to be 
missionaries in Africa.42 They were also deeply in love, and had seven children together.     
From Pretoria to Basel 
As students, David and Annemie began to express misgivings that they had about 
the National Party. While Bosch confidently called Afrikaners to remain true to their 
heritage in 1950, by 1954 he was having trouble defending various aspects of apartheid. 
As chairman of the Student Christian Association at the University of Pretoria, Bosch 
was asked to discuss the moral legitimacy of apartheid at the University of the 																																																								
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Witwatersrand. While he was able to give a basic overview of the moral arguments, the 
audience pressed him on the question of biblical justification. The more they asked, the 
more Bosch found himself unable to answer their questions. He later recalled, “I went to 
my vice-chairman and discussed it with him and said, ‘I can’t defend it anymore.’” 43  
Bosch was, like Marais, skeptical of the scriptural justification of apartheid. This did not 
mean, however, that he rejected the idea completely. In a later interview, Bosch also said 
he was upset when the NP attempted to remove Coloured voters from the common voters 
roll in the Cape Province in 1951. He said, “It was one of the first shocks; the honeymoon 
was over with the new National Party government.”44 Annemie Bosch suggested that this 
development only disturb them later on, when the NP government actually succeeded in 
setting up a separate roll in 1958. They did not reject the idea of “separate development” 
as a nation-building project in their student days, but they were becoming skeptical of the 
NP’s heavy-handed legislation.  
Bosch’s master’s thesis in Afrikaans literature examined D.J. Opperman’s 1949 
epic poem, Joernaal van Jorik. The poem was about a German spy who landed at Cape 
Town in a submarine during the Second World War. Over the course of the poem, Jorik 
become ensnared in the country’s political situation and anxious about its future. The 
poem is replete with religious imagery, and shows the influence of modernists like Ezra 
Pound and T.S. Eliot. For Bosch, Opperman successfully integrated past, present, and 
future, thereby integrating Afrikaner history with the whole story of human history. 
Theologians (and Bosch’s former students and colleagues) Klippies Kritzinger and 																																																								
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Willem Saayman argued that this work marked another turn in Bosch from “chauvinistic 
nationalism.” Bosch was a committed Afrikaner, but he wanted to place that story within 
a wider content. The Afrikaner nation would have a beginning, middle, and end in a 
much longer arc of human history.45  
Bosch’s intellectual abilities far exceeded those of Boshoff and Smith. 
Groenewald recognized this, and encouraged Bosch to complete his doctoral work abroad 
at the University of Basel. At the University of Basel, Bosch would embrace theological 
trends that eschewed nationalism. There, he worked under the direction of Oscar 
Cullman, the famous New Testament scholar.46 Bosch also studied with Karl Barth, who 
was one of the most famous theologians in the world. Barth’s major contribution was a 
rejection of the “romantic theology” that stemmed from the thought of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. For Schleiermacher, religion was rooted a feeling of complete 
dependence—God is revealed in the recognition that we are not self-sufficient, but rather 
we depend on nature and our communities to care for our very existence. Thus, romantic 
theologians believed God was revealed in nature, the bonds between people, and the 
movements of history. It lent itself to a nationalistic theology; the hand of God could be 
seen in the rise of nations. For Barth, this was never a true theology but actually 
anthropology; it said everything about humanity and nothing about God. Barth’s theology 
drew a radical disjuncture between God and creation. The only source of revelation, then, 
is the word of God, which is most known in Jesus Christ, the word made flesh. Apart 
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from God’s self-revelation, there is no revelation.47 Barth took exception to the 
nationalistic theologies that German theologians developed during the Nazi era, and 
joined a movement called the “Confessing Church.” For his oppositional views, Barth 
lost his teaching position at Tübingen and was deported back to his native Switzerland.48 
David and Annemie Bosch lived very near Barth and frequently bumped into him 
on the street. They also took his English language seminar. American Mennonite John 
Howard Yoder, who was not without controversy in his later life, also took the class.49 
Yoder and the Bosches became close friends in those days, and often exchanged 
thoughts. In one class, Barth said that though Switzerland remained neutral, he would 
have certainly volunteered as a border sentinel, and should the Germans have invaded the 
country, he would have shot to kill. This upset Yoder very much, who was a radical 
pacifist. Yoder stood up and smacked the table saying, “You would not!”50 Bosch would 
later find Yoder’s Christian pacifism deeply useful in speaking to the South African 
context.   
University of Pretoria theologian A.B. du Preez contacted Bosch in Switzerland, 
asking him to set up a meeting with Barth. Du Preez was touring universities in Europe, 
where he asserted the theological legitimacy of apartheid. Bosch asked Barth if he would 
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be interested in such a conversation, and Barth wanted to refuse. He said, “I have had 
enough of racism during the Nazi era, and I am tired of it.” Bosch, however, told Barth 
that Du Preez fancied himself a “Barthian” scholar, and he was known as an Afrikaner 
intellectual. Bosch thought an actual meeting might be in everyone’s interest. Barth 
acquiesced on the condition that David, Annemie, as well as his other South African 
student Andrie du Toit also attend. Barth’s longtime assistant Charlotte von Kirschbaum 
read and summarized du Preez’s Skriftuurlike grondslag vir rasseverhoudinge (Scriptural 
Foundation for Race Relations), and Barth was not impressed. When du Preez finally 
arrived, he switched on a tape recorder to have a lasting record of the meeting. Du Preez 
attempted to set the terms of the conversation, asking, “Does a volk have the right to 
defend itself?” Barth changed the subject, asking instead his own array of questions. As 
the tenor of the conversation turned against du Preez, he shut off the tape recorder. 
Needless to say, du Preez found no ally in Karl Barth.51  
Bosch’s dissertation, Die Heidenmission in der Zukunftsschau Jesu (The gentile 
mission in the future vision of Jesus) (1956), analyzed the shift from Jesus’ ministry to 
Jews to later apostolic efforts to convert the gentiles. The topic itself highlighted the fact 
that Bosch was inching even further away from his youthful nationalism. The turn in 
early church history, from one particular ethnic group to the universal, mirrored the shift 
that Bosch himself was in the process of making.52 In his dissertation, Bosch argued that 
after Jesus’ death and resurrection, the apostles were called to expand the Kingdom of 
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God beyond the nation of Israel, in expectation of Christ’s second coming. This 
eschatological argument bore the stamp of his professor, Oscar Cullman. C.H. Dodd 
argued that the Kingdom of God was established in the earthly ministry of Jesus 
(“realized eschatology”), while Albert Schweitzer thought that Jesus’ teachings implied a 
coming kingdom of God (“imminent” or “consistent” eschatology).53 Cullmann, 
however, argued that Jesus inaugurated the Kingdom in his ministry. The Kingdom will 
expand in a redemptive history, culminating at the end of time. For Cullman, the 
kingdom is both “now” and “not yet.”54 This eschatological vision, that all things would 
be made new, would have profoundly important significance for Bosch’s later public 
theology. 
In what would become typical of his later work, Bosch’s dissertation put 
competing paradigms of mission into creative tension. When the Kingdom of God is 
interpreted as God’s sovereignty over individuals, mission is aimed primarily at the 
pietistic goal of “converting souls.” The social gospel movement understood building the 
kingdom to mean strengthening various humanitarian institutions—schools, hospitals, 
youth organizations, churches, etc. There were also those who believed the Kingdom of 
God would come in a future eschatological event. They rapidly expand missionary 
activity, as one reviewer wrote, to “speed up the ultimate dramatic dénouement.” Rather 
than reject these missionary paradigms, however, Bosch showed that they expressed a 
more complete vision of Christian mission when reconciled. When people with opposing 
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ideas were brought into conversation, a new and more complete understanding would 
become possible.55  
The Tomlinson Commission 
 While the Bosches were beginning to have misgivings about apartheid and 
Afrikaner nationalism in general, they remained within the fold. When the government 
funded Tomlinson Commission was published, it directed their missionary energies in 
ways that were congenial with the NP program in South Africa. The massive report 
comprised 18 volumes with some 3,755 pages, 598 tables, and 66 maps.56 In his study of 
the Tomlinson Commission, historian P.J. Trutter highlighted the fact that the Tomlinson 
report reiterated many themes already expressed by SABRA intellectuals and at the 
Bloemfontein Congress. The report claimed there were only two possible solutions to 
South Africa’s racial problems; viz., integration and apartheid (the UP’s moderate 
segregation would fall in either direction). Because whites would never stand for 
integration and blacks would find permanent second-class citizenship in a segregated 
society onerous, the commission argued that only solution was to build equitable and 
separate societies.57  
 In order to make “separate development” work, “the Bantu” areas had to be 
developed to such an extent that they could support a growing black population. It 
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recommended £104 million be invested in the reserves over a period of ten years.58 It 
called for the establishment of a Development Council for research and planning along 
with a Development Corporation for investment in economic projects. The reserve 
economies would be fully diversified, producing raw materials, manufactured goods, and 
services. Rather than being held in communal property, land was to be transferred to 
individual tenure. Farming methods would be mechanized, and those alienated from land 
would find jobs in the reserves’ new economic sectors. Border industries, i.e. white-
owned business near black areas, would absorb further workers. The commissioners also 
repeated the concern that the reserves were much too small and dispersed. They would 
have to be expanded and consolidated; the share of the reserves would have to increase 
from 13 to 47 percent of the country.59  
 The Tomlinson Commission envisioned a large role for Christian missions in 
making the apartheid plan work. From the statistical standpoint, there were still many 
“unreached people” in South Africa. The commission noted that 34.8 percent of the 
South African population was not Christian, the vast majority of whom were black.60 
This presented an excellent opportunity for white South African Christians. For too long, 
the commission argued, the lion’s share of mission work had been completed by foreign 
societies. The commission argued that, “The sons and daughters of South Africa must be 																																																								
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sharpened to the realization that it is in the first instance their task to evangelize the Bantu 
of their land.”61 This was couched in the terms of trusteeship. As a “more developed” 
people, whites had the responsibility to bring the gospel to the “less developed Bantu.”  
The commission shared the NGK’s model of multi-ethnic missions. White pastors 
would also have to learn the local languages and customs. Only two-thirds of Protestant 
missionaries actually knew an African language, making it impossible for them to fully 
understand African cultures. The report suggested that making a “Bantu language” 
mandatory in white high schools could close the gap.62 With knowledge of language and 
culture, the missionary would be able to discern between “desirable” and “undesirable” 
aspects of indigenous practice. Following the principles of trusteeship, the Tomlinson 
Commission argued that white oversight of mission churches ought to have a theoretical 
end date. To that end, missionaries would have to train an ever-increasing number of 
black evangelists and pastors, who would become the leaders of fully independent 
churches. These churches would have their own forms of worship, hymns, and 
confessional writings dedicated to meeting the cultural needs of the local congregation.63    
The report called for greater unity among churches in order to better coordinate 
efforts between the church and the state.64 Missionaries had resources that would enable 
them to be useful pioneers in education and medical work. To be sure, both of these 
would be subject of state oversight. After the passage of the Bantu Education Act, all 
teaching was subject to state control, but missionaries could cooperate with the 																																																								
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government. The church and state could combine funds for funding new clinics and 
hospitals. Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff would all form ethnically based hospitals with 
church and state funds. The Tomlinson Report also envisioned missions expanding their 
facilities to include community centers, printing presses, film services, and other 
information services. All of this would entail a massive building project, as houses, 
churches, schools, hospitals, and other facilities would need to be constructed.65 White 
South African pastors, doctors, nurses, teachers, printers, builders, and even camera 
technicians could play a role in building up the Kingdom of God and the apartheid state.  
Christianity was envisioned as a powerful remedy to many of the perceived-ills of 
black South Africans. Many white intellectuals argued that urbanization led to the 
disintegration of community ties and moral character, and African Initiated Churches 
(AICs) were leading blacks back to “heathendom.” Missionary work was “the only 
security” against “heathendom” and “barbarism.” The gospel, they believed, had the 
power to convert and purify bodily, intellectual, moral, home, family, and tribal life. 
Missionary work would provide a solution to the “criminal element,” and make black 
people more obedient to the white government. For the drafters of the Tomlinson 
Commission, there was also an element of self-defense in white missionary work.66  
The Tomlinson Report called for the establishment of a division of Church and 
Mission Affairs within the Department of Native Affairs. This would be responsible for 
the registration of all churches and missionary societies as well as the licensing of all 
missionaries, priests, mission workers, and black ministers in the reserves. In order to 																																																								
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keep African Independent Churches from expanding in number, the report said that no 
new churches should be registered, except under special circumstances (i.e. the formation 
of new white denominations). In the reserves, there was also a “five-mile radius rule,” 
which made it illegal for different mission societies to establish their stations too closely. 
The commission called for the abolition of this rule. The report also called on the 
government to subsidize the training of white and black mission workers.67 
The rising generation of African Nationalists found the Tomlinson Report deeply 
problematic. The African National Congress (ANC) dismissed the document. Alfred 
Xuma noted that the Tomlinson Commission was presented as a “matter of life and 
death,” which he said was “quite correct. A matter of life for the whites and of death for 
the natives.”68 Robert Sobukwe said that if whites pursued the policies, then “being 
driven to the sea” by a wave of black discontent and backlash was a very real possibility. 
Nic Olivier, who worked on the commission, smugly told Sobukwe that whites would be 
happy to accept his challenge.69 The commissioners hoped that black leaders in the 
“homelands” would respond better to the plan. They realized that without support of 
black leaders, the plan would never work.  
Verwoerd also dismissed much of the Tomlinson Commission because of 
pragmatic political concerns. As Minister of Native Affairs, Verwoerd accepted the 
report “in principle,” but then went on the reject many of its prescriptions.70 In part, this 																																																								
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was because Verwoerd had not been particularly fond of Tomlinson or Olivier when they 
worked together at Stellenbosch. He also resented the fact that they wanted to set the 
government’s agenda.71 Yet from the standpoint of pragmatic politics, the NP knew that 
if it aggressively followed the prescriptions of the Tomlinson Commission, they risked 
losing votes. White trade unionists worried that border industries and the economic 
development of the reserves would undercut white labor.72 Thus, Verwoerd rejected the 
idea of forming a Development Corporation, which would have funneled resources from 
white industrialists into the reserves. The expansion of “native reserves” necessarily 
meant the loss of white farms, an idea that raised the hackles of another 
(disproportionately represented) portion of the white electorate. The National Party could 
not stand to lose rural districts, especially when it had not yet won an outright majority.73 
Against territorial expansion, Verwoerd said the economic “possibilities” of the present 
boundaries of the reserves should not be “underestimated.”74 He also argued that the 
whole plan could be carried out for much less money, but refused to commit the 
government to any figure.75  
The Tomlinson Report was also published when J.G. Strijdom was Prime 
Minister. He was not as cautious as Malan or as intellectually savvy as Verwoerd. For 
Strijdom, apartheid was about maintaining white domination, or “baaskap.” There were 
those who preferred this degrading model of race relations, in which whites ordered and 
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blacks obeyed.76 It was his government that carried out the destruction of the interracial 
and culturally vibrant neighborhood of Sophiatown. In its place, the government built a 
white neighborhood that it tellingly named “Triompf.” In Strijdom’s view, the heavy 
hand of white authority provided the best solution to race relations.77  
White farmers, factory workers, and those who wanted to ensure white dominance 
had to be satisfied along with the church leaders and intellectuals who believed in white 
sacrifice for total apartheid. And so Verwoerd embraced apartheid, but only in a way that 
would not create immediate economic issues. He calmed the fears of the white public, 
when he addressed Parliament in 1955, saying, “Nobody ever stated that we were able or 
intended shortly or even within an appreciable period to remove the Natives from White 
South Africa, away from the farms, and the homes, and the industries.”78 Total apartheid, 
Verwoerd argued, might take as long as 300 years to achieve.79 This would have been 
satisfying enough to those white voters who were concerned about their immediate 
reality. They could claim “separate development” as a moral goal without having to 
sacrifice anything to achieve it. Verwoerd’s position, however, was very disappointing to 
the intellectuals in SABRA and the NGK who hoped for faster development. Olivier said, 
“We do not have unlimited time. Those who think we can wait 50 or 100 years for a 
solution are living in a dream world.”80 The dissonance between the moral vision and the 
actual implementation of apartheid was becoming apparent by the mid-1950s. Historians 																																																								
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note a growing divided between apartheid “ideologues” and “pragmatists.”81  
The tension between Verwoerd and SABRA got so bad that Verwoerd resigned 
his membership. SABRA intellectuals continued arguing for a fast pace of apartheid. 
They further argued that the Coloured population should be accepted as “brown 
Afrikaners,” and not removed from the common voter rolls in the Cape Province. When 
Verwoerd insisted on “parallel development” for the Coloured population in 1960, 
SABRA leaders attempted to hold a conference on “The Coloured Man in the Political, 
Economic and Social Life of South Africa.” Verwoerd’s supporters within SABRA 
effectively postponed the conference, and changed the topic to “Relations Between 
English- and Afrikaans-speaking [white] South Africans.”  In 1961, SABRA held 
elections for its executive, and all those who were elected shared Verwoerd’s 
expectations about the scope and pace of apartheid.82 
Yet the divide was not yet wide enough to precipitate a major crisis of confidence. 
In his 1960 master’s thesis, Boshoff noted that there was some division between “the 
non-political supporters” and “the political supporters” of “distinctive development.” The 
non-political group provided the ideological basis for apartheid, and it included 
intellectuals (such as Geoff Cronjé and A.B. du Preez) and organizations like the NGK 
and SABRA.83 The political group actually implemented the policy, and Boshoff 
included “the main leaders of the National Party, such as Gen. J.B.M. Herzog, Dr. D.F. 																																																								
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Malan, Adv. J.G. Strydom (sic), and Dr. H.F. Verwoerd” among its members. Boshoff 
argued “reproaches were directed against each side.” Many accused the political group of 
not taking steps to implement the policy “drastically enough” or carrying out “its full 
implications.” The non-political group, he continued, was accused of being “unrealistic” 
given the exigencies of the South African economy. Boshoff still contended that both of 
these groups wanted the same thing. Certainly, while his father-in-law was Prime 
Minister, Boshoff took a middle path between ideologues (non-political) and pragmatists 
(political). He argued that the government basically accepted the Tomlinson Report; it 
just needed a slightly longer timeline.84  Throughout the course of his life, however, and 
especially after the death of his father-in-law, he would become increasingly alienated 
from pragmatists and politicians. Boshoff would become one of the leading ideologues in 
the country, and he would lose all confidence in the NP’s ability to implement “separate 
development.” For the time being, however, he was willing to follow his father-in-law’s 
timeline and give the NP a chance.  
Government Commission, Missionary Motivation 
Though it may have floundered as the basis for policy formation, the Tomlinson 
Commission was an inspiration to pious young Afrikaners with an interest in mission. 
The Tomlinson Commission called for young white South Africans to give their labor to 
missionary work among black peoples for the sake of national survival. Missionary work 
and Christian trusteeship more broadly was the calling of the Afrikaner people, and if 																																																								
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they fulfilled that calling, their survival would be assured. The report read, “There is no 
life without sacrifice, [and] no victory without the cross. A volk without a calling 
(roeping) is a volk without a future, but a volk that fulfills its calling is indestructible, 
because ‘the world and its desires are passing away, but those who do the will of God live 
forever (1 John 2:17).’”85 Because Christian mission was the will of God, the report 
contended, it would ultimately save white South Africa. The NP was happy to adopt this 
rhetoric as well. When asked what a young man could do for the future of South Africa, 
Minister of Native Affairs M.C. de Wet Nel said, “Become a missionary.”86  
David and Annemie Bosch both wanted to go beyond South Africa to engage in 
mission work, but while they were in Basel, Annemie’s grandmother sent them two 
books that changed their minds.87 The first was F.A. Venter’s 1952 Swart pelgrim. 
Described by one reviewer as a “‘Jim-comes-to-Jo’burg’ novel about the supposed perils 
of urbanization,”88 it tells the story of Kolisile, a Xhosa man whose fields were depleted, 
forcing him to look for work in Johannesburg. He embarks on a life of crime, and steals 
from a white woman who eventually helps him. Kolisile comes to the conclusion that 
there is no place for him in white society. The novel lent its support to “separate 
development,” couching it in terms of a solution to the devastating effects of the 
migratory labor system.89 These tropes were very common in Afrikaner images of urban 
black people.  																																																								
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Annemie’s grandmother also sent a digested version of the Tomlinson 
Commission, which seemed to offer an answer to the problems of migratory labor. As 
they read about the possibilities of developing the reserves and border industries, the 
Bosches were encouraged to learn that they as young white Christian missionaries could 
make a contribution to the well being of blacks in South Africa. Though it seems 
unthinkable today, they believed that “separate development” might have been the key to 
solving the problem of racial justice in South Africa. If the plan worked, then Africans 
would have their own societies in which they could achieve their fullest religious, 
educational, social, economic, and religious potential. They, as young missionaries, could 
help make that vision a reality. Though they might have had their misgivings about a 
scriptural basis for apartheid, it seemed that the missionaries could work together to make 
a positive difference in the lives of black South Africans. Rather than looking further 
afield in Africa, the Bosches decided to would work among the Xhosa people.90   
The Tomlinson Commission’s statistics about the small Christian population was 
deeply motivating. The Boshoffs decided to go on a tour of the northeastern Transvaal to 
witness the “missionary need” firsthand. They went with Elfriede “Elfie” Strassberger, 
travelling secretary of the Student Christian Union. They visited the town of Philadelphia, 
where there was only one missionary and several indigenous evangelists in an area of 
90,000 “natives.” Traveling to Klipspruit in Sekukuneland, they found that the Rev. and 
Mrs. Malan were the only missionaries surrounded by 100,000 people. Then, they entered 
the Low Veld, an area of 300,000 hectares that had only a smattering of mission stations. 
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In this large area of the Transvaal, only 2 percent of the population was Christian. When 
they returned, Strassberger spoke to a gathering of local churches on the “need in such a 
time as this.” She told her listeners of the “mile after mile, hut upon hut, thousands and 
still thousands of raw heathen, dying without Jesus.”91  
Boshoff wanted to impress upon his congregation this “missionary need.” 
Ascending the pulpit shortly after his trip through the “native reserves,” he preached on 
Luke 9:37-38, “The fields are white unto the harvest but the workers are few.” He told his 
congregation that both personnel and monetary donations to the mission field would have 
to increase.92 He attempted to charge his white listeners with a sense of responsibility, 
saying “The missionary need calls, the missionary need calls!”93 After several weeks of 
discussing “the missionary need,” Anna turned to Carel and said, “We can talk to others, 
we can pray for others, but we can only give ourselves.” Her meaning was clear; she 
wanted to pioneer new mission work among unreached people. The two prayed, saying,  
Here we are, Lord. Direct us, direct us to an area where there are no workers and 
where there is no money to place workers; and use us in your grace as a sacrifice 
to size the youth of our church to lay themselves on the alter, and make 
Christians’ hearts open to give to the cause of the Lord so that your work may no 
longer suffer damage.94 
 
One particular area where there were no workers or money for mission was the Low 
Veld, among the Northern Sotho speakers. It would help that he had already studied the 
language.  
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The young couple expressed their interest in a Low Veld mission to a certain Rev. 
Louw, who was quick to provide them with the same answer David Bosch received 
during his student days—there was no money for new missionary work. The Boshoffs 
were persistent and told Louw that they would be willing to work for the salary of an 
evangelist. For his part, Louw was willing to see if the plan would work. The financial 
support for missionaries in the Low Veld fell under the purview of the mission 
commission of the Lydenburg Presbytery, and Louw called a meeting of that commission 
the following Monday. The members of presbytery decided that they could collect £30 
(roughly 700 USD) per month to cover the cost of Boshoff’s salary, travel, and housing. 
The Boshoffs were elated to learn the news, and gladly accepted the offer.95  
Boshoff let his congregation know his decision from the pulpit. After the sermon, 
some members of the congregation were deeply upset, calling his decision thoughtless 
and irresponsible. Members of his congregation warned him that the Low Veld was a 
malaria region, which put the life of his infant daughter at risk. Still, the young couple 
stood resolute. Boshoff’s parents were not much happier about the idea. Boshoff’s father 
believed, like so many Afrikaners of his generation, that social outreach should be 
directed among one’s own people before reaching out to other groups.96 At the same 
time, his father noted with a great degree of acuity, “When Carel gets something into his 
head, nothing in the world can get it out again.” The Verwoerds were thrilled by the 
decision, and they gave their enthusiastic support. Verwoerd pulled out a file filled with 
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different plans for possible buildings at the mission station. They talked into the night 
about different possibilities given funding, climate, and other concerns.97  
Verwoerd was no doubt excited for many reasons. His father, after moving the 
family from the Netherlands, became an NGK missionary in Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe). Verwoerd had even considered studying for the ministry, and he had a 
fondness for missionary work. As Minister of Native Affairs, Verwoerd would have 
recognized the potential of Christian mission for the cause of Afrikaner nationalism. He 
told Boshoff, “You young men must do your job as thoroughly as possible, because there 
would be such an awakening of national consciousness among blacks in the next 20 years 
that whites won’t enjoy influence in their churches.”98 Verwoerd was right in as much as 
there was an awakening of national consciousness that made white leadership over blacks 
suspect. Yet Verwoerd was no doubt envisioning (or hoping) that nationalism would 
develop along separate courses. He hoped that independent churches in “native reserves” 
or  “homelands” would not want white leadership, in the same way that white churches in 
“white South Africans” did not want black leadership.    
 During the second week in August 1956, the Boshoffs bid farewell to Belfast. 
After Carel was invested as a missionary at Kampersrus, they entered the field. Their first 
residence was in a vacant house on a citrus farm, where they stayed on the condition that 
they would hold services for the workers every morning. They would name their mission 
station Meetse-a-Bophelo, Northern Sotho for “Water (Fountain) of Life.” During the 
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week, Boshoff began visiting various headmen with an eye toward establishing 
missionary outposts, while Anna tended to their home and child, while also giving 
Afrikaans classes to the Americans working for the Church of the Nazarene mission at 
Arthurseat.99  
 In a letter to Die Kerkbode, Boshoff described the events that led up to his 
becoming a missionary. It was laced with pious language, and made appeals to members 
of “our church” rather than “our volk” to enter the mission field. It made one passing 
reference to the Tomlinson Commission, but ended with the earnest prayer, “O Lord of 
the harvest, send your workers out into the harvest land!”100 That same edition of Die 
Kerkbode included a small blurb about the “Parsonage Couple Becoming Missionaries.” 
While it mentioned that Anna was Dr. Verwoerd’s daughter, the emphasis was on the 
desire that the Boshoffs would set an example for other young couples. It said, “We can 
only trust that their example will be followed by other young people in our country and 
that they may experience great blessing on the new road that they forging for the sake of 
building God’s kingdom.”101  
   The article in Die Kerkbode had the desired effect. In 1956, the Rev. Brood 
Potgieter and his wife Katie contacted the Boshoffs, stating that they wanted to leave 
their position in the white congregation at Dwaalboom to work in the Low Veld. Boshoff 
and Louw along with Potgieter went to the Lydenberg Presbytery mission commission 
together, asking for further funds. The elders were somewhat speechless, but nevertheless 
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decided to find the money. Potgieter became missionary at Acornhoek, where he had a 
very successful start to a career, working with a group of talented evangelists. Within two 
years, he baptized a group of eight women, and by 1961, the station had an established 
missionary congregation. Potgieter’s life was cut tragically short, however, when a falling 
water tower crushed him in August 1963. Ben Marais conducted his funeral service.102    
Verwoerd Cuts a Path to Tshilidzini  
The facts and figures of the Tomlinson Commission were also striking to Smith. 
In 1956, Smith and Beyers Naudé were delegated by the Potchefstroom Congregation to 
attend a church congress on the findings of the Tomlinson Commission. Smith was 
particularly shocked by the small percentage of Christians in the rural Transvaal. 
Recalling the congress in 1963, Smith wrote, “My attention was suddenly drawn to a 
statistic…that only ten percent of the Bantu in the Lowveld of the Transvaal belonged to 
the Christian faith. But how is that possible? This means therefore that ninety out of 
every hundred Bantu are still heathens, living outside the belief in the Creator God, 
serving strange gods and missing the whole purpose of their being.”103 To Smith, it was 
shocking that so many people in such a heavily evangelized country would be living as 
“heathens.” He likewise noted that his work at Potchefstroom, while fulfilling, was not as 
urgent as the need for missionaries.104 No doubt, Oswald Smith’s question played in his 
mind: why preach to the converted when so many remain unconverted?  
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 Shortly after the congress, the Smiths took a vacation to Kruger Park. They stayed 
at a bungalow in the southern part of the park, and Smith began asking the black workers 
about their church affiliations. He found that many of them belonged to no church, and he 
found it an encouraging sign when some people came to visit him to discuss “the things 
of Modimo” (Sotho/Tswana word for the creator God).105 During their time there, the 
Smiths also visited a number of mission stations, and they were further shocked to learn 
that they were controlled by workers from Swedish, Dutch, and British mission societies. 
As members of the NGK, and as supporters of the government policy of “separate 
development,” the Smiths received a cold welcome at foreign mission stations. Smith 
worried that foreign missionaries were sabotaging government policy by teaching 
converts to resist it. He later recalled thinking, “That makes it even more important for 
our own people to do missionary work to convince black people that the policy of 
“separate development” will be in their interest.”106 To be sure, Smith may have been 
painting his younger self as more ideologically obsessed than he actually was. At the end 
of their vacation, the Smiths prayed, saying they would go into the mission field if God 
led them there.  
 On their way back to Potchefstroom, the Smiths stopped at Belfast to meet the 
Boshoffs as they were preparing to go into the mission field. In Smith’s memory, Boshoff 
already knew about Sibasa, and encouraged them to consider becoming missionaries 
there. Smith remembered feeling that it was a sign from God that an opportunity to 
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become a missionary presented itself.107 According to Boshoff, however, they learned 
about the Sibasa possibility later. Regardless, it was clear that the Smiths left with the 
pull of “the missionary need” tugging at their hearts.108 
 Over the course of the next week, Smith could not think of much beyond 
missionary work. He confided in Beyers Naudé, saying that he could not encourage 
others to go into the mission field if he himself was not willing to go. At the same time, 
he had just become youth minister at Potchefstroom, and did not want to disappoint the 
congregation by leaving so quickly. Smith remembered Naudé telling him, “If the Lord 
needs you for work at Sibasa, don’t let Potchefstroom stand in your way.”109 After 
speaking with Naudé, Smith made up his mind. That evening, he called Boshoff, and they 
made a plan to meet on Monday to go over their options.  
The Smiths arrived early at the Boshoffs’ home in Belfast, and then set out 
immediately for the Commissioner of Native Affairs office in Pietersburg (now 
Polokwane). There, they met with the commissioner, Dr. Brink. The government had 
recently made great strides toward the eradication of malaria, and now the Department of 
Native Affairs wanted to spearhead initiatives against tuberculosis. As Boshoff 
remembered the event, Brink spread out a map in his office, and pointed to a piece of 
native trust ground at Sibasa in the Venda homeland.110 Smith, however, said that they 
went to the commissioner’s office to ask about Sibasa, and Brink was not terribly 
enthusiastic about the prospect. He told them that the Berlin Mission Society had been 																																																								
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working in the area for some time, and that the local headmen were not eager to allow 
additional missionaries to work in the area. There was also already a Presbyterian 
hospital to the north of the area, and they would not be happy about additional 
missionaries setting up a station in the vicinity. Even still, the Commissioner told them to 
tour the region along with a black police officer. They drove out and found the area 
mostly overrun with “bush,” and they “saw no terrain that looks in any way suitable for a 
mission station.”111   
After they dropped off the police officer, they admitted that situation did not seem 
promising. The headmen had ultimate say over who could and could not construct 
mission stations in their areas. But there was a way that white missionaries could get 
around this law. In 1936, the government passed the Native Trust and Land Act, which 
set up funds for the government to purchase white-owned farmland and crown land, 
which would be put into the South African Native Trust.112 The government held this 
land “in trust,” ostensibly for the expansion of black “homelands.” Ironically, 
government control meant that black people were frequently alienated from this land. 
White missionaries, for example, could work in cooperation with the government in order 
to gain access to trust land.  
There was certainly one person who could help them gain access to trust land: 
Hendrik Verwoerd. Boshoff phoned his father-in-law from his parent’s farm on route to 
Pretoria, and Verwoerd agreed to meet them. They arrived at his residence, Bryntirion 19, 
that evening at 11pm. Verwoerd received them in his study, and genially asked his son-																																																								
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in-law, “What could possibly be so urgent that you need to see me at this hour?” Boshoff 
explained the situation to his father-in-law, and without missing a beat, Verwoerd noted 
that there was a farm in the trust near Sibasa. While the mission would not have to get 
approval from a headman to occupy the land, they would need authorization from 
Parliament. Verwoerd told the young men not to worry about that detail; he could easily 
get Parliament’s approval. They spent the night there, and went home the next 
morning.113  
Shortly thereafter, Smith received a telephone call from Verwoerd, telling him to 
meet two commissioners in Sibasa. There, they brought him to a plot of land completely 
overgrown with Madagascar thorn bushes. On his previous visit, Smith and Boshoff had 
stopped at that exact stop, and casually remarked that he might pitch a tent and start a 
mission station. The fact that he was brought back to the same spot appeared to Smith as 
a call from God, saying, “you have no choice, you have to come.” At the same time, the 
Native Affairs Commissioners said to him, “As you can see for yourself, it is covered in 
bush. However, if you think you are up to it to tame the place, you can start a mission 
station here. Dr. Verwoerd said we must measure up the terrain if you are up to it.”114 The 
language of “taming the area” played on the patriarchal colonial image of “the white 
man” subduing the wilds of “darkest Africa.” Smith believed that God was calling him to 
begin mission work at the spot that Verwoerd would secure for him.  
There were, however, obstacles. Smith had no steady source of funding, he had no 
official call form the church to become a missionary, and he had not consulted with 																																																								
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mission stations and hospitals in the area. While Verwoerd cut a path for Smith into the 
mission field, those around him were very upset. Ellen was deeply anxious about the 
complete lack of salary, worrying that her husband’s call to follow the Lord would leave 
their children naked and starving. There were also proper formats for entering the mission 
field. Dion de Villiers, a classmate from University of Pretoria, and the seasoned (and 
exceedingly abusive) missionary Lukas van der Merwe were both upset that Smith was 
acting without any church sanction. The Berlin Mission Station, which was only a few 
kilometers away from the site at Sibasa, was naturally very anxious about “sheep 
stealing,” and the Donald Fraser Hospital of the Scottish Missionary Society thought a 
new hospital might provide unwanted competition.115  
Pious confidence and well-connected friends began to sort out these problems. A 
surprise visit from a parishioner with a box of sweets and a ten-shilling note convinced 
Ellen that the “Lord would provide.” Her confidence was doubled when the 
Potchefstroom congregation agreed to support part of Nico’s work in the mission field. 
Many members of his congregation were deeply inspired by the missionary’s actions. 
One businessman in particular became a major donor to the mission, and another couple 
even named their son after him. The Soutpansberg Congregation in Louis Trichardt 
agreed to officially call Smith as a missionary, provided that they did not have any 
financial responsibilities for his salary.116 As news of Smith’s plans spread, more 
financial offerings came pouring in, and older missionaries began to feel slighted. They 
had been working for some time in spite of a dearth of funds, and now a young and 																																																								
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inexperienced missionary was gathering unheard of resources. Beyers Naudé, at that time 
assessor of the Transvaal NGK, defended Smith’s action in Die Kerkbode as a “leap of 
faith.”117  
When Smith finally arrived in Venda, “Old Man” van der Merwe arrived at the 
mission station with mission secretary Jan Stofberg and other mission leaders. Van der 
Merwe was seething, saying that the fact he was not consulted was an insult to him 
personally.118 He was noted for his violent temper, often beating black members of his 
congregation when they did not act according to his expectations. He complained about 
“squatters” on the mission station, many of whom had lived on the land for over 60 years, 
and he worked in conjunction with Stofberg to get the government to forcibly remove 
them.119 His often callous and cruel actions earned him the nickname “Satan” among 
local black people.120 Smith met Stofberg’s anger with his youthful piety. He told the 
men that God called him to Venda, and he had to obey. While van der Merwe was not 
impressed, the other men were less inclined to speak against his pious conviction. While 
they said Smith should have followed official channels, they supported his mission.121  
Pastor Schultz from the Berlin Mission station arrived with a list of his concerns. 
Smith took him inside the rondeval where he was staying and narrated his call story 
again. Hearing Smith’s story, Schultz stretched out his hand and said, “Welcome to 
Venda.” The men found common ground in their call stories. Schultz told Smith that he 																																																								
117 Ibid., 15.  
118 Ibid., 16. 
119 Mamphela Ramphele, Across Boundaries (The Feminist Press, 1995), 29-31.  
120 S.T. Kgatla, “Mission driven by fear and despair: The case of Kranspoort – the first Dutch 
Reformed Church mission station outside the Cape Colony.” Stellenbosch Theological Journal vol. 1 no. 2 
(2015). http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2413-94672015000200024.   
121 Smith, “Tshilidzini,” 16.  
		
144 
was once an engineer in Germany, but then felt God calling him to Africa. His family 
called him crazy, but he went anyway. Schultz said, “Who am I to come and tell you that 
the Lord did not have the right to call you here.”122 Schultz offered to assist Smith in any 
way possible. 
Finally, Smith received a letter from Dr. Aitken of the Fraser Hospital, asking 
when they could meet to sort out details. Even before Smith went to Venda, Neil du 
Plessis, secretary of the Association of Missionary Hospitals in the Transvaal, offered to 
meet with both Smith and Dr. Aitken to smooth over the tension. Du Plessis was a 
member of the Broederbond, and very anxious to support the cause of NGK missions in 
the northern Transvaal. Aitken’s car broke down, however, and he was unable to make 
the meeting. Smith recalled breathing a sigh of relief. At that point in his life, he lacked 
speaking confidence in the English language in spite of the hours he spent reading 
English books. He knew that he could depend on Ellen, whose English skills and medical 
knowledge would prove to be an asset. Aitken met with the couple at their home, and 
Ellen put out a large spread for lunch. She then spoke, doctor to doctor, with Aitken, and 
the two came to a suitable compromise. Ellen said she would focus on tuberculosis, 
referring all other cases to the Fraser Hospital. Dr. Aitken was pleased with the deal, and 
welcomed the Smiths to Venda. Social grace, a good lunch, and collegiality could work 
as well as piety to smooth over tensions in the mission field.123 Verwoerd cut a path, and 
all other obstacles had been eliminated. They would name the mission station Thsilidzini, 
a Venda word meaning “Place of Grace.”  																																																								
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“A Place Called Madwaleni” 
As much as the Department of Native Affairs could be a help to missionary 
efforts, it could also prove to be a hindrance. When the Bosches returned to South Africa 
in 1956, David completed a colloquium doctum, which Annemie later described as “an 
examination by which the Dutch Reformed Church [NGK] made sure ‘her children’ had 
not strayed too far from ‘the true gospel’ while studying in Europe.”124 He passed the 
church’s examination and worked briefly as a minister in Johannesburg. The distance of 
Europe forced Afrikaners outside of their hitherto closed communities. Professors like 
Barth, Cullmann, Hoekendijk, and others attempted to push their students beyond their 
nationalistic worldviews. Peers from foreign countries also helped sensitize students to 
the wider world. Indeed, Bosch’s dissertation highlighted a shift away from ethnic 
particularity toward the universal. His mission work, however, would focus extensively 
on the ethnic particularity of the Xhosa, and he would cooperate closely with the NP 
government. Even though he was ideologically well disposed, Bosch’s journal entries 
from the time revealed a protracted struggle with the Department of Native Affairs. The 
Group Areas Act specifically blocked access to a potential mission site, and then the 
bureaucracy of the department further delayed his work.  
At the beginning of 1957, the Cape NGK sent the Bosches to work as 
missionaries in the Xhora district of the Transkei, the Xhosa homeland. They lived in 
Elliotdale, where they scouted out a spot to build a missionary station. In what seemed to 
be a stroke of good fortune, the local ratepayers at Elliotdale gathered on the evening of 
																																																								
124 Annemie Bosch, “My Best Friend, My Husband,” 16. 
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July 27, 1957, and decided to sell five acres of town’s land to the mission station for 
£25—a remarkably reduced price.125 Bosch was enthusiastic about the prospect, and 
provisionally laid out various buildings.126 Bosch arranged the use of prison labor with 
the local jailor, and he broke ground at the mission station on August 20.127 By the end of 
the day, earth had been turned over, gravel and concrete were delivered, and a machine to 
make bricks was installed. By September 5, a group of inmates had made 1,200 bricks 
while Bosch began cutting a roadway into the mission with a pick and shovel.128  
Apparently, overexertion took its toll on the young theologian, and by September 
10, Bosch was in bed with the flu. The local physician, Dr. Bingle, visited him, and gave 
him a bottle of pills along with a message that he should contact Bart Wooding, chairman 
of the Transkei Missionary Council. While David convalesced, Annemie phoned 
Wooding, who relayed the news from Mission Secretary P.E.S. Smith that the Minister of 
Native Affairs, Hendrik Verwoerd, had rejected their application for a mission station. 
The land that the ratepayers sold to the mission station in Elliotdale was designated as a 
white area. Therefore, it could not legally be sold to a mission station, which was 
designated for use by “non-white” persons. The matter was turned over to the Group 
Areas Commissioner of King Williamstown and the High Magistrate of the Transkei. 
They would investigate further and attempt to find another plot. This would not be a 
quick process, as the magistrate would be on vacation until the next month. That same 
evening, the Bosch’s lawyer, Mr. Starke, brought a letter from the Cape Provincial 																																																								
125 David Bosch, ““Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” August 9, 1957, 20.  
126 Ibid., August 10, 1957, 23.  
127 Ibid., August 20. 25-26.  
128 Ibid., September 3. 31. 
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Administration addressed to the local board. Apparently, the ratepayers in Elliotdale did 
not constitutionally convene their meeting, and all decisions made at that time were null 
and void.129  
It is impossible to say whether the Department of Native Affairs and the Cape 
Provincial Administration were working in tandem to keep missionaries from creating a 
“black spot” in a white area (though Elliotdale itself was something of a “white spot”). 
Regardless, it meant that even if the Department of Native Affairs decided that the 
missionaries could have access to the land, the ratepayers would have to meet again, next 
time constitutionally, and agree to sell the property again. The initial enthusiasm that 
Bosch had going into the building project waned as he worried that he would not be able 
to continue construction until the next year at the very earliest. While this was frustrating, 
they were able to sooth their disappointment with a quotation from Romans 8, “We 
trust,” Bosch wrote, “that even in this case, ‘all things work together for good.’”130 
On October 20, 1957, a new possibility arose. Patrick Lawlor owned a trading 
post 30 km south of Elliotdale at “a place called Madwaleni.”131 Lawlor was supportive 
of Christian missions, and he thought he had a possible solution to the Bosches’ 
problems. He offered the mission two morgen (roughly 4 acres) of land adjoining the 
trading post. Bosch noted that, though it was somewhat out of the way, there were 
promising aspects of the site: it appeared to have a constant source of water and a fairly 																																																								
129 Ibid., 32-33.  
130 Ibid., 33. 
131 It is interesting to note that Lawlor was the uncle of Donald Wood, who would one day become 
an anti-apartheid activist. Wood recalled visiting his family there as a child, where one of his earliest 
memories was his sturdy Irish grandmother blasting a snake in a tree with a shotgun. Donald Woods, 
Asking for Trouble: The Autobiography of a Banned Journalist (Atheneum, 1981), 25.  
		
148 
large population. The problem was that the land was far too small. They, much like 
Smith, would also have to obtain additional trust land.132  
Completely opposite of Smith, Bosch managed to gain the approval of almost 
every conceivable authority, save for the Department of Native Affairs. Bart Wooding 
and Bosch presented their plans to the City Area Commissioner of King Williamstown 
one Mr. Brownley, the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei T.D. Ramsey, the local 
magistrate, and the local council. A band of officials visited the site, and they decided to 
make a positive recommendation to the Department of Native Affairs. Bosch wrote 
gladly, “The possibility is very strong that the land will be given to us, and that the 
stumbling block will be moved out of the way.”133 Later that same day, Lawlor told 
Bosch that he was willing to give the land to the mission for free. A few weeks later, Bart 
Wooding brought mission leaders A.C. van Wyk, W.J. van der Merwe, and P.E.S. Smith 
to the site. They were all enthusiastic about the plan.134 Excitement for the project spread 
as the Rev. Latsky (organizational mission secretary of the Cape NGK) visited the site 
with a Bomvana chief, Zwlinqaba Gwebindlala, both of whom were eager to see the 
mission station move forward at Madwaleni. All of the religious, civil, and “tribal” 
authorities supported the Madwaleni site.135    
But it would require further maneuvering through the exigent bureaucracy of the 
apartheid state before the land could be given to the mission station. On a visit to the 
magistrate’s office, Bosch learned that the Department of Native Affairs was reluctant to 																																																								
132 Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” October 20, 40-41.  
133 Ibid., October 30, 45.  
134 Ibid., November 20, 49.  
135 Ibid., November 22, 49.  
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give its approval for right of ownership to the mission. Bruce Young, undersecretary for 
Native Affairs, contacted P.E.S. Smith with a plan to accelerate the process. If Lawlor 
were to transfer the ownership of the property to the Department of Native Affairs, then 
they would be able to grant it, along with additional land from the Native Trust, to the 
mission.136 By this time, Lawlor’s patience was wearing thin, and he told Bosch to do 
whatever it takes. With the assistance of a lawyer, Bosch drafted a letter in which Patrick 
Lawlor offered his land to the Department of Native Affairs. After assembling the 
appropriate documents, they submitted their application on March 10, 1958 and then they 
waited patiently.137  
In the meantime, the Bosches attended a missionary conference hosted by Smith’s 
former congregation at Potchefstroom. There, Smith preached on “the needs of 
missions,” Dawie Conradie discussed stumbling blocks to missions (though it is doubtful 
he mentioned the Department of Native Affairs), and finally Bosch—ever an optimist—
spoke about opportunities in mission.138 While they attended the conference, the Bosches 
stayed with Ilse and Beyers Naudé. In spite of his position within the Broederbond and 
the NGK, Naudé was also beginning to have doubts about the apartheid state. He 
confided these doubts to Smith and Bosch.139 Smith remembered him saying, “The 
millions of blacks in our country who experience the current policy of the government as 
oppression can’t all be wrong. Something is not right.”140 Bosch, too, had increasing 																																																								
136 Ibid., March 10, 54-55.  
137 Ibid., May 10, 57.  
138 Ibid., May 27, 58-59.  
139 David Bosch, “The fragmentation of Afrikanerdom and the Afrikaner churches,” Resistance 
and Hope: Essays in Honor of Beyers Naudé, (David Philip, 1985), 68. 
140 Smith, “Afrikaner Broederbond, Ch. 1” (unpublished manuscript, 2009), 24.   
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misgivings. He was troubled by the attempts to remove Coloured voters from the 
common roll in the Cape Province.141 Their misgivings had yet to develop beyond the 
bounds of a loyal opposition.  
Returning from Potchefstroom, the Bosch’s went to another meeting, this time for 
the Transkei Mission Council. There, they ran into P.E.S. Smith, who told the Bosch’s 
that he had been in Pretoria, where he met with Bruce Young. Apparently, the 
Department of Native Affairs had approved the Madwaleni site, but they had not yet 
informed either the missionaries or the local Native Affairs Commissioner. At the 
beginning of June, Bosch fired off a telegram to the central Department of Native Affairs, 
asking them to contact the local office. Two weeks later, some nine months after being 
derailed by the Department of Native Affairs for the first time, they were able to begin 
work at Madwaleni.142 
Conclusion 
 In the early 1950s, Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff’s youthful piety found expression 
in a desire to do missionary work. They wanted to save unconverted people, connecting 
individuals with the gospel message. Their missionary energy, however, was informed 
and directed by the National Party’s political program and state-sponsored research. The 
1954 Tomlinson Report had a great influence on young missionaries. It would lead them 
to direct their energies for mission toward “native reserves” or “homelands,” where they 
founded three new mission stations. State policy, however, could be as much of a 
hindrance as a help to missionaries. While Boshoff’s close connections with Verwoerd no 																																																								
141 Livingston, 45.  
142 David Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” June 6, 59-60.  
		
151 
doubt paved the way for Smith’s work at Tshilidzini, Bosch’s journals revealed that the 
Department of Native Affairs could be a hindrance to mission work.  
Bosch’s journals from the late 1950s do not reveal anything about his opinion of 
the racial legislation that blocked his work—just that it blocked his work. While the 
journal noted that he visited Beyers Naudé, it did not reveal details about their political 
conversation. If his mission journal discussed politics at all, it tended to favor 
government policy. Bosch’s misgivings were, at this time, largely confidential. He spoke 
about them with his wife and his colleagues, but did not yet write them down. It was 
clear, however, that there was dissonance between the ideological commitments of 
“separate development” and the NP’s legislative program. This was causing moral 
problems for men like Naudé and Bosch. Also, Bosch’s graduate studies had made him 
skeptical of purely nationalistic aims in mission. In the coming decades, these concerns 
would grow into a full crisis of confidence that would push many Afrikaners to search for 
a new racial morality. In the 1950s and into the 1960s, however, NGK missionaries like 
Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff would gladly follow the contours of separate development.
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CHAPTER 3: 
MISSIONARIES OF APARTHEID? (1958-1963) 
Introduction 
Given the close ideological connection between missionaries and the state, it is tempting 
to label David Bosch, Carel Boshoff, and Nico Smith as “missionaries of apartheid.” 
Indeed, there is a stack of evidence that would suggest that this appellation fits well. 
Mission stations became a site of white trusteeship as envisioned by the Tomlinson 
Commission, and missionaries built apartheid into the architecture. They cooperated 
closely with the state to build hospitals, and attempted to plant ethnically distinct (and 
therefore separate) churches for black people. They were decidedly paternalistic in their 
relationships with and attitudes toward black people. At the same time, however, 
missionaries’ ability to enact a program that fulfilled their national vision was limited by 
their own human abilities. The institutions they built were woefully inadequate, and they 
frequently misunderstood the cultures they thought they were Christianizing. 
Missionaries also had their own set of pious concerns that often, in small ways, 
undermined the apartheid vision. While Smith refused to eat in integrated dining rooms, 
he would go to the bedside of a terrified black man, and hold his hand until he fell asleep. 
Boshoff would establish networks of childcare in urban areas, adding resources to 
stabilize the urban black population (which was at odds with his ideological vision). 
Therefore, while the main thrust of Bosch, Boshoff, and Smith’s mission work was 
defined by the parameters of their nationalist assumptions, their human limitations and 
pious concerns could undermine those same assumptions. Nationalism may have dictated 
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the main course of their religious activity, but their ethical concerns would also challenge 
the rigid boundaries of that nationalistic vision.   
“Our church has nothing to do with the government” 
Boshoff, Bosch, and Smith would have rejected the label “apartheid’s 
missionaries.” They would have argued that their work was religious—certainly not 
political. Apartheid, they would have said, was the “landsbeleid,” or the “policy of the 
country.” Even though Smith was a supporter of the landsbeleid, and even though the 
government had provided tremendous assistance for Tshilidzini, he later remembered,  
Our decision to do mission work in a ‘Bantu homeland’ was filled in all respects 
with religious content. The context of apartheid in which our decision was made 
and the way we actually contributed to…[making] apartheid work was simply 
outside my world of thought…. I thought purely and only in terms of a calling 
from God that I had to obey. I can therefore truly say that we did not go to Venda 
to help promote apartheid policy.1  
 
Smith believed he was called to make Christians, not separate nations. Smith was not 
alone in this. He could not remember any of his co-workers ever discussing apartheid, 
much less claiming to enthusiastically support its ends as missionaries.2 Years later, 
Smith would write that, “In the context of the time, I was obviously a co-promoter of the 
policy.”3 At the time however, he was “blind” to the connection between his pious and 
nationalistic impulses.4  
The close ties between the NGK and the NP were certainly not lost on black 
South Africans. In November 1958, a man named Dubada arrived at Madwaleni after 																																																								
1 Nico Smith, “Tshilidzini (A Place of Grace): Christian Missionary Work in an Apartheid 
Context” (unpublished manuscript, n.d.), 3.  
2 Ibid., 37.  
3 Ibid., 3. 
4 He calls himself and his coworkers “blind” to the apartheid ideology at work several times in his 
later Thsilidzini memoir. See Smith, “Thsilidzini,” pp. 3, 7, 20, 28, 37, 48, and 55.  
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having had too much to drink. He excitedly told Bosch that he and his whole family were 
going to become members of the NG mission. He told Bosch that his family was going to 
leave the Wesleyan Church to become a member of the “government church,” then the 
family would “get everything that their hearts desire,” including a teaching job for his 
son. Dubada told all his friends and neighbors the same thing. Bosch was taken aback, 
and tried to “convince him that our church had nothing to do with the government but 
rather is the church of Christ.” Dubada said he had “preached a foolish thing,” and would 
try to clear the matter up.5 Dubada’s confusion, however, was very telling. For outsiders, 
there was a clear connection between the NGK and the NP; they not only shared 
members but also policies. 
In 1965, Boshoff told American Journalist Joseph Lelyveld that many black 
people, especially in urban areas, accused the NGK of being “the apartheid church.” 
Echoing the NGK mission policy, Boshoff responded to these accusations saying, “we 
were organizing churches for the different ethnic groups so they could worship in their 
own languages and with their own people.” Boshoff further believed that many black 
people would continue to join NGK missions, not only because many of the many 
talented black evangelists, but also because “it preaches the gospel—not politics.”6 One 
wonders how NGK missionaries could have honestly been such ardent supporters of 
apartheid and cooperated so closely with the state while never thinking of their 																																																								
5 David Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” November 15, 1958, 78-79, Sinode: 
Oos-Kaap, Kommissie: Sending, OKS 225, NG Kerk Argief, Stellenbosch, South Africa. “Toe ons hom 
nederhand oortuig het dat ons kerk niks met die regering te doen het nie, maar wel die kerk van Christus is, 
het hy gesê, ‘But then I preached a foolish thing. I’ll have to tell the people.’” Note that Bosch recorded the 
dialogue of his conversation in English, no doubt the language he used to communicate with Dubada. 
6 Joseph Lelyveld, “Daughter of Verwoerd Runs an African Mission,” New York Times, July 27, 
1965.  
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motivations or actions as “political.”  
At a formal level, the NGK and the NP were two separate institutions, each with 
their own leadership. Afrikaners commonly argued that religion and politics ought not to 
mix, and working in one field usually precluded one from working simultaneously in the 
other.7 Politics were worldly, while religion was spiritual. In his 1960 master’s thesis, 
Boshoff wrote that the political, economic, educational, and social work conducted by the 
state sought to develop the inherent properties and ethnic unity (volkseie) of “the Bantu.” 
But missionary work was different, he argued, because it sought to develop the Christian 
religion.8  
Yet there was undeniable overlap. The NP and the NGK shared an 
anthropological and ethnic vision that Bosch, Boshoff, and Smith accepted as a fact. They 
believed that the ethnic groups of South Africa were irreconcilable. Young Afrikaners did 
not see anything political about following ethnolinguistic contours in their mission work; 
it merely adapted the gospel to the context. Nor did they consider it political to work with 
the NP government; to them, this was friendly cooperation rather than what later looked 
like nefarious collusion. They certainly accused “foreign missionaries” of “getting 
political” with their talk of equality, human rights, and democracy, of “getting political.” 
But Afrikaners believed they were only bringing the gospel to all nations in a culturally 
relevant way.  																																																								
7 When, for example, D.F. Malan became a politician, he resigned from his pulpit. A number of 
scholars (Heyns, Bosch, Viljoen) noted that Afrikaners embraced a pietistic religion which shunned any 
connection between religion and politics.  
8 Carel Boshoff, “Streeksontwikkeling in die Sekôkôrô-, Mamathôla- en Mametsa-gebied deur die 
Department van Bantoe-Administrasie en –Ontwikkeling, sosiologies en volkekundig beoordeel” (Master 
Thesis, University of Pretoria, 1961), 67.  
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Boshoff summarized this line of thought in his thesis. He argued that the task of 
Christian mission was to inculcate Christian influence upon all aspects of “Bantu life.” 
He wrote, 
Now as never before, it is currently the task of the Church to proclaim and apply 
its message over the entire terrain of Bantu development. The Christian religion 
must impregnate (bevrug) and leaven (deursuur) the Bantu’s developing politics 
with the aim of establishing a Christian state and a state that is Christian at its 
very essence. The whole educational process must, from the lower primary school 
all the way through the teacher’s colleges and universities, be filled with the 
Christian message to prevent the whole program from becoming a secularization 
process. Ultimately, the task of the church can be summarized as the indigenizing 
of the Christian Church among the Bantu.9  
 
To a large extent, Boshoff’s choice of words exposes the intersection of male 
chauvinism, paternalism, and colonialism. The white Christian missionary is painted as 
the industrious and intellectually astute male who “impregnates” the misguided and 
potentially dangerous “natives,” who by implication correlate with the female. For 
Boshoff, however, there was nothing uniquely “Afrikaans” about this form of mission 
work. Instead, he placed it within the context of the global missionary movement. As he 
told Lelyveld, “the establishment of national indigenous churches has always been a 
fundamental principle of any mission work.”10 
 To the fair, mission was different than party politics. Bosch’s journals reveal a 
record of pious activity including daily prayer, bible studies, catechism classes, baptism, 
																																																								
9 Ibid., 67. SJL translation of, “Soos nog nooit tervore is dit tans die taak van die Kerk om sy 
boodskap oor die hele terrein van Bantoe-ontwikkeling te verkondig en toe te pas. Die Christelike 
godsdiens moet die Bantoe se ontwikkelende staatkunde bevrug en deursuur ten einde ‘n Christelike Staat 
en Christelike Staatswede deer te stel. Die hele opvoedingsprogram, vanaf die laer primêre skool tot en met 
die Onderwysers- en Universitêre opleiding moet deur die Christelike boodskap gevul word om te verhoed 
dat die hele program ‘n sekulariseringsproses word. Altesaam kan die taak van die Kerk saamgevat word 
in die verinheemsing van die Christelike Kerk onder die Bantoe.”  
10 Lelyveld, “Daughter of Verwoerd Runs an African Mission.” 
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and the Lord’s Supper.11 His time was far more occupied with finding a solution to the 
mission station’s water needs rather than white survival. Boshoff’s account of his time in 
the mission field revealed more about car accidents and near misses on the road than his 
nationalistic worldview.12 Smith’s newsletters deal with youth camps and financial 
concerns.13 NG missionaries’ daily set of concerns looked much more like normal 20th 
century Protestant missionary work than it did the fanatical schemes of nationalist 
ideologues. Yet in the context of apartheid South Africa, they shared an ideological 
trajectory with the state; they were working toward the same ideal. As the state built 
institutions for separate ethnolinguistic “homelands,” missionaries attempted to exert 
Christian influence on the formation of these institutions through the formation of an 
indigenous church.   
Ethnically Specific Churches 
 Bosch, Boshoff, Smith, and other NG missionaries sought to make ethnically 
distinct, and therefore racially separate, churches. “Indigenization” and 
“contextualization” were not the unique purview of Afrikaans missionaries and 
missiologists. On the contrary, such processes have been taking place throughout the 
entire history of Christianity. Beginning in the 16th century, some Roman Catholics had 
been engaging with local cultures around the world to connect people with the Christian 																																																								
11 Bosch briefly discussed these problems in his “Jaarverslag van die Stendingstasie 
MADWALENI aan die Transkeisendingraad in sitting vanaf 10 April 1961 (Annual Report of the 
Madwaleni Mission Station to the Transkei Missionary Council in session beginning on April 10, 1961).” 
12 Boshoff recounted some form of difficulty involving a vehicle in Carel Boshoff, Dis nou ek 
(Lapa Uitgewers, 2012), 142-143, 145-146, 152, 155-158, 160-161. 
13 Smith wrote a monthly newsletter, mostly to report on institutional progress and to give donors 
a sense of how money was being spent. Nico Smith, “Sibasa Sendingnuusbrief,” December 1956 to 
February 1962, Diverse Versameling: Sendingstasies en Hospitale, Naam: Tshilidzini, DIV 184, NG Kerk 
Argief, Stellenbosch, South Africa.   
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message.14 While German missiologists were cited for having taken the idea to its 
extreme, by the middle of the 20th century, a variety of Anglo-American, French, and 
Dutch missionaries argued that there was no need to remove a person from his or her 
cultural ties to become a Christian.15 In South Africa, however, the idea of 
“indigenization” fit with the nationalist program of “separate development.” In the same 
way that whites and the different “Bantu tribes” required separate political structures and 
societies, so too did they require separate churches. Ethnically based churches respected 
“tribal authority,” utilized “tribal languages,” and conveyed the Christian message using 
elements of “tribal culture.” Ironically, they frequently misunderstood the cultures they 
intended to Christianize.   
Tribal Authorities 
The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act established local chiefs and headmen as 
authorities in the reserves or “homelands.” As is well documented, the South African 
government often handpicked or even created these chiefs, and if a chief was 
uncooperative, he might be replaced.16 NGK missionaries worked within the system of 
“tribal authorities.” They obtained local chiefs’ approvals before beginning their work 
and kept chiefs apprised of mission developments. Those missionaries, like Smith, who 
																																																								
14 Ronnie Po-Chia Hsia, A Companion to the Early Modern Catholic Global Missions (Brill, 
2018). Many scholars have written on Chinese Jesuits embrace of Chinese culture. Michela Fontana, 
Matteo Ricci: A Jesuit in the Ming Court (2011). Catholicism in the Kingdom of Kongo provides and 
excellent African example: Cecile Fromont, The Art of Conversion: Christian Visual Culture in the 
Kingdom of Kongo (University of North Carolina Press, 2014).  
15 See for example J.V. Taylor, The Primal Vision: Christian Presence Amid African Religion 
(SCM, 1963). 
16 Anne Kelk Mager and Maanda Mulaudzi, “Popular Responses to Apartheid: 1948-c. 1975,” The 
Cambridge History of South Africa, Volume 2, 1885-1994, eds. Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill 
Nasson (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 389-90.  
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built on Native Trust land had more leeway in terms of occupancy and construction, but 
they still needed to consult with chiefs to determine the extent and parameters of their 
work in a given community.  
Boshoff was very sensitive to negotiating courtly protocol. One could not speak 
directly to a chief. He first sent an evangelist to talk to a member of the chief’s council, 
who in turn announced that Boshoff wanted an audience with the chief. At that point, he 
had to wait for a chief’s invitation before any meeting could take place. When he at last 
received an invitation, Boshoff could not simply walk into the chief’s home. He had to 
stand roughly 500 meters away from the chief’s compound while his presence was 
announced, and then he was invited to enter. Inside, the chief sat on an honorific stool 
flanked by his advisers. Boshoff and the evangelist were also invited to sit on stools. The 
evangelist acted as Boshoff’s mouthpiece. He told the adviser closest to him “Moruti (the 
pastor) would like to address the chief.” The message was passed to the chief through the 
advisers, and then the chief passed a message back. This continued until the evangelist 
said, “We want to set up a mission station, build churches, have Sunday school for the 
children, and set up a hospital. We want to have permission to move about in the area and 
to visit people’s homes.” The chief then addressed Boshoff directly.17  
The chief asked Boshoff why the mission was asking for permission at all. The 
American Nazarene missionaries, he said, merely arrived and began working. Boshoff 
told the chief that their people (i.e. Afrikaners and Northern Sotho speaking Pedi) had 
known each other for a long time, and he wanted to demonstrate mutual respect. They 
																																																								
17 Boshoff, Dis nou ek, 147-148.  
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talked about the various institutions the missionaries would bring. The chief was excited 
about the hospital, but he also wondered if they might also build a school. Echoing the 
Bantu Education Policy, Boshoff told him that the responsibility for education rested with 
the local community. Missionaries would only assist if the local parent communities 
asked.18 Schools, one of the hallmarks of 19th century mission, were completely absent 
from all three missions.  
Even with Boshoff’s sensitivity to protocol, there still were misunderstandings. 
After speaking with the Sekororo chief, he was granted permission to begin mission work 
among the people. Boshoff selected a spot to hold church services that seemed suitable. 
Yet when he held the first service, only a handful of children were in attendance. He 
thought that perhaps the people needed a building before they would come, and so 
organized the materials, builders, and construction of a church. Boshoff organized a large 
grand opening, inviting Minister of Native Affairs M.C. de Wet Nel. To his dismay, only 
a handful of women and children attended the service. The absence of men made it clear 
that some offence had been committed.19  
Boshoff went to discuss the matter with the master builder, Josias Mahlo. 
Remarkably, they only discussed the problem once the building was constructed. Mahlo 
told Boshoff that he did not have permission to build on that particular spot. Boshoff 
immediately protested, saying he received permission from the chief of Sekororo. Mahlo 
was quick to tell Boshoff that Sekororo was not their chief. They were, in fact, part of the 
Ba-Mahlo group. They crossed the mountains in the previous century to evade Swazi 																																																								
18 Ibid., 148.  
19 Ibid., 148-149.  
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attacks, and while they had been classified by Paul Kruger’s government as part of the 
Sekororo people, they understood themselves to be a distinct entity. Both the Sekororo 
and Ba-Mahlo were insulted by the location of the church plant, and they refused to 
attend. Boshoff decided not to use the church, but rather to tear it down and salvage as 
much material as possible.20  
The process of contacting chiefs was decidedly more informal in the Transkei. 
Perhaps this was because the centralization of power in “Bantu authorities” was at odds 
with the tradition of bunga councils. When evangelist Philip Mohale and David Bosch 
went to meet Chief Dilikile of Dabane, they found that he was not at home. In an age 
before mass communications, there were few options besides arriving at a person’s home 
and waiting. Having exhausted their patience, they left a message with somebody at the 
chief’s home and left. Later that evening, the chief visited Bosch’s home, and he said he 
would discuss a potential mission station with his community. Dilikile had a number of 
conversations with his people, discussing the matter at least twice over the course of ten 
days before coming to a final decision. Dilikile’s community agreed to allow the mission 
to begin working, and Dilikile provided Bosch with new land for a permanent church 
outpost.21  
Chiefs in the Transkei were beholden to the desires of their people, making 
negotiations with missionaries even more complex. Bosch began conversations with 
Chief Phewula at Xuba in the Bashee River Valley shortly after his arrival in Transkei. 
Like Dilikile, Phewula promised that he would talk to his people about establishing an 																																																								
20 Ibid., 149-150.  
21 Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” August 9, 1957, 21.  
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outpost. They told their chief that they did not trust Bosch’s church, believing that it was 
a ploy to get land.22 Bosch assumed that he would not be able to begin working in that 
area. Over the course of the next two years, however, several members of Phewula’s 
family and community became members of the church outpost in a neighboring 
community. In November of 1959, Phewula told Bosch that he had gotten approval from 
his people to set up a mission outpost.23 Establishing an outpost did not necessarily mean 
it would be a permanent venture. The outpost at Cwebe had promising beginnings in 
1961, but opposition from headmen and local people forced them to close the site in May 
1962.24 Bosch did not address the specific issues at stake in his journal. Although the 
local chief, Wontyana, said he would bring the matter up again with his people, it became 
clear that it was not terribly promising.25  
Even while white missionaries found ways to bypass local leaders’ antipathy 
toward their work, nationalist visions of “tribal” or “bantu authorities” frequently limited 
the range of NG mission work. Other mission organizations worked without local 
authorities’ consent, and historically there was frequently tension with chiefs and 
Christian communities.26 NG missionaries, however, were eager to work in such a way 
that recognized and legitimated “Bantu authorities.” This nationalist vision gave chiefs 
some limited power over missionary activity, and it seems that local communities also 
																																																								
22 Ibid., October 20, 1957, 40-41. 
23 Ibid., November 20, 1959.  
24 Annual Report for 1961; Annual Report for 1962.   
25 Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1962-1983,” June 24, 1963. Sinode: Oos-Kaap, 
Kommissie: Sending, OKS 226, NG Kerk Argief, Stellenbosch, South Africa. 
26 Lamin Sanneh, Abolitionists Abroad (Harvard University Press, 1999), 62-63. Sanneh argued 
that missionaries in Sierra Leone challenged chiefly norms and hierarchies. See also Norman Alan 
Etherington, Preachers, Peasants, and Politics in Southeast Africa (Royal Historical Society, 1978). 
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had some measure of say over missionary work, particularly in the Transkei. In giving 
chiefs that power, however, NG missionaries legitimated the vision of separate 
authorities for black and white South Africans.    
Language 
Once missionaries had the permission to work in an area, they needed to convey 
their message. The NG mission policy and the Tomlinson Commission placed a high 
value on preaching in local languages. Rooting the Christian message in the local idiom 
ensured that people were able to remain committed members of their ethnic groups while 
embracing the gospel. Missionaries the world over embraced local languages to convey 
the Christian message. They believed that their message was best heard in the language 
of their listeners’ hearts. In South Africa, language was one of the clearest ways of 
defining separate ethnic groups. Despite their ideological commitments to cultural 
integrity, not all NGK missionaries took the time to learn the local languages. Boshoff 
had studied Northern Sotho in high school, and it is clear that he also worked very hard to 
gain competence and fluency beyond the classroom level. Ultimately, he was able to 
preach full sermons in the language and he could hold conversations with people. One 
can imagine that he worked with teachers, evangelists, and local people to master the 
language.27  
Bosch’s journals reveal his long and arduous path to mastering the Xhosa 
language. Before going into the mission field, the Bosches spent three months at Umtata 
(Mthatha) in language study. While they spent hours attempting to successfully produce 																																																								
27 Boshoff, 90. P.J. Trutter, “Die verhouding tussen staatsbeleid en sendingbeleid in die Tomlinson 
Verslag” (Master Thesis, UNISA, 1995), 68. 
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Xhosa’s three click consonants, Annemie Bosch remembered the “implosive b” sound to 
be the hardest for the “pious young Afrikaners” to master.28 When Bosch arrived in 
Transkei in July of 1957, he eagerly engaged in conversation with two evangelists, David 
Ntakana and Philip Mohale, to improve his language skills.29 By the end of October, 
Bosch preached his first Xhosa sermon on Genesis 6 and 7; he told the gathering of about 
55 people that just as the ark saved Noah, Christ would save them from God’s wrathful 
judgment. Ntakana was present, and said that it was understandable. For the Bosches, it 
was not yet fully satisfactory. Annemie wrote in the journal, “For us, it was a great event 
even though the sermon was written out and David had to read it from paper. It is still 
progress.”30 A few days latter, he preached a Xhosa sermon at the local jail, preaching on 
John 3:3, “No one can see the Kingdom of God unless they are born again” (NIV). This 
time, Mohale reviewed the text and corrected his grammar.31 Preaching in Xhosa required 
a great deal of preparation, and even then reading through the sermons was still a 
struggle. In January of 1958, the Bosches spent four weeks in Port St. John doing further 
language study.32   
 Throughout the course of 1958, Bosch’s Xhosa improved dramatically. By 
January of 1959, Bosch was able to assist with the language classes at Port St. John, and 
on February 22, he was able to give a full sermon in Xhosa without a manuscript. He 
																																																								
28 Annemie Bosch, “Ek en Madwaleni—‘n klein stukkie daarvan,” unpublished article, c. 2010-
2015. Private Collection.    
29 Annemie Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” July 19, 1957. 15. “Vir ons was 
dit ‘n groot gebeurtenis al was die preek voluit neergeskryf en al moes David hom daar aflees. Dis tog 
vordering.”  
30 Ibid., October 22, 1957, 42. 
31 David Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” October 27, 1958. 44. 
32 Ibid., January 22, 1958, 53.   
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used a blackboard and chalk as visual aid, and Annemie noted in the journal that “it truly 
looked like the people understood more easily and thereby formed a better understanding 
of the spiritual things.”33 Annemie also worked very hard at the language, and she could 
ultimately hold a conversation and ask people what they thought about sermons.34 She 
noted, however, that David mastered the language to a far greater extent. In 1982, when 
the Bosches visited the Transkei, a woman named Silili took Bosch to see her blind 
uncle, Sandle. She told her uncle that she brought someone that had not visited in a very 
long time. They spoke for a while, and the uncle made a few guesses as to the identity of 
his interlocutor. It became clear that the man thought he was talking to a Xhosa speaker. 
Eventually, Bosch gave the man a hint, saying “I’m white,” and the man replied, “then 
you can only be Bosch (Hlati).”35  
Smith never learned Venda. While he learned a few Venda greetings in 
Potchefstroom before going into the mission field, he never viewed language as a 
priority. He frequently cited Albert Schweitzer’s statement, “It is better to use a translator 
than speak their language poorly.” Dieter Giesseka, a child of German missionaries who 
spoke Venda from an early age, led classes for the staff at Tshilidzini. They were held in 
the evenings, and the exhausted Smith frequently fell asleep as Giesseka painstakingly 
charted Venda grammar. Seeing the complex grammatical rules laid out, Herman Visagie 																																																								
33 Annemie Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” February 23, 1959, 85-86. Dit 
het werklik gelyk asof die mense makliker verstaan en ‘n beter begrip vorm daardeur van die geestelike 
dinge.”  
34 Interview with Annemie Bosch, March 2016.  
35 Ibid. See also, Annemie Bosch, “My Best Friend, My Husband,” David J Bosch: Prophetic 
integrity, cruciform praxis, eds. Klippies Kritzinger and Willem Saayman (Cluster Publications, 2011), 17. 
Silili’s father, Vethe, had given Xhosa names to the Bosch family. Bosch was Hlathi (literally forest, Xhosa 
translation of Dutch/Afrikaans word bos). Annemie was Nonembile (the capable one, or the one who is 
uneasy about things that are not right). Their children had Xhosa names as well.  
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turned to Smith once and said, “I never thought the Vendas could be so intelligent! They 
have to be really clever to speak a language like this.” Beyond his native Afrikaans, 
Smith studied Dutch, German, Greek, Hebrew, and Latin at the University of Pretoria and 
passed all of his classes, though one wonders how much competency he could have 
gained. He also could speak and read in English, though not with a great deal of 
confidence. Unlike Bosch, he never took the time to learn to speak Venda by practicing 
with local people.36  
Smith ultimately said that his failure to learn the language was based on his racial 
prejudice. He did not think highly of the people, so he did not think highly of their 
language. The Smiths wanted their children to learn Venda, and they encouraged their 
daughter Maretha to play with Joyce Netshikulwe, daughter of a Venda worker at the 
mission. While Joyce quickly mastered Afrikaans, Maretha failed to learn much Venda. 
For Smith, it was all a sign that the oppressor had an unconscious aversion to learning the 
underling’s language. Yet that could not be the total explanation, as there were other 
Afrikaners who did learn Venda at Tshilidzini, such as Rina Loedolff.37  
Preaching 
As preachers, missionaries attempted to relate the Christian message to people’s 
lives. Their goal was to make the gospel culturally relevant for their listeners. This task 
allowed the missionaries to be creative, but their associations also had to be credible to 
the indigenous group. For Smith, finding the point of cultural contact proved to be a steep 
learning curve. It quickly became clear that he did not understand Venda concepts of 																																																								
36 Smith, Tshilidzini, 42.  
37 Ibid., 43.  
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God. The first week that Smith preached at Tshilidzini, he was pleased to see forty people 
gathered under a tree to hear his sermon. He thought it was a good turn out in spite of the 
rain. His pious sentiment was stoked, and he thought it was a sure sign that there was a 
“thirst for the Gospel” among the “heathens.” In his first sermon, he told his listeners that 
there is a God, that God is the creator of heaven and earth, and that all people owed this 
God worship. He went home feeling that he successfully preached his sermon with 
conviction. The next Sunday, however, Smith had fewer listeners, and by the third 
Sunday, it was only Smith, Johannes, and an interpreter. Whereas he had once felt 
hopeful, he dropped to his knees in prayer, quite unsure of what he was doing wrong. No 
doubt his ego was somewhat bruised, and he was probably a little angry.38 Several years 
later, he would cite this as evidence that “fallen people” were the “enemies of God.”39  
Nevertheless, Smith went to the people and asked them directly why they did not 
return to hear him preach again. Though most were reluctant to say anything, one young 
man told Smith that he did not attend Church again because his parents had already told 
him that there was a God who deserved obedience. He asked Smith, “Why should we 
have to go to your house on Sundays to hear the same story?” This statement jogged 
Smith’s memory; he recalled the work of German romantic missionaries, who argued that 
Christian preachers were not bringing God to “heathens,” but rather the indigenous 
population already had a conception of God. Returning to his bookshelf, he read about 
Christian Keysser’s missionary work in Papua New Guinea. Rather than attempt to create 
																																																								
38 Ibid., 26.  
39 Nico Smith, Wat word verstaan onder sendingnood? (Enslins, Die Drukkers: Potchefstroom, 
n.d.), 2.  
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Western Christians, Keysser rooted the Gospel in the indigenous soil; it was an idea that 
Smith later recalled “strengthened my apartheid thinking.” The object of the Christian 
missionary was to present God to non-Christian people in a new way.40   
For Smith, the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus would provide the new 
content for the indigenous conception of God. Smith’s preaching became nearly 
exclusively Christo-centric. He also used aspects of the “old religion” to illustrate some 
aspect of the “new religion.” Smith told the story of a Venda chief who was engaged in 
heavy fighting with the Swazi. He was wounded when a spear pierced his hand. The chief 
said, “Do you see how my blood is dripping to the soil? My blood now becomes part of 
the soil. Therefore, this land and all the people who live on it now belong to me.”41 The 
images of “blood” and “soil” must have appealed to Smith’s nationalistic sentiment. He 
told the people that Chief Jesus was locked in fierce combat with the evil powers of this 
world. These powers pierced Chief Jesus’ hands and feet, nailing him to the cross. Smith 
told his congregation that Jesus said, “The work is complete. The earth my blood is 
dripping on and all who live here belong to me. You belong to me. You must follow me.” 
Smith’s efforts were very effective, and his group of listeners steadily grew, as did the 
people who committed themselves to following “chief Jesus.”42   
Bosch’s journals also reveal how he connected Xhosa tradition with the Christian 
religion. At the opening service of the church in Madwaleni, he preached on John 17, 
“Greater love has no man than this, to lay down your life for your friends.” Bosch noted a 
																																																								
40 Smith, Tshilidzini, 27-28.  
41 Ibid., 51. I have not found any corroborating accounts of this story.  
42 Ibid., 51.  
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parallel between Christian and Xhosa traditional religion. When a Xhosa person is sick, 
diviners often reveal that the cause is angry ancestors. Ancestors are placated through 
animal sacrifices. When a person was healed, he or she frequently put the skull of the 
animal on the walls of their home, serving as a reminder of the healing the ancestors 
brought. In the same way, the church is marked with a cross, “representing the sacrifice 
that Jesus brings on account of our sickness (sin). We are thus healed [and] saved through 
his blood, and this cross above the church door will always be there to remind us of His 
great sacrifice for the sake of us and our sins.”43  
After spending a number of weeks with a catechism class, Bosch determined that 
some members of the group were ready for baptism. He delivered a sermon on Baptism, 
in which he told his congregation that it marked the final step in becoming a Christian. In 
Baptism, Bosch said, a person makes a public confession of faith, and God accepts that 
person as a member of God’s own community forever. He compared baptism to Xhosa 
initiation. Both marked transition from one state of life into another. Yet in Baptism, 
Bosch argued, one leaves the power of the ancestors and comes under the power of 
Christ.44 While Baptism was only done once, Bosch told his congregation that the Lord’s 
Supper was repeated with frequency to strengthen a Christian’s faith. It also had a 
parallel in Xhosa religion, namely, the sacrificial meal. But while the sacrificial meal was 
part of a ritual to placate angry ancestors, Bosch said that the Lord’s Supper was God’s 
invitation for his children to join in a meal with God and each other. In each instance, 																																																								
43 Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” July 13, 1959, 107-108. “Dit [i.e. the 
cross] simboliseer die offer wat Christus terwille van ons siekte (sonde) gebring het. Ons is dus genees, 
verlos deur sy bloed, en hierdie kruis bo die kerk deur sal altyd daar wees om ons te herinner aan sy groete 
offer t.w.v. ons en ons sondes.”  
44 Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1962-1983,” June 16, 1963, 105.  
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Xhosa religion was used to explain a Christian practice, which the Christian practice was 
meant to replace.45  
Negotiating the Place of “Heathen Customs” 
Although they regarded their message as superior, NGK missionaries wanted to 
retain certain aspects of “tribal culture.” Both the NGK mission policy and the Tomlinson 
Commission suggested that missionaries ought to maintain indigenous customs that were 
not in conflict with the Gospel. Bosch gave some leeway to the local community in 
discussing cultural questions. During Bible studies at Madwaleni, Xhosa Christians 
debated questions such as:   
When heathens want to have a large field hoed, they brew a great vat of beer and 
invite all of their neighbors out on a certain day to take part in a hoeing party 
(skoffelparty). What must a Christian widow, for example, now do if she also 
wants her land hoed? And what must their relationship be with regards to the 
eating of the meat from sacrifices to the spirits of the ancestors? May a man 
attend a beer party just for the sake of company if he keeps himself away from the 
beer? May Christian parents send their sons to the ‘inthonto’ (hut for circumcised 
young men)?46 
 
They evidenced a range of opinions on these matters, and though Bosch certainly let his 
voice and opinion be heard, he provided space for the burgeoning Christian community to 
explore various possibilities, trusting that “God’s spirit leads them in the whole truth.”47  																																																								
45 Ibid., 106-107.  
46 David Bosch, “Jaarverslag van die Stendingstasie MADWALENI aan die Transkeisendingraad 
in sitting vanaf 10 April 1961 (Annual Report of the Madwaleni Mission Station to the Transkei 
Missionary Council in session beginning on April 10, 1961),” 3. This document is stapled onto page 217 of 
the “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961.” “Soms lei die Bybelstuie tydens die biduur ons tot die 
besprekeing van baie wesenlike problem vir hierdie jong Christene, bv.: Wanneer die heidene ‘n groot land 
wil skoffel, brou hulle ‘n groot vat bier en nooi dan al hulle bure uit op ‘n bepaalde dag aan ‘n skoffelparty 
deel te neem. Wat moet die Christenweduwee bv. nou doen wat ook haar land will skoffel? En wat moet 
hulle houding wees ten opsigte van die eet van die vleis van offers aan die voorvadergeeste? Mag ‘n man ‘n 
bierparty bywoon net terwille van die geselskap, as hy self van die bier afgesien het? Mag Christenouers 
hulle seuns na die „inthonto” (hut vir pasbesnede jon mans) stuur?”  
47 Ibid. 
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Missionaries had long struggled with questions of polygamy, and NGK added a 
number of voices to the discussion. The Bosches held a camp for women where they 
discussed marriage. Bosch wrote, “It was with trembling that we tackled this topic 
because the pronouncements of the Bible about marriage and the claims that it places on 
marriage appear to be so far, far from their reach.”48 Nevertheless, the women apparently 
responded favorably to the idea that marriage is an institution of God. The journal hints at 
the fact that many of these women were in polygamous marriages, as Bosch wrote, “We 
realized that most of them have heathen husbands, and therefore there is little they can do 
about their domestic situation.” The Bosches hoped, however, that they would raise their 
children with the expectation of forming monogamous marriages.49  
 Smith also had to navigate the question of polygamy. A woman arrived at his 
doorstep one day, saying she had been the second wife of a man who decided to join the 
church. The rule was that he would have to send away all but one of his wives, and he 
sent her back to her family, but they refused to take her in, saying she had been a bad 
wife. Smith had previously viewed polygamy as a result of men’s lust and control over 
women. He had not previously considered the effects that its prohibition might have on 
people protected by polygamous marriages. Faced with this moral conundrum, he 
provided an innovate solution. He told the woman and her husband that they could live 
																																																								
48 David Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1962-1983,” 29 July 1963, 110-111. Dit was met 
huiwering da tons hierdie onderwerp aangepak het, omdat die uitsprake van die Skrif oor die huwelik 
omdat die uitsprake van die Skrif oor die huwelik en die eise wat dit stel aan die huwelik so ver, ver buit 
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49 David Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1962-1983,” 29 July 1963, 110-111. “….Ons 
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together provided that they did not have sexual intercourse. He later wrote in disbelief at 
his decision, “what an instruction!” While they could attend church, they would not be 
able to participate in the sacraments. The arrangement would allow a polygamous man to 
become a Christian and save a woman from destitution, though it certainly was not a 
satisfying solution.50  
Although Smith failed to learn Venda, he attempted to utilize indigenous African 
art to convey the Christian message. The results were rather uneven, and frequently 
demonstrated just how little about the Venda he actually knew. Cape Town architect 
Danie Brink offered to design the church building at Tshilidzini. Smith and Brink 
developed a round design, which included an inner court for Christians and an outer 
enclosure, or lapa, for non-Christians. When a person became a Christian, she or he 
would then be invited into the believers’ area. Interestingly, this went against Keysser’s 
volkskirche model of mission; Smith was intentionally dividing the tribe rather than 
“Christianizing” the entire “volk.” To some extent, it demonstrated his more paternalistic 
and evangelical concerns for the state of the individual African believer rather than his 
ethnonational concerns for tribal unity. The inner enclosure could hold about 200 people, 
and they sat on benches made of planks resting on bricks. A large central pulpit rose 
between the Christian and non-Christian section, so that both groups could hear the 
sermon.51 
Ria Fouche and some of her students from Tshakuma painted the walls of the 																																																								
50 Smith, Tshilidzini, 56.  
51 Ibid., 48-49. There was, to be sure, some precedence for dividing full members and 
catechumens (or those in the process of becoming Christian) in the history of Christianity. It was, however, 
not as common in the 20th century. 
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church. Taking their inspiration from indigenous pottery, they painted the outside with 
Venda symbols. They never thought to ask what those symbols might happen to signify, 
and found themselves conveying a curious message. Some older Venda people came to 
Smith and asked why on earth he had chosen to paint the walls of the church using 
symbols that represented male and female genitalia. Smith recalled them asking, “And 
what is happening here? Do you know what all those drawings really mean for the 
Venda? Lots of them are symbols for sex—some for the vagina of the woman and others 
the man’s penis. And you put it on the walls of your church.” The pious, and somewhat 
puritanical Smith wrote, “I realized that the culture of a nation could not be taken over 
just like that with the idea that it is innocent. Culture also expresses the complete being of 
people. The problem is just that the complete being does not always fit in with the 
church.”52 
Inside the building, one Mrs. Junos, the wife of a Swiss missionary, painted 
scenes from the Bible. The hope was that the contrast between the symbols on the outside 
and the inside would demonstrate that while the form of Venda culture had been 
maintained, it was being filled with new meaning. Yet it was the missionaries who 
decided what the original culture was, and then they decided how best to fill it with 
Christian meaning. This was often done without consulting indigenous Christians. 
Likewise, as their use of symbols on the outside of the building demonstrated, Smith was 
largely ignorant of the culture he sought to preserve.53  
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Missionaries also had a rather static view of culture. Well into the 20th century, 
Xhosa Christian converts spoke disparagingly about “red people,” or those who practiced 
indigenous religion.54 In the 19th and early 20th century, clothing was an indicator of 
religious affiliation. Those in Western clothes were likely Christians, while those in 
traditional attire were practitioners of indigenous religion. One of Bosch’s first 
conversations among the Xhosa dealt specifically with this question. A Xhosa man 
expressed his surprise that he did not have to go to school or wear Western clothing to 
become a member of the church. Bosch wrote, “This is one of the tragic fruits of 
Wesleyan and Presbyterian mission work. Opportunity and clothing qualifies a 
Christian—not just faith in Jesus Christ.”55 Later, however, a group of catechists at 
Madwaleni said that the people wanted money for clothing. Bosch posed some resistance 
to the idea, saying, “Our heavenly father cares for you as much in red blankets as in 
clothes.” Nevertheless, the evangelists were insistent, so the missionaries provided them 
with money. Annemie later noted that it was “strange to see people in clothes instead of 
red blankets.” Indeed, she thought that they “looked very pretty,” and as long “as clothes 
do not become the most important thing, it’s certainly a change for the good.”56 
It would seem that Smith was more emphatic about maintaining indigenous 
traditions in spite of indigenous opposition. A group of women wanted to be baptized in 
their salempor clothing. Smith asked the women if the clothing had to any connection to 																																																								
54 See, for example, P. Mayer, Townsman or Tribesman (Oxford University Press, 1963), 3-4; or 
Lily Moya in Shula Marks, Not either an experimental doll (Indiana University Press, 1987), 94.  
55 David Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” November 7, 1957. “Hierdie is een 
van die tragiese vrugte van die Wesleyaanse en Presbiteriaanse sendingwerk. Die geleendheid en klere 
kwalifiseer die Christen—nie meer die geloof in Jesus Christus nie.”  
56 Annemie Bosch, “Madwaleni Dagboek (Journal), 1957-1961,” March 8, 1959. “Solank die klere 
net nie vir hulle die belangrikste word nie, dit is seker ‘n verandering ten goede.”  
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the ancestral veneration or worship. They responded that there was no religious 
connection, but it was what their parents had worn, and they chose to wear it as well. For 
Smith, therefore, there was no problem with the clothing. The Venda Christians, 
however, were opposed to the idea; they argued that it would obscure the distinction 
between Christians and non-Christians. Smith dismissed what the indigenous Christians 
said, remembering that he “thought they were influenced too much by the white 
missionaries to see a heathen at work in every traditional custom.”57 When he suggested 
that they put a drum in the tower rather than a bell, again the Venda Christians 
immediately protested. They said Smith would confuse the people. Drums, they told him, 
were not part of everyday life. Instead, they were used at a specific time as the voice of 
the ancestors to the people. For Smith, however, drums were “African” and bells were 
“European.” He wanted the Christians to maintain what he understood their culture to be, 
rather than allowing them to adopt the practice of their choosing. He dug in his heels 
until, by sheer happenstance, Karel Schoemann donated a bell to the church, quieting 
Smith’s rhythmic impulses.58  
Missionaries struggled to see that African culture was changing. According to 
their nationalistic worldview, African culture took place in the “homelands.” Here, the 
individual thrived while supported by a network of “tribe” and family. In the early 1960s, 
Smith praised the morality of Africans who lived in the “homelands.”59 Yet whites had a 
great deal of anxiety about urban Africans, who risked becoming prostitutes or tsotsis if 
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they stayed in “white cities” too long. Pure African culture happened in the “homelands,” 
while corruption happened in the urban areas.60 But the black experience of urbanization 
and industrialization had a profound impact on black aspirations and desires. It would 
take missionaries another decade before they fully realized this. In the meantime, they 
tried to preserve and promulgate their vision of “African culture,” frequently in spite of 
local opposition.  
The indigenous church was ultimately expected to assume leadership and 
financial responsibility for itself. As has already been noted, Bosch, Boshoff, and Smith 
all worked very closely with black evangelists, who provided an important indigenous 
leadership role. Bosch would work to train pastors and evangelists as professor at 
Stofberg, the Reformed training institute in Mthatha. Bosch was also happy to report in 
his annual reports that the fledgling congregations under his care were beginning to 
assemble funds to pay for the maintenance of buildings and the salaries of evangelists. 
Bosch likewise noted that the young congregations were taking responsibility for 
disciplinary matters. When a man left the mission to join an independent church, “the 
members themselves” decided to make it known from the pulpit that he was leaving, that 
if he wanted to come back he would have to go through catechism class again, and that he 
was not allowed to attend any member’s prayer service.61 Nevertheless, the prospect of 
full independence was a long way off. While missionaries might have given a measure of 																																																								
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self-governance to the churches, they still had the ultimate say over what shape the 
“indigenous” church would take.  
Hospitals 
 While there was ideological overlap between NGK missionaries and the NP in the 
realm of ethnicity and church planting, they cooperated very closely in the formation of 
hospitals. For every Pound (later Rand) the church raised for hospital work, the state 
provided up to seven.62 Not only was it a large state subsidy, but it also required the 
missionaries to keep meticulous records of their income and spending, and the hospitals 
were subject to state inspection. The initial plans for the hospital at Madwaleni, for 
example, were rejected, and even when everything was built in accordance to state 
specifications, it still had to be approved by a board of examiners.63 Boshoff remembered 
the day when a team of officials in white coats arrived at Meetse-a-Bophelo. He watched 
them nervously as they meticulously examined the beds, the supplies in the cabinets, and 
a variety of the equipment they inherited from an older mission hospital. When they were 
finished their examination, he invited them to a lunch where Anna served tea “and her 
best butter bread sandwiches.” As they chatted, Boshoff waited anxiously to hear their 
verdict. After lunch, the officials informed him that they could not give him a verbal 
answer; he would have to wait to receive their approval in writing.64  
By funding missionary hospitals, the South African government was to a large 
extent subsidizing Christian evangelism. Annual reports from Madwaleni reveal that a 
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great deal of mission work took place in hospitals, and it became increasingly more 
advanced. When the general hospital first opened, the personnel attempted to visit each 
patient once a month, discussing and outlining some of the key aspects of “sacred 
history.”65 By the next year, they began delivering a daily message to the patients, either 
midday or in the evening. Bosch eventually developed a two-month cycle of Xhosa 
messages (62 in total) for the patients, ideally suited for those undergoing a long recovery 
from tuberculosis.66 As the technology at Madwaleni improved, they were able to 
broadcast the staff’s daily prayers services and Bible studies into the hospital over a 
loudspeaker system.67 They used the loudspeakers so much in fact that they broke down 
and had to be replaced. Some of the patients found these messages inspiring, and even 
began attending catechism class.68  
The relationship between church and state was not without its own tensions. 
Smith informed the Health Department in Pietersburg that the mission had run out of 
money and could not afford to keep the hospital open without an immediate inflow of 
state capital. The Health Department told Smith that they were not in the habit of 
advancing payments to hospitals, regardless of their situation. They told him to keep an 
account of his spending, and at the end of the month the department would reimburse 
him. Doing this would mean running a deficit, and it was not clear when the state would 
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pay back the money. Smith decided he would do no such thing, and he unilaterally 
decided to close the hospital. Within a few days, the director of the Health Department 
arrived at Thsilidzini in person to ask how much money Smith needed to reopen the 
hospital.69  
Though Smith’s actions had the desired effect, they almost caused a riot among 
his staff members. They were furious that he had not consulted them about the decision, 
and they were also concerned about what it could mean for their patients and their 
salaries. Their dissatisfaction ran deeper. Smith was a very difficult boss. He later 
commented with remorse that “So-called Christian bosses can become real slave drivers 
and I was one of the best.” He pushed his workers very hard, and he had exceedingly 
high expectations. Ever concerned about wasting resources, he even forbade small talk 
during working hours. For some, his decision to close the hospital without consulting 
them was the last straw, and they left the mission station.70    
Missionaries were providing health care services to regions where they had 
previously been absent. When the first five tuberculosis patients arrived at the hospital in 
Tshilidzini, the Smiths encountered some unanticipated difficulties. Some of the patients 
had never seen a bed before, and found them very difficult to use. Patients were unsure of 
how to get into a bed, and then lying so far off the ground on one’s back was an awkward 
feeling to those who had never done it before. Beyond this, patients did not realize that 
windows contained panes of glass, and there were a few accidents in which people put 
their hands through them. Being strangers to running water, some people turned on taps 																																																								
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and left them running, and they clogged toilets with sticks, stones, and corncobs. Smith 
did not have much patience for this, and he gruffly told the patients he would shove the 
contents of the clogged toilet down the throat of the next person who stopped it up. It 
apparently never happened again.71 This cruel reaction was certainly one of the less 
benevolent expressions of missionary discipline. Smith, no doubt, was also highlighting 
the cruel and unfeeling nature of his earlier racist self.    
There were other instances in which Smith was decidedly more patient. A group 
of chiefs asked the Smiths to expand their medical work, running clinics at outpost that 
would be more accessible to people who lived far away from the hospital. At the clinics, 
many prospective patients were merely curious or only had minor injuries, while others 
were seriously ill. Ellen devised a plan where she would look after the serious cases, 
while Nico would tend to those who were not as sick. A group of people assembled 
around Nico, and he provided them with bandages and aspirin as he saw fit. The people, 
however, came to expect that he would use the stethoscope to diagnose all of their 
potential maladies.72 Ellen laughed to see her husband listening to arms, knees, and sore 
teeth. As large groups assembled, however, it was clear that they were responding to a 
real need in the community.  
The medical services offered by the missionaries, however, fell sadly short of 
meeting the community’s need. Shortly after the hospital opened, the Department of 
Native Affairs contacted the Smiths, asking them to build a ward for patients with 
chronic illnesses, particularly those with mental illnesses. There were 63 patients spread 																																																								
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over the Johannesburg area’s hospitals who spoke Venda and/or Tsonga that the 
government wanted to relocate to the “homelands.” The Smiths responded, building a 
residence called “Kathushelu,” or the “Place of Mercy.” Smith later remembered the 
patients being bitter and angry about having to move. He wrote, “we were obedient co-
workers of the government in the execution of its policy. What we did not comprehend 
and did not have any sensitivity for, was the fact that these chronically ill people…[were] 
brought from the places where they spent most of their lives to a place where they were 
separated from their families.”73 Rina and Kobie Boesenkool, a Dutch couple, oversaw 
the work in the residence for those with chronic conditions. In addition to caring for the 
patients, they trained local young women as caretakers, teaching them how to care for 
patients, cook, clean, and sew. After one year, this group of women graduated, and a new 
group were began their training.74  
Kathushelu was the first mental health facility in Venda. Those living with mental 
illness previously were taken care of by their families. It was not uncommon for those 
who might become a danger to themselves or others to be tied to a tree. The Smiths could 
not make accommodations for all of the mentally ill at the hospital (though there might 
have been 63 more spaces had it not been for relocations), and they arranged to have 
some mentally ill people put in jail.75 Smith later wrote, “that was, in any way, better than 
being tied to a tree.” Nevertheless, it was a profoundly discouraging experience of what 
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he called “the pain of Africa.”76 Though their medical mission was not without success, it 
was also woefully inadequate to meet the needs of the local population.  
NG Missionaries and the apartheid state found a symbiotic relationship in the 
health care system. For apartheid ideologues, mission-pioneered clinics, hospitals, and 
dispensaries would become the backbone of the health care system in independent 
“homelands.” Because hospitals were places where evangelism took place, the state was 
effectively subsidizing mission work. Though they worked together, the relationship 
between church and state was not always easy, especially in the area of funding. 
Likewise, while the institutions made a tremendous impact on the local communities, 
introducing people to new health care options, they fell short of meeting the enormous 
need. This was, in many ways, a mirror for the entire apartheid system. In its propaganda, 
the government boasted of its development projects, but these institutions failed to 
support anything near the alleged homeland population. The “homelands” would remain 
underdeveloped and overpopulated throughout the apartheid years.  
The Ambiguities of Separation and Contact 
On Friday, June 13, 1958, contractor Alec Kapp and David Bosch surveyed the 
ground at Madwaleni. They measured sites for the missionary’s house (parsonage), a 
doctor’s house, nurses’ houses, a general hospital, a tuberculosis hospital, and a church.77 
The layout of the station revealed the same anxieties about interracial proximity shared 
by wider white South African society. Though the facilities on the mission station were 
intended for the use of black persons, both blacks and whites staffed them. Teams of 																																																								
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white doctors, nurses, secretaries, and builders occupied mission stations along with 
missionaries and their families. The designers of the mission stations ensured that white 
staff member had white spaces to return to at the end of their workday. There were 
separate residences for black and white nurses, where they took their meals and 
socialized apart. Even the parsonage was designed for racial separation. The Cape 
Mission Board sent new missionaries architectural plans for parsonages that included a 
“Bantoe-Ontvangskamer,” or Bantu Reception Room.78 The name of the room revealed 
the racial character of the mission. This room was intended to be a space where the white 
missionary could receive black persons in a space other than the family’s living room. It 
was on the far end of the parsonage, and it was separated from the rest of the house by the 
missionary’s study.79 White guests would have been received in the rest of the house, 
where the missionary’s family had spaces for relaxation, eating, and sleeping.  
For all of the paranoia of proximity, the line of separation was never hard and 
fast. When they moved into the completed parsonage on January 20, 1959, Annemie 
Bosch wrote that her family “could not be thankful enough” for the house that “truly 
looked pretty” and had “enough room and storage space.” As the family worked to 
arrange their belongings in their new house, Annemie noted that “by every curtain-less 
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window a bunch of red-blanketed Bomvanas stood…gawking [at us].”80 When some of 
the women asked to come in to her new home, Annemie found herself to be reluctant. 
The walls had just been painted in a variety of then-fashionable colors, and she worried 
that the ochers from the women’s red blankets would leave ruddy smudges on the fresh 
walls. Nevertheless, Annemie invited the women into her home, and to her shame, they 
respectfully walked through, looking at each room without leaving a single mark on the 
walls.81  
Her initial lack of hospitality and feeling of shame forced Annemie to face her 
own racial prejudices, and further rethink her assumptions about racial contact. The 
proximity of blacks and whites on the mission station, and Annemie’s desire to make 
connections with people in the immediate environment, pushed her to move past the 
paradigm of separation. The Bosches did not use the “Bantoe-Ontvangskamer” for its 
stated purpose, but rather for a variety of other functions. This was in part a matter of 
expediency—the growing family needed the space. But it also partially interrupted the 
carefully guarded separation of whites and blacks on the mission station.82  
Smith remembered being zealous about racial separation at Tshilidzini. One 
evening, the black nurses invited the white staff to dinner, raising white anxieties about 
racial mixing in a social setting. Smith ultimately decided that they would attend the 
dinner, but use it as an occasion to announce that such meals would not take place in the 																																																								
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future. For their part, the black nurses believed that they had maintained sufficient 
segregation by setting a separate table for their white colleagues. The two racial groups 
ate their respective dinners, after which Smith stood to address the crowd. He told them 
Aesop’s fable in which a jackal and a stork became friends. One evening, the jackal 
invited the stork to his house for dinner, and he served soup on a flat plate. While the 
jackal was able to dive face first into his soup, the stork could not manage to eat it with 
his long beak. The stork then invited the jackal to his house for dinner, and he served 
soup in a urn. The stork was able to drink deeply from the urn, but the poor jackal’s snout 
could not reach the soup. Smith then said that such stories demonstrated the difficulty of 
interracial eating, even at segregated tables. His meaning was clear, and the nurses did 
not extend another invitation.83  
 Yet Smith himself was forced to break his own food taboos when in the presence 
of chiefs. He grew up believing that black people were “dirty,” and he was always 
warned against touching them or eating anything they offered him. On the other hand, as 
a supporter of indigenization, he believed firmly in respecting “native customs.” 
Therefore, when offered something to eat, he believed he was obliged to take it. He 
recalled his first meal in a hut after meeting with a chief. The chief sent Smith to eat in a 
hut by himself. Smith was never sure if this was a Venda tradition or if they knew he had 
a complete revulsion against eating with black people. Regardless, after sitting for a few 
moments, a woman entered the hut on her knees, offering him some food. Though he 
recognized the pap (cooked maize meal), he could not identify anything else. He took a 
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moment to take it in. He thought the sauce “looked a little suspect,” and as the scent of 
the meat wafted to his delicate nostrils he found the “odor disgusting.” He choked down 
the food as quickly as possible before washing it down with a Coca-Cola. The familiar 
carbonated concoction soothed his nauseous stomach.84  
 After a meeting with another chief, a young man was sent to fetch Smith a mug of 
fresh, warm, frothy milk. Even as a child, Smith had trouble tolerating unpasteurized 
dairy products. Knowing the pain that would ensue later, he brought the mug to his 
mouth and as soon as the warm, earthly liquid hit his lips, he drank it as quickly as 
possible. The chief saw this, and assumed that Smith must have really had a penchant for 
fresh milk. Every time Smith visited him afterwards, the chief always ensured that he had 
a full mug of fresh milk for his guest. Though he “died a thousand deaths,” he always 
drank the milk.85  
Much like Smith at Tshilidzini, Boshoff also remembered being offered food after 
his meetings with chiefs. Unlike Smith, however, he ate the meal along with his black co-
worker, and Boshoff seemed to lack Smith’s squeamishness about what he was being 
served. He said, “The especially delicious meal was served by one of the women, and it 
consisted of bok meat and samp porridge.”86 Rather than Coca-Cola, Boshoff 
remembered drinking coffee at the end of his meal. After the meal, the atmosphere was 
less formal. The chief personally greeted Boshoff and the evangelist, and wished them a 
safe trip home. In an interview with Carel’s son Wynand Boshoff, he reported that his 																																																								
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father did not share Smith’s concerns about interracial eating on the mission field. It was, 
according to him, common practice for his father to eat with the people among whom he 
was working.87   
Other concerns would also push Smith beyond the line of racial separation. One 
night at about 2 am, a young man urgently roused Smith from his bed. Wondering what 
the matter could be, the young man told him that Johannes Netshikulwe urgently needed 
to see him. Netshikulwe worked very closely with Smith from the very beginning of the 
mission. He was a member of the Lemba people, a group who practice a religion that is 
interestingly similar to Judaism. Smith found Netshikulwe in a state of absolute terror. He 
was crying with fright as beads of sweat rolled off his brow. Netshikulwe told Smith that 
he dreamed he was riding his bicycle on his way to the hospital. As he was riding, he 
began to experience serious leg pain, and he heard the voice of his ancestors. They told 
him that they were very angry that he was working in a mission hospital. Netshikulwe 
woke with a terrible start, and he was horrified to find that his legs actually were in 
pain.88  
Smith took Netshikulwe by the hand, and ever a missionary, he said that Jesus had 
the power to save him from his angry ancestors. Smith stayed with Netshikulwe for two 
hours, comforting him, and only left after Netshikulwe had fallen calmly back to sleep. 
The next day at work, neither Smith nor Netshikulwe brought up the previous night, nor 
would they ever mention what happened. It was a scene in which the lines of separation 
were crossed. The same Smith who was averse to eating in the same room as blacks, who 																																																								
87 Interview with Wynand Boshoff, March 2016.  
88 Smith, “Thsilidzini,” 44. 
		
188 
grew up believing that blacks were dirty, willingly held a black man’s hand in the middle 
of the night, offering comfort in the best way he knew how.89 On the one hand, it was 
paternalistic in nature. On the other, an undeniable concern for a fellow human being 
pushed Smith past his racial sensibilities. Smith’s growing moral concerns would 
continue to push him beyond his racial boundares. While this would only be minor at 
first, he would eventually attempt to leave the white community altogether to live in 
solidarity with black people in Mamelodi.  
The Ambiguity of Urban Mission  
The ironies and shortcomings of apartheid were exposed most clearly in urban 
mission work. In January 1960, the Boshoffs went to work as pioneer NGK missionaries 
in Soweto, where their pious concerns about children inadvertently gave stability to a 
population they believed was transient. Boshoff’s leadership in expanding missionary 
activity in the Low Veld gained him some notoriety among NGK leaders. For several 
years, Beyers Naudé and Frans Geldenhuys were becoming increasingly concerned about 
the difficult conditions that black people faced in cities. They wrote to Boshoff, telling 
him that while rural missions were now thriving, the cities had been seriously neglected. 
Recently, the South African government had constructed several new neighborhoods in 
Soweto, including Diepkloof and Meadowlands. These neighborhoods carried the 
notorious distinction of being the areas where many people from Sophiatown were 
relocated. Anglican missionary Trevor Huddleston brought this to the world’s attention, 
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and it was immortalized in the Kwela song, Meadowlands.90 The residents of the new 
neighborhood did not have a reformed pastor. Naudé and Geldenhuys asked Boshoff to 
serve that function.91  
 Carel and Anna Boshoff discussed their options, and they prayed about the 
decision before them. They decided to go to the city, leaving the work at Meetse-a-
Bophelo in the hands of Pieter Kotzé and then Anna’s brother, Hendrik Verwoerd, Jr.92 
The move was very difficult for Boshoff. He felt comfortable amidst the “majestic 
mountains and lush vegetation” of the Lowveld. While Anna was comfortable in the city, 
Carel found it shocking. In particular, he was troubled by the effects of urban life on 
black people. Boshoff asked, “What does a city do to a person, and what does a person do 
in a city, especially if the locations, which were called townships in those days, are just a 
place to sleep.”93  Boshoff echoed the concerns of many apartheid ideologues when he 
decried the negative effects of “migratory labor.” The people in the city became part of a 
faceless mass that woke up before dawn, was crowded onto a train, and returned only 
after dark. Boshoff said, “It took me three months to get over the culture shock and even 
then I was only moderately oriented.”94  
 The Boshoffs began their work in Soweto in January 1960. Immediately, they set 
about getting to know the surrounding areas. The state’s resources, once again, would 
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prove helpful to mission work. The Boshoffs obtained a map of the townships from the 
Resettlement Commission (Hervestigingsraad), which included all of the housing lots. 
Afrikaner youth would prove a great help to their work. The Boshoffs recruited 
volunteers from local NGK youth groups, and they were sent out with pamphlets in Sotho 
and Zulu introducing the new mission. The youth were also coached on how to conduct a 
friendly conversation, and how to obtain certain valuable information. They went through 
the townships two by two, collecting the head of household’s name, the number of people 
living in a house, the lot number, the area, and the church affiliation. Echoing her father’s 
panache for counting and categorizing, Anna took the information collected by the 
students, and then transferred it onto a map, using colored pins to denote church 
affiliation. They stood in front of the map, seeing the religious demographics of 
Diepkloof and getting a sense of the shape of their parish.95   
 As a missionary in the township, Boshoff responded to the needs of an urbanized 
population. He worked very closely with an elderly evangelist named Stefanie Secheaba. 
On Sundays, their first order of business was to go to the mining compound. These were 
notoriously bleak places, noted for their overcrowding and scarce amenities. 
Communication was difficult because miners came from the entire Southern African 
region. Secheaba was fluent in Afrikaans, Zulu, Fanakalo, and no doubt other languages, 
making communication possible. Boshoff marveled that Secheaba spoke Fanakalo better 
than the miners, but this is not terribly surprising given the fact that it was a pidgin 
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language developed for use in the mines and not anybody’s first language.96 It certainly 
had its limits. One day as Boshoff was preaching, he noted that Secheaba translated 
“Jesus, the son of God,” into “Jesus, God’s piccanin”—an offensive term for a black 
child. Boshoff turned to Secheaba, and said, “No, Stefanie, you can’t call Jesus God’s 
piccanin.” He replied, “But Moruti (pastor), what else shall we say?” Boshoff though for 
a moment, but was unable to come up with another answer.97  
After the early morning services at the mining compounds, Boshoff and Secheaba 
returned to the church at Diepkloof. There, Boshoff was able to preach in Sotho, and 
Secheaba preached in Zulu. They made recordings of their sermons that could be used at 
services throughout the townships. They also bought a VW microbus, which was able to 
carry around a film projector and sound system for screening Christian films. These 
served as talking points for lectures and conversations. Rather than doing any formal 
mission work in the “white areas” for domestic workers, Boshoff preached to the NGK 
about the “missionary task of the church.” He told them that every Christian was meant to 
be a missionary, and therefore they were responsible for teaching their domestic workers 
about Jesus. In some ways, this was the urban corollary to the rural pattern of farmers 
offering religious services to their black employees.98 Boshoff invited many Afrikaners to 
black churches where all participants shared communion together, which was rather 
progressive. He would not, however, take black Christians to white churches, as “that 
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would not be worship. It would be display.”99 
Building a church community leads to creating a sense of social stability in an 
area. People come together, pray together, and listen to one another’s concerns. Church 
becomes a space where people become sensitized to one another’s needs.100 According to 
the ideology of apartheid, black people living in urban areas were only there to serve in 
white businesses and households. For the apartheid ideologues, blacks were not 
permanent residents of Johannesburg, but rather they ought to live in a “tribal homeland.” 
Yet mission work began to create institutions that served to stabilize the urban black 
population. 
Beyond the church, missionaries created urban institutions through pioneering 
youth camps and daycare centers. The Boshoffs were deeply worried about children who 
were left in the township all day while mothers worked. They established a daycare to 
provide some measure of security and enrichment for the young children. They applied 
for a house in Diepkloof that could accommodate roughly 40 toddlers. After acquiring the 
space, they hired a trained social worker and three helpers to run the daycare. Every day, 
they ensured that the children were fed and also had time for naps, play, and some 
educational activities. The need for daycares was enormous, and the idea caught on like 
wildfire. It grew into a network of 11 daycares each with its own administrative staff. 
Now hundreds of mothers could go to work confident that their children would be fed 
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and safe during the day.101  
The Boshoffs also pioneered monthly camps for boys and girls respectively. The 
campsite was north of the city on a fruit farm, where there was space for children to play 
field sports, a swimming area, and as Boshoff noted, “a tidy warehouse” for indoor 
activities and sleeping space. Interest in the camps was overwhelming, no doubt 
reflecting the need for such activities, and the organizers had to turn children away 
because there were not enough seats on the busses. Still, they managed to host three to 
four hundred young people at each camp.102  
Boshoff and Secheaba ran the boys camp, which included a great deal of sport. It 
was no small feat finding space, equipment, and referees for a few hundred soccer 
players. A boxing club in the city later donated equipment to the mission, and Boshoff 
and Secheaba found themselves refereeing matches. After exerting themselves, the 
children were able to cool off by swimming in the farmer’s reservoir. Boshoff wrote that 
“The youth camp for girls, for which Anna was responsible, was naturally of a 
completely different nature.”103 Rather than soccer and boxing, the young women 
engaged in rhythmic dance set to music. There was also decidedly more singing and 
naturally lessons in needlework. All children received the same religious components of 
the camp. There were Bible studies, followed by Bible quizzes with prizes, and also film 
screenings. According to Boshoff, Ken Anderson’s 1960 film, Something to die for, 
																																																								
101 Boshoff, Dis nou ek, 172-173.  
102 Ibid., 170. 
103 Ibid., 171. “Die jeugkamp vir meisies, waarvoor Anna verantwoordelik was, was natuurlik van 
‘n gans ander aard.”  
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became an instant favorite.104  
According to the Boshoffs’ apartheid ideology, blacks “belonged” in their 
respective “homelands”; urban living was only a temporary measure to make money. If 
there were permanent institutions to be built, they should be built in the “homelands.” Yet 
the Boshoffs could not simply ignore the plight of urban black people, especially the 
children. And so, they responded by building childcare networks. It is doubtful that the 
Boshoffs saw this action as stabilizing the urban black population. Perhaps they would 
have considered such institutions temporary measures until families could return to 
“tribal homelands.” But the fact remains that the tiny tots who went to the daycares the 
Boshoffs spearheaded in the early 1960s were part of the same generation that rejected 
apartheid so definitively in the 1976 Soweto uprising. The camps were intended to be an 
“entry point” for the gospel. Yet beyond the boxing matches, dancing, and Bible quizzes, 
they also provided children with a chance to make friends with one another, and built a 
sense of belonging and community.   
Conclusion 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff happily cooperated with the 
National Party to build institutions for black people in the so-called “homelands.” While 
they claimed to be operating independently of the government, they had a significant 
degree of ideological overlap. All three believed that South Africa’s various ethnic 
groups had separate destinies. The believed that white and black South Africans were too 
culturally different to form a single church or society. They attempted to build 
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“indigenous churches,” based on their understandings of African culture. Their own 
understanding of African culture was deeply flawed, however, because they adopted an 
essentialist lens. African culture was changing, and it could not be neatly divided from a 
“white” South Africa.  
 As missionaries, Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff had profound concerns about the 
people among whom they were working. Missionary work in the apartheid context was 
deeply paternalistic. White Christians assumed that they had a superior faith and more 
advanced civilization. They understood themselves to be trustees of less advanced 
people. The racial hierarchies on the mission station tended to preclude real connections 
between equals. This did not, however, preclude real ethical concerns that went beyond 
eternal salvation. These concerns could push missionaries beyond the line of racial 
separation, or to act in ways that did not fit with the ideology of total separation. When 
apartheid proved to be oppressive, real ethical concerns about black people would often 
push missionaries to reexamine their moral commitments. In the 1960s, however, Bosch, 
Smith, and Boshoff remained convinced that apartheid or “separate development” would 
yield positive fruits.
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CHAPTER 4: 
WHITE FEAR AND THE IDEOLOGICAL CENTER (1960-1966) 
The 1960 Sharpeville Massacre would test the limits of Afrikaners’ ethical concern for 
black people’s political aspirations. In the wake of the atrocity, the World Council of 
Churches sent a delegation to South Africa to hold talks with member churches, including 
the Cape and Transvaal NGK. This gathering would become known as the Cottesloe 
Consultation, and all participants, including NGK representatives, signed onto a 
document that endorsed moderate reforms. Verwoerd and many NGK members were 
seething over the Afrikaner delegates’ endorsement of reform. The fallout over Cottesloe 
exposed a divided within the Afrikaner community. In the early 1960s, many Afrikaners 
were deeply anxious about decolonization and African independence. In this context, 
most Afrikaners rejected any reforms as a threat to white survival. Verwoerd’s 
confidence in the face of uncertainty, as well as a buoyant economy, proved reassuring to 
many Afrikaners. A minority of leaders in the NGK began to argue that if apartheid failed 
to provide a just and peaceful social order, it would have to be changed (though not 
necessarily abandoned). Boshoff and Smith, while not directly critical of the Cottesloe 
delegates, would continue to stand with the majority. Bosch, on the other hand, was more 
conciliatory. In spite of his more open attitude, Bosch still believed that South Africa’s 
ethnic groups were irreconcilable, and he was open to the possibility that the “homeland 
experiment,” given time, would provide answers for South Africa’s racial questions. 
Boshoff and Smith, who supported the causes of separation and Afrikaner nationalism, 
were brought to the center, while Bosch, who embraced ecumenism and reform, 
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remained on the margins.  
The Growing Climate of White Fear 
Before 1960, there were still many open protests against the National Party’s 
policy of apartheid. White women in the Black Sash and white Veterans in the Torch 
Commando protested against the erosion of Coloured People’s franchise.1 Black voices 
of dissent, while repressed, were able to find spaces for expression. The African National 
Congress was able to organize a defiance campaign in 1952, in which more than 8,000 
were arrested.2 In 1955, the Congress Movement spelled out their political vision in the 
Freedom Charter, which called for non-racial democracy, equality, the nationalization of 
key sectors of the economy, and the redistribution of land.3 In 1956, when the 
government announced women would have to carry passes, Lilian Ngoyi and Helen 
Joseph organized more than 20,000 women to individually deliver letters of protest to 
Prime Minister Strydom. Together they sang, “Strydom, you have struck the women, you 
have struck a rock, you will be crushed.”4 There was space for dissent.  
Joe Slovo, a leading member of the underground South African Communist Party, 
said that though the police in the 1950s could be firm, “they were not torturers…In a 
sense up to about 1960/61 the underground struggle was fought on a gentlemanly 																																																								
1 William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (Oxford University Press, 2001), 150, 188-89. 
The black sash took its name from the stole the women wore in mourning for the death of the constitution. 
See: The Black Sash: The Early Years (videorecording), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5PW3M4KYC8.  
2 Anne Kelk Mager and Maanda Mulaudzi, “Popular Responses to Apartheid: 1948-c. 1975,” The 
Cambridge History of South Africa, Volume 2, 1885-1994, eds. Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill 
Nasson (Cambridge University Press, 2011),372-73. Beinart, 154.  
3 “The Freedom Charter,” From the South African Past, ed. John A. Williams (Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1997), 282-86. Mager and Mulaudzi, 378-79. Beinart, 155.  
4 Shireen Hassim, Women’s Organizations and Democracy in South Africa: Contesting Authority 
(University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 26. 
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terrain.”5 By 1960, however, the white minority government was less inclined to entertain 
opposition. This was largely because the international political climate was changing. On 
February 3, 1960, Conservative British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan famously 
delivered his “Winds of Change” speech at a joint session of the South African 
Parliament, in which the British government restated its intention to pursue a policy of 
decolonization.6 The international community, which had hitherto supported Western 
colonial rule in Africa, was now increasingly inclined to support African nationalists’ 
demands for majority rule on the basis of “one man, one vote.” White South Africans 
feared that these winds of change would blow the whites out of Africa. 
 Even more shocking than Macmillan’s speech, however, was the March 21, 1960 
Sharpeville Massacre. Reports of what exactly happened that day vary, but there were a 
number of indisputable and appalling details. Robert Sobukwe’s Pan Africanist Congress, 
a self-consciously black African political party, called for a protest against the pass laws 
at Sharpeville, a black township near the industrial center at Vanderbijlpark. Between 
5,000 and 20,000 protestors gathered at the police station. As the day wore on, the police 
began getting jittery. Although no one ever took responsibility for the order, the police 
opened fire into the crowd with live ammunition, killing 69 people and wounding 180 
others. Notoriously, police shot many people in the back as they fled the scene. The 
reports of the event were deeply disturbing for onlookers both inside and outside South 
																																																								
5 Joe Slovo in From Protest to Challenge, volume 5, eds. Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart 
(Indiana University Press, 1997), 24. 
6 Harold Macmillan, “The Winds of Change,” From the South African Past, eds. John A. Williams 
(Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 292.  
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Africa. The event exposed the apartheid system’s racist brutality.7  
In the immediate aftermath of the event, protest swelled against the government. 
The government flexed its coercive arm by declaring a state of emergency on March 30. 
There were thousands of arrests, and the government banned both the ANC and the PAC. 
The international community viewed this as evidence that the South African policy of 
apartheid was inherently violent and racist.8 The United Nations Security Council passed 
resolution 134, expressing outrage at the events that took place in Sharpeville, and it 
called on South Africa to abandon the policy of apartheid. The Afrikaner establishment 
was also morally shaken by the event. Church leaders, members of the business 
community, intellectuals, newspaper editors, and even cabinet members believed that 
concrete changes had to be made.9  
Before any new option could be discussed, David Pratt attempted to assassinate 
Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd at the Rand Easter Show in Johannesburg on April 9. 
Pratt, a white farmer from Magaliesberg who was later determined to be mentally ill, shot 
Verwoerd in the face at point-blank range. He was rushed to the hospital. Boshoff arrived 
at his father-in-law’s bedside several hours later, and he recalled, “it was a shocking 
experience. His [Verwoerd’s] face was blue and almost swollen round, and he spoke with 
																																																								
7 Mager and Mulaudzi, 395-96. Tom Lodge, Sharpeville: a massacre and its consequences 
(Oxford University Press, 2011) is a monograph about the massacre. Lodge rightly argues that the major 
effects of Sharpeville were the galvanization of international opinion against apartheid while at the same 
time consolidating the white minority’s hold on the country.  
8 Lodge sets the estimate for those arrested at “nearly 10,000.” Lodge, Sharpeville, 167. Eric P. 
Louw, The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid (Praeger Publishers, 2004), 120 and Nancy L. Clarke and 
William H. Worger, South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Routledge, 2013), 62 both set the 
estimate higher.  
9 Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (University of Virginia Press, 2009), 
522-24.  
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difficulty.” With little else he could say or do, Boshoff knelt by his father-in-law’s 
hospital bed, and prayed for him.10  
Verwoerd’s recovered surprisingly quickly. Even his doctors were astounded that 
he managed to survive the wound. His more moderate ministers had privately hoped that, 
as historian Herman Giliomee put it, “the bullets would soften his hard head,” but it had 
the opposite effect. Verwoerd was emboldened by the event, and he rebuked his ministers 
for suggesting that there would be a change in policy.11 He remained confident in the 
apartheid policy, promoting “independent homelands” as a kind of South African 
corollary to independence elsewhere.12 Verwoerd’s confidence was reassuring to the 
white public, which viewed African nationalism with trepidation.  
The Afrikaans press portrayed decolonization as the first step toward the 
elimination of white communities living in Africa. Even before the June 30, 1960 
independence of the Belgian Congo, Die Burger reported, “For the first time since the 
‘winds of change’ began to blow a white minority flees helter-skelter before black 
terror.”13 After independence, the violence spiraled into what became known as the 
Congo Disaster. White South Africans read reports of widespread looting, assault, and 
rape. These articles played on whites’ economic, physical, and sexual anxieties. Die 
Kerkbode ran an article on “Mission and the Congo-Crisis,” with two photographs. In 
one, the caption read “whites stream out of Leopoldville (Kinshasa) after the outbreak of 
riots in the Congo,” while in the other Catholic missionaries in long white robes and pith 																																																								
10 Carel Boshoff, Dis nou ek, (LAPA Uitgewers, 2012), 191-193. “Dit was ‘n skikkende ervaring. 
Sy gesig was blou en feitlik rond geswel, en hy het moeilik geprak.”  
11 Giliomee, 523-525.  
12 Ibid., 531. 
13 Ibid., 525.  
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helmets were evacuated on a U.S. military airplane.14 African nationalism throughout the 
continent was being viewed with suspicion. Die Kerkbode editor A.P. Treurnicht’s article 
“Their Ideal for Us?” featured a picture of a mission station that had been surrounded by 
barbed wire for protection during Mau Mau in Kenya. He rhetorically asked, “Does the 
West want to see the whole of Christianity in Africa behind barbed wire?”15 In bold 
bullet points, he asked, “Non-white nationalism is heathen in its essence—must we now 
be turned over to it?”16 This played on white stereotypes of “uncivilized heathens,” which 
carried the connotations of a “barbarism” that would destroy Christianity and civilization. 
White nationalism, on the contrary, was seen as both civilized and Christian. For the 
white public, the notion of assertive black political action coupled with images of whites 
fleeing their homes was a frightening specter. They worried that their livelihoods, which 
were buttressed by a buoyant economy, were at stake, along with their bodily integrity.17   
Verwoerd’s peculiar blend of a jovial disposition and a hardline commitment to 
white survival made him attractive to white voters. Confidence in his leadership was 
further buoyed by steady economic growth. South Africans were also enjoying a time of 
tremendous prosperity. In October, Verwoerd called a referendum, asking if white South 
Africans wished to become a Republic, thereby limiting the influence of Britain and the 
Commonwealth nations on South Africa’s politics. Mincing no words, the “yes” 																																																								
14 E.N. Casaleggio, “Die sending en die Kongo-krisis,” Die Kerkbode, December 28, 1960, 926-
28. “Blankes stroom uit Leopoldville ná die uitbreek van die onluste in die Kongo.” 
15 A.P. Treurnicht, “Hulle ideal vir ons?” Die Kerkbode, February 24, 1960, 294. “Wil die Weste 
dan die hele Christendom in Afrika agter die doringdraad sien?”  
16 Ibid., 295. “Die nie-blanke nasionalisme is in sy wese heidens. Moet ons dan nou daaraan 
uitgelewer word?” 
17 For a study of fear as a factor in white South African politics, see, Derek Du Bruyn and Andre 
Wessels, “Vrees as factor in die regse blanke politiek in Suid-Afrika,” Journal for Contemporary History 
vol. 34 no. 3 (2009): 91-110. The study deals with a later period, 1976-1982.  
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campaign ran under the slogan, “Our Republic Now, to keep South Africa White!”18 
Highlighting whites anxieties about interracial sex and African nationalism, the English-
language Rand Daily Mail quipped, “The whole republican referendum is reduced to the 
simple question of whether you want your daughter to marry an African, or, more to the 
point, be ravished by a Congolese soldier.”19 The “Yes” vote carried by a narrow 
majority. It was clear that Verwoerd, and by extension apartheid, won the day.20  
Cottesloe 
The massacre at Sharpeville precipitated huge tension between white English 
speaking church leaders and Afrikaner church leaders. While voicing sympathy with 
members “of all races” who were involved in the event, the NGK was defensive. The 
Cape NGK leadership blamed outside agitators for encouraging rebellion, which, it said, 
would “surrender civilization and Christianity…to the activities of a lawless and 
irresponsible element.”21 The Anglican Bishop of Cape Town, Joost de Blank, was 
seething mad at this declaration. In a letter to World Council of Churches (WCC) General 
Secretary Willem Visser ‘t Hooft, de Blank demanded that either the NGK be expelled 
from the WCC, or the Anglican Church in South Africa would withdraw.22  
The leadership of the WCC was not pleased with de Blank’s suggestion. They 
worried that he was breaking up the ecumenical movement, and that he threatened to set a 
dangerous precedent by one church using its membership as leverage to get another 
expelled. Likewise, many members of the Anglican Communion, were equally irked by 																																																								
18 David Harrison, The White Tribe of Africa (University of California Press, 1981), 165. 
19 Cited in Harrison, 165.  
20 Cited in Giliomee, 525. 
21 The “Cape Declaration,” in A.H. Lükhoff, Cottesloe (Tafelberg, 1976), 6-7.  
22 Lückhoff, 8. 
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de Blank’s rhetoric. Archbishop of Canterbury Geoffrey Fisher told Visser ‘t Hooft that 
de Blank’s suggestion was “a stupid remark,” adding that one could not end apartheid by 
creating more division.23 Anxious to smooth over tensions, Visser ‘t Hooft sent Robert 
Bilheimer to arrange an ecumenical gathering between the various member churches in 
South Africa, with a special emphasis on reconciling the Dutch Reformed Churches and 
the Anglicans. Bilheimer had the unenviable task of negotiating the ethnic defensiveness 
of Afrikaner ministers and the ego of an Anglican Bishop. Nevertheless, he persisted, and 
all churches agreed to meet to discuss a range of contemporary issues.24  
The Cape NGK and the Transvaal NGK operated as independent churches at that 
time, and they set up their own respective study commissions to prepare for the 
consultation. Boshoff and Smith sat on Transvaal’s commission. As missionaries, they 
were considered experts in racial matters.25 Their classmate Willie Jonker joined them on 
the commission, along with their former professors and pastors, Beyers Naudé, E.P. 
Groenewald, A.B. du Preez, Ben Marais, and a host of others.26 Both the Transvaal and 
the Cape studies agreed that “separate development,” given time, would eliminate 
discrimination while giving all racial groups the opportunity for development. The 
Transvaal commission argued that while racial demographics were making whites 
uneasy, they could justly maintain political power over their own affairs through the 
formation of parallel societies. Consistent with many in the NP, the admitted that the 																																																								
23 Geoffrey Fisher quoted in Lückhoff, 15. 
24 Lückhoff, 16-26.  
25 Interview with Klippies Kritzinger, February 2016. Kritzinger noted that NGK officials 
frequently turned to missionaries to discuss racial matters.  
26 Lückhoff, 29. There is a full list of the members who participated in both the respective 
Transvaal and the Cape NGK Study Commissions.  
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word apartheid had failed. They believed in marketing the policy as “distinctive 
(eiesoortige)” or “separate development (afsonderlike ontwikkeling).”27 For its part, the 
Cape NGK commission called for the consolidation (i.e. territorial expansion) of the 
reserves and rapid industrialization—themes which were consistent with SABRA’s 
recommendations. This, they thought, would make “separate development” more 
feasible.28  
Both churches saw room for improvement. They each argued that the church had 
the responsibility to promote justice, not just the interests of the white minority.29 The 
Cape NGK was decidedly more progressive than its sister church in the Transvaal. It 
argued that the reserves could not absorb the entire black population, and many black 
people would have to continue seeking economic opportunities in “white areas.” Under 
apartheid legislation, black South Africans in “white areas” were tantamount to guest or 
migratory laborers, and so they were denied basic rights to franchise, domicile, or 
residence. The Cape NGK argued that this arrangement would have to change, as, “the 
right of domicile and [the right] to a say in the government over him belongs to every 
adult person, and therefore a policy that permanently denies economically integrated non-
whites the right to co-participation in the country’s government cannot ultimately be 
justifiable.”30 Against the National Party’s policy of removing Coloured representation, 
the commission claimed that there was “no principle objection against direct [Coloured] 																																																								
27 “Memorandum of the Cape NGK Study Group” quoted in Lückhoff, 63.  
28 Ibid., 62.  
29 See specifically the “Memorandum of the Transvaal NGK Study Group” in Lückhoff, 63. 
30 “Memorandum of the Cape NGK Study Group” quoted in Lückhoff, 61. “Die reg tot grondbesit 
en tot seggenskap in alle regering oor hom gestel, tot die waardigheid van die volwasse mens behoort en 
daarom kan ‘n beleid wat die ekonomiese-geïnegreede nie-blanke blywend die reg van medeseggenskap in 
die landsregering ontsê, uiteindelik nie regverdigbaar wees nie.  
		
205 
representation in the Parliament.”31 The Transvaal commission, while not envisioning 
reforms as far-reaching as their Cape counterparts, was astonishingly willing to assert 
that the pass laws, and not just “outside agitators,” were at the root of African protest. In 
a later report, they also noted that discriminatory alcohol laws, influx controls, low 
wages, and general discrimination led to unrest.32 It was clear that both groups saw that 
the present political program, at the very least, needed adjustment.  
Regarding religious separation, the Transvaal and Cape commissions were 
emphatic that “no one who believes in Christ can ever be excluded from any church on 
the basis of color or race.”33 Separate churches, however, could be formed for according 
to the “needs of different groups.”34 The Cape commission noted that this was at the heart 
of the NGK mission policy, and it led to much of the misunderstanding between the 
Afrikaans and English churches.35 The Cape NGK also said that there was not scriptural 
basis for the prohibition of mixed marriages (or interracial sex per se), but it argued 
“legal, social, and cultural factors…make such marriages in our situation undesirable.” 
There could be no objection to common worship, and both churches believed that more 
opportunities needed to be found for interracial communication both in and out of 
churches.36  																																																								
31 Ibid., 62. “Daar kan geen beginselbeswaar wees teen direkte verteenwoordiging in die 
Parlement nie.”  
32 Memorandum of the Transvaal NGK Study Group 64. 
33 This came from the Memorandum of the Cape NGK, 61. “Niemand wat in Christus glo deur 
enige Kerk ter wille van kleur of ras ooit mag uitgesluit word nie.” The Transvaal made a similar statement, 
Memorandum of the Transvaal NGK, 64. 
34 Ibid., 64. “…die befoeftes van verskillende groepe…” 
35 Memorandum of the Cape NGK Study Group quoted in Lückhoff, 63. 
36 Ibid., 61. “Ten opsigte van gemengde huwelik tussen individue van die verskillende rassegroepe, 
moet ons verklaar dat daar geen grond in die skrif is om dit van staatswëe te verbied nie. Die welsyn van 
die Christelike gemeenskap asook pastorale verantwoordelikheid vereis egter dat deeglike aandag aan 
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Unlike the Cape and Transvaal NGK, the Hervormde Kerk’s commission was 
defensive and unyielding. It argued that the policy of apartheid was just, and therefore the 
“Christian government” would know how best to implement the policy. The real problem 
was a policy of acculturation, in which black people became permanent residents of 
“white areas.” They lashed out at the wider world, decrying the “professional fault 
finders” who were a stumbling block to implementing “separate development” properly. 
They accused the WCC’s anti-racism initiative of being in conflict with God’s design of 
an ethnically delineated humanity. They accused the United Nations of being a platform 
for atheism, and they argued that it along with Europe was pushing a “guilt complex,” in 
which whites were portrayed as the oppressors of Africans. The statements of communist 
agitators and leaders of English churches propagated this narrative, and they were 
responsible for the unrest in South Africa. Black freedom, they argued, was a threat to the 
bodily integrity of whites.37  Again, sexual anxieties about politically active black men 
were never far from the surface. Mincing no words, a delegate to the 1961 Hervormde 
synod said, “For the black man in the Congo, the term ‘freedom’ meant the right to rape a 
white woman.”38 
The Consultation took place the week of December 7 to 14, 1960 at the Cottesloe 
dormitory at the University of the Witwatersrand, from which the event took its name. It 
was “fully interracial,” owing to Beyers Naudé’s careful placement of delegates so as to 
																																																																																																																																																																					
wetlike, sosiale en kulturele faktore gegee moet word wat sodanige huwelik in ons situasie onwenslik 
maak.”   
37 Memorandum of the Hervormde Nederduitse Kerk quoted in Lückhoff, 66-67.  
38 Lückhoff, 67.  
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reflect unity without offending the racial sensibilities of some.39 In addition to the Cape 
and Transvaal NGK, the Hervormde Kerk, and the Anglican Church, other delegates 
came from the Bantu Presbyterian Church, the Methodist Church, the Presbyterian 
Church, and the Congregational Church. Each of the eight churches sent ten delegates. 
The WCC selected Franklin C. Fry, who was president of the American Lutheran Church, 
as the chairman. They also selected a group of delegates that included Visser ‘t Hooft, 
Bishop Lakdasa de Mel, Charles Parlin, Wilhelm Nielsel, Robert Bilheimer, and Sir 
Francis Ibiam (who could not attend). The delegates came from a wide spectrum of 
political orientations and racial groups. Out of a total of 86 delegates, there was only one 
woman in attendance (Monica Wilson, an Anglican), and there were no Indian 
delegates.40 The Afrikaner had every confidence that their delegates would defend their 
racial policy in this ecumenical gathering. Over the course of that week, the delegates 
reached some agreement. The delegates slept in the same dormitories, prayed together, 
argued with each other, and ate together, save for the HNK, who ate alone.  
The central question for the delegates at Cottesloe was apartheid or “separate 
development.” Bill Burnett, then Anglican Bishop of Bloemfontein, believed that racial 
segregation was morally indefensible. When he asked the NGK to defend apartheid 
briefly, A.B. du Preez stood up and said that the bishop would have to read his book. 
Burnett responded that there was not enough time to read a whole book, and instead they 
would have to briefly assert their position.41 O’Brien Geldenhuys provided an answer by 
																																																								
39 Ibid., 72-73. 
40 Ibid., 71-72. 
41 F.E. O’Brien Geldenhuys, In die stroomsversnelling (Tafelberg, 1982), 50.  
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using a missiological argument. He later remembered saying,  
People are different. They have different needs. They live on different planes of 
understanding, of civilization, of knowledge. If you want to reach them with the 
gospel, you must thus approach them in their own language, their own idiom, 
[and] their own milieu. For that reason, our church has always followed the 
principle in its mission policy that you must try to understand the man and make 
the gospel understandable to him in the world in which he lives.42 
 
Bilheimer said, “If I understand him [Geldenhuys] correctly, he said that a man must 
bring the gospel differently to different people so that they can better understand.” 
Raising his hand, Bilheimer continued, “If I understand him correctly, then I agree with it 
one hundred percent.” There was even the rumor that even Alan Paton found it 
convincing, and later reported that as Geldenhuys spoke, he thought, “I can hear my own 
voice speaking.” 43  Though nothing in Paton’s own words would confirm this, there was 
a great deal of mutual understanding at the consultation. After the consultation, even 
Joost de Blank said he regretted speaking so “heatedly,” and he humbly added, “Where, 
in the past, we have at any time unnecessarily wounded our brother, we now ask their 
forgiveness in Christ.” W.J. Van der Merwe graciously extended a hand of friendship.44  
Cottesloe was not radical; it was a compromise. Its vision for South Africa was 
far from a non-racial democracy. It tacitly supported the belief that white minority rule 
could be reformed.45 There would still be “homelands,” but urban Africans would be 
																																																								
42 Ibid., 50. “Mense is verskillend. Hulle het verskillende behoeftes. Hulle lewe op verskillende 
vlakke van begrip, van beskawing, van kennis. As jy hulle met die evangelie wil bereik, moet jy hulled us 
benader in hul eie taal, hul eie idiom, hul eie milieu. On dié rede het ons kerk nog altyd in sy sendingbelief 
die beginsel gevolg dat jy die mens moet probeer verstaan en die evangelie vir hom verstaanbaar moet 
maak in die wêreld waarin hy lewe.” 
43 Bilheimer and Paton quoted in Geldenhuys, 51. 
44 Lückhoff, 94-95.  
45 Many moderate Christians would continue to argue that apartheid could be reformed along 
moral lines. See Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford University Press, 2014), 169. 
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afforded more political and economic opportunities. In this way, the recommendations 
would anticipate the later (disastrous) reforms of P.W. Botha in the 1980s. In 1960, 
however, Cottesloe was an exceedingly brief moment when Afrikaner nationalist and 
English-speaking white liberal Christians found some common ground. While the NGK 
understood its memoranda to be defenses of “separate development,” the liberal members 
were pleased to find room to maneuver within them. Visser ‘t Hooft said, “it soon 
became obvious to all people that the highest probability of getting consensus was by 
taking up the strong points of the memoranda of the Dutch Reformed Churches of the 
Cape and of the Transvaal.”46 While it affirmed the ethnic diversity of Christian 
communities, it asserted that no one could be excluded from the church on the ground of 
race. Like the Cape NGK, it affirmed that there was no scriptural prohibition to mixed 
marriages, and it nearly quoted their memorandum’s section on urban African domicile 
and franchise rights.47 The delegates affirmed that there could be no objection to 
Coloured representation in Parliament. They decried the negative effects of job 
reservation, the migratory labor system, and it called for the expansion of facilities for 
blacks in “white areas.” The report claimed that all delegates were united in “rejecting all 
unjust discrimination,” though they differed in how exactly to do this. Far from attacking 
the policy of “separate development,” the Declaration argued that reserves ought to be 
developed to provide “the Bantu” with opportunities there. This language and 
terminology was completely consistent with apartheid ideologues. The NGK delegates 																																																								
46 Willem Visser ‘t Hooft quoted in Lückhoff, 112. 
47 “It is our conviction that the right to own land wherever he is domiciled, and to participate in the 
government of his country, is part of the dignity of the adult man, and for this reason a policy which 
permanently denies non-White people the right of collaboration in the government of the country of which 
they are citizens cannot be justified.” Cottesloe Declaration, Part II, Article 15. 
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were unable to argue against most of the Declaration, because it reflected the same 
nationalistic and pious concerns in their study groups’ memoranda.  
The Hervormde Kerk, however, went to the press and dissociated with the 
Declaration. They said it was too radical, they opposed all forms of integration, and they 
supported the government’s implementation of the policy of “separate development.”48 
The press latched on to four points in the Declaration: 1) there was no scriptural ground 
for banning mixed marriages, 2) there should be direct Coloured representation in 
Parliament, 3) there should be common worship, and 4) urban blacks ought to have the 
right of domicile and participation in government. According to historian A.H. Lückhoff, 
many Afrikaners felt betrayed by the NGK delegates. People accused the delegates of 
being led down foreign paths and meddling in affairs that did not concern them. One 
cabinet minister’s wife said ministers should spend less time worrying about politics, and 
more time doing house visits. Rumors abounded that the NGK was going to lose 
members to the NHK. The delegates defended their actions, but few were willing to 
listen.49 Perhaps one of the greatest ironies of all was that the men who spilled the most 
amount of ink defending apartheid, such as A.B. du Preez and E.P. Groenewald, were 
now suspected of turning their backs on the Afrikaners.    
After the publication of the Cottesloe Declaration, the Rev. J.S. “Kosie” Gericke, 
Vice-Chancellor at Stellenbosch, visited the Verwoerds at their vacation home in Betty’s 
Bay. He personally assured Verwoerd that the opinions held by the delegates at the 
																																																								
48 Lückhoff, 100-103. 
49 Ibid., 105. 
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consultation were not widely shared.50 Verwoerd, who argued against granting blacks 
rights in urban areas and Coloured representation in Parliament, did not need much 
convincing. In his New Years Day radio broadcast, Verwoerd dismissed Cottesloe as an 
attempt by outsiders to influence South African policy. He noted that while “certain 
church members” (never mind that they were senior NGK leaders) may have spoken at 
the consultation, “the churches have not yet [officially] spoken. The voice of the church 
still must be heard—to wit, at their synods where the members as well as the ministers 
will be represented.”51  
 The delegates who supported the Cottesloe Declaration were dismayed. Shortly 
before the Transvaal NGK’s synod meeting, Nico Smith went to see Frans Geldenhuys 
and found him engaged in serious conversation with Beyers Naudé. They were deeply 
hurt by the accusations. Not only had Treurnicht published his own condemnation of 
ministers meddling in politics in Die Kerkbode,52 but he also published a variety of letters 
accusing the delegates of being “led astray.” J.P. van der Walt practically accused the 
Declaration of encouraging “intermarriage with non-Whites.” He suggested that it bore 
the mark of Johannes van der Kemp, the 18th century Dutch missionary who married a 
woman of color.53 Geldenhuys and Naudé were also hurt that so many of the delegates 
who had remained silent about their objections at the consultation were so quick to 
publically denounce the declaration. They asked Smith what he thought about the matter, 
obviously expecting him to share their dismay. After all, he had been part of the study 																																																								
50 Ibid., 116.  
51 Verwoerd in Giliomee, 528.  
52 A.P. Treurnicht, “Die Kerk-Konferensie,” Die Kerkbode, December 28, 1960.  
53 Snyman and van der Walt, quoted in Lükhoff, 119.  
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commission on which the document was based. Smith was uncertain. He refused to take a 
position, and conversation came to an abrupt end.54  
The respective Transvaal and Cape NGK synod meetings after Cottesloe revealed 
a moral divide among Afrikaners. The Rev. G.J. Snyman said that 70 percent of the 
members of the NGK were the “strongest supporters” of the apartheid policy (and 
therefore rejected the Cottesloe declaration).55 He left it unsaid, however, that 30 percent 
were not so adamant in their support and might have entertained moderate reforms. This 
division became apparent at the respective synod meetings. A number of delegates, 
attempting to reassert their commitment to the Afrikaners, distanced themselves from the 
Declaration. A.B. du Preez (at the Transvaal NGK) blamed the Cape NGK’s commission 
for the liberal tenor of the Cottesloe declaration, while Groenewald asked for 
forgiveness.56 Cape delegate T.N. Hanekom said he was never satisfied with the initial 
memorandum. F.J.M. Potgieter echoed Verwoerd’s policy, saying that “Bantu residents” 
in white areas could have no political say where they actually lived, but rather in their so-
called “homelands.”57 Others, however, qualified their support of apartheid. Cape 
delegate W.A. Landman said that “separate development” would only be moral if it were 
implemented humanely.58 In a similar vein, Frans Geldenhuys argued that if the policy 
proved impractical, it would have to be reassessed.59  
Those who qualified their support for apartheid frequently envisioned reforms and 																																																								
54 Smith, “Afrikaner Broederbond, Ch. 5 to end,” (unpublished manuscript, 2009), 55.  
55 Lückhoff, 119. 
56 Ibid., 141. 
57 Ibid., 146. 
58 Ibid., 147. 
59 Ibid., 140. 
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the extension of rights—and not, one must add, non-racial democracy. Beyers Naudé 
argued there were three requisite conditions for any racial policy, 1) it had to be 
defensible from a Christian standpoint, 2) it had to be practical to implement, and 3) it 
had to be acceptable to whites and “non-whites.” If total territorial separation were 
impossible for any of these reasons, then black people in urban or “white” areas ought to 
get some form of political representation.60 The Cape’s A.P. Smit argued that rights ought 
to be extended to Coloured people, and hinted that whites and Coloured people should 
form a single society.61  
There were also those who were deeply concerned that apartheid divided not only 
society but also the church. Stellenbosch missiologist W.J. van der Merwe argued that the 
NGK could not only confess diversity, but also unity.62 This was an idea that David 
Bosch would adopt, expand, and promote in the next decade. A.J. van Wyk took a similar 
view, adding that there was nothing in scripture to prohibit mixed marriages, and that 
black people must be accepted in white congregations. He rhetorically asked, “If the head 
of the Russian state were to come here, would he be welcome in our churches because he 
is white? What about our non-white members?”63 His question exposed the hypocrisy of 
Afrikaner racial exclusivity—he wondered if Afrikaners would be more willing to 
welcome anti-religious white communists into their midst than a black Christian neighbor 
who shared their creed.  
 The majority of NGK members sided with the hardliners. The fear of being “led 																																																								
60 Ibid., 140. 
61 Ibid., 147. 
62 Ibid., 147. 
63 Ibid., 140. “As die Russiese staathoof hierheen kom, sou hy in ons Kerk welkom wees omdat hy 
blank is, maar wat van ons eie nie-blanke lidmate.” 
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down a foreign path” led many Afrikaners toward a kind of isolationism. Both the 
Transvaal and the Cape NGK voted to sever ties with the WCC. Those who even 
questioned the primacy of white survival were ostracized. While he said he believed in 
self-preservation, he added, “it is not our highest duty.”64 For the courage of his 
convictions, he lost his seat as assessor, 450 votes to 280. Geldenhuys had served as 
actuary for the previous 14 years, and lost his seat by the same margins to Willie Jonker. 
Smith later remembered them each having to stand up, leave the front desk, and take 
seats in the back of the hall.65  
 Jonker was not well-known at the time, having just returned from a study tour in 
Europe. When it turned out that Jonker actually agreed with the Cottesloe Declaration, 
whispers began, “We have selected the wrong actuary!”66 Bosch had visited Jonker as a 
student in the mid-1950s, and noted that he already began to develop alternative 
paradigms.67 In 1962, Jonker published a short book criticizing the NGK mission policy, 
which only added to the murmurs against him. Jonker argued that in its missionary work, 
the NGK was not extending itself, but forming new churches on the basis of color 
prejudice. While he admitted that language considerations were important, they could not 																																																								
64 Ibid., 140. 
65 Smith, “In Conversation With…,” (unpublished manuscript, 2010), 60-61. Smith inaccurately 
painted a picture of the meeting in this text. He wrote, “I had to listen how one prominent NG Church 
leader after the other, who had attended the Conference and had therefore approved of the decisions taken 
there, bowed to the pressure exerted by Afrikaner ranks to reject the decisions. Only Beyers stood by his 
principles.” He also made it sound as though Naudé was the only one who lost his seat. Others viewed the 
delegates’ very differently. After the synod, A.J. van Wijk (a visitor from the Cape NGK) wrote to 
Bilheimer, “It was worth the trouble and shock of listening to most of the speeches in order to hear the 
‘apologiae’ [i.e. defenses] of men like Lex van Wyk, Bertie Brink, Frans Geldenhuys and Bey Naudé. I do 
not think that I have in my lifetime heard such fearless and inspiring speeches. To a certain extent this was 
true of Groenewald’s speech too. A.B. du Preez took the opposite point of view.” Quoted in Lückhoff, 144. 
66 Lückhoff, 138. “Ons het ‘n verkeerde actuaries gekies!” 
67 Kevin Livingston, A Missiology of the Road: Early Perspectives in David Bosch’s Theology of 
Mission and Evangelism (James Clarke & Co.: 2012), 47. 
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take precedence over the unity of the church. While many NGK theologians confessed an 
“invisible unity” in order to avoid visibly unified interracial churches, Jonker argued that 
visible unity was the most sincere expression of “invisible unity.” Therefore, the various 
Dutch Reformed Churches should work toward institutional unity with room for 
diversity.68 It was also Jonker who removed the “whites-only” requirement for 
membership in the Transvaal NGK. For his perceived “liberal opinions” and actions, 
Jonker quickly found himself ostracized by many of his colleagues, friends, and even 
some family members. Jonker found little favor in Afrikaner circles during the 1960s, 
and after working briefly at the University of South Africa and the Irene Congregation, 
he took a job at the Theological University of Kampen in the Netherlands.69  
 In the aftermath of the synod, Smith spoke with some of the delegates. C.B. Brink 
invited Smith into his office, shut the door, and asked him sternly, “Brother Smith, do 
you agree with those who say that we, as delegates of the NGK at the Cottesloe 
conference, have allowed ourselves to be taken in by the enemies of the Afrikaners.” 
Smith was not sure what to say. While he did not want to call them traitors, he did think 
that “the delegates had acted incorrectly by dumping such a heavy dish so suddenly on 
the plate of ordinary members of the church.” Brink was livid, and demanded to know if 
he doubted the ability of the delegates to represent the church. Smith was silent, and the 
conversation came to an end.70  																																																								
68 J.A. Lombard, Ontwikkelinge in die sendingbelied en –praktyk van die Nederduitse 
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The Question of Mission and White Survival 
Cottesloe revealed the tension between the Afrikaners’ perception of Christian 
calling on the one hand and the struggle for national survival on the other. The question 
of whether or not white minority rule could be justified from a Christian perspective was 
at stake. This was not lost on Afrikaner Christian intellectuals. At a 1961 Stellenbosch 
symposium, Charles Fensham presented his paper “Die Spanning tussen ons Christelike 
Roeping en Ons Stryd om Selfbehoud (The tension between our Christian calling and our 
struggle for self-maintenance).” He admitted that there was, indeed, much tension 
between one’s Christian calling and one’s struggle for national survival, in fact “there 
always had been and always will be.” 71 Fensham wrote that Africa was an awakening 
“giant.” As African’s political consciences were awakened across the continent, “chaotic 
powers,” including “liberalism” and “Communism,” were being unleashed. Fensham 
asked, “No state in the world would allow that chaotic power to triumph in its midst. 
Must the Christians of this state, regardless of which group they belong to, give 
themselves over to powers, which can destroy the state? [which, incidentally, the “white 
group” controlled]” Fensham, not surprisingly, answered in the negative. He wrote that 
Christianity had to form a powerful front against the chaotic powers that sought to 
undermine it.72 In reality, neither communism nor liberalism posed a major threat to 
either Christianity or white South Africans. Nevertheless, the specter or perception of a 
threat made men like Fensham feel vulnerable and highly defensive.  																																																								
71 Charles Fensham, “Die Spanning tussen ons Christelike Roeping en Ons Stryd om Selfbehoud 
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The morality of white minority rule continued to be couched in terms of Christian 
mission. Fensham argued that if Christians did not exercise some form of self-
preservation, they would not be able to fulfill their calling. M.W. Retief spelled this 
sentiment out exactly in his 1961 editorial in the missionary journal, Op die horison. He 
wrote, “We believe that we must survive (voortbestaan) to be able to fulfill our calling to 
spread the light of the Gospel in darkest Africa.”73 Implicit in this statement was the idea 
(which is unthinkable now) that Christianity would only survive on the African continent 
with white leadership. Whites had to defend their interests so that they could be a 
blessing to Africa. It would not be until the 1970s that black opposition and state violence 
would force whites to seriously consider the “blessings” they offered.  
Boshoff also argued that there was some connection between white survival and 
missionary work in his master’s thesis. Boshoff framed his entire study with a sense of 
threat. On page one, he asked, “What will the morning light bring to this dark continent? 
What is the future of the five million whites in this continent where they form a little dot 
in the immensely numerically superior non-whites?”74 He wondered what the future of 
Western civilization would be in the context of the “communist-inspired slogan of anti-
colonialism.” Boshoff further asked what the future of Christianity would be given a 
“spiritual climate” that was rooted in “revived heathendom, or in an Afro-asiatic spiritual 
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connection with Mohammedism.”75 Given these changing geopolitical realities, Boshoff 
argued that whites in South Africa—who aligned broadly with “Western Christian 
civilization”—were extremely vulnerable. While he argued in other countries the 
population was so low that “a few battleships could move them away,” in South Africa, 
such an option would not be feasible.76 
The various forces that Fensham and Boshoff identify as threatening actually 
posed little danger to white South Africans. “Revived heathendom” might have been a 
code word for African Independent Churches (AICs). Black leaders formed AICs in 
opposition to white missionary leadership. AICs were places were black people organized 
themselves apart from any white oversight, which many whites found threatening. AICs 
also included a great deal of elements from African traditional religions, and white 
Christians worried that this would be a “bridge back to heathenism.”	77 In reality, AICs 
rarely (if ever) adopted political stances that would have been threatening to white 
people. Likewise, the idea that Islam or communists from either the Soviet Union or 
China directly threatened South African whites was also far-fetched. His language choice 
heightened the perceived sense of vulnerability. Even if there was no credible threat, 
“whites” felt vulnerable as a demographic minority in a world that increasingly supported 
majority rule. There was a sense that any concessions might begin an inevitable march 
toward majority rule and the end of the white community. Note that Boshoff couched his 																																																								
75 Ibid., 1. 
76 Ibid., 1.  
77 Bengt Sundkler, Bantu Prophets (James Clarke & Co., 1948), 297. After further research and 
rethinking his data under the influence of scholars such as M.L. Daneel, Sundkler changed his position in a 
later text. Rather than viewing them as a bridge back to heathendom, these groups were understood to be an 
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interests not merely in terms of the Afrikaners’ future, but the white South Africans’ 
future. This was part of a larger trend; Afrikaner nationalism would increasingly express 
itself in terms of white interests.78  
The only way beyond the perceived threats, Boshoff argued, was “separate 
development.” It would create a context in which black and white nationalisms could 
coexist. It would also create a context in which white missionaries could (attempt to) 
exert influence on the rising African nationalism. “Separate development” would limit 
African nationalism to the “homelands,” where it would pose little threat to South 
Africa’s white population. Missionaries would attempt to influence this nationalism with 
the gospel, making it even more congenial to the white population.79  
Bosch was less comfortable drawing a connection between mission work and the 
nationalistic aims of white survival. His graduate work with Barth and Cullman had 
directed him away from baldly nationalistic aims in missionary work. In 1961, Bosch 
published Jesus, die lydende Messias, en ons sendingmotief, which digested much of his 
dissertation. He argued that Christ the suffering servant ought to be the paradigm for 
missionary activity.80 Given the vulnerability of Jesus, Bosch criticized those church 
leaders and politicians who drew a close connection between mission work and 
nationalist aims. By the early 1960s, Bosch was willing to question these aims in print. 
He asked,  
What is the ultimate goal of the mission…? Is it the maintenance of a white volk 
in South Africa—or is it the foundation of a church of Christ that greets his 																																																								
78 Dubow, 30.  
79 Boshoff, Streeksontwikkeling, 21-27.  
80 Livingston, 49. 
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return? Is it service to South Africa—or service to God? Is it obedience to the 
voice of sentiment and [one’s] own blood—or obedience to the last command of 
Christ? To put it differently: with this missionary motive, are we contending with 
a sheep in wolf’s clothing, or is it perhaps a wolf in sheep’s clothing.81 
 
Mission was about building the Kingdom of God through suffering service to non-
Christians, not about saving the Afrikaners from being numerically overwhelmed. To 
engage in nationalistic aims was duplicitous; it gave the impression of selfless service, 
but in fact it was deeply selfish. Theologian Kevin Livingston cited this passage to 
demonstrate that Bosch was no longer in step with Afrikaner nationalism.82  
Even while Bosch championed purely pious aims in Christian mission, he was not 
immune from the endemic white fears of the early 1960s. On Good Friday 1963, the day 
on which Christians remember Christ’s suffering on the cross, Bosch called a meeting of 
the white personnel at Madwaleni. He told them that the police had visited him the night 
before, asking if there were any firearms on the mission station. Bosch replied that they 
did not believe in having firearms, because “we may not defend our Christian confession 
with armed violence.”83 The police informed Bosch that he might want to reconsider his 
position, given the fact that the military wing of the PAC, Poqo, was operating at least 
one (and maybe two) cells in the area. The police added that Poqo had attacked numerous 
homes and businesses with axes and pangas in Paarl in November 1962. The police 
played on racial anxieties. They specifically highlighted that Poqo killed two whites in 
Paarl, and then in February 1963, they killed five white people who were camping by the 
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Bashee River—not terribly far from Madwaleni. Poqo members frequently targeted 
police, threatened chiefs and judges, and killed black informants. For its part, the state 
arrested and executed numerous Poqo members.84 The police informed Bosch that the 
white community in Elliotdale was “armed to the teeth except for the mission personnel,” 
thus making the mission station an easy target.85     
 As the white personnel at the mission station discussed their options, the feelings 
of insecurity and vulnerability trumped their pious idealism. The mission personnel 
decided that Poqo would not attack them for religious reasons, but rather for racial 
reasons. Bosch wrote, “It was a military operation with the ultimate goal of putting all the 
whites in the country out of action and setting up a communist or nationalist government 
in power. In such a case, we believed, we are called to self-defense.”86 They would not 
kill for Christ, but they would defend the current political dispensation against Black 
nationalism or communism.  
Annemie Bosch later remembered the decision being deeply personal. Though she 
was not initially in favor of being armed, she wrote, “I reasoned that, should anyone try 
to harm our children I would definitely shoot at whoever was doing so. By doing that, 
however, I knew I would be drawing a line through everything we stood for at 
Madwaleni—and that I did not want to do.”87 After Easter weekend, the mission procured 
revolvers. They also discussed installing an alarm system.88 In spite of the fact that the 																																																								
84 For more on Poqo, see The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 270-277. Dubow, 133-134.  
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cruciform praxis, eds. J.N.J. Kritzinger and Willem Saayman (Cluster Publications, 2011), 23. 
88 David Bosch, Madwaleni Journal, Volume 2, April 12, 1963, 86-87. 
		
222 
actual threat was quite small, it was a frightening time, and the feeling of vulnerability 
was palpable. Annemie remembered going to David one night, telling him that she was so 
incredibly frightened. He was exhausted from the day’s work, and half asleep, he sang to 
her in Xhosa, “Ungoyiki, mpefumlo wam/ Yondikap Inkosi yam/ ndoya nayo ndigaphiki/ 
Ithi yiza enva kwam, (Do not fear, o my soul/my God will walk beside me/I will go with 
him/Don’t be troubled any longer/The Lord says follow me).”89 
Like Bosch, Smith rejected the idea that one engaged in missionary work to save 
oneself; on the other hand, he echoed Fensham’s idea that self-defense is a prerequisite 
for missionary work. In his pamphlet Wat word verstaan onder sendingnood? (What is 
understood by mission need?), Smith condemned the baldly nationalistic missionary 
impulse. He shared Bosch’s concern that in the minds of some Afrikaners, “missionary 
need is comprised of the need of whites’ survival (voortbestaan) in South Africa.”90 
Smith found it troubling that some of his donors expressed the following sentiment: “We 
realize that mission work is the only way out of our precarious situation. Mission work 
will make the non-whites our friends and they will be our well-wishers (goedgesind) (and 
as such will not drive us out of South Africa).”91 While Smith may have been 
exaggerating, such attitudes were consistent with the missionary thought of J.G. Strydom. 
Like Bosch, Smith condemned this attitude as selfish and damaging to the gospel. He 
asked, “Who will indeed be willing to accept the Gospel out of the mouth of people who 																																																								
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try to maintain themselves (hulle self te behou) thereby, to save their white skin, or to 
remain existing in their fatherland?”92 Christian mission, Smith argued, was not a 
program to save white South Africa, but rather it was the proclamation of God’s saving 
activity in the world.  
 Smith also claimed that white Christians’ “foolish attitudes,” or racism, was 
responsible for the situation of unrest in the country. While he still conceded that many 
white attitudes were “understandable,” Smith argued that whites’ aversion to blacks often 
manifested itself cruelly, sowing seeds of hatred. Smith wrote,  
Should it surprise us when the day of retaliation comes and these people place no 
boundaries on their fury? The harvest that we ourselves planted in the earth will 
have to be brought in at one time or another. The suicide of a nation can thus also 
be cultivated by the nation itself willfully and deliberately. Verily, the thunder of 
God’s judgment is already beginning to rattle in the distance. Sharpeville and 
Langa are already the far-off booming of it.93  
 
Whites’ attitudes were directly responsible for fanning the flames of Black Nationalism 
and the “humanistic world spirit” (i.e. liberalism and communism) that led to the “restless 
situation in the country.” Smith’s criticism of white attitudes, and especially white 
racism, would continue to be a major theme in his life’s work. 
In the early 1960s, however, Smith saw no contradiction between condemning 
selfish and cruel white attitudes on the one hand while affirming the principles of 
“separate development” on the other. Rather than accepting blacks on the basis of 
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equality, Smith believed that the solution for South Africa’s problems was for whites to 
be better trustees. He envisioned Christian mission in paternalistic racial terms; all 
Christian whites were responsible for evangelizing “heathen” blacks. Smith likened 
whites to the Centurion in Luke 7, who brought his servant to Jesus for healing. In the 
same way, he called on South African whites to bring their “spiritually sick” black 
servants to Jesus for healing. He wrote,  
They live on our borders, [and] in our towns, they move past us in the streets, and 
they work in our houses and gardens. Fortunate is the servant who has a master 
(heer) with an open spiritual eye to understand the true need of his servant. Happy 
is the servant who had a master like the servant in Capernaum. Like this 
centurion, we shall have to go to Jesus in the interest of our spiritually sick 
servant.94  
 
Smith instructed his white readers to “name the names of those who work in our kitchens 
and gardens.” “Masters” could teach black “servants” about Jesus, and this influence 
would spread to “his family, [and] to his homeland, until the entire volk is reached.”95 Far 
from criticizing the policy of “separate development,” Smith enthusiastically reported on 
“the untold developments.” Like Boshoff, Smith argued that the task of the church was to 
keep up with these developments, bringing “the new upcoming civilization under the 
banner of Jesus Christ, the Lord of all.”96 Smith may have condemned while survival as 
the end of mission, he still tacitly affirmed that Christian mission was the goal of white 																																																								
94 Ibid., 7-8. “In so ‘n toestand leef hula an ons grense, in ons dorpe, beweeg hulle by ons verby in 
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geestelike oog om die ware nood van sy dienskneg te verstaan. Gelukkig is die dienskneg wat ‘n heer het 
soos die dienskneg in Kapernaüm. Soos hierdie hoofman sal ons in belang van ons geestelike kranke 
dienskneg na Jesus moet gaan.” 
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survival in Africa.  
In the early 1960s, Smith did not think his refusal to eat with black colleagues 
constituted a “foolish attitude.” Smith had very congenial relationships with German 
missionaries from the Berlin Society’s nearby mission. He remembered Christmas parties 
at Pastor Shultz’s home very fondly, and the Smiths vacationed with Pastor Fobbe’s 
family at Kleinmond. But the missionaries did not always see eye to eye, especially on 
racial questions. Fobbe, in particular, was an outspoken critic of South African apartheid. 
Twice a year, he gathered missionaries from the surrounding area to discuss mission-
related problems (and to accuse one another of “sheep stealing”). At the end of one 
meeting, Fobbe invited the clergy into his home for lunch. When Smith walked into the 
house, he stopped cold. The tables were not segregated. Smith immediately thought that 
he had to “stick to his guns” as an Afrikaner; he would “rather not eat than eat with 
blacks.” Mrs. Fobbe, however, anticipated Smith’s attitude. She discreetly approached 
him, and told him that she set a separate place for him in the study. There, Smith ate his 
lunch completely alone, convinced of the righteousness of his action.97  
Smith would retell this story countless times throughout the course of his life. He 
told it so frequently, in fact, that those who heard it the most were able to point out the 
aspects that he was, perhaps, embellishing.98 For him, it would become an example of his 
earlier racism, demonstrating the foolishness of eating in complete isolation. At the time, 
however, the Fobbes’ integrated tables offended Smith. Smith’s later remembered 
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thinking that overseas missionaries did not understand Africans. He thought, “Once you 
start eating with them, you socialize with them, and the next thing, they will marry your 
daughter, and then you will lose your God-given identity, and God’s curse will be upon 
you.”99 Again, sexual anxieties frequently intersected with Christian nationalism. 
Proximity would lead to interracial procreation, which they feared would destroy the 
white race.		
He wrote a letter to Die Kerkbode, complaining that foreign missionaries were not 
respecting South African customs. Treurnicht was delighted, and formulated Smith’s 
letter into an article that ran in the March 8, 1961 edition.100 Smith argued that foreign 
missionaries were strangers to South Africa, and as such, Afrikaners had the right “as a 
volk” to demand that foreigners respect their customs (i.e. the Afrikaans language and 
unrelenting racial separation). Foreign missionaries, however, were choosing to remain 
“strangers in a strange land,” because they did not learn Afrikaans, they denounced the 
“political policy with regard to race” as “un-Christian,” and they did not work with the 
Afrikaans churches.101 (Smith did not mention that Afrikaans churches were frequently 
reluctant to work with foreign churches). While foreign missionaries were “political,” 
Smith wrote, “Our language will have to be the pure language of the gospel without 
getting mixed with any ulterior motive in mission.”102  
There is an irony to the fact that segregated mission stations that buttressed the 																																																								
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100 Smith, “Tshilidzini,” 58.  
101 Nico Smith, “Die Buitelandse Sending in Suid-Afrika,” Die Kerkbode, March 8, 1961, 318. 
102 Ibid., 319-320.  
		
227 
homeland policy could be seen as preaching a “pure gospel” devoid of any “ulterior 
motives.” Yet neither Smith nor most of his Afrikaans readers could see the difference. 
Both the church and the state believed they were adapting their respective preaching and 
policies to the ethnolinguistic contours of South Africa. Smith believed he was 
responding to the integral differences between people, preaching the gospel in different 
ways to different people. Foreign missionaries, however, attempted to pave over those 
difference and force people into one uncomfortable society. He thought this smack of 
“liberalism” or even “communism,” and was therefore “political.”  
Bosch in the United States 
Bosch’s rejection of nationalistic mission was very different than a rejection of 
“separate development.” His own position in the 1960s aligned closely to the Cottesloe 
Declaration. While finding aspects of urban apartheid unacceptable, he still believed 
South Africa’s people groups were “irreconcilable.”  Bosch would continue to publically 
defend this moderate version of apartheid throughout the mid-1960s. In 1965, Bosch was 
part of the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program (US-SALEP). Founded 
in 1957, US-SALEP brought people from a wide variety of ethnic and career 
backgrounds together to explore solutions to racial problems. In the United States, Bosch 
specifically studied racial questions, mission work among Native Americans on 
reservations, modern Bible translation, and contemporary missionary training 
programs.103 Bosch kept a detailed journal of his visit that reveals an outsider’s view of a 
country in the midst of profound technological and social change. On March 21, Bosch 																																																								
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watched the civil rights march from Selma to Birmingham led by Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and other religious leaders on the television of his Hilton Hotel room in Washington, 
D.C. Two days later, on March 23, he switched on the television to watch the launch of 
Gemini 3.104 The mere act of watching television must have seemed like a novelty, as 
South Africa would not broadcast programs for television until 1976. Television, even in 
its filtered form, would open a whole new world to South Africans. Bosch took a 
whirlwind tour of the United States through the large metropolitan areas of the north, 
cities and towns in the South, the Grand Canyon, and California with a side trip to 
Disneyland. It was an exciting and deeply challenging time in the United States, a 
country in which it seemed to Bosch everything was electric and backwards.105  
Bosch heard a range of opinions about racial politics in the United States. When 
Bosch was in Atlanta, he noted that while most of the whites claimed to be more liberally 
minded about racial issues than their neighbors in Alabama, they nevertheless were 
against King’s march from Selma to Montgomery and his boycott movement. They told 
Bosch that King was “pushing too hard” and “jamming things down people’s throats.” 
Perhaps most ironically of all, one white Georgian told Bosch, “King could have been a 
man of history if it hadn’t been for this.”106 He later remembered that when watching 
television with a white couple, a group of protestors knelt in prayer. One white person 																																																								
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implied that it was artificial and calculated for effect. Bosch, however, thought “it was 
clear…that for King this was genuine and natural.”107  
Bosch also heard a range of black voices. In North Carolina, he was delighted to 
hear a sermon by an African American minister that was “more or less up to the same 
quality and standards as our…NG Kerk sermons (whites!).”108 In Atlanta, he heard a 
lecture on standards of living given by Dr. Josephus R. Coan of the Interdenominational 
Theological Center.109 When interviewing Fannie Rushing, secretary at the Chicago 
office of SNCC (the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee), he was told that 
“non-violent” was only in the title for tactical reasons. She believed that the various 
people of color would unite against white domination, meaning that the Western world 
“will soon learn that the world is basically black and that their only hope of survival will 
be to fit into the position the Coloured races of the world are prepared to grant them.”110 
From conservative to radical, Bosch heard a full range of racial opinions while in the 
United States.    
Bosch had a chance to meet American businessman and lawyer Clarence B. 
Randall, who wrote the Reader’s Digest article, “Why South Africa Needs Time.” 
Randall’s views, Bosch wrote, “generally agreed almost literally with my own view of 
the situation” in South Africa.111 Randall criticized pass laws, the separation of families 
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in the migratory labor system, and the segregation of professional organizations. He 
“could not stomach” the heavy-handed nature of police authority, especially after the 
passage of the 1962 Sabotage Act, which allowed police to detain people for 90 days 
without trial. Randall believed that Africans should be able to own land in urban areas. 
Neither Bosch nor Randall thought that majority rule would provide a solution. On the 
contrary, they believed that cultural differences between ethnic groups would lead to 
chaos in a single democratic society. Randall argued that the “homelands,” given time, 
would prove a successful solution to South Africa’s unique cultural problems. Randall 
thought white South Africans were keenly aware of their “great responsibility” toward 
blacks, and had already proven their intentions by building a society in which blacks 
enjoyed the highest standard of living on the continent. He was also optimistic about the 
liberalizing influences stemming from business leaders, the press, and the NGK. Whites, 
he argued, were “at heart our kind of folk. In the end, they will do right.”112 Bosch shared 
this hope throughout his life.  
Bosch defended this moderate version of apartheid at a number of lectures in 
throughout the United States. While in North Carolina, Bosch stayed with Wake Forest 
ethics professor G. McLeod Bryan, who would one day write a biography of Naudé. 
Bryan and Bosch sat on a panel at the (African American) North Carolina College at 
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Durham (now North Carolina Central University), along with one Dr. Jones (who was 
professor of African History there) to discuss “the South African Crisis.” In his journal, 
Bosch accused Jones of knowing next to nothing about the South African situation, 
speaking only in “cheap general utterances.” He also said that Jones’ only source was 
evidently This is Apartheid by Leslie Rubin, who Bosch decried as “a listed 
communist!”113 Jones clearly offended Bosch on a personal level, as he wrote, “[Jones] 
evidently did not know that I am an Afrikaans speaking South African, and then painted, 
a la Rubin, the ‘Boers’ as the dregs of the world. My courage fell!” Jones also argued 
that it would perhaps be possible for other African countries to invade South Africa to 
establish majority rule.114 Bryan, Bosch said, took a tactful approach. He argued, not 
unlike Randall, that South Africa could not be portrayed monolithically, especially 
because various free institutions, including the press and churches, were discussing 
alternative options for the future. Bryan thought that invasion by other African countries 
was out of the question, because the entire Western world, including the United States, 
would side with “white South Africa” to protect the mineral wealth from the 
communists.115  
In his own speech, Bosch almost defensively declared that the situation was 
extremely complex and required an innovative solution. He argued against a boycott 
policy, saying that it would only increase the suffering of “migrant and indigenous 
Bantu.” He also said that South Africa’s cultural groups were irreconcilable 																																																								
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(onversoenbaar). This is particularly important, because later reconciliation would prove 
to be a central component of Bosch’s racial politics. At this point, however, cultural 
particularity played a key role in Bosch’s missiological and political thought. Finally, he 
discussed the possibilities that the “Transkei experiment” offered for the political and 
economic aspirations of black South Africans.116  
In the 1960s, Bosch was positive about Transkei’s internal self-government. In his 
mission journal, he declared that November 20, 1963 “was one of the greatest and most 
important days in the history of the Transkei, because today the first general election was 
held.” It was also the same day that the Transkei received internal self-government. 
Madwaleni was a polling place, and mission staff had to help around 600 people navigate 
a ballot with no fewer than 29 names, of which voters had to chose seven. By his 
estimation, most voters did not know what was going on, and “many people told us they 
came because the chiefs told them that they had to.” Not sure what final pronouncement 
to make of the experience, Bosch simply wrote, “Democracy?!?”117 Bosch would also 
defend the “Transkei experiment” at a later lecture in Harlem.118 
The conversation that followed the North Carolina College panel lasted over two 
hours, and most of the questions, Bosch said, “were directed against me.” Nevertheless, 
the conversation was conducted in a congenial atmosphere, although Liberian student 
contended that “War will come and must come, and very quickly too!” Evidently, Dr. 
Jones was not particularly eager to speak with Bosch, and he remained silent the rest of 
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the evening. Bosch spent some time after the formal period of conversation discussing the 
situation with a student from Kenya, who Bosch thought understood the complexity of 
the problem very well.119   
Bosch also visited the Navajo Reservation and the University of Arizona 
Flagstaff, where he gave a lecture defending the policy of Bantu Education. He argued 
that mission education and earlier state run education “detribalized” Africans; they were 
taught the English language, often using the same readers as students in England. This 
alienated students from their own cultural groups. Bosch wrote, “They could now read an 
English book, but what does that help in the case of a drought, or when a sacrifice has to 
be made to the ancestors or when a child gets ill or when a person has been the victim of 
black magic?” Because previous models of education were so devoid of any reference to 
African cultures, Bosch argued that a student would begin to “look down upon his own 
culture,” inevitably adopting both Western dress and English names, further dividing 
himself from his communities of origin. Bosch argued that the Department of 
Education’s “completely new education program” (i.e. Bantu education) attempted to 
integrate education into tribal life. Students learned about “African and tribal” history in 
the vernacular, and they were taught about the “many positive elements in their own 
culture.” Although he admitted the policy was not perfect, he boasted about the increased 
number of students in schools and increased communal involvement in education.120  
 The reaction was, according to Bosch, “surprisingly positive.” The idea of 
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tailoring education toward students’ cultural needs resonated with his audience. “Indian 
Schools” operated on a policy of acculturation; they promoted white Anglo-Saxon 
protestant norms while disparaging Native American culture.121 The students responded 
to Bosch, complaining that Navajo students were given the same materials as white 
students, which were ill-suited to their needs. When the Navajo students performed at a 
lower level, the Department of Indian Affairs cited it as evidence that “Indian Children 
are inferior to white children.” The students found so much promise in the policy of 
Bantu Education that one person said to Bosch, “You must go to our Department of 
Indian Affairs and tell them these things you told us.”122  
 “Bantu Education” would become one of the most universally hated aspects of the 
apartheid policy, especially after the Soweto Uprising of 1976. It was frequently cited as 
one of the white government’s most grievous injustices against the black majority. 
Bosch’s statements and his audience’s reaction, however, must be read in the context of 
1965. Native Americans were asserting their own identities over and against a 
humiliating legacy of Western-oriented education. “Bantu Education” seemed to offer 
promise for those who were seeking to reassert their identity after a humiliating colonial 
past. The industrial model of the Tuskegee Institute dominated Native American 
education. It aimed to assimilate students into the dominant Anglo-American culture, 
neglecting cultural continuity.123 What neither Bosch nor his audience could foresee was 																																																								
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that the cultural policy of Bantu education would be experienced as an extreme limitation 
by black students in the 1970s and the 1980s. Thus, even while rejecting a close 
connection between mission and nationalism on the one hand, Bosch still believed that a 
modified version of “separate development” might hold the key to the future of South 
Africa’s different cultural groups in the 1960s.  
 Bosch’s American journals made it clear that he was still heavily invested in the 
idea of “separate development.” While he may have thought that heavy-handed police 
authority was problematic, he also thought that cultural differences in South Africa were 
so great that a majority democracy would be impossible. Numerous scholars have read 
Bosch as stepping outside of the proverbial “Afrikaner laager” by the early 1960s. It 
would be more accurate to say that he was part of the loyal opposition, not unlike many 
of the NGK leaders who endorsed the Cottesloe Declaration. He believed that white 
minority rule could be reformed, but not abandoned. At the same time, the journals reveal 
that Bosch had a willingness to listen to opinions other than his own. While still wedded 
to a vision of ethnic particularity, he was cosmopolitan. He found the diversity of ideas 
instructive and even inspiring rather than challenging. While he was blatantly resistant to 
“outsiders’” condemnations of South Africa, he would be willing to listen to black South 
African Christians in the 1970s. This willingness to listen would make Bosch decidedly 
more open to the demands of black theology than many of his Afrikaner peers, and it 
would push him to look for new paradigms.  
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Margin and Center 
During the 1960s, Bosch began to listen to a range of voices within South Africa. 
In late 1961, Bosch visited Naudé to discuss both the fallout around Cottesloe and ways 
of keeping ecumenism alive in the NGK. On January 23, 1962, Bosch convened a 
conference of white NGK missionaries, at which Naudé addressed an audience of some 
20 clerics including the Bosches’ friend Jaap Durand.124 Durand would become a leading 
voice against apartheid, and, along with Bosch, a major proponent of reconciliation. His 
1961 doctoral dissertation, Una Sancta Catholica in Sending Perspektief argued that 
unity ought to transcend ethnic diversity, putting him at odds with mainstream NGK 
thought. He worked as a missionary at Cala in the Ciskei from 1961 until 1965. At the 
meeting, Naudé lamented the fact that the NGK was rapidly becoming isolated, and he 
urged missionaries to maintain relationships with other churches at the local level.125 
Bosch acted on Naudé’s advice, and he was a founding member of the Transkei 
Council of Churches, serving as its first president. It was unusual for NGK clerics to play 
a leading role in ecumenical activities in the early 1960s, and Bosch later boasted that, 
“in the sixties…the Transkei was the only place in the Dutch Reformed Church setup 
where there were practical, structural, working relationships with people from other 
denominations.”126 The South African Police tended to be skeptical of ecumenical 
dialogue, and they investigated the Transkei Council of Churches. Police asked Bosch for 
the minutes from their previous meetings—a request that Bosch flatly refused. He told 																																																								
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the policemen that if they wanted to know what happened at the meetings, they were free 
to attend.127 Those at the center of Afrikaner influence viewed Bosch’s ecumenical 
impulse with suspicion, and he would remain largely marginalized from centers of 
influence for the rest of the decade.     
 For his part, Naudé would be pushed further from the center of Afrikaner 
religious influence. There were, to be sure, attempts to bring Naudé back into the fold 
after Cottesloe. Although he lost his position as assessor of the Transvaal NGK, he 
became moderator of the newly formed Southern Transvaal Synod.128 It quickly became 
clear, however, that he could not remain in his position of influence for long. While the 
NGK was closing ecumenical avenues, Naudé launched Pro Veritate in April 1962, 
which was a journal committed to ecumenical conversations about South Africa’s 
political situation. In March 1963, Naudé resigned his membership from the Afrikaner 
Broederbond, and a month later, he formed the Christian Institute (CI), which was 
committed to ecumenical dialogue.129 The CI became increasingly radical; it supported 
the Black Consciousness Movement and black theology in the 1970s, and it sided with 
the Kairos theologians in the 1980s.130 Even though the CI was not particularly radical in 
the early 1960s, the NGK was suspicious of any ecumenical contact, so it gave Naudé the 
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choice between either leading the CI or remaining a pastor in the NGK. Naudé resigned 
from his pulpit in September 1963, preaching a farewell sermon entitled “Obedience to 
God.”131 In November, Naudé was implicated in leaking Broederbond Documents to the 
Sunday Times—an English-language newspaper known for its unfriendly views of the 
NP.132 The Broederbond maintained that Naudé’s actions were tantamount to treason. It 
was clear that Naudé would not put the Afrikaners first, and he was pushed out from the 
center of influence.  
 While the conciliatory figures like Bosch and Naudé were marginalized, Boshoff 
and Smith moved into even more prominent positions within the NGK and Afrikaner 
society. In 1963, both were selected to become mission secretaries—Boshoff in the 
Southern Transvaal Synod and Smith in the Northern Transvaal Synod. As mission 
secretaries, they were responsible for placing personnel at mission stations throughout 
their respective synods, securing the support of white NGK members, and serving on the 
NGK’s Mission Commission.133 In a letter to Boshoff, Smith discussed his misgivings 
about leaving Tshilidzini. The work had stabilized, and he hoped to continue growing the 
church he planted. Yet rather than seek stability, Smith wrote, “it must be held in mind 
that we are God’s trekking volk, and we must go where the great Trek Leader takes 
us.”134 The imagery of the Great Trek leaves one to wonder whether “God’s trekking 
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volk” referred to all Christians or specifically Afrikaners. Smith decided that he would 
become mission secretary. Before he left, however, he joined the Afrikaner Broederbond.   
Boshoff had been a member of the Broederbond since 1955. During his first call 
at Belfast, the town doctor, Hennie Grové, recruited him.135 The image that emerged from 
Boshoff’s account of the Broederbond was decidedly benign. It was an organization that 
utilized members’ expertise to keep others abreast of developments. Boshoff’s first task 
as a young Broeder, for example, was to provide his fellow members with an overview of 
the Tomlinson Commission.136 The Broederbond attempted to ensure that Afrikaners had 
institutions that supported their cultural interests. The Rand Afrikaans University, for 
example, was a Broederbond project that ensured Afrikaners had a place of higher 
education in Johannesburg.137 In spite of his later differences with the organization, 
Boshoff thought that the work of the Broederbond was important to the life of the 
Afrikaners, and it even had some noble characteristics.  
Smith developed almost the polar opposite view of the Broederbond as a self-
serving organization that kept the Afrikaners in a state of perpetual immaturity. He spent 
the later part of his life decrying the negative effects of the Broederbond, publishing a 
book Die Afrikaner Broederbond.138 Smith was invited to become a member of the 
Broederbond in Louis Trichardt. After writing his letter chiding foreign missionaries, the 
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Rapportryers extended an invitation for membership. The Rapportryers was a Christian 
Afrikaner men’s organization that included leading members of the community. Smith 
quickly ascended the ranks of leadership and became chairman of the Louis Trichardt 
branch of the Rapportryers. As chairman, Smith remembered being, in his own words, 
“instrumental” in the removal of Indians from the town’s center to a new township. These 
were members of the same Muslim community who, only a few years previously, 
donated money to the mission hospital at Tshilidzini.139    
Smith’s professional success, his position as chairman of the Rapportryers, and 
his ideological commitment made him an ideal candidate for membership in the 
Broederbond. The local cell put his name forward, and they expedited his candidacy, 
ensuring that he would become a member before moving to Pretoria. When members of 
the local cell approached Smith, he said he had several misgivings. Prof. Pellissier told 
his students that membership in a secret organization was contrary to the gospel, as he 
said, “Nothing done in accordance with the word of God needs to be done in secret.” The 
Broeders immediately dismissed the objection. They said it arose from a 
misunderstanding about the true nature of the Broederbond. It was, they argued, a 
Christian organization, which was based on Christian service. It did not seek to serve the 
needs of members, but rather the needs of others (other Afrikaners anyway). 
Furthermore, they told him there were many upstanding and pious members. Smith found 
out that Pellissier was his only professor who was not a member of the Broederbond. 
Church leaders such as Frans Geldenhuys, C.B. Brink, and even his trusted former 
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colleague Beyers Naudé (who would resign several months later) were counted among 
the Broeders. Smith’s initial objections began to soften. It was a tremendous boost to his 
ego to be considered worthy of membership in an organization that included some of the 
men he admired the most.140  
On Monday, February 4, 1963, Smith sat waiting in the car while the Broeders 
prepared the initiation ceremony. In his later account, he remembered a great deal of soul 
searching, especially over the questions of swearing oaths, secrecy, and being bound to 
do things against conscience. When he was finally invited into the meeting place, he 
entered a darkened room. The only light came from two candles on a table draped with 
the South African flag. He was told not to look at anyone in the room, but to take his 
place in front of the table. Fanie Botha, the National Party MP from Soutpansberg, stood 
behind the table with a Bible open in his hands. He said a prayer and read a portion of 
scripture before reading the formula of induction.141  
Smith then heard different voices behind him saying what was expected of 
members. They did not use the word “secrecy.” Instead, they told him that the materials 
and meetings of the Broederbond were “strictly confidential.” He was also told to 
“undertake never to reveal the names of members of the AB, nor my own membership, 
under any circumstance.” Finally, Botha said,  
In light of what you have heard, I ask you to consider once more your decision to 
become a member of the Afrikaner-Broederbond. Should you be of the opinion 
that you are not ready for this decision or are not prepared to accept the said 
responsibilities, you will be granted the freedom to withdraw your consent to 
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become a member of the Afrikaner-Broederbond. I am now giving you a few 
moments of silence to reflect on your decision. 142  
 
When the silence had expired, Smith was asked again if he wanted to become a member. 
He simply said, “Yes.” At that moment, the lights came on in the room, and he was told 
to greet his brothers. To his delight, he knew most of the men in the room. It is worth 
noting that Smith’s description of the ceremony matched other descriptions of the 
initiation ceremony.143 
 Christian piety and euphemistic language were at odds with the disreputable 
rumors that circulated about the organization. Scripture and prayer put Smith’s mind at 
ease. Even the formula of induction sounded like ecclesial language, something he found 
familiar and comfortable. The Broederbond did not use the specific words “secret” or 
“secrecy.” Instead, words like “confidential” and terms like “undertaking not to reveal” 
provided a release from the moral scruples of being in a secret society. And while they 
asked him to agree to confidentiality, he was not asked to swear an oath on a Bible, 
something that Smith would not have been not entirely comfortable doing.144 Rather than 
swearing an oath of allegiance to a self-serving secret society, Smith’s conscience could 
rest easy that he had freely agreed to be part of a confidential Christian organization 
dedicated to serving national interests.  
  Yet even at the first meeting, it was clear that the Broederbond often promoted its 
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members’ self-interest. The local dentist, Dr. Stegman, had just opened a new motel on 
the national road leading from Louis Trichardt to Messina. He desperately needed a 
telephone connection, which was under the purview of the post office. The postmaster 
was not a Broeder, and informed Dr. Stegman that there was a backlog of telephone 
connections, and he would have to put his name on the list and wait his turn. Other 
members began grumbling that they too were on the postmaster’s list. Stegman asked 
Fanie Botha to take the matter up with Albert Hertzog, the Minister of Posts and 
Telegraphs. Botha was more than happy to do this, and in no time at all, the Broeders had 
their telephone connections and the postmaster had been transferred. This did not seem 
right to Smith, but he kept his moral scruples to himself.145    
Smith and Barth 
Between his jobs, Smith went on a study tour of Europe and had a chance to meet 
Karl Barth. By that time, Barth was in his late 70s, but no less prolific and adept at 
argument. Smith, being trained in the Reformed tradition, had a great deal of respect for 
Barth. He remembered the aging theologian’s study was incredibly cluttered, filled with 
books and papers piled on top of one another. Barth cleared a space for Smith in a chair 
and handed him a cigar. After lighting his pipe, Barth told Smith he had been reading 
about South Africa’s racial issues, and he said that Verwoerd sounded like President 
Jefferson Davis of the Confederate States of America. Barth asked, “Must I therefore take 
it that you people in South Africa are living a hundred years behind the times?” Smith 
was embarrassed by the question, and simply said, “that may be so, but I came to talk 
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about theology and not politics.”146 The elderly theologian was happy to oblige Smith. 
For the next hour and a half, they discussed Barth’s take on the future of theology in 
Europe.147  
As Smith was getting ready to leave, Barth began something of a Socratic 
discourse. He asked if Smith was free to preach the gospel in South Africa. The ever-
effusive missionary Smith responded immediately, “Of course! I am completely free as 
we have freedom of religion in our country!” Barth said he was not talking about that 
kind of freedom. He asked Smith if he came across things in the Bible that ran contrary to 
what his friends and family were doing, would he be able to preach about it. Smith 
thought for a moment and simply said that such a situation had never arisen. Barth 
pressed him further. Smith remembered him asking, “But you know, it may become even 
more difficult. You may discover things in the Bible that are contrary to what your 
government is doing. Will you be free to preach about such issues?”148 Again, Smith 
blushed and responded, “I really don’t know.” Barth simply looked at Smith and said, 
“It’s OK. You may go.”149  
Smith told this story time and again later in his life. He said it was a major 
experience that his mind about apartheid. During the 1980s, Smith gained international 
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acclaim and the story was frequently cited as a major turning point in his life.150 It was a 
turning point in Rebecca Saintonge’s 1989 biography.151 It appeared in numerous 
obituaries after Smith died in 2010.152 A number of Karl Barth scholars have also 
highlighted the story.153 It even features prominently in Smith’s Wikipedia entry.154 It 
was, however, certainly not a dramatic moment of metanoia in which scales fell from his 
hitherto racist eyes. He remembered thinking at first, “I’m sure Barth thinks we in South 
Africa are Nazis and he wanted to warn me against apartheid.”155 At the time, he 
dismissed Barth as a foreigner who did not understand the complexity of the South 
African situation.156 But Barth had unsettled Smith. The parallels between his three 
questions and Christ’s three questions to Peter (John 21:15-19) were unmistakable, and 
they stuck with Smith. Barth made Smith wonder whether he was, in fact, free to preach 
the gospel. As he began to see dissonance between the demands of the gospel and the 
actions of his friends, neighbors, and government, the memory of Barth’s question 
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pushed him toward speaking out rather than remaining silent.157 This incident would 
grow in importance for Smith, after his mind began to change.    
Mission Secretaries 
When Smith arrived in Pretoria, he joined the local Broederbond cell that 
included many elite members of Afrikaans society, including a high court judge, the 
general manager of the Volkskas, the Minister of the Department of Agriculture, a 
medical specialist, the principle of a boys’ high school, a dominee, and a professor of 
theology. This gathering, he later wrote, “made me aware of the special task that had 
been entrusted to me as mission secretary, as well as the confidence the Afrikaner 
Broederbond placed in me that I would also do my work in the interest of the 
Afrikaners.”158 It is unfortunate that Smith did not provide further insights into how he 
used his position as Mission Secretary to further “Afrikaner interests.”  
 The Broederbond did not, however, dictate all of Smith’s concerns. From his later 
account, it seems that pragmatism as much as ideology dictated his actions. Smith wanted 
to make prudent placements to ensure the collegiality of mission staff. A doctor came 
into Smith’s office in Pretoria, and he said he wanted to be a missionary, but did not want 
to pray or preach in public. Smith was reluctant to place the doctor, but nevertheless sent 
him to work with a missionary who “had a free spirit and would accept a person like this 
and make him feel at home.”159 Several months later when Smith visited the mission 
station, he was delighted to learn that not only was the doctor’s work flourishing, but also 
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his “non-preaching” Christian witness was very effective. A member of the mission told 
Smith, “This new doctor is a real Christian. The way he speaks to us and treats us tells us 
he is a Christian.”160 Smith’s concerns were not, therefore, solely nationalistic, but also 
pragmatic and spiritual.   
 Boshoff offered even fewer clues as to how his Afrikaner interests might have 
influenced his work as Mission Secretary in the Southern Transvaal. He may have even 
denied a direct connection. According to Boshoff, he and Smith sought to transform the 
nature of the NGK’s mission work. Following the argument of Dutch missiologist 
Hendrik Kraemer, they argued that mission was part of the essential nature of the church. 
This argument was meant to be a corrective to the 19th century practice of forming 
separate societies, bonds, and unions for mission work. Boshoff and Smith, like so many 
other midcentury Protestant missionaries, worried that this had divided the church 
between those who participated in mission work and those who did not. They were eager 
to get every Christian involved in mission.161 To that end, Boshoff visited white 
congregations throughout the Southern Transvaal Synod, giving slideshows to raise 
awareness and interest in the work. Anna often assisted her husband in putting together 
the slide shows, in addition to caring for their (at that time) four children.162  
In addition to trying to increase involvement of white congregants in mission, 
Boshoff also worked with missionaries to assess their needs. Shortly after becoming 
Mission Secretary, he invited all of the missionaries in the district to his home for 
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lunch—provided by Anna. Boshoff wanted to know what problems the missionaries were 
encountering, and how he could help. As he remembered it, they addressed three 
problems specifically: urbanization, the lack of workers, and a lack of worship spaces. 
Quite tellingly, he said that he could not do anything about the first matter, and apart 
from encouraging people to become more involved in mission, there was little he could 
do about the second matter. He would, however, spearhead a plan for financing new 
worship spaces. His predecessor, Essie Esterhuyse, collected an annual fund that was 
given to where the need was greatest. Boshoff decided that rather than distribute the 
money; he would (with the cooperation of the NGK) use the money to finance loans. The 
NGK Mission Commission started the “Open Door Funds” to provide interest-free loans 
to missions for the construction of church buildings. It was incredibly popular, and in the 
first year alone, it financed the construction of 12 new churches.163  
As mission secretaries, Boshoff and Smith also worked on the NGK’s Mission 
Commission (Algemene Sinodale Sendingkommissie ASSK), which was brought into 
being in 1961. The object of the ASSK was to coordinate missionary efforts at the 
national level. These meetings were generally held in Bloemfontein, which was a 
convenient midpoint between the mission offices in the Cape Synod and those in the 
Transvaal. Boshoff and Smith were very much friends at the time, and they went to these 
meetings together. They sped down to Bloemfontein from the Witwatersrand in 
Boshoff’s 1961 Alfa Romeo Guilietta—a sports car he ostensibly bought to quickly cover 
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great distances as mission secretary.164  
Boshoff thought it an immense privilege to sit on the ASSK next to the 
respected—and by then quite elderly—missiologists G.B.A. Gerdener and W.A. 
Malherbe. Gerdener, as noted above, was a leading voice in Afrikaans missiology and 
organized numerous conferences, inspiring and earning the respect of a generation of 
Afrikaans missionaries.165 He was also a leading moral supporter of “separate 
development” as a national building project. Malherbe was a pioneer missionary to the 
Tiv people in Nigeria. He worked very hard to master the language and authored the first 
Tiv-English dictionary in 1931.166 Malherbe was succeeded on the ASSK by P.E.S. 
Smith, who oversaw the expansion of the Cape NGK’s missionary work (and therefore 
worked closely with David Bosch). Alongside these respected elders, Boshoff and Smith 
were able to work with mission leaders from all over the country.167 Their careers were 
bringing them into greater positions of influence.  
University Professors 
Beyond the daily work at the mission station, Bosch’s passion for mission was 
deeply intellectual. Not only had he completed a dissertation dealing with questions of 
mission in the New Testament, but he also devoured hundreds of volumes about Christian 
mission and missionary topics. He loved exploring the creative tension of contradictory 																																																								
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ideas about mission work. Bosch synthesized various arguments into a growing list of 
papers, articles, and pamphlets. By the middle of the 1960s, he was meeting mission 
scholars around the world and building a reputation. Bosch would have been a credit to 
any university. 
Boshoff and Smith were also deeply reflective about missionary work. Boshoff 
noted the growing influences of individualism and secularization among urban black 
people, and decided to study the matter further in a dissertation, which he began in the 
middle of the decade.168 At roughly the same time, Smith began to work on a dissertation 
that evaluated the history, theology, and practice of the NGK’s mission work.169 Their 
years of practical experience had led them to formulate questions, which they now 
attempted to answer through doctoral studies.    
In 1966, both the Stellenbosch University and the University of Pretoria had job 
openings in missiology. By the middle of the 20th century, “missiology” developed as a 
distinct discipline within the academy. The scientific quality of the name was meant to 
give some scholarly weight to the traditionally pious enterprise of mission thinking. 
Bosch’s practical credentials and academic capacities made him an ideal fit. Other 
leading contenders for a post included Jaap Durand, Willem Krige, Pippin Oosthuysen, 
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and Pieter Kamfer.170 In spite of the fact that Smith had barely begun his doctoral studies, 
Charles Fensham asked him to apply for the job at Stellenbosch. E.P. Groenewald put 
Boshoff’s name forward as a potential candidate at the University of Pretoria. Smith was 
offered the job at Stellenbosch, and Boshoff received a job offer from the University of 
Pretoria.   
Shortly after he was offered the job, Boshoff visited his father-in-law. As they 
strolled through the gardens at Libertas, Verwoerd discussed what such a position would 
mean. It would require a great deal of hard work, and he would have to be sure to finish 
his degree in a timely manner. Nevertheless, it seemed to Verwoerd that it was an 
excellent option. After praying about the matter with Anna, he accepted the job.171 Others 
were less excited about the prospect. Although Boshoff and Smith were the least 
qualified candidates, they had something the other candidates did not—membership in 
the Afrikaner Broederbond. The Boshoffs’ former companion Elfie Strassberger wrote to 
Carel, saying he should reject the position flatly. David Bosch, she wrote, was a far more 
suitable candidate. Strassberger went on to say that the only reason Boshoff got the job 
was because he was a member of the Broederbond and Bosch was not.172 For Boshoff, 
however, the only thing that mattered was that Groenewald proposed his name, not why.   
Smith later remembered having more pangs of conscience about his preferential 
treatment. When he received the job offer, he was not entirely sure what to make of it. 
H.D.A. du Toit, Smith’s doctoral adviser at the time, invited him into his office and let 
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out a memorable guffaw. Still chuckling, he said, “Nico, now this is what I would call a 
wonderful Afrikaner Broederbond call in the proper sense of the world.”173 Smith was 
embarrassed by du Toit’s laughter. It weighed on his conscience that the faculty prayed 
for the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in their selection process, but the call was 
prearranged. In spite of Smith’s misgivings, Du Toit told him to take the position, 
assuring him that with hard work he would be successful.174  
Smith remained uneasy about the matter, so he consulted several other professors. 
Kosie Gericke told him that academic qualifications were not the only aspect of making a 
selection. Indeed, both Smith and Boshoff were successful missionaries and had served as 
mission secretaries. Their pragmatic expertise would be useful to future NGK 
missionaries. W.J. van der Merwe said he would have preferred Jaap Durand get the job, 
but he nevertheless assured Smith of his full cooperation. Attie van Wyk even felt a little 
sorry for Smith, saying he was the “unfortunate victim of the manipulation of the call.” 
His guilty conscience was somewhat assuaged by his seniors’ consensus, and Smith took 
the job. In April of 1966, the Smiths moved to Stellenbosch.175 
A number of Broeders found themselves on the short list for university jobs. 
Johan Heyns and A.P. Treurnicht were also offered positions at Stellenbosch. Heyns was 
offered a job in systematic theology. He was a talented and qualified theologian in his 
own right. He graduated from the University of Pretoria one year before Smith and 
Boshoff, and he earned a Ph.D. at the Free University in Amsterdam. He was a proponent 
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of Christian Nationalism, and his theological vision dovetailed well with Afrikaner 
nationalism, though he also expressed concerns that the rejection of Cottesloe would 
damage relations between the “mother” and “daughter” churches of the NGK. Treurnicht, 
who was offered a job in practical theology, turned the post down. He had no 
qualifications for the position, having studied philosophy and then edited the NGK 
newspaper. They hired Dawid de Villiers for the position, and he resented the fact that he 
was the second choice. De Villiers let both Smith and Heyns know that he felt that their 
membership in the Broederbond had given them an unfair advantage.176 David Bosch and 
Jaap Durand were not members of the Broederbond. Their Afrikaner credentials had not 
been assessed by various ranks of their impeccably Afrikaans peers. Bosch and Durand 
participated in ecumenical dialogue with English churches and (no doubt more alarming 
for the Dutch Reformed theology faculties) Roman Catholics. They seemed to be 
conciliatory rather than confident and questioning rather than certain. At denominational 
seminaries, professors need to toe the party line. Smith and Boshoff seemed more likely 
to do this, while Bosch and Durand would not.    
While the faculty at Stellenbosch and the University of Pretoria did not hire 
Bosch, he would go to work for Stofberg’s Umtata Campus. Stofberg trained black 
ministers and evangelists, and Bosch lectured in the history of Christianity and missions. 
Theologian Girme Bekele argued that Bosch made major changes in his social, political, 
and missiological thought at Stofberg. Indeed, Bosch himself argued that by the end of 
the 1960s, he developed “reasonably clear contours” of a new theological paradigm. 
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Writing about how his mind had changed from 1972 to 1982, Bosch said it was more a 
period of clarification than any major new development. After all, Bosch continued, “not 
many people change their views very radically once they have turned forty.”177 Given this 
statement, Bekele argued that 
During his time at Stofberg, Bosch completely freed himself of what he had 
rejected in his inherited [paternalistic] vision be envisioning an alternative 
community in which racial and socio-political superiority were neutralized. He 
rejected any establishment, whether ecclesiastic or political, that existed to serve 
the few at the expense of others who were seen as inferior. He saw all such 
structures as intrinsically unjust and in need of being challenged toward a norm of 
communal justice that involves accepting all people equally, regardless of skin 
pigmentation and social standing. Having adopted this as the ideal norm in his 
mind Bosch came to see apartheid not only as unjust, but as an evil dehumanizing 
structure standing in opposition to the truth that humanity was created in the 
image of God. He began to see the mentality of apartheid as an obstacle hindering 
the universal missionary agenda of God, who desired to bring all human beings 
back to him.178   
 
This statement of Bosch’s new political orientation does not come from any of Bosch’s 
writings in the 1960s. It was, instead, inferred based on later ideas and statements that 
Bosch would make. Indeed, his ideas were changing, but it is important not to overstate 
the case. He would not begin to use the “alternative community” as a paradigm until mid-
1970s after reading the work of his old classmate John Howard Yoder. Likewise, Bosch 
would have been reluctant to use adjectives such as “evil” and “dehumanizing” to 
publically describe apartheid until the 1980s, and even then he spoke cautiously.  
 During the time that he was at Stofberg, it is clear that Bosch began to argue for a 
change in power dynamics on the mission field. Nevertheless, he was still invested in 																																																								
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missiological paradigm that placed great value on ethnicity and/or culture. He continued 
to think in terms of “whites” and “Bantu,” using the terminology of “Bantu coworkers,” 
“Bantu evangelists,” and “Bantu ministers.” In his 1967 manual for missionaries, Julle 
sal my getuies wees (You shall be my witnesses), Bosch argued that white missionary 
paradigms needed to shift from one of domination to one of service. Bosch complained 
that many Afrikaner missionaries, especially those who grew up on farms, treated every 
black person like a servant. They expected to be able to demand any task of any black 
person. Missionaries had to remember that “here in the homelands, they [i.e. ‘the Bantu’] 
are much more independent and proud and they take much quicker offense to attitudes of 
being the baas (baasskaap).”179 He also found it problematic that “many of us also so 
easily speak of ‘my’ evangelist. He is not your evangelist.”180 Bosch also thought that 
white missionaries made too many decisions unilaterally; he wrote, “Our attitude is that 
the mission station is the exclusive property of the white personnel where their word 
alone is law.” Against this, Bosch argued whites needed to act as partners, treating 
Africans, in the words of Roland Allen, not as “children” but as “brethren.”181 
 Bosch encouraged greater cultural understanding and sympathy for (rather than 
judgment of) “the Bantu’s needs, problems, struggles, temptations, [and] weakness.” 
Regarding moral questions, missionaries were to stand next to and not over “the 
																																																								
179 David Bosch, Julle sal my getuies wees, (Self-Published Course Packet, 1967), 53. “Hier in die 
tuisgebiede is hulle veel meer selfstandig en trots en neem hulle veel gouer aanstoot aan ‘n houding van 
baaskap.” This was a bundle of lessons that Bosch gave to missionaries entering the Transkei in 1966 and 
1967. It it not clear how many copies were published, or how widespread they were. This version was from 
the NGK archive at Stellenbosch. 
180 Ibid., 54. “Baie van ons praat ook so maklik van ‘my’ evangelis. Hy is nie u evangelis nie.”   
181 Ibid., 55. “Ons housing is dikwels dat die sendingstasie die uitsluitlike eiedom van die blanke 
personeel is waar hulle woord alleen wet is.”  
		
256 
Bantu.”182  Bosch told young missionaries to treat black congregants with the same 
respect and discretion that ministers would offer white congregants. He also thought they 
needed to attend sermons preached by Black ministers and evangelists, demonstrating 
their solidarity with the local community. Finally, when missionaries were in the wrong, 
they needed to apologize. Bosch recognized that this was particularly difficult for 
Afrikaners, but that made it all the more necessary. He wrote,  
Few of us have the greatness of spirit to acknowledge a fault and to apologize 
(mekaar om verskoning te vra). For our Boer blood, it is even more difficult to do 
it with a Bantu. It is, however, sometimes absolutely necessary, more frequently 
than we think. The result is usually surprising. The fact is that the Bantu do not 
expect it of us—which in itself is a charge against us!183 
 
It is clear that Bosch sought to steer white missionaries away from paternalistic attitudes 
and actions. White answers were not de facto right answers. Instead, missionaries needed 
to be adaptable and understanding. They were not in the mission field to be lords and 
masters, but rather servants. His missiological vision was still invested in the language of 
“homelands,” cultural difference, and racial parity. White missionaries entered the 
“homelands” as guests and servants of a different people. “Homelands” were the domain 
of black people, and white missionaries needed to respect this. Bosch envisioned the need 
of individual whites to apologize to black individuals. In the next decade, however, he 
would come to see that need as communal.   
 																																																								
182 Ibid., 57. “Ons sal ons met die Bantoe se nood, problem, stryd, versoekings, swakhede moet 
vereenselwig as ons hom wil help.”  
183 Ibid., 58-59. “Min van ons het die grootheid van gees om ‘n fout te erken en mekaar om 
verskoning te vra. Dis vir ons Boerebloed nog moeiliker om dit teenoor a Bantoe te doen. Dit egter soms 
absoluut noodsaaklik, meer dikwels as ons dink. Die resultaat is gewoonlik verraasend. Die feit is dat die 
Bantoe dit nie van ons verwag nie…wat op sigself al ‘n aanklag teen ons is!” 
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Conclusion 
State violence gave many Christian Afrikaners pause. It led some to qualify their 
support of apartheid, believing that while total territorial separation might be just, some 
allowances would have to be made for black people living permanently in “white areas.” 
Bosch was among this group. Others continued to argue that any deviation from total 
apartheid would threaten white survival. Smith and Boshoff tended to align with this 
group. They carefully formulated the relationship of white survival and mission work. 
While leaders in the 1930s said mission offered “salvation for volk and fatherland,”184 
missionaries in the 1960s flipped this idea on its head: whites needed to survive so they 
could do missionary work. Those who more clearly supported the aims of “separate 
development” were brought to the center of influence, while those with misgivings or 
even moderate concerns remained outside the centers of influence. Regardless of their 
understanding of reform, Smith, Bosch, and Boshoff all shared the belief that given time, 
“separate development” might work. As time passed, however, the crisis of confidence in 
the NP’s policy would continue to grow. By the 1970s, more Afrikaners would embrace 
the idea that some kind of change needed to be made.    
 
																																																								
184 J.G. Strydom in Richard Elphick, Equality of Believers: Protestant Missionaries and the Racial Politics 
of South Africa (University of Virginia Press, 2012), 226-227.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
PIPE DREAMS AND NEW ALTERNATIVES (1966-1975) 
The new political options discussed by delegates at Cottesloe remained a minority 
position among Afrikaners. Verwoerd’s self-assurance buttressed the electorate’s 
confidence in the NP and apartheid. By the end of the 1960s, however, more white people 
were coming to see that total separation was not practical. Many argued that the 
economic realities of South Africa meant that some form of common society would have 
to be accepted. Smith would be won over by these arguments, but would not yet be 
radicalized. Smith would also have a crisis of confidence in the Afrikaners; he would 
come to find the secrecy and “tricks” of the Broederbond as morally problematic. Voices 
of black protest, which had been silenced by state coercion in the early 1960s, were now 
being heard again through the Black Consciousness Movement and black theology. 
While Boshoff dismissed these voices as dangerous and revolutionary, Bosch would hear 
a plea for white conversion. Bosch’s confidence in apartheid had finally dried up, and he 
came to believe that new solutions could only be found in interracial conversations. He 
would make a definitive break with his past missionary thinking, arguing that, rather than 
replicating ethnic divisions, the church ought to unite hitherto divided peoples into a 
single new body. Boshoff would begin to have a different kind of crisis of confidence. As 
chairman of SABRA, he would plead with the NP for territorial expansion and 
consolidation of the “homelands.” These calls would fall on deaf ears, as they had for the 
past several decades. Boshoff began to wonder how committed the NP really was to the 
vision of total separation. The early 1970s would prove to be a turning point. The unity of 
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racial morality that Afrikaners shared in the early 1950s irreparably unraveled, which 
presented Afrikaners with two very distinct moral visions of the future.   
Assassination of Verwoerd 
Nico Smith was remarkably close to Hendrik Verwoerd the day he died. In early 
September 1966, Boshoff phoned Smith at Stellenbosch, asking him to introduce Prof. 
and Mrs. Blaauw from the Free University of Amsterdam to his in-laws at the Prime 
Minister’s Cape Town residence, Groote Schuur. The Smiths were more than happy to 
accommodate.1 On the morning of September 6, Betsie Verwoerd cordially received the 
Smiths and Blaauws at Groot Schuur with her characteristic smile. She showed them 
around the gardens, and they shared a pleasant cup of tea around noon. Mrs. Verwoerd 
insisted that her guests stay for lunch with her husband, but when he had not arrived by 
one o’clock, she suggested that they meet Verwoerd at the session of Parliament later that 
afternoon. As they were leaving, they passed Verwoerd’s car at the gates, where Smith 
and Verwoerd exchanged a friendly greeting as they drove past each other.2  
The Smiths and the Blaauws did not go to Parliament that afternoon, opting 
instead to have lunch and a cup of coffee at Smith’s sister’s home. Their light-hearted day 
was interrupted by an urgent telephone call. Smith’s brother-in-law frantically related that 
Verwoerd had just been assassinated at his seat in Parliament. At that moment, they were 
not sure what to think. Nico and Ellen worried that it might be the beginning of a 
revolution.3 Only later would they find out that Dimitri Tsafendas, a parliamentary 
																																																								
1 Nico Smith, “In Conversation With…” (unpublished manuscript, 2010), 109.  
2 Ibid., 109-110.  
3 Ibid., 110.  
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messenger who was a temporary hire, fatally stabbed Verwoerd just as the session was 
opening. 
Boshoff was at work in Braamfontein when three of his colleagues burst into his 
office with the news. He immediately picked up the telephone, trying to reach Anna, but 
he was unable to get through as the entire telephone system had collapsed. When Boshoff 
arrived at home, the family listened to the developing news on the radio, too shocked to 
speak to one another. Soon, the police arrived, telling Anna that she would have to get 
ready for a trip to Cape Town, where she would spend several days with her mother.4  
The state funeral took place at the amphitheater of the Union Buildings in 
Pretoria. 4000 dignitaries attended the funeral, including 16 African chiefs. The foreign 
press reported that these chiefs were the first black people to ever attend a state funeral in 
South Africa. Kosie Gericke gave the sermon at the funeral. He lamented the loss of 
Verwoerd, but added, “thank God we still have his message.”5 The funeral procession 
went from the Union Buildings to “Heroes’ Acre,” a section of the Church Street 
Cemetery in Pretoria reserved for leading Afrikaners. There, Verwoerd would be buried 
in the company of the voortrekker Andries Pretorius, President and nationalist icon Paul 
Kruger, and poet Eugene Marais. The funeral route was lined with some 200,000 
mourners. The Chicago Tribune reported, “in line with official dictates that nonwhites 
could stand along the route of the funeral procession ‘where ever they can find a place,’ 
clumps of Africans mingled in the predominantly white crowd.”6 At Heroes Acre, 
																																																								
4 Boshoff, Dis nou ek (LAPA Uitgewers, 2012), 193-194.  
5 “16 Africans at Verwoerd Funeral Rites,” Chicago Tribune, September 11, 1966.  
6 Ibid. 
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Boshoff presided over a private burial service. He read from Romans 8, “As it is written, 
for Thy sake we are killed all day long: we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter.”7 
The selection of text implied that he thought his father-in-law was something of a 
national martyr.   
Boshoff’s sister, Annatjie Boshoff, had been serving as Betsie Verwoerd’s 
personal secretary. She remembered being alongside Mrs. Verwoerd over next days. Piles 
of letters arrived at Libertas and the telephone rang insistently. A call came through from 
the next Prime Minister, John Vorster, not asking for Mrs. Verwoerd, but rather for 
Annatjie. He asked her if she would be willing to serve as personal secretary to his wife, 
Tini, a post she took with encouragement from her former employer. The cabinet also 
personally paid for Annatjie to travel to Germany with Mrs. Verwoerd.8 When they 
returned to South Africa, Betsie Verwoerd moved into Carel and Anna’s house, and she 
would live alongside them until her death in 2000 at the age of 98 in Orania.9   
Verwoerd’s assassination is a wellspring of rumors, which remain a topic of 
conversation over half a century later. Some said Tsafendas assassinated Verwoerd 
because of apartheid’s inherent racism, while others said it was because he thought 
apartheid offered black people too much. Still others heard that Tsafendas believed a 
tapeworm told him to do it. Many have argued that the assassination was orchestrated by 
General Hendrik van den Bergh, who sought to keep Verwoerd from making a speech in 																																																								
7 Ibid. “Nonwhites Join Whites At Verwoerd’s Funeral,” The Montgomery Advertiser, September 
11, 1966.  
8 Annatjie Boshoff, Sekretaresse vir die Verwoerds (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1974), 240-
252. 
9 Ibid., 253-260; Agence France-Presse, “Betsie Verwoerd, Apartheid Ruler’s Wife, 98,” New 
York Times, March 2, 2000.   
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which he was going to make major changes to apartheid. Van den Bergh founded the 
South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS), which, though he denied it, was 
responsible for the deaths of many black people in detention, and it operated hit squads 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Not only was van den Bergh responsible for the detention of 
Nelson Mandela, but he also found that Beyers Naudé was leaking Broederbond 
documents. He was an exacting and brutal policeman, which made it seem all the more 
strange that he may have hired Tsafendas, a man with a psychiatric record and a one time 
member of the Communist Party. Such an out of character hire led many to assume that 
van den Bergh was using Tsafendas.10 Newest research into Tsafendas revealed that he 
killed Verwoerd specifically because he disagreed with apartheid. He wanted to cut off 
the head of the system, hoping that the body would then fail. In police questioning, he 
developed the persona of an insane person (making claims about the tapeworm). The 
government happily latched onto the insanity explination, hiding any evidence of political 
dissatisfaction.11 Tsafendas was ruled mentally unfit to stand trial. Rather than being 
placed in a psychiatric institution, he would spend the next 20 years of his life on death 
row in Pretoria Central Prison before being moved to Zonderwater Prison. In 1994, he 
was finally moved to a psychiatric hospital where he died in 1999.12  
Barring some archival find, it will never be known what Verwoerd was going to 
say in Parliament that day. Again, the rumors abound. Some have argued that Verwoerd 																																																								
10 Hilton Hamann, Days of the Generals (Zebra Press, 2001), 5-7. Alan D. Elsdon, The Tall 
Assassin (Umuzi, 2009) sorted through historic details about van den Bergh and pieced them together into a 
novel.   
11 Harris Dousemetzis, The Man Who Killed Apartheid (Jacaranda Media, 2018).   
12 Terry Bell with Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and 
Truth (Verso, 2003), 58. Tiffiny Fawn Jones, Patriarchy, Mental Institutions, and the Mad in Apartheid 
South Africa (Routledge, 2012), 87-92, 160.  
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was going to depart from apartheid orthodoxy.13 Others said, given the fact that he was 
returning from Lesotho, that he was going to make neighboring states an offer of territory 
to expedite the process toward total apartheid.14 It could also have been that his “major 
statement” was going to be little more than a repackaging of his same political policy. His 
blood soaked speech was lost, and it does not seem there was another copy.  
Boshoff at SABRA 
 Verwoerd’s death marked a turning point for Boshoff. For the family, the loss was 
undeniably personal. To the Boshoffs, Verwoerd was not a distant Prime Minister or the 
maniacal architect of apartheid, but rather their father and grandfather. They all went to 
his summer home at Betty’s Bay, where they watched him fish on the rocks, drive his 
motorboat, and try his hand at building cabinets. They played in the swimming pool at 
Groote Schuur, and they celebrated Verwoerd’s birthday in the state dining room at 
Libertas. Though busy with state affairs, Verwoerd took time to play with his 
grandchildren.15  Even today at the Hendrik Verwoerd Museum in Orania, one gets the 
sense that they are not only commemorating Verwoerd the scholar and politician, but also 
Verwoerd the beloved patriarch. Amidst the bloodstained clothes from the first 
assassination attempt, the seat in Parliament where he was fatally stabbed, massive 
political posters, and gifts from foreign dignitaries, one finds domestic images of 
																																																								
13 Bell and Ntsebeza, 58. 
14 Interview with Wynand Boshoff, March 2016.  
15 Annetjie Boshoff’s memoir Sekretaresse vir die Verwoerds (op. cit.) of her time working with 
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Verwoerd. In one shot, the proud patriarch stood next to a massive tuna he caught, while 
in another he clumsily carried his fishing gear.16 
Boshoff not only believed in apartheid, but he believed in his beloved father-in-
law. He believed that Dr. Verwoerd—as he always called him—had the intelligence and 
the wherewithal to make the complete and total separation of races a possibility in South 
Africa. Boshoff would always believe that had his father-in-law lived, the principles of 
“separate development” would have been applied creatively and consistently. He would 
concede to journalist Joseph Lelyveld that there was perhaps “something psychological” 
in his firm support of his father-in-law’s policies.17 Boshoff would continue to espouse 
the vision of total separation between races as the best possible arrangement for the 
happiness of both blacks and whites in South Africa. While Boshoff claimed the legacy 
of Verwoerd, his vision of “separate development” was decidedly different from that of 
his father-in-law. While Verwoerd rejected large territorial expansion of the 
“homelands,” Boshoff would advocate mass consolidation. Verwoerd talked about a 
“reduced state” for whites, but never the formation of a white homeland or “Volkstaat,” 
which became increasingly central to Boshoff’s thought. Like the SABRA intellectuals in 
the 1950s, Boshoff would press on the NP to expand the “homelands,” and the NP would 
tell him it was impractical.  
Not all Afrikaners shared Boshoff’s confidence in apartheid. In 1966, Willem de 
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17 Boshoff in Joseph Lelyveld, “South Africans Ask a White ‘Homeland,’” New York Times, 
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Klerk began speaking of a divide between verligte and verkrampte Afrikaners.18 Those 
on the verligte (“enlightened”) side would come to believe that apartheid needed to be 
reformed. The ideal of total territorial separation, they argued, was impossible given the 
economic realities of South Africa. Black people were far too integrated into the ‘white’ 
economy to be denied rights in South Africa. To be sure, most verligte thinkers and 
politicians were not in favor of majority rule; they merely came to believe that some new 
political arrangements needed to be made for “economically integrated” black and 
Coloured South Africans. The verkrampte (“narrow” or “cramped”) side believed that 
any deviation from total apartheid posed a threat to the Afrikaners’ future: there was no 
middle option between total separation and complete integration. Leading Afrikaans 
newspapers began using “verligte” and “verkrampte” as political shorthand, clearly 
advocating for the policies of the former while deriding the latter as backward.19    
When Verwoerd’s successor John Vorster took office, he said that the NP would 
continue implementing his predecessor’s policy. There were certainly clear signs of this. 
In 1970, the South African Parliament passed the Bantu Citizens Homelands Act, which 
effectively denaturalized all black South Africans. It created a legal basis for treating 
black and white South Africans like members of separate countries. Under Vorster’s 
tenure, two “homelands” or “Bantustans” became nominally independent (though not 
recognized by the international community) and three others gained self-government.20 
Vorster would clearly continue pursuing the policy of “separate development.” Yet it was 																																																								
18 Boshoff, Dis nou ek, 247; Alleta G. Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse (Verso: 1996), 
187.   
19 Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (University of Virginia Press, 2009), 
549. Norval, 187-189.  
20 Giliomee, Hermann Giliomee, The Last Afrikaner Leaders (NB Publishers, 2012). 
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also clear that the “homelands” were profoundly underdeveloped and overcrowded. Far 
from being independent nations, they took on the character of labor reserves for the white 
economy.  
But Vorster also showed signs of compromise. As part of his policy of détente, 
Vorster established diplomatic relationships with independent African states and tried to 
make South Africa a key player in the regional community. He courted favor with the 
United States by sending South African military resources and personnel to Angola to 
fight Soviet-aligned forces there.21 Vorster took a conciliatory position regarding 
English-speaking South Africans, frequently talking about a solid “white South Africa.” 
Beginning with Verwoerd, Afrikaner nationalism was increasingly couched in terms of 
shared white interests. Vorster also tried to improve South Africa’s international image 
by sometimes allowing integrated international sports teams to compete in South Africa. 
The prospect of Maori rugby players on New Zealand’s All Blacks playing against South 
Africa’s all white Springboks proved too much for some nationalists to stomach. Albert 
Hertzog, son of the famous General JBM Hertzog, left the National Party to form the 
Herstigte Nasionale Party in 1969. While the political party’s formation exposed a 
growing rift within Afrikaner nationalist circles, the Broederbond effectively squashed 
the HNP’s potential influence by prohibiting its members (i.e. most leading Afrikaners) 
from becoming members. During the 1970 election, the HNP did not even win 5 percent 
of the overall vote.22  
Economic and political realities were forcing moral leaders to reconsider 																																																								
21 Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 571-574. 
22 Ibid., 558.  
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“separate development.” Jaap Durand accepted a call to pastor a congregation in 
Kwazakhele, a black township in Port Elizabeth. There, Durand realized that the cultural 
emphasis in NGK missions failed to address the rapid cultural changes black people in 
cities were experiencing. This realization would make him a more vocal critic of 
“separate development.” In 1970, he published Swartman, stad en toekoms (Blackman, 
City, and Future). He argued that the project of “indigenization” was wrong-headed. 
Africans, especially in South Africa, had become too invested in the economic, 
technological, and cultural words of modernity, or “Western civilization.” He wrote,  
The basic fact that has been ignored is that the Blackman no longer experiences 
the pattern of Western civilization as something strange…In a greater or lesser 
measure it has already become an inalienable part of his daily life without which 
he no longer has the possibility of existence (bestaansmoontlikheid).23  
 
Durand argued that it was, therefore, impossible for “the Black man” to leave “the White 
man’s” city and return to “his own world.” Note that Durand uses the language of “black 
man” rather than “Bantu.” It implied a move away from viewing black people as 
members of culturally stagnant ethnic groups, to individual actors navigating the modern 
world. Black Africans not only worked in mines, but also came to embrace cinemas, 
clothing, and living standards that included bedroom sets as their own.24 The end result of 
modernization was that there were no pure or separate “African civilizations”; there was 
only one economically integrated South Africa that shared a common destiny. Durand 
continued, “Those who don’t want to recognize this and who still want to dream dreams 																																																								
23 J.J.F. Durand, Swartman, stad en toekoms (Tafelberg, 1970), 1-2. “Die basiese feit wat uit die 
oog verloor word, is dat die Swartman die Westerse beskawingspatroon nie meer bloot as iets vreemds en 
ook nie altyd bewustelik as ‘n bedreigende mag ervaar nie. In ‘n mindere of meerdere mate het dit reeds ‘n 
onvervreembare deel van sy daaglikse lewe geword waarsonder hy net nie meer ‘n bestaansmoontlikheid 
het nie.”   
24 William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (Oxford University Press, 2001), 193.  
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about the development of another distinctive (eiesoortige) civilization for the Black man 
suffer under a form of romanticism that does not correspond with reality.”25    
 The Cape Argus referred to the book as a “devastating blow for apartheid.” While 
he admitted that the book did attack apartheid, it only did so by implication. He later 
lamented that many conservative Afrikaners never saw it as a critique of the “separate 
development” or separate churches as such.26 Nevertheless, his argument was an 
important step for Afrikaans missiologists. If one read it seriously, it shattered the basis 
of the ethnocultural paradigm of mission. Separate churches made less sense if there were 
not easily definable separate people groups. By 1971, mission theorists began to debate 
Durand’s argument at the South African Missiological Society (SAMS).27 Bosch was 
president of SAMS, and over the next decade, it became a platform for discussing new 
ideas about racial morality.  
The growing rift in Afrikaner political thinking was clearly exposed when 
Boshoff became chairman of SABRA in 1972. Boshoff said he would continue to purse 
SABRA’s founding goal, which was to advance “a social order that offers every volk the 
choice to develop their full volk-hood, and that places each volk in a condition of self 
determination in its own state (staatsverband), that is to say, on its own land, and under 
its own authority.”28 Boshoff thought that neither white domination of blacks, nor black 
domination of whites was acceptable (a common trope in apartheid ideology and non-																																																								
25 Durand, Swartman, stad en toekoms, 1-2.  
26 J.J.F. Durand, “Discovering The Implications Of Reconciliation,” Journal of Theology for 
Southern Africa 41 (1982), 23.  
27 Durand’s work was the topic of Markus Braun’s paper, “The structures of the congregation in 
an urban setting,” at the 1971 SAMS conference on “Building the Congregation in Africa.” Full text in 
Gemeenteopbou in Afrika, ed. David Bosch (N.G. Kerkboekhandel, 1972), 124-135. 
28 Boshoff, Dis nou ek, 245.  
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racialism).29 Against thinkers like Durand (whose work SABRA expressly rejected), 
Boshoff clung to the idea that a commonwealth of multi-racial states could be carved out 
of South Africa.30 SABRA would very much become Boshoff’s own organization. While 
most previous chairmen only led the organization for two to five years, Boshoff would 
lead it for thirty.   
At the academic level, SABRA held conferences and offered a range of 
publications, including books, papers, and newsletters. It was committed to cultivating 
grassroots support for “separate development” by holding conferences for white, black, 
and Coloured youth.31 The English press accused these events of “brainwashing,” but 
SABRA leaders responded that they were necessary to combat “communist-developed 
sensitivity training” that was being imported into South Africa.32 Sensitivity training was 
not actually developed by communists, but rather American behavioral psychologists at 
the National Training Laboratories in Bethel, Maine. Through group encounters, it hoped 
to sensitize people to their prejudices and encourage individual growth, which SABRA 
viewed with trepidation.33 At SABRA’s various programs, academics, state officials, 
clergy, and members of the media encouraged young people to form deeper commitments 
to their ethnic communities. Church, cultural, and civil organizations cooperated with 
SABRA to support its work. The same year Boshoff was elected chairman, it received 																																																								
29 Carel Boshoff, “Vrede vereis eie volksvryheid,” SABRA Nuusbrief, 4 (June 1974), 2. ACC 417, 
Nico Smith, UNISA Archives, Pretoria, South Africa. 
30 Ibid., 246.  
31 John Grogan, “Operation Brainwash,” Sunday Tribune, January 20, 1974. ACC 417, Nico 
Smith, UNISA Archives, Pretoria, South Africa.   
32 P.J. Vender in A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (South African Institute of Race 
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grants from the Department of Education, Arts and Science, the Department of Cultural 
Affairs, and the Department of National Education.34  
Boshoff set a verkrampte agenda at SABRA. He argued that the acceptance of 
blacks outside of the “homelands” would endanger the survival of the “white state.” He 
would, therefore, take a “militant” stand against integration, while funding research 
projects to make new proposals for the total separation of races. Boshoff said that he 
would continue encouraging the work of youth programs, and that he would begin 
working with black leaders “for the advancement of all our national, economic, and 
cultural autonomy.”35 He contentiously added that he was open to discussing the 
possibility of a Coloured homeland.36 At the same congress, outgoing chairman Gerrit 
Viljoen gave a paper in which he argued that Afrikaners might need to form a white 
homeland to ensure their survival. The Afrikaners would have to do something akin to 
“operation Israel,” in which they would “make the desert bloom.” Boshoff said he was 
open to the idea of a white homeland, but it did not yet form the central drive of 
SABRA’s research project.37  
Eight members of SABRA’s Western Cape Branch resigned in protest of 
Boshoff’s agenda, including the chairman. They resented the fact that Boshoff was 
allowing for the discussion of a Coloured homeland, which was against government 
																																																								
34 A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 55-57. 
35 Boshoff in A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 57.  
36 A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 57. For discussion of SABRA debates over position 
of Coloured population, see W.E. Barker in John Lazar, “The role of the South African Bureau of Racial 
Affairs (SABRA) in the formulation of apartheid ideology, 1948-1961,” The Societies of Southern Africa in 
the 19th and 20th Centuries, ed. Institute of Commonwealth Studies vol. 14, collected seminar papers 37 
(1988), 102.  
37 A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 57.  
		
271 
policy. One of the men who resigned, Stellenbosch economist Sampie Terreblanche, 
added that economics made total apartheid impossible. He said, “Our point is that it is not 
possible to accept a massive flow-back of Bantu to the ‘homelands.’ They will always 
form a great part of the cities. This must be accepted.”38 For Boshoff, however, this 
would undercut the morality of apartheid. He believed that total separation was the only 
option. Those who resigned disagreed. They thought that Boshoff’s leadership 
“represents an interpretation of policy direction so reactionary that, in our opinion, it 
offers no perspective on the handling of the challenges which social and economic 
realities will present in the near future.”39 The resignations took Boshoff by surprise. He 
argued, quite innocently, that SABRA was an academic organization, and there was 
certainly room for difference of opinion. Before the end of the decade, the “difference of 
opinion” would develop into two different political platforms within Afrikaner politics—
one that embraced reform and one that rejected it.40   
Smith’s Misgivings  
All of the openings on the council of SABRA’s Western Cape branch provided a 
space for Nico Smith to become a member. Boshoff was no doubt delighted when his 
friend joined SABRA. Smith would be a potential ally in the region. It seemed that 
Smith’s position lined up closely with Boshoff’s on questions of Coloured representation. 
In 1971, 109 academics from the Western Cape signed a petition in which they called for 
Coloured people’s “equal and full citizenship” in South Africa. Herman Giliomee, whose 																																																								
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name was on the petition, remembered a number of academics objected to the petition. 
Smith, Giliomee recalled, “deplored the petition as something that would only serve to 
make the government’s task more difficult.”41 But Smith soon left his position at 
SABRA, citing increased academic duties.42 In truth, Smith was growing increasingly 
uncomfortable with the activities of the Broederbond and other organizations that 
promoted Afrikaner interests to the exclusion of others.43 
When the Smiths first moved to Stellenbosch, they built a house in the 
Mostertsdrift neighborhood, where they lived along with Johan Heyns, who taught at 
Stellenbosch before moving to the University of Pretoria, and A.P. Treurnicht, who 
would become the leader of the Conservative Party. The local Broederbond cell warmly 
welcomed Smith. The Broeders in Stellenbosch believed that they had the special task of 
producing many of the working papers that were debated throughout the wider 
organization. MP Hennie Smit kept them up to date on government affairs, and 
occasionally even the Prime Minister addressed them personally.44 Smith found 
friendship and a sense of belonging among this tight-knit group of academics. As a 
member of the Broederbond, many social doors were opened to the Smiths. They had a 
lovely life, full of friends, colleagues, and garden parties. Smith’s voice was taken 
seriously by his colleagues.45  
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Owing to Smith’s natural ability to connect with and guide young people, his 
colleagues in the Broederbond asked him to become leader of a Ruiterwag wagpos. The 
Ruiterwag was an Afrikaans youth organization that was secretly under the supervision of 
the Broederbond. Much like SABRA’s youth programs, it sought to instill a commitment 
to Afrikaner freedom, independence, and identity in college-aged young men. Each 
branch had a “wagpos,” or watch post, that was headed by a local Broeder called the 
Hoofwag, who was also assigned with the task of recruiting young perspective 
Broeders.46  
At the same time, Smith continued to question his position and the goals of the 
Broederbond. At his first meeting with the Mostertsdrift cell, Smith was cautioned 
against Dawid de Villiers, who had learned the secret handshake but was not a member. 
They went on to discredit de Villiers’ character, which Smith found disconcerting. But it 
was the work of the Ruiterwag that troubled Smith most. He never got over his moral 
qualms about convincing young people to join a secret society. The Ruiterwag also began 
acting as right-wing university tattletales. When professors made statements or 
suggestions deemed too controversial, Ruiterwag members often reported them to (the 
Broederbond-aligned) University authorities, who then attempted to reign in critical 
voices through social pressure. Smith argued that the Ruiterwag kept progressive student 
organizations, like the National Union of South African Students, off campus.47  
The Ruiterwag attempted to ensure that candidates in student government 
supported Afrikaner nationalist causes by any means necessary. After the student body 																																																								
46 Smith, “Afrikaner Broederbond, Ch. 5 to end,” 31.  
47 Ibid., 6-7.  
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election in 1972, the Ruiterwag gathered at Smith’s house to discuss the election. One 
young man boasted that he had taken a whole stack of unused punch card ballots from the 
medical school, marked them all for the Ruiterwag-backed candidates, and cast them all. 
As the students began to laugh, Smith objected at once. They tried to downplay it as 
student fun, but Smith remembered,  
I was appalled that young Afrikaners could be guilty of such blatant corruption 
and that they saw nothing wrong with it whatsoever. I saw it as an illustration of 
where secret group action could lead young people who weren’t yet capable of 
fully grasping the consequences of their deeds. Was this the road on which I had 
helped to lead young Afrikaners?48  
 
Cheating and lying were an affront to Smith’s pious sensibilities.  
Apart from having moral qualms about his own social circles, Smith became 
increasingly involved in conversations with philosopher Johan Degenaar, who himself 
was critical of apartheid. Degenaar hosted a public discussion group comprised of 
Afrikaners who were envisioning new political options for the future. Smith and Heyns 
initially joined the group to make a case for “separate development” as a just and 
Christian political policy, but quickly found that their arguments were not as sound as 
they had initially supposed. Smith remembered André Hugo asking Heyns specifically 
how he, as a Christian theologian, could justify apartheid. Heyns echoed the mission 
policy, saying it was a question of white Christian trusteeship. He used the metaphor of a 
patriarchal family. The father of a family, he said, decides which rooms children ought to 
occupy. If children were able to choose their own rooms, it would only lead to bedlam. In 
the same way, whites, as the more developed race, needed to ensure that blacks got their 
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own rooms or “fatherlands” to avoid chaos. Immediately, the group set on this answer, 
arguing against Heyns’ paternalistic (if not overly simplistic) point from multiple 
angles.49 The story must be read with some skepticism, as Smith frequently 
misrepresented Heyns’ positions. Nevertheless, many members of the Afrikaner 
intelligentsia were no longer confident in apartheid, and they were looking for different 
answers. The self-serving activities of the Ruiterwag and Broederbond as well as 
conversations with Degenaar precipitated Smith’s crisis of confidence, which would only 
deepen as he became sensitized to the injustices of the apartheid regime.      
Smith’s crisis of confidence put him at odds with his old friend Carel Boshoff. 
The Smiths frequently hosted Boshoff when he had meetings in Stellenbosch or Cape 
Town. On one cold night during the early 1970s, Smith lit a fire in his study and invited 
his friend to take a seat. Smith recalled saying, “We have the whole night to discuss 
matters in detail. Tonight I want to get clarity on what you have in mind with the 
homeland policy for blacks, and now for whites as well.”50 Boshoff spoke for over an 
hour, telling Smith that an industrial area (what he called a Ruhr area) would have to be 
developed from Rustenburg to Richards Bay. The “homelands” to the north and east of 
that line would have to be expanded and consolidated. Black people would then be able 
to leave the “white areas,” and settle in the “homelands” where they could have an 
economically viable existence.51  
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Smith remembered being skeptical and asking,  “Carel, do you really mean that 
all the blacks, including those in Soweto, would have to be moved?” Boshoff said that 
was exactly what he meant. Such a view would have placed Boshoff far to the right of the 
NP. The rents from the Townships had more than paid for the cost of construction, and 
the government would be at no loss if they demolished those areas. Boshoff never had 
any moral quandaries about the large-scale relocation of people. On the contrary, he 
viewed it as necessary for peace. Should the “homelands” still not provide enough 
employment opportunities for black people, they would still be able to work as migrants 
in the white area. Smith asked how exactly Boshoff proposed having black workers but 
no black housing in white areas. Boshoff responded, “Oh, that wouldn’t be a problem. 
They would be transported to and fro daily with high speed trains.” Smith found the idea 
almost laughable. He later remembered saying, “Carel, Carel, please stop for a moment. 
Tell me, for heaven’s sake—do you mean what you say, or are you making fun of me?”52 
Boshoff generally was level headed, dogged, and calm in the face of those who 
disagreed with him, which he was increasingly used to. Yet Smith’s refusal to play along 
with his vision hurt Boshoff. He got angry and said he was shocked that a friend of his 
could so easily succumb to “Cape Liberalism.” While “Cape Liberalism” as a political 
policy reached its apex at the end of the 19th century, there was frequently a sense that 
Afrikaners in “the North” (i.e. the Orange Free State and the Transvaal) were more 
conservative than those in “the South” (i.e. the Cape Colony). Being called a “liberal” 
was very much an insult in Afrikaner communities, as it implied a connection with 
																																																								
52 Ibid., 16-17.  
		
277 
British interests.53 They talked for a while longer, and managed to cool down. Yet the rift 
between the two had opened, and they clearly would be on separate sides of the debate 
about South Africa’s political future. Before going to sleep that night, Smith remembered 
Boshoff saying, “Nico, I foresee the day when everything in this country of ours will go 
to pieces. And then each of us will blame the other and say, ‘See, I told you the policy 
that you advocated would never work.’”54 Boshoff did not recount his side of the 
conversation, so it is impossible to say how much was actually said and how much was a 
reconstruction. The fact of the matter, however, Smith found Boshoff’s ideological 
commitments increasingly absurd. Such notions seemed less like feasible policies, and 
more like a dangerous pipe dream.  
Boshoff was beginning to have a crisis of confidence of his own, but for very 
different reasons. As head of SABRA, he was coming into increased conflict with 
Vorster’s government. He later wrote that while Vorster was interested in the suppression 
of communism, state security, and international relations, “in the area of essential 
separation, nothing was advanced.”55 Boshoff began to accuse the government of being 
too trepidatious to fully implement the policy of “separate development.” He even said, 
“a scared policeman is no worse than a scared Prime Minister.” In response to this 
statement, Die Burger commented, “If SABRA wants to be a friend of the government, 
then Mr. Vorster does not need enemies.”56 Boshoff wrote to Vorster, saying that he was 																																																								
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not speaking of a specific Prime Minister, but in general terms. Boshoff added that “good 
relations” with the international community might help create an atmosphere where 
problems could be solved, but they were not solutions to domestic issues in their own 
right. The NP was increasingly cold toward Boshoff’s suggestions, dismissing them as 
impractical. After listening to Boshoff’s plans for partition one afternoon, Vorster merely 
said, “We cannot make promises that cannot be fulfilled.”57 The NP was not willing to go 
as far as Boshoff thought it needed to go.  
Leaving the Broederbond 
As Smith became increasingly disillusioned, his relationship with the 
Broederbond became unbearable. He found his way out of the organization in August 
1973 in the fallout over the new HNP. At an emergency meeting of the Mostertsdrift 
Division, a Broederbond executive council circular was read which required members to 
pledge their loyalty to the National Party. In cooperation with Broederbond chairman Piet 
Meyer, Vorster was attempting to use the Broederbond to limit the influence and growth 
of the HNP. When asked to pledge his loyalty, Smith objected, saying that he had thought 
Broederbond was supposedly a cultural organization that protected Afrikaner interests, 
not a political organization. His colleagues, who had verligte leanings, were surprised. 
Surely, they told him, he need not object to getting rid of the verkrampte HNP members. 
They also said that it was necessary to exclude “the schismatics” for the sake of 
Afrikaner unity. They urged him to pledge his allegiance to the NP and remain a member 
of the Broederbond. He would be able to voice his misgivings from the inside and effect 
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changes that way. Smith, however, did not budge. If he would be unwilling to sign the 
pledge, they told him he was free to walk away, and he did.58 
Smith was unsure of himself, and remembered feeling “seized by a lack of self-
confidence” the next day. He went to discuss the matter with his trusted confidant 
Charles Fensham. They had a very long friendship, and their families even went on 
vacation together. The morning after Smith resigned from the Broederbond, however, 
Frensham made it clear that their friendship had come to an end. Smith had opted to 
remove himself from the close circle of trust established among members of the 
Broederbond. No doubt, many of his former “Broeders” viewed him with suspicion, 
perhaps even considering him a verraaier—a traitor. The chilly reception he received 
from Fensham would be repeated, to a greater or lesser degree, by many of the Smiths 
former friends. Smith felt that he had “become a second Beyers Naudé.”59    
While several Broeders asked Smith to keep his objections about the Broederbond 
silent for two years, his conscience did not allow him to remain quiet long. Johan Heyns 
wrote a letter to Die Burger in which he argued that the NGK’s deep-rooted pietistic 
impulses prevented the church from engaging in politics. For pietists, Heyns argued, 
politics were too “worldly” and had little to do with the church. Smith responded in a 
subsequent letter to the same newspaper, arguing that, if anything, the inverse was true—
Afrikaner church leaders were overly involved in politics. He later summarized the main 
thrust of his letter, “The real problem…was that the DRC had landed in the lap of the 
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Afrikaner nation. And whenever a church and a nation landed in each other’s laps and 
entered into a ‘sweetheart’ relationship, the end result was the birth of a monster, in this 
case a monster named apartheid.”60 Needless to say, Smith’s outspoken opinions 
unleashed a heated debate. He went to Willie Jonker, who had just replaced Heyns as 
professor of theology, for advice. Jonker suggested that Smith keep silent for a while and 
let the storm die down. Smith, who seemed to be making a habit of acting first and then 
feeling unsure of himself later, was more than happy to heed the advice for the time 
being.61  
   The NGK, however, would not let the accusations of one of their ministers and 
seminary professors go unchecked. They summoned Smith to an executive meeting of the 
curatorium to discuss his statements. He approached the meeting with fear and trembling, 
expecting a fiery rebuke from Koot Vorster and Kosie Gericke. To his surprise, Vorster 
simply told Smith that there was no basis for the claim that the NGK sacrificed itself to 
Afrikaner politics. He said that such an argument was irresponsible for a seminary 
professor to make, as he exerted a heavy influence on young and impressionable minds. 
Finally, Vorster told Smith to be very careful in formulating all future statements. Smith 
left his meeting, realizing that after leaving the Broederbond, he no longer had the ability 
to speak freely as an Afrikaner.62  
UNISA, the Cave of Adullam? 
In 1972, David Bosch was offered a position as professor of missiology at the 
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University of South Africa (UNISA). UNISA was unique among South African 
Universities, in that it was interracial. This was largely because it was a correspondence 
university, and students of different races would not necessarily come in contact. The 
Theology faculty also had significantly more freedom to assert positions that would have 
been subject to church censure (or at the very least review) at denominational seminaries. 
In 1990, Chris Botha wrote a history of the theology faculty at UNISA entitled Cave of 
Adullam or Achor, a door of hope? The title alluded to two biblical locations. In 1 
Samuel 22, David took refuge from King Saul at the cave of Adullam, and there he 
gathered “everyone who was in distress, and everyone who was in debt, and everyone 
who was bitter in soul.”63 In many ways, the theology faculty at UNISA was a place for 
those theologians who were distressed by the contemporary political and doctrinal 
situation in South Africa. Because of their differences of opinion, they were often passed 
over by other major universities in favor of more doctrinally and politically aligned 
candidates. The second metaphor refers to the valley of Achor, where Achan and his 
family were stoned to death by the people of Israel after they had sinned. Yet it became a 
sign of hope; the Israelites in exile looked forward to the day when they could return to 
Jerusalem by going through the Valley of Achor (Hosea 2:5).64  In this way, though the 
faculty was composed of the “rejects” and/or “outcasts” of the NGK like David Bosch, it 
would grow into a sign of hope for the wider society.  
It should not be assumed that the entire theology faculty at UNISA was 
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universally against apartheid; on the contrary, there were many professors at UNISA who 
supported the policy. Though UNISA fought to remain interracial as a correspondence 
university, it still had separate curricula for white and black students.65 Nor should it be 
assumed that there was a total disconnect between the faculty at UNISA and those at 
NGK seminaries. In fact, Groenewald temporarily acted as dean of the faculty while its 
professors attempted reconciliation in 1971-72 (the same year Bosch was offered a job).66 
It was not uncommon for professors from UNISA to substitute or give guest lectures for 
those at the University of Pretoria. The founder of the faculty, J.A. “Dotjie” Lombard, 
was Groenewald’s student, and he held wide appeal across the NGK, getting letters of 
recommendations from not only Groenewald, but also Frans Geldenhuys, and Ben 
Marais.67  
The fact that so many highly talented academics were passed over for jobs at the 
leading denominational seminaries meant that as Lombard was hiring new staff, he had a 
pool of highly qualified dissidents to draw from. Abraham Viljoen was one of Lombard’ 
distressed dissidents.68 Viljoen also spent some time with Bilheimer at the WCC in New 
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York, placing him under the suspicion of many Afrikaner leaders. While in the United 
States, Viljoen contributed an article to Die Kerkbode about the reformed church in 
America.69 When the Cottesloe Controversy exploded, Viljoen wrote a letter to Die 
Kerkbode defending both Bilheimer and the WCC. Kerkbode editor A.P. Treurnicht 
responded, “you really don’t want me to publish this,” and he told Viljoen that he threw it 
away.70 Treurnicht, however, did not throw the letter away; he sent it to E.P. Groenewald, 
who was himself under some fire from the NGK for his role in Cottesloe. Groenewald 
summoned Viljoen to his office, and Viljoen remembered him saying, “You haven’t 
exactly made yourself loveable to the NGK.”71 A heated three-hour argument ensued. 
Groenewald wanted Viljoen to recognize the authority of the General Synod on racial 
matters, and Viljoen said he would not recognize any decision that was in conflict with 
his reading of scripture. The University faculty made Viljoen’s life very difficult, forcing 
him to re-take a comprehensive exam, which he had previously passed with distinction. It 
was clear that they would continue blocking his progress, and he withdrew from the 
program. Viljoen would go on to work with Naudé as a co-founder of the Christian 
Institute before being appointed lecturer at UNISA.72  
 Viljoen participated in the Study Project of Christianity in Apartheid Society 
(SPRO-CAS), which was a joint effort of the South African Council of Churches and the 
Christian Institute. In 1968, the SACC published “A message of the people of South 
Africa,” in which they declared that the “doctrine of separation is a false faith,” and they 																																																								
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called on South Africans “to work for expressions of God’s reconciliation here and 
now.”73 Any display of reconciliation, it argued, would be a threat to South African 
society. Leaders developed SPRO-CAS as a response to this message. While the CI and 
the SACC agreed that apartheid was wrong, they also wanted to demonstrate some kind 
of alternative.74 Naudé used connections with churches throughout Europe to fund a 
massive study project that examined a wide variety of social institutions, including the 
church, politics, education, and the economy.75 Over 150 academics took part. 
Participants were deeply divided over the question of South Africa’s future. Some, in line 
with the Cottesloe Declaration, believed that the system could be reformed from within. 
Others, particularly the rising generation of black students, believed the entire system 
would have to be scrapped.76 Both positions were threating to conservatives. Boshoff and 
those at SABRA rejected SPRO-CAS as an “integration project.”77 Bosch’s colleagues at 
UNISA, therefore, were working on very different projects than those at denominational 
seminaries.  
Moving to Pretoria from the Transkei, the Bosches found themselves both like 
and unlike their neighbors. Kritzinger and Saayman noted that Bosch never became truly 
alienated from his Afrikaans heritage. The Bosches moved to Menlo Park, a decidedly 
Afrikaans eastern suburb of Pretoria (to be sure, they legally would have had to live in a 
“white area”). Their children attended Afrikaans schools, and the family remained 																																																								
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members of the NGK. The Bosches also hired black domestic workers.78 At the same 
time, the Bosches tried to live differently from within their context. Kevin Livingston 
quoted Bosch as saying, “We moved back to Pretoria, very afraid of Afrikaners. Very 
afraid of white people. We were returning home, in a sense, but returning very different 
from what we were when we had left in the early 1950s.”79 Willem Nicol wrote, “…it felt 
as if David and Annemie…simply stayed there [in Menlo Park] because they needed a 
roof over their heads. They certainly did not belong there. It felt as if they should have 
lived in Mamelodi or some such place.”80 Nicol went on to note that they did not have a 
manicured garden in front of their house. On the contrary, Bosch tended an expansive 
vegetable garden. Nicol even remembered the Bosches’ food being different. They 
largely eschewed the elegant gardens and dinner parties their neighbors embraced.81   
Beyond their garden and table, the Bosches attempted to instill a respect for black 
people in their children. Saayman and Kritzinger wrote, “David and Annemie 
consistently taught their children respect for black people—the black ministers and 
lecturers who visited them as well as the domestic worker who worked in their home—
and modeled to them how one could live with justice and compassion, as an Afrikaner, 
without race or class prejudice.”82 It is important to note that the Bosches included black 
people in their lives not only as hired laborers, but also as intellectual and spiritual 
equals.  																																																								
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After Bosch went to Pretoria, he organized meetings of ministers in the various 
branches of the NGK family. Through one of these meetings, Bosch and Takatso 
Mofokeng became friends, and their families began spending a great deal of time 
together. Mofokeng later remembered how odd this was at that time. He wrote, “There 
were many white NGK pastors near Mamelodi, in the suburbs of Villieria and Waverly 
and so on, but they cannot be your friends; they are not friendly; there is a distance; there 
is a master-servant relationship.”83 Mofokeng argued that this was not the case with 
Bosch. A sincere friendship grew between the Bosches and the Mofokengs, and they 
frequently visited one another without appointments. They shared cake while 
Mofokeng’s wife MaMpho and Bosch swapped gardening tips. Mofokeng fondly 
remembered the Bosches visiting them after their first child was born, and the way that 
Bosch’s daughter, Annelise, held his infant son. In that moment, he recalled, “You could 
see that David Bosch brought up his children in such a way that he instilled…freedom 
and humanity in them.”84  
The Bosches’ move to Pretoria was accompanied by a family tragedy. Only one 
week after they arrived in their new home, Bosch had gone on a shopping trip. Their little 
son Gregory was riding his bicycle in the street when a car hit him, killing him. When 
David returned home, Annemie had to tell him that their son was dead. She later recalled, 
“The horrible shock of this news caused David’s whole body to tremble and it took a long 
time for him—and for all of us—to work through the tragic loss of our fifth child.”85    
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Black Theology and the Alternative Community 
 Bosch’s openness to black Christians predisposed him to take black Christian 
concerns seriously, even if they conflicted with his own. By the late 1960s and early 
1970s, “black theology” was growing in popularity among young black seminarians and 
pastors. While the state had managed to clamp down on the ANC and PAC during the 
early 1960s, the Black Consciousness Movement was giving new voice to black political 
demands. Through the South African Student Organization (founded 1969), Steve Biko 
was encouraging blacks to seize their own political destiny. They rejected apartheid, but 
they also rejected white liberals, who were frequently paternalistic in attitude and tended 
to stifle more radical black concerns. For Biko, “Blacks are tired of standing at the 
touchlines to witness a game that they should be playing…They want to do things for 
themselves and all by themselves.”86 As a participant in SPRO-CAS, Biko was given a 
copy of Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the oppressed. He applied Freire’s idea of 
“conscientization” (from the Portuguese conscientização) to the South African context.87 
Biko wanted to make black people aware of the oppressive structures in society, and then 
empower them to think of their own solutions. The Black Consciousness Movement 
called on black people to reject white systems of values and rather pioneer their own.88 
As Barney Pityana famously wrote in the SASO Newsletter, “BLACK MAN YOU ARE 																																																								
86 Biko in Karis and Gerhart, 99.  
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ON YOUR OWN.”89 The rejection of white leadership was very threatening to the 
apartheid state, which claimed it was the only political organization that could govern the 
country.  
 Black theology was, in many ways, the spiritual corollary to the Black 
Consciousness Movement. It was largely influenced by James Cone in the United States, 
but also took on a life of its own.90 SASO member and seminarian Stanley Ntwasa argued 
that the task of black theology was to “free black people not only from estrangement to 
God but also from slave mentally, inferiority complex, distrust of themselves and 
continued dependence on others culminating in self hate.”91 While the theology of 
apartheid understood people to be members of groups, and while the theology of 
evangelicalism and liberalism understood people to be individuals, black theology 
understood people to be either oppressor or oppressed. Salvation was defined as the 
liberation of the oppressed, which Cone wrote was to be achieved “by any means” at the 
disposal of the oppressed.92 It was a position that could be read as religious sanction for 
armed revolution against an oppressive regime. 
Many white South African theologians found “black theology” to be very 																																																								
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threatening. Carel Boshoff (ironically) accused black theology of “racialism,” adding fuel 
to the fires of revolutionary impulse, which could precipitate a conflict of “unpredictable 
proportions” in South Africa. Boshoff’s alternative to black theology was improving 
channels of communication between white and black churches while at the same time 
rooting the gospel in indigenous soil (meaning that the churches would remain 
separate).93 P.E.S. Smith understood the image of Christ as liberator as a buttress to the 
Black Consciousness Movement, which he believed sought to eliminate the whites. His 
solution was improved relations between ethnic groups, better theological training for 
black students, and building a theology which was relevant (but certainly not 
revolutionary).94 NHK theologian Adriaan Pont, known for his provocative statements, 
dismissed black theology as a “communist front organization” that had more in common 
with Mao Zedong and Che Guevara than Jesus Christ.95 
Missiologist Dionne Crafford was more sympathetic in his approach to black 
theology. He argued that it was a black response to white Christians who failed to live up 
to their principles. Black theology also put ministers within the Dutch Reformed Church 
in Africa (the NGK’s mission for black people; abb. DRCA) in a difficult spot. If they 
were to reject black theology out of hand, it would alienate them from many members 
who were involved in the Black Consciousness Movement, and they would also gain the 
appearance of government stooges. On the other hand, he argued that ministers in the 																																																								
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DRCA cannot “accept black theology with all its negative aspects.” Leaders in the DRCA 
would have to take a tactful middle path.96 For most Afrikaner theologians in the early 
1970s, therefore, black theology was a dangerous phenomenon that needed to be 
contained through argument and white charity. Yet as David Bosch listened to the voices 
of Black South African theologians, he heard a different plea, namely the appeal for 
white conversion and interracial reconciliation between complete persons.  
 Black theology became a vital ecumenical player during the 1973 South African 
Congress on Mission and Evangelism. Bosch was invited to give a lecture on “Mission 
and Special Needs” at the congress, which was sponsored by Michael Cassidy’s African 
Enterprise. Born in Johannesburg, Cassidy attended Cambridge, where his friend Robert 
Footner “led him in making a commitment on 23 October 1955 to follow Christ.” 97  
Cassidy attended Billy Graham’s 16 week rally in New York, where he became 
convinced that God was calling him to “do evangelism in the cities of Africa.” With that 
trajectory, he entered Fuller Theological Seminary in 1959, and he founded African 
Enterprise while still a student in 1961. African Enterprise would bring church leaders, 
politicians, and business people together throughout the continent to facilitate Christian 
mission work. Cassidy also believed that Christianity and apartheid were irreconcilable. 
While he was quite conservative theologically, he was therefore willing to entertain 
radical black voices. This led to confrontation with the state.98  
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 The Durban Congress was unusual in South Africa because it was interracial. As 
Vorster’s government relaxed some of the restrictions on interracial gatherings, Cassidy 
received government sanction for a mass interracial meeting. The nearly 700 delegates 
stayed together at the Athlone Gardens Hotel. It was an event that brought people in 
contact across both denominational and racial lines. The delegates represented a wide 
variety of theological opinions, from Anglicans to Pentecostals, from the conservative to 
the radical.99 Billy Graham spoke at the conference after waiting 26 years to come to 
South Africa. He said that he would not preach before segregated audiences.100   
For many theologians, the congress was a sign of hope for the future. As Brian 
Johanson wrote in the Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, the congress “must be a 
picture of the church of the future in South Africa,” and he added that “we discovered the 
true South African society as distinct from the artificial one into which we are thrust daily 
by a thousand laws.” Johanson concluded by writing that the bonds of unity the delegates 
discussed could not be “undiscovered.” More and more people would come to embrace a 
call to Christian unity.101  
 The congress was also deeply shaken by the rise of black theology. When Manas 
Buthelezi took the podium, it is easy to imagine that many of the more conservative 
delegates shifted uncomfortably in their chairs. Buthelezi was a Lutheran pastor and a 
leading South African exponent of black theology. He had studied at Umphumulo 
Theological College before earning a masters at Yale and a doctorate at Drew. Returning 																																																								
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to South Africa, he worked at Umphumulo, where he introduced students to works by 
James Cone and other leading black theologians. He was also one of the leading 
contributors to the 1972 conference on black theology sponsored by the South African 
Council of Churches. At the time of the Durban Congress, Buthelezi worked with Beyers 
Naudé at the Christian Institute, using its organ Pro Veritate to further raise awareness 
about black theology. He would go on to be a leader in the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
in Southern Africa and a prominent voice in the anti-apartheid movement.102 
 At the Durban Congress, Buthelezi laid out his understanding of the task of 
evangelism in South Africa. He told his listeners that white hegemony in missions and 
church leadership needed to come to an end. The time had come for the black Christian 
majority to set the agenda in South Africa’s churches. Buthelezi also argued that if 
Christianity were to survive, it needed to be made “relevant to the existential problems” 
of black South Africans. Only black leaders who were in touch with the needs and 
aspirations of the black community would be able to provide this ministry.103  
Buthelezi’s vision for the future of Christianity in South Africa also included 
white people. Flipping the traditional assumptions about race and mission, he argued that 
whites were to be an object of black Christian mission. White Christians, Buthelezi 
argued, failed to recognize the black person “as someone to whom they can relate with 
any degree of personal intimacy in daily life and normal ecclesiastical situations.” 104  																																																								
102 James Kenokeno Mashabela, “Buthelezi, Manas,” African Dictionary of Christian Biography, 
https://dacb.org/stories/south-africa/buthelezi-manas/.  
103 Manas Buthelezi, “Six Theses: Theological Problems of Evangelism in the South African 
Context,” Mission Trends No. 2, eds. Gerald H. Anderson and Thomas F. Stransky (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1975), 132.  
104 Ibid., 132. 
		
293 
Part of the evangelistic task of black Christians, therefore, was overcoming white racism. 
As Buthelezi said, it was “time for the black man to evangelize and humanize the white 
man.”105  
 Theologian John de Gruchy remembered the uproar that followed Buthelezi’s 
talk. A great deal of tension developed at the congress, and black delegates in particular 
believed that whites were not being honest about the pressing issues. The black delegates 
decided to withdraw in the hope of being able to discuss problems candidly without a 
white audience. Whites also met among themselves, where they argued with one another 
about the theological justification of apartheid.106 The press used this split as an 
opportunity to report a divide in the congress. Later, Johnson wrote, that there really had 
not been a fissure among the delegates, but “rather, an important step towards 
reconciliation was being taken—the step of confrontation. Unquestionably it hurt. But it 
made the subsequent coming together more meaningful.”107 Reconciliation continued to 
be a major theme in the ecumenical movement, but it was still largely ignored or 
“spiritualized” in the Afrikaner churches. De Gruchy remembered the outcome of the 
divide differently, writing, “Eventually black and white came together again, but the gulf 
remained.”108  
Buthelezi’s theology resonated with Bosch. To be sure, he shared his Afrikaner 
contemporaries’ concerns about the revolutionary impulses of black theology—in 
particular that of James Cone. Bosch read Cone as “attributing sin essentially to the white 																																																								
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community only.”109 Bosch thought that such a view subsumed reconciliation into 
liberation; if whites were responsible for all the world’s problems, the only solution was 
destroying white power through a liberation struggle.110 This had the additional problem, 
Bosch thought, of utopianism. It led to the belief that once whites were vanquished, all 
the world’s problems would disappear. For Bosch, this seriously underestimated the 
power of sin to corrupt all political dispensations, whether white or black.111   
While critical of what he called Cone’s “theology of pure revolution,” Bosch 
argued that black theology in South Africa had key differences and should “ultimately be 
judged positively.”112 Bosch thought that black theology was a helpful corrective to the 
“pietistic” theology of an earlier generation. Earlier generations of missionaries had a 
“vertical” theology, meaning they were only concerned with “saving souls,” and they 
showed little concern for Africans’ cultural and social conditions. Black theology, on the 
other hand, focused on the situational realities of people’s lives. It reintroduced a 
“horizontal” element into Christian faith and practice, focusing on the relationships 
between people. Bosch also appreciated black theology’s ecumenical impulse. Black 
Christians found they had far too much in common with each other to allow 
denominational differences to divide them. Bosch did not think that black South African 
theologians were rejecting the gospel, but rather the “white man’s” presentation of the 
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gospel.113 
Like its American counterpart, Bosch recognized that black South African 
theology made an unapologetic assertion of the worth and dignity of black identity. Black 
theologians sought to conscientize black people, rejecting the belief that their thinking 
and attitudes ought to conform to white patterns of thought. They called on black people 
to think for themselves.114 Parallel to the secular Black Consciousness Movement, black 
theology rejected white definitions of black humanity. Along the same lines, Bosch 
understood black theology as a reaction against “tokenism,” which he defined as “the 
habit of many white South Africans of trying to impress blacks by a condescending 
friendliness and benevolence towards them.”115 Again, like the Black Consciousness 
Movement, black theologians were critical of white people who claimed to speak for 
black people. They rejected the attempts of white liberals who, though critical of South 
African politics, sought to limit and define black responses to those politics. Black people 
asserted their own voices in the argument.116  
Unlike his colleagues, Bosch did not think black theology was fanning the flames 
of anti-white racism, but rather calling on black people to reconcile with whites on their 
own terms. The fact that South African black theologians still maintained a distinct role 
for reconciliation apart from liberation is what, in Bosch’s mind, set them apart from their 
American counterparts. Bosch wrote that South African black theologians “say things 																																																								
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that seem to be absent from Cone’s writings.” He quoted Ernest Baartman’s 1971 Pro 
Veritate article at length, in which he wrote,  
This is the difficult demand… ‘TO LOVE THE WHITE MAN.’ We cannot hate 
our fellow man. God created us in love because He loved us, He so loved us that 
He chose the way of love that goes through bitterness, sweat and blood. He chose 
death. It is difficult to love whites. It is costly to love whites, yet the black man 
must…The majority of those in the church still speak of unity but this majority is 
slowly but surely being whittled away. We constantly pray that the day must 
never come when every black man will say, ‘I shall have nothing to do with the 
white man.’117  
 
Bosch wanted to highlight Baartman’s insistence on finding unity across a fraught and 
often very painful racial divide. Bosch also quoted Buthelezi who argued that the love of 
God transforms strangers into “loving brothers.” Buthelezi went on to write that the 
Gospel changes points of “racial friction”—a common slogan in apartheid parlance—into 
“points of fellowship.”  
 As a missiologist, Bosch had particular interest in Buthelezi’s concept of a 
missionary endeavor that went “in the opposite direction: from black to white.” Far from 
being anti-white, Bosch argued that this showed a genuine and deep concern for white 
people. Buthelezi even made the argument that black people would be held responsible 
for not converting racist whites. Bosch quoted Buthelezi’s provocative language at 
length: 
Does it ever occur to black people that they have an evangelistic duty of getting 
the white man out of the spiritual darkness which has prevented him from seeing 
that the black is his daily life brother? God will ask: ‘Black man, where were you 
when the white man abandoned my Gospel and went to destruction?’ When the 
black man answers, ‘I was only a kaffir, how could I dare to preach to my baas?’ 
God will say: ‘Was Christ’s resurrection not sufficient to liberate you, black man, 
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from that kind of spiritual and psychological death? God to eternal condemnation, 
black man, for you did not muster the courage to save your white brother. 118   
 
For Buthelezi, then, the recognition of black dignity would challenge the sin of white 
racism. The assertion of black identity was not violent, but rather it inspired a mission “to 
preach love to the white man so that he may have the courage to see…that his security is 
not necessarily tied to his rejection of the black man.”119  
 Bosch judged black theology, therefore, not as a call to arms, but as a plea for 
conversion and reconciliation. Bosch wrote, “One thing is, however, very clear: Nothing 
less than a new metanoia is expected of us [by black theologians], a new and radical 
conversion.”120 For black people, conversion meant turning to self-consciousness, 
refusing to blindly accept white patterns for social, political, economic, and religious 
power structures. For thinkers like Buthelezi and Baartman, it also meant turning away 
from the desire for revenge and toward the possibility of loving the oppressor. For white 
people, conversion meant abandoning privilege and security, it meant giving up the 
confidence that white answers were the only answers, and it meant listening to black 
people and understanding them on their terms. Breaking the assumptions of superiority 
and inferiority would open the possibility for blacks and whites to reconcile.  
While he did not unreservedly accept black theology, Bosch took this challenge 
seriously. Black theology shattered whatever remaining confidence Bosch had left in 
“separate development.” Bosch took black voices of discontent seriously, and he began to 
look for new models. Terms like “irreconcilability” and “Bantu” almost completely 																																																								
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vanished from his work. Culture and ethnicity became a secondary concern for Bosch. 
From that point on, Bosch began to look for new moral models of race relations that 
would give Afrikaner Christians the language to think of themselves as part of a single 
community with black people. The idea of the “alternative community” would begin to 
satisfy that demand.   
The Alternative Community 
In November of 1973, mission historian Andrew Walls invited Bosch to give his 
lecture on black theology at the University of Aberdeen. He chose Bosch because they 
shared a missiological connection. Bosch highlighted the difference between black 
theology in the United States and South Africa, he highlighted the main trends in South 
African black theology, and he noted that it called on white Christians to undergo a new 
conversion. The lecture was very well received, and at a dinner party afterward, Bosch 
met Wilbert Shenk, the American Mennonite missiologist. Bosch asked Shenk if he knew 
an American Mennonite scholar by the name of “Yoder,” saying that they had been 
students together at the University of Basel, but they had lost contact after graduating. 
Not only did Shenk know John Howard Yoder, but he also happened to have a copy of 
his most recent article, “Exodus and Exile: The Two Faces of Liberation.” He was more 
than happy to relinquish his copy to Bosch.121  
As Bosch read Yoder’s article, he found a new paradigm for Christian politics, 
which he believed had immediate relevance for South Africa. In fact, Bosch found the 
lecture so important for the South African situation that he contacted Yoder for 
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permission to publish it in the SAMS journal Missionalia. Yoder seemed to offer Bosch a 
way beyond the debate between the NGK theologians on the one hand, and liberation 
theologians on the other. As a Mennonite, Yoder was a committed pacifist and, therefore, 
very uncomfortable with many liberation theologians’ reading of the exodus as divine 
sanction for violence.122 Furthermore, he thought that open support for revolutionary 
movements led the church to lose its own distinctive voice. Yoder understood “the 
church” to be a distinct community with a political vision based on the teachings of Jesus. 
This political vision was different from what the many and various political systems “the 
World” offered. For Yoder, this was not a politics of withdrawal, but rather one of 
example. Simply by existing as a distinct community, Yoder argued that the church 
showed the World what it could be; it modeled another way of living. When the church 
embraced political programs—regardless of whether they were radical, reactionary, 
conservative, liberal or anything in between—it would lose its alternative voice and 
simply become redundant.123  
In “Exile and Exodus,” Yoder drew a distinction between the liberation 
theologians’ reading of the exodus narrative, and the narrative of Israel in exile. 
Liberation theologians tended to focus on the triumph of the Israelites over Egypt, but 
they neglected the fact that, time and again, foreign people conquered the Israelites.124 
During the Babylonian captivity, they had no capacity to govern either themselves or 
others. Rather than seek to undermine or destroy the political order they inhabited, the 																																																								
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exilic Israelites, in the words of the Prophet Jeremiah, “sought the welfare of the city” 
(Jeremiah 29:1-7). While the exilic community could use the government as a resource 
for protection, it was not ultimately dependent on that particular government. Because it 
had its own communal life, the exilic community was also able to survive any change in 
political structure. This exilic identity as a separate community whose destiny is distinct 
from political power structures became Yoder’s preferred paradigm for liberation. Such a 
community offered the world a new possibility, whereas revolutionary movements 
offered people much of the same. The exilic community could survive the rise and fall of 
empires, while revolutionary movements could not.125  
 Yoder’s thought inspired Bosch’s concept of the “alternative community.” Bosch 
argued that the church, as a universal institution, ought not to follow any social patterns 
defined by the world. Faith in Christ transcended all worldly commitments, including 
those to ethnic or racial groups. This made the church an alternative to the world. This 
became Bosch’s preferred model for Christian political engagement, and he frequently 
wrote on the subject.126 At its core, what made the “alternative community” unique was 
its eschatological vision. Bosch argued that because Christians believe that God was 
making a new heaven and a new earth (Isaiah 56:17 and 66:22; 2 Peter 3:13; Revelation 
21:1), they could not unreservedly associate with any political, economic, and/or social 																																																								
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power structure. All power structures are part of a world that is passing away. When the 
church replicated worldly commitments (i.e. following ethnic division in church 
planting), then it failed to live up to its highest ideal of unity. Ethnic unity was not 
automatic, but this did not mean that the church should be comfortable replicating 
worldly divisions, or much less enforce those divisions. Instead, Christians of different 
backgrounds ought to be reconciled into a new solidarity based on their common faith in 
Christ and future expectations.127  
 Bosch first began to explore the significance of the alternative community in a 
lecture to the Association of South African Theological Institutions in 1975, which was 
published as “The Church as the ‘Alternative Community.’” Bosch seldom made direct 
attacks on the NP government or the NGK, especially before the 1980s. For this reason, 
many of his contemporaries accused him of lacking a prophetic voice.128 But for Bosch, 
living as an alternative community challenged the status quo in and of itself. Taking a cue 
from a preacher he heard in the communist-governed East Germany, Bosch wanted to 
speak in such a way that everyone knew what he was talking about without having to 
spell it out for the audience.129      
 Rather than address the South African context directly, Bosch used four New 
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Testament topoi to discuss the possible political options Jesus could have chosen. The 
first option was the path of the Sadducees and Herodians. They did not believe that Rome 
could be overthrown, so they adapted to the status quo. Their accommodation went so far 
that they found it difficult to criticize Rome.130 On the oppose side were the zealots, an 
informal collection of Jewish groups that sought to overthrow Rome through righteous 
violence. Jesus was perhaps politically closer to this group, but he rejected their violent 
methods.131 The Essenes took a third option, removing themselves from public life 
entirely, living in the desert. Finally, the Pharisees remained in society, but they shunned 
involvement in politics, focusing instead on holiness.132 Bosch drew a direct connection 
between these four political options and present political options, “These then were the 
options before Jesus. They are essentially the same as the options open to us today, or to 
the church in any period of its history: those of conformity to the status quo, revolution, 
asceticism or pietism.” 133 Bosch left his listeners to complete the parallels to 
contemporary South Africa. The Sadducees were like those NGK theologians who 
supported apartheid, the Zealots were those who wanted to overthrow the state, while the 
Pharisees might have been those theologians who did not want to “get involved” in 
politics.  
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Bosch argued that Jesus did not choose any of these options, choosing instead to 
build a new community based on new expectations for the future. Though Jesus 
confronted the hypocrisy of many religious authorities, Bosch argued that his main work 
was non-confrontational; again, his focus was on building a new kind of communal life. 
Jesus’ community was so different, however, that it became unbearable to the various 
powers that be, and they made a common cause to kill him. Bosch wrote, “By simply 
being faithful to God’s new dispensation and to a new orientation of their lives and 
loyalties, they became unbearable to others.”134 By living differently—i.e. non-racially in 
a racialized society—the church would challenge the present order.  
 Bosch rejected both conservative theologies of the status quo and theologies of 
revolution. Conservative theologies imply that Christians have a stake in the present state 
of the world. Bosch accused conservative theologians of bowing to the political powers 
of this world, “either fatalistically or resentfully, because there is nothing they can do 
about them, or they bow to them gleefully, because they represent what these Christians 
themselves desire.”135 Bosch also rejected the theology of revolution because it implied 
that Christians have a stake in some future political dispensation. He rather argued that 
Christians experience “the freedom from needing to smash the structures of this world, 
since they are about to crumble away.”136 Here, Bosch defined a political position that 
was quite different from many of his NGK and liberation theologian colleagues. Neither 
the maintenance of white Christian civilization nor its overthrow was decisive for the 
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church. 
 The main work of the Church was building the alternative community, and in 
South Africa, that meant undertaking the project of racial reconciliation. Again, Bosch 
contrasted Cone and Baartman as two leading exponents of black theology. Bosch took 
issue with Cone’s sentence, “what we need is divine love as expressed in Black Power 
which is the power of black people to destroy their oppressors, here and now, by any 
means at their disposal.”137 Bosch argued that it made Christ “so very muscular.” At the 
1974 World Evangelization Congress in Lausanne, Michael Cassidy said that when one 
group’s Christ becomes too muscular, others become intimidated and retreat. A muscular 
Christ no longer bears the marks of the cross, because “the print of the nails tends to 
disappear behind the flexing of the muscles.”138 Bosch finds Baartman’s “difficult 
demand” to love the white man as more consistent with the alternative community 
because “it bears the print of the nails,” which is to say it is more consistent with the 
cross of Christ.139 It was, to be sure, also more in line with his interests as a privileged 
white man.  
Bosch recognized the privileged position of white people calling for reconciliation 
while black people called for “liberation.” “Reconciliation” could seem like an easy 
answer in the face of grave injustice. Bosch’s response to this problem was to embrace 
“costly reconciliation” (alluding to Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s “costly discipleship”/”cheap 
grace” distinction). God achieved reconciliation with the world through Christ’s death on 
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the cross. In the same way, reconciliation between people would require major sacrifices. 
He wrote, “unless the cross somehow becomes visible in us, there will be no 
reconciliation and the church’s mission will remain incomplete. Reconciliation is costly. 
There can be no cheap answer here, no easy triumphalism. Without thorns and pain and 
nails there can be no new life.”140 Costly reconciliation was, therefore, the work of the 
alternative community. It must be noted that Bosch was not dealing in the realm of 
policies but ideals. He did not say exactly what he had in mind by “costly reconciliation.” 
Nevertheless, the ideal represented a vital change. Rather than focusing on ethnic 
difference to preserve integrity, Bosch was now committed to the idea of sacrifice in 
order to find common ground.   
Conclusion 
  Verwoerd’s death marked a turning point in South African history, not because he 
could have made apartheid work, but because none of his successors would pursue the 
policy with the same degree of certainty that he did. Moral leaders were now presenting 
Afrikaners with two mutually exclusive visions of the future; one would pursue even 
greater separation, while the other moved toward unity. While Boshoff continued to take 
a hard line on total racial separation, others began to lose their confidence in the idea. In 
his conversations with Johan Degenaar, Smith came to see that apartheid was not the only 
option for South Africa. He also came to believe that the Afrikaner Broederbond was 
unfairly advantaging the Afrikaners. David Bosch was attuned to the new voices of black 
protest rising throughout the country. While he did not totally accept black theology, he 
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took its challenge to the white community seriously. By embracing the church as an 
“alternative community,” he made a fundamental break with the NGK mission policy. 
The church was not meant to replicate the ethnolinguistic structures and divisions of the 
world, but rather bring different people into a new unity. In doing so, the church would 
also demonstrate to the world that racial reconciliation was possible. Bosch would work 
to promote this new ideal within the Afrikaner community, and he also joined with 
leaders from across a variety of denominational and religious backgrounds. In doing so, 
they would begin to gain support for reconciliation as the moral alternative to apartheid.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
FROM PACLA TO SACLA (1976-1979) 
Theological discussion became urgent after the 1976 Soweto Uprising. Students were 
protesting Afrikaans-medium education, and were fired on by police. Protest became 
widespread, and repression severe. Much like the Sharpeville Massacre, white 
theologians were asked to reexamine their relationship to the state. Likewise, the state’s 
repressive response led many to wonder what the future would be for concepts such as 
reconciliation. Theologians also began to discuss Afrikaner Christianity as a “civil 
religion,” a divergence from Christian tradition that served only to buttress Afrikaner 
power structures. Bosch maintained a strong position for reconciliation, and also began to 
envision a more politically active role for the “alternative community,” specifically 
stating that it should facilitate negotiations between contending parties. Bosch shared this 
idea with many black theologians like Manas Buthelezi, and it would prove to be central 
in the democratic transition. Some of Bosch’s colleagues cast doubt on whether or not 
one could be a pacifist in the South African situation. For his part, Boshoff was becoming 
increasingly defensive. Not only did he defend Afrikaner religiosity, but he also spurned 
what he saw as Bosch’s integrationist vision. In spite of conservative opposition, white 
and black theologians began to build broader consensus around the ideal of 
reconciliation—although they did not always agree what exactly that would mean.    
The Soweto Uprising 
 
In 1975, the FAK passed a motion which called on the government to promote 
Afrikaans in “non-white” schools. A.P. Treurnicht, who at this time had gone from editor 
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of Die Kerkbode to enter the political realm, was serving as Deputy Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development. He boorishly argued that if whites were paying taxes 
to subsidize black schools, then whites ought to have some say in the language of 
instruction.1 What Treurnicht and the NP blatantly ignored was the fact that black 
students and their parents in townships like Soweto were almost universally against 
Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. English was the urban lingua franca, the language 
of youth culture, and it provided access to opportunities throughout the modern world. To 
demand that students learn in Afrikaans was not only frustrating to those who did not 
speak Afrikaans, but profoundly limiting; its scope did not extend terribly far beyond 
South Africa. Afrikaans was also the language of apartheid bureaucracy, the police, and 
the white minority government. It carried the very negative connotations of being a white 
language. Nevertheless, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development 
insisted on half-English, half-Afrikaans instruction. Certain classes were to be taught 
exclusively in Afrikaans.2   
 On June 16, 1976, students took to the streets in Soweto, demonstrating against 
Afrikaans-medium instruction. They carried placards saying, “Afrikaans is oppressors’ 
language,” “We are not Boers,” “Afrikaans is a tribal language,” and “If we must do 
Afrikaans, Vorster must do Zulu.”3 15,000 students gathered at Orlando stadium, and the 
																																																								
1 Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (University of Virginia Press, 2009), 
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Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 420-421; William 
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police rushed to the scene. They fired teargas into the crowd and then opened fire with 
live ammunition. Rather than stifling dissent, there was a surge of popular protest. The 
Uprising, as the event became known, spread to townships throughout the Witwatersrand 
and around the country. Various organizations helped to coordinate protests, including 
the South African Student Movement (SASM), the South African Student Organization 
(SASO), and the Black People’s Convention (PBC). By the end of the month, students 
had burned down more than 50 schools. Their outrage went beyond education, as they 
also attacked other symbols of the apartheid state, including Bantu School Boards, Urban 
Bantu Councils, government offices, and state-run beer halls.4 For the young protestors, 
poor education and poor employment prospects made the future look bleak.  
 As protests gained momentum, the government was anxious to regain control. 
Vorster appeared on the newly established SABC television service, saying, “This 
government will not be intimidated, and instructions have been given to maintain law and 
order at all costs.”5 Yet the police were not sure how to restore “law and order,” having 
never dealt with such large protests. They opted for brute force, using live ammunition 
against unarmed students. At the end of February 1977, 575 were dead and 2,389 were 
wounded.6 12,000 young people fled into exile, where many would join the ANC and 
PAC. The Uprising also took the ANC and PAC by surprise. It would, however, provide 
both organizations with new supporters and energy.7   
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Steve Biko died in police custody on September 12, 1977. Several days earlier, he 
had been arrested in Port Elizabeth. Police stripped, chained, and tortured Biko in an 
interrogation room for two days. After sustaining serious head injuries, doctors decided 
his condition was critical, and he would have to be transported to a prison hospital in 
Pretoria. Police loaded and chained Biko’s naked body into the back of a Land Rover. 
The journey was well over 1000 km, and would take 10 hours at the very least. Biko died 
in Pretoria the next day. Police claimed that Biko died of a hunger strike—a blatantly 
false statement. Photographs of his body revealed the extent of police brutality; his entire 
body was covered in bruises and lacerations.8 The NP’s response to Biko was callous. 
South African Minister of Justice Jimmy Kruger said, “I am not glad and I am not sorry 
about Mr. Biko. He leaves me cold.” Another NP member supported the “democratic 
right to starve to death.”9  These responses demonstrated the fact that the NP frankly 
denied basic human dignity to politically oppositional black people.  
On October 19, the government banned a number of organizations, including 
SASO, the BPC, and the CI. It also banned individuals. Steve Biko’s partner and fellow 
activist Mamphela Ramphele was served with a banning order. She was pregnant at the 
time, and had to move from the Eastern Cape to the isolated area surrounding Tzaneen in 
the northern Transvaal. According to the government, this area was her “homeland” 
(never mind the fact that she made her home nearly 1500 km away). Beyers Naudé was 
served with a banning order for seven years. Shortly after his banning order was lifted, 																																																								
8 Daniel R. Magaziner, The Law and the Prophets: Black Consciousness in South Africa, 1968-
1977 (Ohio University Press, 2010), 183.  
9 Quoted in Robin Wright, “Jimmy Kruger: Afrikaner Under Fire,” The Washington Post, 
September 25, 1977. Donald Woods, Biko (Henry Holt and Company, 1978).  
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Naudé recalled, “for all practical purposes, a banned person becomes a non-person. He is 
simply removed from the public eye, the public ear, and the public voice.” 10 Banned 
people could not meet with more than one person socially at a time. Their movement was 
restricted to certain areas within a city or town. They could not write anything for 
publication, nor could they be quoted by the press. They could not enter an educational 
facility that was engaged in publishing materials, nor could they give educational 
instruction to anyone beyond the members of their family. Banned persons were also 
subject to police surveillance. Neither Ramphele nor Naudé wasted that time. Ramphele 
became a community organizer in the area, and Naudé continued meeting colleagues like 
Desmond Tutu one-on-one, and he also set up a small counseling service for pastors.11     
 World opinion toward South Africa soured. Photographer Sam Nzima captured 
the shooting of the first student, thirteen-year-old Hector Pieterson, on film. In the iconic 
image, Mbuyisa Makhubo rushed Pieterson’s body to the clinic while Pieterson’s sister, 
Antoinette Sithole, ran alongside.12 The image of two children desperately trying to save 
their dying peer exposed the brutality of the apartheid regime. The unarmed children 
were protesting a government policy, and the government’s response showed a complete 
disregard for their lives in the name of “law and order.” The world responded in outrage. 
On November 4, 1977, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a 
resolution to impose a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa.13 Within South Africa, 																																																								
10 Bob Bilheimer, “The Cry of Reasons: Beyers Naudé, an Afrikaner Speaks Out,” 1988, YouTube 
Video, 56 minutes, posted November 2, 2015,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPsv-YKeTYQ. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Karis and Gerhart, 168. “Soweto Uprising: The Story Behind Sam Nzima’s Photograph,” Time 
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it became clear that the state, while violent, was also vulnerable. The Uprisings, which 
were themselves the result of new political directions that black people had taken after 
Sharpeville, created new political possibilities.14 While the state could ban organizations, 
it could not ban the ideas of Black Consciousness or discontent. Nor could the 
government quiet the growing concerns of the white electorate.  
 Only several days after the Soweto Uprising, Nico Smith read A.P. Treurnicht’s 
book, Credo van ‘n Afrikaner. In his book, Treurnicht defended the necessity and justice 
of “separate development” from biblical and political standpoints. Smith, however, wrote 
that he read the book with “the greatest dismay.” While he may have assented to many of 
Treurnicht’s points as a young man, he now drew questions marks and exclamation 
points in the margins. Smith was deeply troubled by Treurnicht’s sentences,  
I believe that the Christian Afrikaner, especially in education, has the calling and 
the equipment to be a spiritual pioneer, a prophet who can equip our young 
generation for the tasks of the next quarter century, and that through our victories, 
in a modest way, a direction for the world can be pointed out. A volk with God, 
even though it is a small volk, is a majority and is a victor. Such a volk is a 
blessing for the world.15 
 
Smith underlined these words with a firm hand, drawing no fewer than four question 
marks and four exclamation points around the text. Smith now thought that the 
Afrikaners were not “a blessing to the world,” but rather stood “in the judgment of 
God.”16  
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Civil Religion 
As Smith’s crisis of confidence in the Afrikaners deepened, academics were 
casting further doubts on the orthodoxy of Afrikaner religiosity. Dunbar Moodie, in his 
Rise of Afrikanerdom, analyzed Afrikaner politics as a “civil religion.” He argued that 
while Afrikaners spoke of God in terms that were consistent with Christianity and 
Calvinism, they spoke of salvation along national lines. He wrote, “The object of his [i.e. 
God’s] saving activity—the Afrikaner people—is not a church, a community of the 
saved, however; it is a whole nation with its distinct language and culture, its own history 
and special destiny.” For Moodie, this was a “Christian heresy.”17 This argument proved 
to be a major challenge to many NGK leaders, who prided themselves on their 
conservative faith.  
 Moodie’s argument, along with W.A. de Klerk’s Puritans in Africa, sparked 
massive debate within South Africa. The University of Cape Town held a summer school 
course on civil religion in South Africa in January of 1977. It gave ammunition to those 
who wanted to challenge the supposed Christian basis of Afrikaner political life. The 
charge of civil religion made many Afrikaners doubt the moral foundations of their 
political life. Bosch would adopt “civil religion” as a tool for pushing Afrikaners away 
from nationalistic theologies. It also put theologians who supported apartheid on the 
defensive. Boshoff, for example, argued that if civil religion “is interpreted as a religious 
attitude which makes God a ‘tribal God’ and sees in Christianity a means of ‘self-
preservation,’” then the Afrikaners’ “Christian National world view is not ‘civil religion’ 
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because the religion of the Afrikaners is thoroughly biblical.”18 For many, however, 
Boshoff failed to prove his argument and answer Moodie’s charges.  
PACLA   
From December 9-19, 1976, roughly 800 delegates attended the Pan African 
Christian Leadership Assembly (PACLA) at the Kenyatta Center in Nairobi, Kenya. 
These delegates came from all over the African continent, and included between 60 and 
70 South Africans (with roughly equal numbers of black and white delegates).19 PACLA 
was self-consciously irenic. Though Cassidy’s African Enterprise organized PACLA as a 
follow up to the evangelical International Congress on World Evangelization in 
Lausanne, they hoped to build bridges between “evangelicals” and “ecumenicals.”20 
Organizers were very successful in this regard. PACLA gained the support of the WCC-
affiliated All Africa Council of Churches (AACC). Leading Evangelicals, like Billy 
Graham, John Stott, and Isaac Zokoué shared the stage with ecumenical leaders like 
Bishop Gitari, John Mbiti and John Gatu. Rather than churches sending official delegates, 
it was a meeting of individual Christians. In this way, many NGK theologians were able 
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to attend, as it is doubtful that their church would have sent an official delegation.21 
While there was certainly friction between ecumenical and evangelical delegates, they 
were also able to meet one another, learn from one another, and explore possible 
partnerships. The organizers also hoped that the delegates would be reinvigorated and 
inspired to do further mission work.22  
PACLA exposed the tension and mistrust between black and white South 
Africans in the wake of the Soweto Uprising. Many NGK leaders David Bosch, Nico 
Smith, and Piet Meiring were eager to have fellowship with Christians across the racial 
divide. For other Afrikaners, however, the meeting represented an opportunity for “the 
forces of reason and moderation [to] prevail against the overpowering odds of anti-
Christian and violent revolutionary forces which cause so much suffering and devastation 
in many countries in our continent.”23 Such a sentiment could easily be interpreted as 
supporting the South African government’s efforts to fight communism and maintain 
“Western Christian civilization.” Black delegates became suspicious of the motives of 
their NGK counterparts, and the rumor began to circulate that agents of the South African 
Bureau of State Security (BOSS) had infiltrated the white delegates.24  
 On the first day of PACLA, organizers gave national groups a chance to get 
acquainted among themselves and elect a chairperson. When the South African group 
met, electing a chairperson caused a great deal of tension. Black delegates did not want to 																																																								
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elect a white chairperson. In South Africa, black leaders argued that the time had come 
for black Africans to take the helm of African churches. Now that they were in 
independent Africa, they were even less willing to elect a white leader—especial one who 
might be an NP stooge. Many white delegates felt rejected and slighted by their black 
colleagues, and dug in their heels against the assumption of black leadership. The 
situation was so tense that members of other delegations had to mediate a solution. 
Eventually, they elected Dr. Frank Mdlalose, but the feelings between black and white 
delegates remained raw.25  
When David Bosch ascended the podium to deliver his paper, “The Renewal of 
Christian Community in Africa Today,” many African delegates took pause. Bosch was 
an Afrikaner, making him part of the community that violently enforced white minority 
rule on an African majority. The black African delegates’ responses to Bosch ranged 
from curiosity to skepticism and anger.26 The main body of his lecture discussed 
reconciliation in the “alternative community.” For Bosch, this would be a painful process. 
He graphically stated, “Reconciliation presupposes an operation, a cutting to the very 
bone, without anesthetic. The infection is not just on the surface. The abscess of hate and 
mistrust and fear, between black and white, between nation and nation, between rich and 
poor, has to be slashed open.”27 Reconciliation, Bosch wanted to be clear, was not the 
easy way out; it required a painful sacrifice that could be likened to field surgery. Bosch 
went on to argue that in reconciliation, two forces collide and something gets crushed in 																																																								
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the middle. When God and humanity came into conflict, Jesus was crushed in the middle. 
One gets the sense that he meant in the collision of white and black South Africans, 
comfort and security would be crushed for the sake of reconciliation (but that was not 
always clear).   
At the close of the lecture, Bosch told a story that illustrated the pain and 
challenge of reconciliation. At a meeting of black and white ministers at their home, 
David and Annemie Bosch talked with their friends about what it meant to be a Christian 
in South Africa. Bosch said that the group’s attitude was, “In spite of everything you two 
whites say tonight, you will belong to the group of the oppressors. You benefit from the 
system; we don’t. You are privileged; we are not. You remain white and we black. Your 
feet remain on our necks.” They talked late into the night, and, as Bosch said, “it seemed 
as though we would never be able to find one another.” Bosch remembered that the 
conversation became dehumanizing. Bosch said, “We were not people but blacks and 
whites. We were not people but categories.” As the ministers were preparing to leave, 
Annemie began crying, pleading for understanding.28 
Annemie later remembered the story somewhat differently. It was one minister in 
particular who privately made the statement to the Bosches. His words fell on her very 
painfully. Their families had known one another for some time, and they had watched 
their children play together. His words suggested that there could be no common future 
for the two of them, not even as Christians. She remembered thinking, “If Jesus is not the 
answer for South Africa, then nothing is.” She burst into tears and was utterly 
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inconsolable. She remembered other ministers looking at her, wondering what the 
problem was. It was only after the meeting that the other ministers were informed what 
had happened.29  
The sincere pain of Annemie Bosch’s cries had an effect on the group of 
ministers. The next day, one of the ministers returned to the Bosches’ home on behalf on 
the others. He told Bosch, “Your wife’s tears made all the difference. If it can still happen 
in South Africa that a white woman weeps because of a desire for real, human fellowship 
with black men, then this is something that cannot be explained logically. It must be of 
God.”30 For Bosch, this event approximated reconciliation in the alternative community. 
It was not based on avoiding difficult issues, but rather honest confrontation. It required 
the vulnerability to get hurt and to reach out to those in pain.  
Using this story as a springboard, Bosch attempted to make a step in the direction 
of honesty and humility in front of his fellow delegates. Voice quaking, he asked,  
Are we prepared to follow the way of the cross for the sake of real Christian 
Community in Africa; we who are today gathered here from all over our 
continent. It is such a temptation to reply with a show of bravado. ‘Of course I 
will follow where he leads, even to the cross.’ I myself am less confident. I know 
myself and my repeated failures too well. And I know my fears and my 
prejudices. But I also know our Lord Jesus Christ and what He expects of us in 
[the] form of real community. I know him as the Lord of Compassion. I know He 
will have compassion upon me. And upon you. Kyrie eleison! Lord, have mercy 
upon us.31 																																																								
29 Interview with Annemie Bosch, February 2016.  
30 Bosch in Tooke, 109.  
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Bosch admitted to falling short of the Christian ideals he espoused, and he reached out to 
others in spite of his shortcoming. As he finished his statement, he himself began to cry.32  
 By the mid-1970s, Bosch began to see admitting his own prejudice as part of the 
important process of reconciliation and change. In an interview with an American church 
newspaper, Bosch said that many white South Africans “are with me as far as accepting 
the black man and not discriminating in any way on a personal level, but they are not 
prepared to give blacks the political vote. When the crunch comes, I don’t know whether 
I’ll be prepared to accept majority rule even though the Scriptures say I must be.”33 This 
honesty was uncommon in Afrikaners, who often claimed that “separate development” 
was based on racial parity and not the desire to maintain white minority rule. For Bosch, 
however, the failure to accept a democratic majority was rooted in the fears and 
prejudices about black governments. The ethical and Christian response to these fears 
was not “separate development,” but to accept a majority government anyway.  
The PACLA delegates who had originally had mixed feelings about the presence 
of this Afrikaner, responded positively to Bosch’s show of humility. After a period of 
silence, people from all over the continent began to stand up, walking forward, embracing 
Bosch and one another, saying, “you are my brother.”34 The PACLA organizers cancelled 
worship that evening, and they gave national groups a chance to meet again. When the 
South African delegation met, it was clear that a more conciliatory spirit had replaced the 
previous atmosphere of suspicion. There were moments of reconciliation among the 																																																								
32 Tooke, 109.  
33 David Bosch, “A Critic Within,” The Church Herald (May 1977), 10 in Kritzinger and 
Saayman, 88. 
34 Ibid., 109.  
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various members. One black delegate, taking an Afrikaner minister by the hand, 
confessed that he had come to hate white people, but was now open to finding common 
ground. For those who had experienced a lifetime of racial separation and the racially 
charged tension at the beginning of the meeting, the feeling of coming together was 
almost intoxicating. The delegates talked with one another, formed friendships, and they 
discussed new possibilities. The delegates became so friendly and comfortable with one 
another, that when they returned to South Africa, people assumed they were an interracial 
delegation from elsewhere.35 
Wider ecumenical contacts were also pushing Afrikaners to reach out beyond 
their own group. Late one night, a group of Ethiopian Orthodox leaders knocked on the 
hotel room door of Eddie Bruwer, Mission Secretary of the North and East Transvaal. 
They urgently wanted to talk to members of the NGK about their church. Bruwer roused 
Piet Meiring to join him in conversation. They asked if the NGK was really Christian. As 
best as they could, Meiring and Bruwer explained the challenges that the NGK faced and 
the factors that complicated unity among the various churches in the NGK family. 
Meiring noted that these men had come from “the oldest church in Africa,” and Ethiopia 
had just undergone a communist revolution, making Christian leadership challenging. For 
Meiring, it was deeply touching that these men, in spite of all the challenges they faced, 
reached out to learn about South Africa’s problems. When it was almost morning, the 
Ethiopian delegates asked that the South African delegates kneel with them in prayer, and 
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they each prayed that God would use the NGK “to be a light in the darkness.”36 This 
metaphor of “light in darkness” was changing. In the 1930s, it implied that “white 
Christians” were a light to the “dark and heathen Continent.” By the late 1970s, however, 
Meiring and others would understand “light in darkness” to mean a sign of reconciliation 
amidst growing division.    
Piet Meiring also remembered the NGK delegates feeling personally charged and 
inspired by the words of Bishop Simon Ibrahim of Nigeria. He said that South Africa had 
immense technical, economic, mineral, and other forms of wealth. He continued,  
Your country is also rich in theological tradition. Your country has already known 
Jesus for three hundred years. When will the day break that the Christians in 
South Africa will take each other’s hands in love, that you will teach what 
reconciliation really means? When day that happens, it will be like a rock that is 
thrown in a reservoir, from which the ripples will reach to the furthest coast of 
Africa!37  
 
Many Afrikaans delegates took these words very seriously, gaining the sense that the 
process of reconciliation was not just about South Africa, but would have implications for 
continent and even the world. The experience of PACLA, and the example of Bosch’s 
leadership and humility, ensured that many NGK leaders would actively pursue 
reconciliation rather than separation.   
Reconciliation, however, could quickly become a byword for moderate change. 
The editor of the DRC News Africa listed Byang Kato’s three options for church unity. 
On the one hand, there was the option of unifying all of the churches into one ecclesial 
structure. This, the editor worried, would force churches together without regard to 																																																								
36 P.G.J. Meiring, “Response to Nico Smith, ‘In die konteks van Afrika,’” Stormkompas, eds. 
Smith, Geldenhuys, and Meiring (Tafelberg, 1981), 13. 
37 Simon Ibrahim in Meiring, 12-13.  
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distinction or “the truth.” On the other hand, there was the possibility of recognizing 
spiritual unity without manifesting any signs of visible unity. Many leading theologians 
in the NGK, including Groenewald and du Preez,38 took this position as a way of 
maintaining racially separate churches while claiming a deeper, spiritual unity. Finally, 
Kato named the option of “unity in the midst of diversity.” In this form of ecumenism, 
the churches would remain separate, but they would come together for “fellowship, 
service, and witness.” It was this moderate option that the editor preferred. Though it 
moved beyond the “spiritual unity” of many NGK theologians, it still allowed for the 
possibility of there being separate churches for different racial groups. There was, to be 
sure, a growing desire for ecumenism and racial reconciliation within the NGK, but it 
was not yet clear what shape and contours those desires would take.39 
SAMS 1977 
By the late 1970s, the South African Missiological Society, of which David Bosch 
was president, was turning its attention increasingly toward political questions facing 
South Africa.40 The early conferences dealt with “traditional” and/or “practical” 
missiological questions, such as building congregations in Africa (1971) or the role of 
indigenous workers in African churches (1972). The early conferences also made 
extensive use of Afrikaans, and a great deal of SAMS’ early materials was published in 
																																																								
38 There were others who made similar arguments: J.C.G. Kotzé, Principle and Practice in Race 
Relations (S.C.A. Publishers, 1962). He argued that “spiritual unity” did not require structural or visible 
unity. He was candid that underlying “spiritual unity” was the fact that “We do not want intermingling of 
racial groups in South Africa … With regard to the preponderance of numbers on the part of the Bantu, the 
only hope lies in housing the greatest possible number of them in Bantu homelands,” 55.   
39 “The Two Decades Ahead,” DRC Africa News vol. 5 no. 3 1980.  
40 They changed the name to “Southern African Missiological Society” in 1983 to reflect its 
regional makeup.  
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Afrikaans. Beginning in 1973, however, Bosch wanted to point SAMS in an international 
direction. That year, he founded Missionalia to serve as the journal of SAMS, which was 
published exclusively in English. As editor Missionalia, Bosch included articles deemed 
relevant to the South African situation, books reviews, and an ambitious “abstract” 
section, which grew to include thousands of entries, demonstrating the breadth of 
perspectives that SAMS would come to include. While SAMS would continue to discuss 
pragmatic questions, it also began to address liberation (1977), Marxism (1978), 
reconciliation (1979), black-white discourse (1981), African Independent Churches 
(AICs) (1984), and ecology (1991).41 Bosch included a diversity of perspectives at these 
meetings, from the Afrikaans right to the radical black left.     
 In January 1977, South African Missiological Society held a meeting on “Church, 
mission, and the liberation of peoples.” In his opening lecture to the congress, Bosch 
began to envision a more robust role for the “alternative community” in South African 
politics. His lecture also provided his peers with a chance to voice their concerns about 
the shortcomings of Bosch’s vision, both from the left and the right. Bosch opened his 
lecture by addressing the rapidly shifting political landscape in Southern Africa. 
Mozambique and Angola achieved political independence after the Carnation Revolution 
in Portugal, and Zimbabwe was “irrevocably on its way towards majority rule.” He also 
argued that Namibia was heading for independence, but it was unclear what shape that 
would take. He also dispassionately mentioned, “In October, 1976 Transkei became 
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independent, though without any recognition from the international community.” 42 It is 
worth noting that Bosch was dispassionate in this statement, and he did not challenge the 
status of the Transkei as independent. Though he clearly supported majority rule by this 
time, his commentary was not radical. “Inside the Republic,” Bosch continued, there had 
been a considerable change in social climate, stemming from the Soweto Uprising, which 
“spread like wildfire…across the land and finally destroyed the dream world in which so 
many Whites had been living, namely the conviction that we have in South Africa a 
Black population which accepts the political and social status quo.”43 Bosch’s statement 
implied that white people would finally have to contend with the fact that their system of 
governance was deeply flawed.  
 After making these very contextual remarks, Bosch withdrew to a more 
theologically abstract realm, repeating many of his previous arguments about the 
alternative community. He defined the church as God’s new creation based on a new kind 
of love, namely the reconciling love between enemies.44 Because the church anticipates a 
new world in God’s coming kingdom, it is not beholden to any power structures of this 
world. This does not mean that the church withdraws from the world, but rather it 
actively engages the world to manifest signs of the kingdom.45 Again, Bosch rejected 
both a conservative theology of the status quo as well as a theology of revolution.  
 Yet it seems that after the Soweto Uprising, Bosch defended a more active 
political role for the alternative community beyond cultivating its own communal life. He 																																																								
42 David Bosch, “The Church and the Liberation of Peoples?” Missionalia vol. 5 no. 2 (August 
1977), 8-9.  
43 Ibid., 8-9.  
44 Ibid., 10-13.  
45 Ibid., 13-16.  
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said many ministers who supported the status quo frequently charged preachers who 
spoke out against injustice as “getting political.” Bosch noted a degree of hypocrisy, 
saying that many of the same ministers had little trouble officiating at state functions, and 
they were not unwilling to lobby the state on matters of liquor control, gambling, or 
Sabbath observance. Ministers who supported the status quo only seemed to have trouble 
with political preaching “When preachers raise their voices on matters such as fair wages, 
justice, or human rights.”46 Bosch said, with no small measure of frustration, that 
aversion to “political preaching” was so great that when the Reformed Ecumenical Synod 
called for the restoration of peace, justice, and order in South Africa during the Uprising, 
one NGK minister raised objections to the inclusion of “justice.”47  
 To quell voices of political protest, critics of “political preaching” frequently cited 
Romans 13, which reads, “let everyone be subject to the governing authorities for there is 
no authority except that which God has established.” Bosch, however, argued that the text 
was not meant to silence voices of Christian dissent, but rather reflected Paul’s reaction 
against antinomian tendencies among early Christians communities. Paul believed that 
God instituted government for the sake of a well-ordered society. Those who occupied 
government institutions were not divinely ordained, nor could they simply do as they 
pleased. Citing the reformed Scottish Confession of 1590, Bosch said that the governing 
authorities were responsible to both God and their subjects to “save the lives of the 
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innocent, to repress tyranny, [and] to defend the oppressed.”48  Where state officials 
transgressed their appointed role, churches would be obliged to speak out against them.49  
 While the church did not have a social or political blueprint, it ought to voice its 
social and ethical concerns to the government. Approaching a direct critique of South 
African policy, Bosch wrote,  
The church may never become the ally or advocate of a specific portion of the 
population; her prophetic voice must be heard whenever the state favors one 
section above the other. If the church does not do that, she is guilty of what today 
has become known as ‘civil religion,’ where the church, for all practical purposes, 
becomes subservient to a political ideology.50   
 
For his listeners, the meaning was clear, especially given the recent academic discussions 
at the University of Cape Town surrounding Moodie’s The Rise of Afrikanerdom. If the 
South African government favored the Afrikaners or the white section of South African 
society, and a church did not speak out against this, then it would be guilty of supporting 
a civil religion rather than true Christianity. Bosch’s NGK listeners would again have to 
reflect on whether they were standing in line with the church as a witness to God’s 
coming kingdom, or whether they stood with the Afrikaner volk. Bosch also added that 
the church was obliged to speak on matters of “unemployment,…bad housing, an unjust 
wage system, lack of freedom of worship, speech, assembly and association with others, 
disruption of the family life (e.g. because of migratory labor) and the lack of participating 
in decision making processes.”51  
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In Bosch’s vision, the church’s political involvement was not circumscribed to 
criticism, but it also had an active role to play in the political process. Though the church 
had no policy blueprints, Bosch argued it could inculcate the government with Christian 
principles. He defined this not so much as a moral crusade against alcohol or obscene 
literature, but as voicing concerns and compassion for “the victims of society,” whom he 
defined as “the poor, the blind, the widows, the sinners, the captives, those who are weary 
and heavy burdened, the persecuted, and the lost sheep.”52  
Bosch also envisioned a role for the church in political negotiations. At the level 
of party politics, the church could “urge contending parties to meet and…lift these parties 
to a level of thought and feeling at which a solution becomes feasible.”53 Bosch did not, 
of course, say which parties he had in mind. Was he talking about the National Party and 
the United Party? Perhaps he was thinking of talks between white government leaders 
and moderate black leaders. Did he yet envision talks between the National Party and the 
ANC, PAC, or South African Communist Party? Perhaps he intentionally left the 
statement open to a wide range of interpretations. By 1977, at the very least, Bosch 
clearly envisioned reconciliation in the political arena as an agenda for the Christian 
community. This would lay the groundwork for supporting the morality of a negotiated 
settlement in the coming decades.  
 Bosch took a strong line against the NGK’s ethnically based theology. Like Ben 
Marais, Bosch argued that although scripture acknowledges diversity, ethnic difference 
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ought not to play a constitutive function for Christians, who believe that Christ relativizes 
all ethnic and family ties. Bosch wrote, 
‘People’ as a cultural and ethnic entity is not a theological category and wherever 
it is made into such a category (as an ‘ordinance of creation’ or ‘God-given 
distinctive entity’) it cannot but lead to mutual exclusiveness which endangers the 
life of the church as the new community.54   
 
In South Africa, this was even more problematic because there were two competing 
ethnic groups claiming divine election. On the one hand, there were the Afrikaners whose 
ancestors trekked into a “promised land” away from the yoke of British Imperialism. On 
the other hand, Bosch argued that “Black South Africans have—consciously or sub-
consciously—taken over much of White Afrikaner rhetoric; they have interpreted their 
liberation in Biblical and theological categories.”55 Certainly, Black theologians could 
have arrived at their liberation theology quite independently from any white antecedent. 
Nevertheless, Bosch’s rhetorical move is clear: Afrikaans Christians made a horrible 
mistake in understanding themselves as God’s chosen people, and now, Bosch worried, 
many Black theologians were making that same mistake.  
 While scripture did not place any decisive value on the category of volk, “man” is 
a theological category. South African theology, it must be highlighted, remained invested 
in paternalistic and patriarchal language even as it came to reject racism. This is because 
“man” was created in God’s image, and God became “man” in the person of Jesus Christ. 
Furthermore, because Jesus was sent to the lost, Christians ought to concern themselves 
with, in the words of Karl Barth, “those in society who are weak and exploited, in other 
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words, the poor.”56 The church does not seek to preserve ethnic integrity, nor does it seek 
to liberate peoples. On the contrary, Bosch argued, “The real matter is not the liberation 
of peoples, but rather liberating people from their peoplehood, into a new solidarity that 
serves the hungry, the thirsty, the naked, the sick, and the captive.”57 The members of the 
church do not define themselves as members of a racial or ethnic group, nor do they 
define themselves as part of an oppressed or oppressing group, rather, the church is 
defined as a new people whose primary concern is care for the “wretched.” His use of the 
word wretched was notable. He had quoted Barth as saying that Christ died to “save even 
the most wretched of men.” It was also, perhaps, an allusion to Franz Fanon’s 1963 The 
Wretched of the Earth.58 While Bosch would not have endorsed Fanon’s embrace of 
violence, he would have thought that Christians should have special concern for society’s 
victims and outcasts.   
At the 1977 SAMS conference, Bosch publically identified as a pacifist for the 
first time. Bosch argued that violence is counter productive, simply because it does not 
change enough. He did not think that revolutionary violence would serve the poor, but 
rather the revolutionaries themselves. Both those who seek to maintain the status quo and 
revolutionaries use violence to force their way without addressing the underlying root 
causes of oppression and domination. For Bosch, it was not a question of vanquishing the 
oppressor, but rather building a community that would destroy oppression and 
domination by bringing both groups together. As a pacifist, Bosch did not believe in 
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passivism, but rather non-violent action to achieve reconciliation between enemies.59  
Bosch’s colleagues found his vision of the “alternative community” wanting. The 
right took issue with his omission of volk as a theological category. His former classmate 
C.I. van Heerden, who was becoming increasingly impatient with Bosch’s thought, stated 
emphatically that while the church was certainly a “new community,” it was not “an 
alternative community which jeopardizes the existence of separate nations.” Such a 
statement demonstrated just how threatening Bosch’s new ideas were to the NGK. Van 
Heerden ran through a litany of arguments for racial separation: the converted Jew 
remained a Jew, and the converted Greek remained a Greek; dissimilarity is sanctified by 
unity in Christ; separate peoples each make their own unique contribution to the 
Kingdom of God.60 As Bosch searched for new paradigms, it was clear that other 
Afrikaners remained committed to ethnic distinction, but their arguments sounded less 
like arguments and more like tired slogans. These ideas came from the 1930s, 1940s, and 
1950s, and they still failed to meet the contextual situation.  
Boshoff fleshed out the conservative Afrikaner position in his lecture at the 
conference, “Church and Mission and the Liberation of Nations in the South African 
Context.” For Boshoff, “liberation” in South Africa meant the liberation of separate 
ethnic groups. Rather than democratization, Boshoff advocated internal decolonization, 
not unlike his father-in-law twenty years earlier.61 He believed effective implementation 
of “separate development” was not only consistent with the Gospel, but it was a matter of 																																																								
59 Krtizinger and Saayman, 83.  
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ensuring order in a chaotic world. Boshoff painted a picture of Africa as a chaotic 
continent, in which as many as 14 million people had died in coups and revolutionary 
violence over the previous two decades.62 Boshoff argued that this violence was rooted in 
the fact that decolonization did not consider the problems that might arise from different 
ethnic groups occupying a single territorial state. Should South Africa become a unified 
democratic state, Boshoff argued that it would lead to “mutual conflict between nations 
[i.e. ethnic groups] and the ultimate elimination of the White man in South Africa.”63  
The way to prevent conflict between various ethnic groups and to save the “white 
man” was to move more fully toward a model that recognized different ethnonational 
entities. Boshoff repeated many of SABRA’s talking points. South Africa had two 
political options: namely becoming a single “territorial state” or a constellation of “nation 
states.” While SPRO-CAS and the CI supported the formation of a territorial state, 
Boshoff believed that it would lead to the “unholy aftermath” of “bloodshed, poverty and 
unrest.”64 The nation state model, on the other hand, would allow for the  
survival of all for whom South Africa is their only father-land; self-existence in 
which everyone can maintain his own language, culture and freedom; co-
existence of communities maintaining their own existence; co-existence of all in 
mutual acceptance and interdependence in communal interests.65 
 
In Boshoff’s mind, building nations along ethnic lines was essential for a peaceful future 
in South Africa.  
Boshoff’s missiological vision continued to follow ethnic boundaries. In contrast 																																																								
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to Bosch’s missiology, which increasingly focused on the unity of believers in an 
“alternative community,” Boshoff continued to pursue a “Christian national” approach to 
mission. While this would primarily mean proclaiming Jesus as Lord to all people(s), it 
would also attempt to tame the wild and unpredictable national forces of politics, society, 
and the economy with the influence of the gospel. Left apart from Christian witness, 
these forces were dangerous, as Boshoff wrote, “Nationalism not ruled by Scripture can 
run riot, as can any power entrusted to human beings.”66 Missionaries would not attempt 
to govern these forces directly, which would have transgressed the boundaries of “the 
church” and “the world.” Instead, they would “equip” or influence the people who 
occupied political, social, and economic positions to fulfill their duties as Christians. 
Missionaries seeking to impress Christian influence upon a non-Christian society might 
tell civil authorities to be just, while they preached obedience to citizens (a la Romans 
13). The church had something to say to employers, workers, doctors, teachers, students, 
judges, lawyers, husbands, wives, parents, children, and so forth.67 There was a 
functionalist underpinning to Boshoff’s thought. He viewed ethnic groups, or volke, as 
complete organic bodies with many different members. In the same way that one cannot 
detach a body part without the death of that body part, Boshoff believed that members of 
the volk were inseparable from the whole. Missionaries preached to members of a volk, 
who then worked to enact Christian values in the whole ethnic body.  
On the left, Douglas Bax said he disagreed with Bosch’s “dogmatic pacifism,” 
and added that there were times when violence was, in fact, the lesser evil and consistent 																																																								
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with Christian love. The prime example, of course, was when theologian Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer participated in a plot to kill Adolf Hitler. He earned the reputation of a 
modern martyr when, after the plot failed, he was executed. Bax was quick to add that 
South Africa was not in the same position as Nazi Germany, but he cautioned that, 
“Blacks are beginning to abandon…[peaceful] means out of frustration with their failure 
in the past.”68 Klaus Nürnberger agreed with Bosch to a large extent, but regretted the 
largely abstract tone of Bosch’s arguments. By not directly confronting the context, it not 
only “missed present day agonies,” but it also intentionally omitted liberation as a task of 
the church and a theme of theology. In doing so, Bosch’s arguments could, though 
unintentionally, exonerate white theologians from the responsibility of critically engaging 
black people’s concrete struggles.69      
Jaap Durand warned against a romanticized vision of an “alternative community” 
as a peaceable utopia, devoid of the divisions of the wider society. The divisions of South 
Africa were mirrored in the alternative community. Durand linked liberation and 
reconciliation, arguing that the divided members of the alternative community needed to 
be liberated from the chasms that divided them, allowing them to reconcile. Liberation 
and reconciliation required the confrontation of opposing viewpoints, but also the 
humility to try to understand one another across the wall of separation. This conversation, 
however, was not easy to have when the stakes were so high. Durand asked, “will we in 
the church be willing to take that path when it seems to us, black and white, that our very 
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existence is at stake? What will I do when my stone-throwing child is shot dead, or my 
wife is struck down with a panga?”70 As the situation became direr, Durand argued that 
liberation from the gulf of separation would require nothing other than an act of God.   
 At the 1977 SAMS conference Desmond Tutu spoke as a pacifist with high regard 
for reconciliation, and also from a position of solidarity with black theology. At that time, 
Tutu was Bishop of Lesotho, and a noted political activist. He spoke at Steve Biko’s 
funeral, and in 1978, he would return to South Africa, where he would serve as the 
General-Secretary of the South African Council of Churches. For Tutu, liberation was at 
the core of the gospel, and he would not wait for white approval before engaging in black 
theology, nor would he try to convince his “White fellow Christians about the validity of 
Black theology or liberation theology” before pursuing its goals and aims.71 Tutu argued 
that black theology, and indeed the whole Black Consciousness Movement were the 
prerequisites for reconciliation. Black theology called on black people to awaken to their 
own dignity and worth, and only by embracing their full humanity could blacks and 
whites hope to reconcile as “real persons.” Finding a common humanity first required the 
robust assertion of one’s own humanity.72  
 As a pacifist, Tutu said that he had “deep respect for the position delineated by 
Dr. Bosch,” but he also had a “few caveats to enter against it” from a position of 
solidarity with the black liberation struggle.73 Black South Africans, Tutu argued, had 
already tried non-violent protest against state policies during the 1950s, and their efforts 																																																								
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failed to achieve any positive change. On the contrary, it seemed that the apartheid state 
met black non-violence with heavy-handed repression. Tutu said, “Blacks still remember 
Sharpeville and they know that it was a peaceful demonstration by Black school children 
which was fired on by the police on June 16, 1976, and the silence of White Christians 
was deafening.”74 The fact that white Christians espoused “non-violence” while at the 
same time lending their tacit support to “state violence” gave a “hollow sound” to their 
eloquent discourses on pacifism. White Christians in South Africa and abroad seemed all 
too happy to engage in an armed struggle against Nazism, and they celebrated the 
sacrifice of Bonhoeffer, but when it came to lending their support to armed resistance 
against oppressive white minority rule, white theologians were reluctant.75    
 Tutu also suggested that it was almost miraculous that a group of black and white 
Christians met at all, given the political tensions. He said that the Standing Committee of 
SAMS publish a statement about the meeting. The statement called the gathering “a 
visible sign of the merciful grace of God” because they were able to meet “with so much 
openhearted counsel against the background of the troubled events in Southern Africa 
during the past eight months.”76 The statement went on to say that the participants wanted 
to live into the calling of the church to be an “alternative community,” fulfilling the 
“demands of Christian love, justice, and reconciliation.” The statement confessed 
bitterness and selfishness as well as a sense of obedience to the demands of 
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discipleship.77  Thus, for Tutu and Bosch, the SAMS conference was a sign that in spite 
of the devastating violence in South Africa, black and white Christians were still 
committed to finding common solutions. While it certainly did not solve South Africa’s 
problems, it meant that a number of white and black South Africans were forming an 
interracial solidarity of Christians in civil society that both embraced and contested “love, 
justice, and reconciliation.” 78 Moral leaders like Bosch, Durand, and Tutu would attempt 
to expand the influence of these concepts in various communities.  
Durand would become a vital promoter of the idea of reconciliation in the Dutch 
Reformed Mission Church (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerk, DRMC), which 
was the NGK mission to Coloured people. In 1973, the University of the Western Cape, 
which was designated for Coloured students during the apartheid era, hired Durand to 
work at the DRMC’s theological school. In his systematics classes, Durand wanted 
students to use theological discourse to reflect on the present situation in South Africa. 
During one class in 1978, as Durand guided students through their conversation, they 
came to the conclusion that “apartheid departs from the irreconcilability of people,” while 
the gospel proceeds from the reconciliation of all.79 These students were so energized by 
that insight, that they went to several leaders in the DRMC, and asked them to make a 
formal statement to that effect. Leaders acted on the students’ request. During the 1978 
Synod of the DRMC, the church declared that “the policy of apartheid and/or “separate 																																																								
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development” was in conflict with the gospel. It was based on irreconcilability, it led to 
the polarization of people, it privileged whites, and it damaged human dignity.80 Thus, 
reconciliation would gain prominence in the DRMC, bringing its leaders and members 
into this informal growing interracial solidarity. The fact that a so-called “daughter 
church” was critical of the so-called “mother church” also had a profound impact on 
many white moral leaders. These were not outside critics, but members of their own 
church family, and therefore merited a genuine response. 
SACLA 
 
 On February 14, 1977, Michael Cassidy was at prayer, asking what the next steps 
would be for Christians in South Africa. Later that day at his office, he received a letter 
from John Hewitson, the national student chairman of the Student Christian Association. 
He said that students who had attended PACLA were hoping that a similar conference 
could be organized for South African Christians. 81  He then received a second letter from 
Douglas Bax, who wrote that as the country seemed to be moving toward an acute 
political crisis, there was a desperate need for an event to bridge the widening gulfs in 
society. Bax hoped that such an event could encourage “reconciliation, justice and 
peace,” moving the country “away from the judgment and anger of God which threatens 
our society because of our profound alienation from and discrimination against each 
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other.”82 After reading his mail, Cassidy received a telephone call from Elaine Botha in 
Potchefstroom, wondering how to apply scripture to the economic and political situation 
in South Africa.83  
 On his way home for lunch, something clicked in Cassidy’s mind—SACLA: the 
South African Christian Leadership Assembly. The local follow up meeting to PACLA 
would provide South African Christians of various backgrounds with a chance to meet 
one another. Cassidy and another colleague called David Bosch, who immediately joined 
their efforts. Bosch told Cassidy, “As I have travelled around South Africa since PACLA, 
I have also found people saying, ‘Well, if it could happen in Nairobi, why not South 
Africa?’” 84 The executive committee responsible for planning the event grew to 30 
members, and they unanimously elected Bosch as chairperson. They hoped, especially 
after his show of humility at PACLA, that he would be able to navigate the growing 
tensions between people of different racial and denominational backgrounds.85  
As plans for SACLA became public, the white right and the radical left voiced 
their opposition. Radical black commentators worried that SACLA would be another 
“white talk show,” at which liberals would make idealistic speeches and talk about 
reconciliation with no real intention to make far-reaching changes.86 On the other hand, 
the white right believed that SACLA was forcing South Africa toward an integrated 
society. They worried that radical elements would use the gathering to stir up unrest. 
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Graffiti began to appear with “SACLA” spray painted next to a hammer and sickle.87   
The signatories of Evaluated and Rejected: SACLA: Beoordeel en Verwerp 
rejected the conference for five reasons. SACLA had ties with the WCC, the SACC, 
SPRO-CAS, and AE, each of which expressed hostility to the NGK’s racial policy. 
Secondly, they accused the organizers of “shock tactics,” designed to restructure the 
“religious, social, political and economic life of South Africa, to build an ‘alternative 
society.’” They were deeply skeptical of Bosch’s “alternative community,” believing it 
played into the hands of those bent on the destruction of “Christian civilization” and the 
Afrikaner people in Southern Africa. In the third place, conservatives claimed that 
SACLA “recklessly set aside, in the interests of ‘togetherness,’ all doctrinal and cultural 
difference.”88 This allowed anyone who claimed to be a Christian to participate, including 
those who espouse “un-Christian utterances” (meaning Black liberation theologians). 
They were worried that SACLA spread would its message of unity throughout South 
Africa, especially affecting the impressionable minds of the youth. Finally, they argued 
that SACLA could not possibly have new answers to the problems the churches had 
already been dealing with for quite some time. With these five points in mind, the 
signatories claimed that SACLA was not going to bring liberation, but rather conflict and 
unrest, “which is unacceptable to us in the light of the Gospel of Peace.”89 Thus, while 
the left worried that SACLA was too weak and moderate, the right believed it was a 
radical front.  																																																								
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Conservative leaders in the NGK were reluctant to allow their ministers to 
participate in SACLA. The Northern Transvaal Moderamen issued a statement in which 
they asked all churches to refrain from participating in SACLA. They wrote, “We, as 
church, need not discover what it means to be faithful and effective witnesses of Jesus in 
South Africa. We daily study God’s Word and know what it is.”90 Other NGK members 
were less confident that they “already knew.” In fact, NGK members represented the 
second largest contingent at SACLA, with over 400 delegates, and most of these were 
young ministers.91 A number of key figures in the NGK would also be in attendance, 
including Johan Heyns and Willie Jonker. The popularity of reconciliation would 
continue to grow among Afrikaner moral leaders, in no small measure because of events 
like SACLA. 
Bosch experienced some Afrikaner antipathy toward the idea of SACLA. 
Generally, he was gracious and level headed in the face of disagreement and criticism. 
Yet Bosch found one visit from an elder at his church particularly unbearable. Though 
the elder did not think Bosch was a communist, he believed that the communists were 
using him to undermine the government. When the elder left, David went to Annemie, 
who was on the phone. He said he needed to talk, but she told him they would talk once 
the phone call was finished. David left the house fuming without telling anyone where he 
was going. When Annemie was finished on the phone, she went to speak with David, and 
he was nowhere to be found. She called Willem Saayman, who was also on the SACLA 																																																								
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planning committee. Saayman found Bosch out wandering. He said he would be home 
after he had a chance to cool down.92  
The police were very suspicious of Bosch’s attempt to hold such a massive 
interracial meeting. Though far from revolutionary, Bosch’s vision of racial unity in an 
“alternative community” was threatening to the South African government. Throughout 
the 1970s, the police frequently monitored the Bosches’ home. The Bosches also knew 
that the security police were reading their mail. Letters would not come for days, and 
then a stack would appear in their mailbox. Later when Smith moved to the Pretoria area, 
the Bosches and the Smiths would occasionally receive each others mail even though 
they lived several kilometers apart. Obviously, the same person was “keeping and eye” 
on both of them. The government no doubt wanted to monitor on their extensive 
interracial and international correspondence. They also had strong reason to suspect that 
the government bugged their home and office phones.93 The police could even be vaguely 
menacing; Annemie once remembered being questioned by a police officer who asked, 
“What’s going to happen to your children if something happens to you?” She simply 
brushed him off, saying, “Nothing’s going to happen to me.”94  
For the most part, the Bosches went out of their way to prove that they had 
nothing to hide. Once, they even sent their children with cups of coffee to take to the 
police who were observing an interracial meeting at the Bosches’ home from the curb. 
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The children also invited the policemen in, saying that the meeting was not secret.95 
Bosch and Saayman were both happy to discuss details of SACLA with police in Bosch’s 
study. It no doubt helped their cause that the policeman assigned to the case was the son 
of an NGK minister both Bosch and Saayman knew. In spite of their accommodating 
attitude, the final permission for the assembly from the Minister of police came less than 
24 hours before SACLA opened.96  
Between February 1977 and July 1979, SACLA’s executive planning committee 
met to hash out details. They decided to hold five parallel conferences for high school 
students, university students, youth leaders, congregational leaders, and national leaders, 
such as politicians and members of the business community, respectively. These groups 
would meet independently during the course of the day and then come together for 
plenary sessions. There were also “pan-interest” seminars that brought people together 
across age sets. The planners envisioned a very large congress, bringing not just national 
leaders together, but those at the grassroots. Speakers came from both inside South Africa 
and the international community. All together, there would be over 5000 delegates. Over 
the course of ten days, they would discuss separate themes related to “witness.”97  
The international ecumenical community as well as the South African business 
community would both commit resources to SACLA’s organizing efforts. Bosch and 
Vusi Khanyile (who was in jail during part of the planning process) went to Europe to 
raise funds for SACLA. German and Dutch churches were overwhelmingly supportive of 
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the efforts once they learned the nature of the meeting. The business community within 
South Africa, who were becoming increasingly worried about sanctions because of South 
Africa’s international image, were also major supporters of SACLA. They raised 
significant funds for those who needed financial assistance to attend the assembly.98 
Rather than arranging accommodation at local hotels, delegates would stay with local 
SACLA participants, frequently bringing people of different races together under one 
roof. Unexpected living arrangements could occur. An Indian family from Natal slept in 
their van until Anglo-American businessman Nicholas Oppenheimer took them into his 
palatial family home. Families remembered being reluctant at first to cross the racial 
barrier, but soon found common ground and even friendships.99  
 In the months leading up to SACLA, Bosch published “Racism and Revolution.” 
In the article, he interpreted the South African situation to the broader international 
missiological community, and he also gave insight into the objectives of SACLA. 
Drawing on Dunbar Moodie’s The Rise of Afrikanerdom, Bosch argued that Afrikaners 
had become captive to a “civil religion.” For Bosch, there were three major influences on 
Afrikaner religion: the German romanticism (neo-Fichteanism) of Gustav Warneck, the 
pietism of Andrew Murray, and the Neo-Calvinism of Abraham Kuyper. Bosch wrote 
that the “three currents…today probably find their most successful ‘blending’ in Dr. 
Andries Treurnicht…Dr. J.D. Vorster…and Dr. C.W.H. Boshoff.” Bosch added (quite 
rightly) that Boshoff showed less Kuyperian influences than the other two.100 Afrikaner 
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civil religion, said Bosch, had its own concept of “God’s election” and “manifest 
destiny.” It also espoused a belief in “white trusteeship” over their black “younger 
brothers.” The duty of trusteeship could only be fulfilled if the Afrikaners defended their 
“white Christian civilization” and a “pure” white nation.101  
While distancing himself from Afrikaner civil religion, Bosch spoke from a 
position of prophetic solidarity. He wrote,  
It is the easiest thing in the world to criticize but desperately difficult to be 
prophetic. That presupposes solidarity. The critic condemns from the outside, the 
prophet confesses from within. The critic judges, the prophet weeps. The former 
therefore remains unscathed while the latter receives blow upon blow.102 
 
He attempted to explain why Afrikaner Christians seemed so doctrinaire and blind to the 
suffering of others. In the first place, he said, it was because Afrikaners were a small 
people who understood themselves to be locked in a struggle against annihilation. By the 
late 1970s, “white South Africa…[was] more exposed than it has ever been,” specifically 
noting that the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola became independent 
Marxist states, Zimbabwe and Namibia were on their way to independence (though the 
latter would only happen sometime later), and a mandatory arms embargo made white 
South Africans uneasy about their future. White fears led many otherwise consistent 
Christians to unquestionably accept coercive state measures.103 
Beyond fear, Bosch argued that there were those Afrikaners, like Boshoff, who 
believed that apartheid was the only political option for the country. They argued that 
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internal decolonization was the only way for white South Africans to maintain control 
over their own destiny. This would, as Bosch noted, require massive sacrifices on the part 
of the whites, which according to Boshoff “must be made, and soon,” otherwise chaos 
would ensue. He noted that Boshoff was fond of saying that if a nation was prepared to 
make superhuman sacrifices when waging war, why not when “waging peace?”104 Forced 
removals, heavily policed racial borders, and influx controls were certainly an ironic way 
of “waging peace.”  
Again, Bosch highlighted the fact that South Africa’s two main nationalist 
movements—the Afrikaner nationalists and the African nationalists—were coming into 
greater conflict. Each group claimed that God was on its side. While official NGK policy 
stated that “a political system based on the distinctive or separate development of various 
population groups can be justified from the Bible,” a growing number of black 
theologians came to embrace Christ as the liberator who would overturn white minority 
rule.105 Each side had come to a selective view of God’s work in the world, and each 
believed that their own vision for the future enjoyed divine sanction. Bosch wrote,  
In both cases—and in similar judgments—the key to the understanding of history 
as God’s revelation lies in the eyes of the beholder. The beholder has 
unconsciously selected where he or she is prepared to see God at work. Such 
persons also select their own ‘group eschatology’: a free republic, a nation-state, a 
classless society, the supremacy of one’s own group, etc.106    
 
It was clear that Afrikaner and African nationalism had very different understandings of 
God and irreconcilable visions for South Africa’s political future.  
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For Bosch, the way “out of this dilemma” was for both groups to encounter each 
other as members of one universal church. This would require bringing members of both 
sides into an honest conversation with one another. As Bosch wrote, “Only when we 
enter into sincere dialogue with brothers and sisters from other traditions (who may also 
suffer from—different—ideological hang-ups!) can our civil religions…be broken open 
and relativized.”107 Conversation would also put a human face on the “caricatures…and 
phantoms we have created of one another.” This kind of humanizing conversation would 
help to bring down “the invisible Berlin walls separating black and white,” and 
demonstrate that their preconceived notions were not authoritative or final. Rather than 
pointing to an earthly goal, it would also be an example of the church pointing toward the 
Kingdom of God. “If the church does that, it will become a challenge to the powers-that-
be, and to society as a whole.”108 This was, in large measure, the goal of SACLA.  
David Bosch addressed the opening gathering of SACLA. The world, he said, was 
rapidly changing, and there was great reason for despair. But despair, Bosch said, was not 
an option for Christians. Bosch wrote, “a new moment in history requires a new 
awareness and a new vision for the days ahead.”109 For Bosch, no one person or group 
had the key to the future. Instead, various groups would have to cross the chasms of a 
deeply divided society to find answers. Bosch acknowledged that there were profound 
differences among participants, and that “the hopes of some will be the fears of 
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others.”110 In spite of their differences, however, Bosch argued that Christians were 
called on to accept each other as Christ had accepted them. This was not to say that they 
should not differ. On the contrary, as Bosch said, “Let us differ by all means. Let us even 
differ vehemently. In fact we can’t afford not to. Too much is at stake.”111 It did, 
however, mean that they could not condemn one another. They were united by a common 
faith in Jesus, and for Bosch, this meant “what unites us is greater than what divides 
us.”112 In a practical sense, this meant you could form group solidarity with some internal 
tension, provided that there was some overarching uniting factor.   
Bosch’s lecture, “The Kingdom of God and the Kingdoms of This World,” 
brought his arguments about the church as an alternative community to a new audience. 
He told the gathered body that the church is God’s new creation, a single people that is 
“not prescribed by loyalties and prejudices of kinship, race, nation, language, culture, 
class, political conviction, religious affinities, common interests, or profession.”113 These 
identities do not cease to exist when people become Christian, but they do lose their 
dominance. When worldly distinctions become normative in the church, then the church 
loses its distinctive identity and simply replicates the world.114   
Though the church is different than the world, Bosch argued that it is in solidarity 
with the world. The church exists for the sake of the world, in order to flavor it like salt, 
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illuminate it like light, and/or mature it like a leaven.115 The church, as a community 
bound together by future hope, seeks to share that hope with the world. It actively 
challenges those aspects of human life that stand in the way of the Kingdom of God. This 
had specific meaning for the South African context. Bosch repeated many of his 
concerns, saying that the church 
can never acquiesce in the reality of widespread unemployment, bad housing, an 
unjust wage system, lack of freedom, disruption of the family life (e.g. because of 
migratory labor), lack of participation in decision making processes, animosity 
between groups, bitterness and fear in society, threats and counter-threats, 
systemic and revolutionary violence.116 
 
Note that for Bosch, both systemic (or state sponsored) violence and the violence of the 
liberation struggle equally problematic. The church was called on to be an instrument of 
both justice and peace.     
A number of international voices present at the conference echoed Bosch’s words. 
The Puerto Rican missiologist Orlando Costas spoke of “manifesting signs of the 
kingdom” by working for “freedom, justice and well-being.”117 Costas was a radical 
evangelical in the American Baptist Church. John Howard Yoder contrasted the “politics 
of men,” which seek their own interest, with the “politics of spirit,” which purse acts of 
humble service. While the “politics of men” seek to dominate others, the “politics of 
spirit” seek new opportunities. Yoder further argued that the success of SACLA 
depended on the honest confrontation between groups at the meeting.118 The presence of 																																																								
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international church leaders acted as an endorsement of SACLA’s aim of interracial 
reconciliation. Such a message would have been powerful to white South Africans, who 
found themselves increasingly isolated on the world stage.  
For black liberation theologians like Desmond Tutu, Elliot Mgojo, and Manas 
Buthelezi, the situation was dire. Black people faced state repression in South Africa, 
leading many young people into exile, where they were engaged in armed conflict with 
the South African Defense Force. Buthelezi provided a theological analysis of this violent 
situation. He said that God embraced the violence of the cross, but it was transformed 
into an instrument of salvation. In this way, suffering and violence could be redemptive. 
Yet not all suffering is redemptive. Oppressive suffering binds people to situations they 
cannot hope to overcome. Redemptive suffering occurs only when people suffer on 
behalf of others. Christians were therefore called to suffer with the oppressed, bearing 
their burdens. Christian fellowship did not only mean enjoying one another’s company, 
but it also included the painful experiences of wiping one another’s tears.119  
 For Buthelezi, “violence is inconsistent with the spirit of the gospel of Christ.”120 
This did not, however, mean that Christians had to acquiesce to state repression. The 
church needed to look for peaceful solutions, but it also needed to be honest about the 
nature of violence. Churches could not condemn “terrorists” and “communists” as 
enemies of the state while condoning the actions of the SADF (South African Defense 
Force) as “state security.” If the church truly wanted to be the servant of peace, it would 
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have to bring “both parties to the conference table for the purpose of negotiating a lasting 
political settlement.”121 For Buthelezi, therefore, reconciliation would not be the meeting 
of like-minded moderates, but rather people on either end of what he and many others 
were now calling a civil war. As a black leader inside South Africa who had been 
previously victimized by police and served with a banning order, Buthelezi was reluctant 
to spell out exactly what he meant. No doubt, he envisioned some kind of talks between 
the South African government and liberation movements such as the ANC, the PAC, and 
the South African Communist Party. In 1979, however, such a hope seemed very remote. 
While encouraging negotiations for a peaceful settlement, the church would have to stand 
in solidarity with the oppressed.122  
The National Party Minister of Plural Relations and Development123 Piet 
Koornhof shared the stage at SACLA with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu. 
Koornhof was still committed to the idea of separate “homelands,” while Buthelezi 
refused independence. At SACLA, they made a number of pious remarks and embraced 
one another on the stage. At the National Press Club in Washington in June 1979, 
Koornhof declared that “apartheid as you know it…is dying.”124 To be sure, he did not 
formally renounce the homeland policy (i.e. the backbone of the apartheid policy), but he 
was a verligte minister who believed in reform along federal lines. Buthelezi also 
believed in reform along federal lines. He signed the Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith 																																																								
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with the United Party’s Transvaal leader Harry Schwartz in 1974. The Declaration 
provided a framework for Constitutional change in South Africa. In addition to protecting 
individual rights, it also envisioned provisions for safeguarding group identity and 
culture.125 This was a politics of moderate compromise, which was far from what 
liberation movements like the ANC envisioned.  
Many found SACLA upsetting or unsatisfying. From the right, Boshoff argued 
that SACLA accepted a future open plural society as a fait accompli. He argued that this 
ignored the fact that nations function in world history as individual entities. Failure to 
recognize differences would lead to disillusionment when a non-racial society fails. He 
further argued that “acknowledging the reality of peoples and nations” is not racist as 
such, provided that it is done in a way that ensures mutual respect.126 For Boshoff, racism 
tended to be couched in terms of “respect” or “disrespect.” While more leaders in the 
NGK became invested in “reconciliation,” Boshoff would continue to espouse the ideals 
of racial separation and parity. 
In his review of the conference, Canadian Christian socialist Harold Wells 
accused the assembly of being vague. While he called Bosch brave for working in South 
Africa while speaking out against injustice, Wells had a serious issue with Bosch’s 
condemnation of “revolutionary violence.”127 For Wells, revolutionary violence was the 
only way to change South Africa. The recalcitrant white minority would have to be 																																																								
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forced to change through a revolution. While pacifists applauded the efforts of Gandhi 
and King, they often ignored the fact that these peaceful movements were accompanied 
by violence. Outbreaks of violence in India and the Black Power movement in the United 
States led to changes, not just non-violent protest. Wells also argued that Britain and the 
United States also had liberal movements that were open to change, while South Africa 
did not. He wrote, “Can we conceive of Gandhi surviving Soweto, 1976? Surely he 
would long since have gone the way of Mandella [sic] or Biko.”128 
For Wells, violent resistance was not impermissible from a Christian standpoint. 
Quoting Colombian liberation theologian Camilo Torres, Wells argued that it is 
permissible to use violence to eliminate serious evils and patterns of continual violence. 
Christian justice allowed the oppressed to use (just enough) violence to end their 
oppression. Wells did not identify liberation movements as entirely righteous. Once they 
achieved their goals, they too would have the temptation to become oppressors. For 
Wells, while SACLA was a “sign of the kingdom,” so too were Marxist movements that 
were “based on love of the oppressed.”129  
In his later account of the event, Nico Smith said he left with a deep sense of 
frustration. He wrote,  
In my opinion an important aspect of the South African situation had not been 
covered, namely a call for justice in the country. Everybody wished that 																																																								
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reconciliation and peace among the inhabitants should happen but the inexorable 
demand of justice that should have particularly been expressed by Christians in 
South Africa at that stage had not been covered. The question in my heart was 
how reconciliation and peace could be achieved before the demand for justice had 
been met.130 
 
He went on to lament the fact that the injustice of the state policy was never raised during 
the meeting (at least not in a way that he thought serious enough). During one of the 
small group sessions, Smith became critical of the injustice of the current system, and 
Willie Marais accused him of dragging politics into religion and upsetting the “mutual 
spirit of goodwill.”131 There was fear among more radical Christians that the conference 
rested on the good feelings of unity without doing anything to directly confront the 
deeper, more pressing political problems.  
SACLA certainly did not confront the state directly; however, it was not 
insignificant. The taste of interracial fellowship at SACLA left many participants hungry 
for further connections, encouraging the formation of small group meetings around the 
country. The (largely white) Anglican Parish in Hilton, Natal, formally appointed an 
individual to make connections with the black community. SACLA inspired people to 
begin new social projects. Zamazulu Nkosi and Mary England met at SACLA, and these 
women joined forces to form the Kwamashu Christian Care Society.132 Ivan Toms was a 
military doctor who received leave to attend SACLA. He found the situation confusing 
and depressing, but then felt challenged to do something. Being from Cape Town, he 
decided to open a clinic in the informal settlement of “Crossroads,” where as many as 
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30,000 Xhosa-speakers were living “illegally.” When he approached the government 
about the idea, he was told that Crossroads would soon be cleared, and therefore there 
was no need to establish permanent medical facilities. Toms then contacted 25 people 
from Crossroads who had attended SACLA, as well as the Rev. David Russell. A 
supporter of Steve Biko, Russell was an Anglican priest who would one day serve as 
Bishop of Grahamstown. At the time, he was currently banned. Together, they formed the 
SACLA Empilisweni Clinic in 1980.133   
Conclusion 
PACLA and SACLA stimulated an interracial base of support for the concepts of 
peacemaking, justice, and reconciliation. From leading members of the NGK, such as 
Willie Jonker and Johan Heyns, to radical black church leaders, such as Manas Buthelezi 
and Desmond Tutu, there was widespread agreement that whites and blacks had a 
common future in South Africa, and they needed to determine the shape of that future 
together. To be sure, they differed greatly in their political standpoints. As Buthelezi and 
Tutu envisioned a non-racial democracy, Heyns and other verligte NGK leaders 
supported the National Party’s efforts toward moderate reform. Nevertheless, SACLA 
spurred many theologically conservative Afrikaners to continue walking down the road 
of “reform.” Heyns and Jonker, along with several other NGK seminary professors, 
would sign the “Reformation Day Witness” on October 31, 1980. In it, they committed 
themselves to promoting reconciliation, preaching against racism, establishing a church 
order that would demonstrate visible unity, and calling on the authorities to reform the 																																																								
133 Ivan Toms in Richard Abel, Politics By Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid, 
1980-1994 (Routledge, 2015).  
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present order. Over the next decade, the political situation would become even more 
desperate. The number of deaths in political violence would tragically only increase. The 
interracial solidarity of Christians that was formed through events like SACLA and 
PACLA would be able to meet again to reassess its position and assert new forms of 
moral authority. SACLA was, therefore, a vital link in a chain of Christian conversations 
about a new South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
ENTERING THE RAPIDS (1980–1984) 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, P.W. Botha’s government began pursuing a policy 
of “reform.” Theologians would have to answer a new series of questions about the 
meaning of racial unity and reconciliation. Bosch and Smith would attempt to push the 
NGK toward greater unity. Their language would become increasingly pointed, getting 
them in trouble with the powers that be. They would come to a crossroads; each would 
have to decided whether he could remain within the NGK, or if he would leave. Bosch 
decided to stay, hoping to act as a prophet from the inside, while Smith left. Smith gave 
up his job as a professor at Stellenbosch to become a pastor in the township of Mamelodi. 
There, he would become increasingly radical, arguing that reconciliation might 
undermine black claims for “justice.” Even still, his program of action had grassroots 
conciliatory elements; he would begin to put white and black families in touch with one 
another to share meals. Boshoff attempted to put the breaks on both Bosch and Smith’s 
efforts. He was not only head of SABRA and a seminary professor, but he also became 
chairman of the Broederbond and leader of the Voortrekkers, giving him the potential for 
tremendous influence. When he refused to endorse Botha’s reforms, however, he was 
increasingly sidelined and ignored. Boshoff would attempt to found new organizations on 
the right, with the hope of reigniting a passion for an independent Afrikaner future. By 
the early 1980s, the scales were tipping. While conservative voices still held power in the 
NGK, Smith, Bosch, Durand, and a growing number of others hotly contested their 
dominance.  
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Swiss Consultation 
 The NGK never found a satisfactory racial policy. After Cottesloe, the NGK’s 
racial policy was called into question once again. In 1962, a new commission was formed 
to draft a policy regarding the nature of unity and apartheid. Their report was discussed at 
the 1966 general synod, leading to heated debate. While some Afrikaners argued that 
unity ought not to be just spiritual, others said that physical or structural (i.e. interracial) 
unity could not be forced. That same year, a new commission was formed to discuss the 
question further. Their report was presented at the 1970 general synod, but it focused 
nearly exclusively on the relationship between “God and man” and said little about the 
relationships between people. Once again, a new commission was formed, which was 
given the express task of talking about race relations in South Africa. The Landman 
Commission (named for W.A. Landman) at long last presented a racial policy that the 
NGK found acceptable. The 1974 general synod adopted their findings as Ras, Volk en 
Nasie en volkereverhouding in die lig van die skrif (Race, Volk, and Nation and human 
relations in light of the scriptures).1  
From April 6-9, 1979, a delegation of the Swiss Protestant Churches met with a 
delegation from the NGK near Neuchâtel, Switzerland to discuss Ras, Volk en Nasie. The 
NGK delegation included church leaders, like ecumenical officer Frans Geldenhuys and 
chairman of the moderature E.P.J. Kleynhans, as well as professors from the church’s 
two theological institutions. The University of Pretoria sent Boshoff, Johan Heyns, and 
A.B. du Toit while the Stellenbosch University sent Smith, Willie Jonker, and P.A. 
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Verhoef. At the meeting, which was pointed but non-confrontational, the Swiss 
delegation said they had serious concerns about Ras, Volk en Nasie. In the first place, it 
suggested that the scriptures both recognized and maintained the variety of volks. While 
they agreed that there was no conflict between fellowship and diversity of human groups, 
the delegates worried that the forced maintenance of ethnic difference was creating a 
barrier between Christians.2 The Swiss delegation was also troubled by the sentence, “a 
political system that is built on distinctive (eiesoortige) development can principally be 
justified in light of the scripture.” The documented added, “the commandment of 
neighbor love must always be established as the ethical norm for the arrangement of 
healthy national relations (volkeverhoudinge).” The Swiss delegates, however, wondered 
whether there could truly be “neighbor love” in a context in which one group would 
unilaterally decide how best to arrange and create the “distinctive development” of other 
groups.3  
In their statement after the meeting, the delegates agreed that the church had three 
pressing tasks; viz., reconciliation, solidarity, and hope. They called for the reconciliation 
of racial groups as well as concrete acts of justice that would make reconciliation 
possible. The Swiss delegates asked if the NGK was doing “everything in its power to 
show Christian solidarity with all those who are suffering in the present situation of the 
Republic of South Africa,” including the disenfranchised, political prisoners, those with 
subpar education, those who were barred from certain jobs, families that were divided by 
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the system of migratory labor, and people whose relatives had fled South Africa.4 Finally, 
beyond solidarity, the church was to become a sign of hope in a suffering world.5 Foreign 
ecumenical contacts, therefore, would continue pushing NGK leaders toward embracing 
reconciliation.  
When the NGK delegates returned to South Africa, they recommended that Ras, 
Volk, en Nasie be revised. According to Heyns, the world had changed, and so too had 
the Afrikaners’ understanding of racial differences. He said, “We can simply no longer 
say and defend things we could in the early 70’s.”6 A growing number of NGK leaders 
wanted to say new things. They were talking about “reconciliation,” “justice,” and “signs 
of hope.” This language came from the interracial ecumenical movement, and leaders like 
David Bosch popularized it through interracial missionary gatherings like SACLA. There 
were a growing number of NGK clerics who endorsed this language, but the NGK 
leadership was reluctant. Official NGK leaders said they would not even discuss forming 
a revision committee until the 1982 general synod, meaning that a new racial policy 
could not be implemented until 1986 at the very earliest (general synods met every four 
years). While people like Bosch, Jonker, Heyns, Smith, Meiring and others began 
discussing the meaning of reconciliation, conservative leaders could rest assured that any 
real policy changes would be delayed for over half a decade.7  
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“Adapt or Die” 
As the NGK talked about revising its racial policy, so too did the NP. Vorster 
resigned (citing ill health) in the wake of the “information scandal.”8 Funds had been 
assembled to promote South Africa’s image abroad. The government even funded the 
ecumenical office of the NGK. The funds were covertly channeled to the office, and its 
leader, Frans Geldenhuys, was unaware of the connection. When the scandal broke, Carel 
Boshoff wrote a newspaper article suggesting that the NGK refund the government. 
David Bosch wrote a subsequent article, suggesting that the money be paid to missions.9 
Vorster’s successor, P.W. Botha, set a reformist agenda. In 1979, he famously 
said that South Africa would have to “adapt or die.”10 As a reformer, he removed some of 
the most hated aspects of apartheid. His government opened the way for black trade 
unions and freehold rights for blacks in townships. His government also revoked influx 
controls and the “Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act.” In 1983, white South Africans 
voted on a new constitution, which established a tricameral Parliament with 
representation from the white, Coloured, and Indian communities (in separate houses).11 
In doing so, white voters endorsed the idea that the policy could be reformed from within. 
The reforms also demonstrated that the verligte Afrikaners had gained significant 
political influence.   
The reforms resembled many of the suggestions of the Cottesloe Consultation, 
and many white South Africans understood them to be significant concessions. The 																																																								
8 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford University Press, 2014), 196.  
9 Klippies Kritzinger and Willem Saayman, David J. Bosch: Prophetic integrity, cruciform praxis 
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10 Dubow, 196.  
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reforms did not, however, actually give black people any political say in national affairs. 
Botha still limited black people’s political voices to so-called “homelands” while 
providing some limited rights to urban black people. Black people could vote for local 
leaders in some instances, but not for leaders who made national decisions.12 Desmond 
Tutu argued that Botha had merely tried to “beautify apartheid.”13 They transformed the 
nature of white domination without ever threating white minority rule.  
Boshoff Against Reform  
While the reforms left black people without any real political power, 
Conservatives thought that they threatened the maintenance of Afrikaner (and white) self-
determination. The verkrampte wing of the NP’s crisis of confidence in the part had 
reached the breaking point. In 1982, former Kerkbode editor A.P. Treurnicht formed the 
Conservative Party (CP) as a parliamentary organization to promote the maintenance of 
“traditional” apartheid.14 Boshoff refused to accept the policy of reform, which alienated 
him from the centers of Afrikaner power. Boshoff would attempt to use his influence to 
keep mainstream Afrikaner organizations from endorsing the NP’s reforms, but he failed 
to gain widespread support.   
By the early 1980s, Boshoff should have been one of the most influential 
Afrikaners in South Africa. He was chairman of SABRA, he had the potential to 
influence the NGK’s racial policy, and, most important of all, Boshoff was appointed 
chairman of the Broederbond in 1980 when Gerrit Viljoen stepped down to become 																																																								
12 Beinart, 247.  
13 Desmond Tutu, “Letter from Desmond Tutu to PW Botha,” 2. 
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administrator general of South West Africa.15 Boshoff had already been a leading 
Broeder, serving on the Watchdog Committee for “Non-White Affairs.” These 
committees studied issues and made policy recommendations to the executive council.16 
As chairman of the Broederbond, it was assumed that Boshoff’s vision would have some 
impact on National Party policy. One foreign newspaper reporter even suggested that 
Boshoff’s views on partitioning the country would “provide a peek at what politicians in 
Pretoria may announce in the future.”17 This proved to be a very poor prediction.  
 In 1981, Boshoff was also elected National Leader of the Voortrekker Movement. 
He did not run for the position, nor was he expecting to win it (though it is not surprising 
that the Broederbond Chairman would be afforded such an honor). Boshoff also assumed 
leadership of the Voortrekkers after telling Anna that he would not take on any more 
leadership positions. When he told her that he had accepted the position, he could not 
look her in the eye.18 While Boshoff was not a member in his youth, he became an officer 
of the Lion Team when his son Willem was a member. He was later elected Commandant 
of the Southern Cross Commando, where he and Anna worked together to expand 
activities. They led training camps for officers, organized youth camps, hikes, bicycle 
tours, horseback riding, and rafting expeditions. There were also annual commando 
camps, in which there were crafts, communal singing, and night marches. Anna Boshoff 
and George Stoop compiled a songbook for these events, which included music meant to 
stimulate national pride. Boshoff later remembered, “It was inspiring to hear more than 																																																								
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one thousand singing: ‘a nation never goes under if it keeps in mind all the nobility, all 
the wonder of its manly courage (mannemoed) and faith.”19 Not surprisingly, nationalism 
couched its outlook in chauvinistic language. His position as National Leader would give 
Boshoff the position to shape Afrikaner youth.   
In spite of his potential influence, Boshoff’s recalcitrant refusal to accept Botha’s 
reforms placed him at odds with the National Party. Boshoff’s rejection of plural societies 
pervaded all of his work. The same year Boshoff became head of the Broederbond, he 
published a book on black theology entitled, Swart Teologie van Amerika tot in Suid-
Afrika. The study was the result of a 1974 study tour to the United States, and it 
demonstrated a slightly more sympathetic understanding of black theology than his 
earlier assessment. Black theology, he wrote, did not come from America, but rather it 
came from the Bible. He wrote, “Black theology came out of Egypt 4000 years ago when 
God gave enslaved people freedom from the yoke of rulers and oppressors through his 
servant Moses.”20 For Boshoff, black theology arose from black people’s experience of 
oppression. Relying heavily on the Marxist sociologist Alphonso Pinkney’s Black 
Americans, Boshoff recounted the history of black oppression, from slavery, to Jim 																																																								
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Crow, and through the Civil Rights movement. Yet for Boshoff, as for Pinkney, legal 
rights did not lead to an end of black oppression. On the contrary, “30 million Black 
Americans still wait for the day to break. They are still not at the end of black history or 
the black experience.”21 
While Boshoff then spent some space describing different approaches to black 
theology, this was not the main concern of his book. The African-American experience 
was, for Boshoff, only one example of the challenges that minority groups could face in 
plural societies. Colonial government brought plural societies into being, drawing borders 
without regard to race, tribe, faith, or regional groupings. Plural societies lack common 
values, and therefore cannot form an organic whole. Ethnic groups within the plural 
societies have different aims and objectives, which leads to friction. Plural societies can 
only be held together by force, and where force fails, they degenerate into chaos.22 He 
cited examples around the world. When British India gained independence, it split along 
religious lines into India and Pakistan. Since the time of independence, he added that 27 
ethnically homogeneous provinces were created in India. Bangladesh hived off from 
Pakistan owing to ethnic differences, becoming an independent “Volkstaat.”23 The use of 
the word “Volkstaat” was significant, given the fact that he would begin to argue for the 
formation of an Afrikaner Volkstaat throughout the 1980s.  
Boshoff was even less positive about the history of plural states in Africa. He 
wrote, “The consequences of pluralism in Africa are well known: the histories of Nigeria, 																																																								
21 Boshoff, Swart teologie, 27. “…en wag ‘n hele 30 miljoen Swart Amerikaners nog op die dag 
om te breek. Hulle is nog nie aan die einde van die Swart Geskiedenis of die Swart Erwaring nie.” Boshoff 
reviews Pinkney’s argument from 12-27. 
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Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda-Urundi etc. offer outstanding examples of the tension that is 
unleashed by trying to unite people who identify differently in one system.”24 He argued 
that “all of the reasons for the tension and violence” could be traced back to the refusal of 
one ethnic group to submit to others. For Boshoff, it was far more than a “black/white” 
conflict. During the “heat of the independence struggle,” the indigenous population 
certainly let its resentment loose against the “white colonialists.” Once the whites were 
gone, however, Boshoff argued that the violence turned inward, resulting in political 
domination by brittle totalitarian regimes. Boshoff argued that pluralism is untenable. It 
leads to political, social, and economic instability, which in turn becomes a breeding 
ground for the expansion of communism.25 It must be noted that these were claims were 
complete reductions and highly debatable. The causes of violence in Africa were far more 
complex than “tribalism” or “ethnic tension.” Ethnic groups and religious groups are not 
natural enemies; leaders intentionally trump up ethnic animosity in order to gain access to 
scarce goods and resources.26  
 The “ethnic tension” argument, however, served Boshoff’s political agenda. For 
Boshoff, there was only one solution to ethnic conflict. The borders of countries would 
have to be redrawn around ethnically homogenous groups. He wrote, “The most obvious 
solution is to do away with the territorial state on which pluralism is built and to plan for 
new borders in which Volkstate (please note, not tribal states), can come into being.”27 																																																								
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His distinction between “volk” and tribe probably suggested that some “volks” have 
multiple tribes. Boshoff argued that a peaceful future in South Africa depended on the 
formation of Volkstate (the plural of Volkstaat). This was a vision that he would advance 
as chairman of the Broederbond, and it would put him at odds with P.W. Botha. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, Boshoff was using the plural of Volkstaat (Volkstate) to describe 
this vision. By the end of the decade, he dropped any conversation about forming 
Volkstate for black people, and only talked about the formation of an Afrikaner Volkstaat.  
In 1979, Botha placed Boshoff on the consolidation committee as a verkrampte 
voice. At these meetings, Boshoff argued that “black areas” would have to be expanded 
to include much larger areas of land and even some “white cities.” This would allow 
black areas to gain much greater economic capacities and “at the very least the white 
state…[could] escape the stranglehold of migrant labor and economic integration.”28 
Boshoff recognized that economic integration had already “too far gone” in some areas. 
During a 1976 speech delivered by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Gerrit 
Viljoen leaned over to Boshoff and said, “We are dishonest if we say Soweto’s 
population must be moved back to a homeland. ” Boshoff added, “The truth overtook 
us.”29 Foreign pressure would influence Boshoff’s thought, though in minor ways. He 
came to argue that the Witwatersrand (roughly the area corresponding to Gauteng today) 
would have to be governed jointly by all racial groups.30  																																																																																																																																																																					
stamstate nie) tot stand kan kom.” 
28 Boshoff, Dis nou ek, 273.  
29 Ibid., 272-273. “Ek herinner my dat Gerrit Viljoen tydens een van die pouses vir my gesê het da 
tons ongeloofwaardig word as ons aanhou sê dat Soweto se bevolking na die tuislande verskuif moet 
word.”   
30 Ibid., 273.  
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When Boshoff made these proposals, the government did not take him seriously. 
They dismissed his vision as “grandiose consolidation.” Though it was still officially 
government policy, it seemed to Boshoff that the NP had given up on the homeland ideal. 
The extent of economic integration and the rapidly growing black population made “the 
actualization of the ideal more unlikely.” By 1980, so-called “white cities” were in fact 
“white suburbs of black metropolises,” and black “homelands” were woefully 
underdeveloped.31 For Boshoff, the idea of apartheid had not failed, but rather the way 
that the NP applied the policy failed. Despondent, he lashed out at the consolidation 
committee, saying, “You will only give the Ciskei cactus and rocks, and then afterwards 
say, ‘Look! The homelands don’t work!”32 His crisis of confidence was in the 
government, not “separate development.”   
As chairman of the Broederbond, Boshoff wanted to keep the organization from 
being another champion of Botha’s reforms. While claiming an “a-political” orientation, 
Boshoff attempted to keep the Broderbond on a clearly conservative tack. Under 
Boshoff’s chairmanship, the Executive Council issued a circular letter affirming that the 
Broederbond was not beholden to any political organization, but was rather a “watchdog 
for Afrikaner interests, especially regarding the Afrikaner’s independent survival 
(voortbestaan).”33 He would also claim that Botha’s reforms were a threat to the 
Afrikaners’ survival. His relationship with Botha was becoming increasingly tense. In his 
1981 address to the Broederbond, Boshoff outlined threats against Afrikaner freedom, 																																																								
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which naturally included the loss of self-determination. Botha was the keynote speaker 
that night, and said, “I have big work to do, and if you do not want to help me, you must 
not hinder me.”34 Though the two men left the stage peacefully, they understood they 
were at odds with one another.  
 When Botha proposed a new constitution, SABRA made its own list of 
suggestions. Following their standard line, they argued that the sovereignty of all groups 
had to be respected. SABRA believed that a tricameral Parliament put white sovereignty 
in danger. Conversely, it also argued that “a dispensation in which white people dominate 
a growing majority of blacks is undesirable and must be systematically ended.”35 In 
Boshoff’s mind, this would be done through internal independence rather than “power 
sharing” or non-racial democracy. Ultimately, SABRA contended that the new 
constitution lacked a clear direction. While it did not work with “volks,” it required 
identification with groups. While it claimed to defend the rights of individuals, those 
rights were still determined by the groups the individual identified with. While it did not 
form Volkstate, it did not form a unitary state. It was ambivalent, and would either go the 
direction of a liberal nation state or “separate development.” For Boshoff, the new 
constitution still lacked a moral high ground. Whites dominated Indians and Coloureds in 
Parliament with effective veto power. It was not clear how the groups were supposed to 
divide their “own” interests from wider “national” interests. And finally, “the main 
problem was, however, that the burning question of black politics was completely 
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ignored.”36  
 SABRA’s report was leaked to the newspaper. Though he could never be sure, a 
reporter told Boshoff that the National Intelligence Agency leaked it.37 Members of the 
Broederbond’s Executive Council who were associated with the government argued that 
it was a conflict of interest for Boshoff to serve as chairman of both SABRA and the 
Broederbond. Again, Boshoff defended himself by arguing that the Broederbond was not 
a political organization, but rather existed to serve the interests of the Afrikaner people. 
Even though he claimed to stand outside of any political party, his criticisms of Botha’s 
reforms echoed the CP. Hoping to mediate the growing conflict, a meeting between the 
EC and SABRA was organized. Boshoff was not allowed to chair this meeting, as he 
shared SABRA’s viewpoint, so it was headed by Pieter de Lange. After several hours, it 
was clear that the conversation was not going anywhere.38  
 There was strong pressure from the Cabinet for the Broederbond to support 
government reforms. The EC engaged in tense meetings. Boshoff was notoriously 
obstinate, and he refused to change his standpoint. At last, Prof. Hendrik Samuels, who 
had supported Boshoff, said that no real conversations were happening. He suggested that 
Boshoff resign as chairman and forward his position as a member of the council. Boshoff 
said he would do this only on one condition—that the EC would not take a stand on any 
question of part policy. This was agreed too, and Boshoff stepped down. The EC selected 
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Pieter de Lange to be Boshoff’s successor.39 
 Shortly thereafter, the EC published a circular letter that Boshoff thought “gave 
its support to the government’s initiative in a flourish of words.”40 Boshoff later 
remembered, “I realized that I had come to the end of the road in the Broederbond, and I 
resigned.”41 Further circular letters made notices of Boshoff’s actions, and Boshoff could 
no longer respond. For some members, it was as though a verkrampte weight had been 
lifted. Others, however, followed Boshoff’s lead. Many conservative Afrikaners had lost 
confidence in mainstream Afrikaner institutions. The Broederbond would now more 
clearly align not only with the NP. By the mid-1980s, it would also embrace 
reconciliation. Boshoff’s successor, Pieter de Lange, met with the ANC’s Thabo Mbeki 
in 1986, and after a very pleasant meeting, he announced that reconciliation would be his 
life’s work.42 
 Conservative voices and organizations were increasingly alienated. After 
SABRA’s critical report was published, the organization immediately began to lose 
funding. Gerrit Viljoen, then serving as Minister of the Education and Teaching, 
withdrew his department’s funding from SABRA’s youth programs, as did the Bantu 
Representatives Councils. Business and cultural institutions followed the government’s 
lead, withdrawing their grants. SABRA was suddenly in a position where its financial 
resources and programmatic capacities were evaporating. The organization still found 																																																								
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enough support to survive. Tom de Beer of Gencor remained a loyal donor, and Henning 
Klopper, MP from Parys and founder of the Broederbond, bequeathed a farm to SABRA. 
The profits of the farm were put at the disposal of SABRA, provided that they 
bequeathed ten percent to the South African Bible Society.43  
 SABRA would survive, but it would no longer be an ally of the Broederbond or 
the National Party—and thus would have even less influence on mainstream Afrikaner 
racial politics. They were now in the position of the opposition, and would attempt to 
coordinate efforts to reorganize Afrikaners along conservative lines. SABRA inaugurated 
the Hendrik Verwoerd Memorial Lectures in 1976. At first, the lecturers were members 
of the political establishment. By the 1980s, however, the lectures became a platform for 
discussing new alternatives. At first, these discussions still envisioned a 
“Commonwealth” (gemenebes) or “Constellation of South African States.”44 As the 
decade wore on, however, the intellectuals at SABRA such as Boshoff and Chris Jooste 
became less concerned with “homelands” for black Africans, and they would come to 
embrace the idea of a homeland for Afrikaners. Boshoff remembered, “The 
truth…overtook us and we had to embark on a whole new road: the homeland policy 
became the Volkstaat idea.”45 Boshoff attempted to promote this idea throughout the 
1980s, but few were convinced of his vision.   
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Stormkompas 
 While Boshoff attempted to maintain an argument for “separate development” in 
mainstream Afrikaner though, Bosch, Smith, and a growing group of NGK clergy were 
eager to move their church toward embracing reconciliation. Smith was profoundly 
disillusioned with the NGK Mission Commission, believing that it never focused on the 
real issues. In a later account, he lamented that after leaving the Broederbond and making 
a number of “political pronouncements,” his voice no longer carried any weight on the 
commission. Boshoff, true to character, assumed a leadership position on the commission 
acting as chief adviser. Smith also argued “nothing pertaining to the government or the 
NP would come up for discussion.”46 For Smith, this kind of talk was no longer helpful; 
in fact, it stood in the way of the church making a real contribution to South Africa. At 
one meeting in the early 1980s, as Boshoff spoke, Smith busily ignored him while 
drafting a list of topics that he thought most pressing for the church in South Africa.47 
After he put the list together, he visited Frans O’Brien Geldenhuys, who was 
eager to discuss new directions for the NGK. He also suggested including Piet Meiring as 
a third editor. Smith and his companion editors wished to include a diverse array of 
voices on his various topics, and they selected a number of verligte and verkrampte 
thinkers (though the former seemed to dominate). A single theologian addressed each 
topic, and then another theologian wrote a response. The first writers did not see the 
responses until the book was published in 1981. Smith went to famous Afrikaans 
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journalist Rykie van Reenen for help editing the text, and it was she who suggested its 
iconic title, Stormkompas.48  
 At the end, Smith compiled a list of “statements about the NGK in the current 
South African context,” which were mostly taken from the contributions. There were 44 
statements in all, and they centered on two foci, reconciliation and solidarity respectively. 
Reading through the statements, one cannot help but see the influence of Bosch, who was 
a major contributor to the volume. Certainly, many of the ideas that Bosch had been 
working with in ecumenical circles were now being posited as guiding principles for new 
directions in the NGK. The list included the idea that the church is the creation of God, 
and therefore it cannot be based on any human institution such as “blood, soil, culture, 
language, stand, or calling.” Likewise, Christians cannot unreservedly identify with their 
“volk, group, class, or culture.” The church is rather a new community, in which 
differences remain and enrich the life of the church, but they are not definitive for 
structuring (or dividing) the church.49 
 Reconciliation stood out as a primary concern in the statements. Smith argued 
they were facing the last opportunity to engage in concrete acts of reconciliation, but the 
white NGK continued to be a stumbling block to this process. Attitudes, treatment, and 
literal racial exclusion in some churches was seen as a sinful refusal on the part of white 
Christians to accept fellow Christians of other racial groups. The church as a community 
of those reconciled in Christ can never be exclusive. In order for reconciliation to happen, 																																																								
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both parties must confess the offenses they have committed against each other, but the 
NGK ought to take the lead in confessing the guilt of white injustices committed against 
black people over the years.50  
 Reconciliation would also mean unification (which Smith and Bosch 
enthusiastically supported) of the “so-called mother and daughter churches of the NGK.” 
Smith argued that the unification of black and white churches had become an urgent 
necessity. To be sure, this unity would not be at the expense of particularity, as there 
would be room for congregations to worship in the language of their choice. 
Nevertheless, racial unification in the churches could serve as a scriptural witness to the 
South African context. The formation of separate congregations was based on the 
“weakness of some members,” and it had developed into an ideology of separation. 
Echoing Jaap Durand and the Dutch Reformed Mission Church’s 1978 statement, the 
statements argued that the “separation of people on the basis of race or skin color is based 
on the conviction of the fundamental irreconcilability between people and as such is in 
conflict with the gospel.”51  
 The church was also called into solidarity with the poor “in the light of the word 
of God.” Though the church does not primarily work for human rights, it is deeply 
concerned with human dignity, which means providing people with the space to fulfill 
their potential as bearers of the image of God. Skin color, they continued, should not 
determine a person’s position in society.52 Again, reflecting Bosch’s thought, Smith noted 
																																																								
50 Ibid., Statements 7-13.  
51 Ibid., Statements 14-18.  
52 Ibid., Statement 29.  
		
375 
that according to Romans 13, government is an institution of God, but this does not give 
divine sanction to the government’s actions. The government is still beholden to the word 
of God, and it is the purview of the church to proclaim God’s Word to the government. 
The church, therefore, was to be involved in politics not as a proponent of a particular 
party or policy, but rather to be an independent Christian witness when necessary.53 In his 
contribution, Bosch was becoming decidedly critical of specific aspects of the South 
African system, calling them “institutionalized sin.” He said that if you have love for 
your fellow human beings, then you are already involved in politics. If you have love, 
then you cannot be silent about: 
More than half a million black people who have already been moved on account 
of the resettlement policy, whether they wanted to or not; the social and other 
consequences of migratory labor; the million people who are crowded into 
Soweto’s hundred thousand houses, frequently without basic facilities; the [racial] 
wage structure that (in spite of reforms) is still in place in our country; the huge 
discrepancy in spending on white and black education; the fact that millions of 
our fellow citizens daily come to stand before closed doors—both literally and 
figuratively; the fact that many people (Christians!) simply take it for granted that 
you do not do unto others as you would have them do to you, etc.54 
 
By the early 1980s, Bosch was clearly more willing to take a firmer stand against the 
political policy in South Africa. He had a greater willingness to directly confront the 
injustice of the system in his work. Bosch called his Afrikaner readers to conversion—not 
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a conversion to Christ, but to their fellow-individuals (medemens) in need.55  
 Smith also included several statements in his list directed against the Afrikaner 
Broederbond. It was, he said, a secret organization built on its members’ fear of potential 
change. The fact that its members operated in secrecy while forming a large part of the 
Christian leadership of South Africa damaged the faithfulness of the church. It led to 
division within the church between members of the Broederbond and non-members. The 
statements reaffirmed Smith’s earlier position that nothing done in light of the word of 
God needs to be done in secret.56 Rather than attempt to shore up white minority rule, 
Smith wrote that the NGK needed to prepare its members “for the fact that the white man 
will obviously not be able to rule South Africa alone indefinitely.”57 Instead, they needed 
to be prepared to work for “a new South Africa, a community (gemeenskap) of true 
justice, peace, and welfare for all.”58 In the early 1980s, however, it was not clear 
whether this “new South Africa” would be the South Africa of Botha’s reforms or a 
totally new political dispensation. Many moderate contributors to Stormkompas were 
willing to entertain reform, while others, in particular missionaries like Smith, Bosch, 
Durand, and Meiring pushed for greater changes.       
From Stellenbosch to Mamelodi 
Even before Stormkompas was published, Smith was finding his presence in 
Stellenbosch increasingly uncomfortable. It was customary for seminary professors to 
deliver two sermons at the Moederkerk in Stellenbosch. On Pentecost 1980, Smith 																																																								
55 Ibid., 30.  
56 Nico Smith, “Stellings oor die Ned. Geref. Kerk,” Statements 40-42; spefically 42.1. 
57 Ibid., Statement 38.  
58 Ibid., Statement 39.  
		
377 
delivered a sermon in which he said the Holy Spirit bound Christians together in unity. 
As a symbol of that unity, the white members of the Moederkerk ought to have tea and 
sandwiches with Coloured members of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church down the 
road. This, evidently, offended some of the congregants, and Smith was asked to 
apologize, or simply say he was sorry that people might have been offended. Smith flatly 
refused. Smith remembered Professor F.J.M. Potgieter saying that farm laborers belonged 
to the Mission Church and farm owners belonged to the Moederkerk. They could not, he 
said, be expected to socialize at church. Smith responded by saying that according to his 
own understanding of the church, people from different social backgrounds should come 
to find that they share common bonds in faith. No longer would they be “master” and 
“servant,” but brothers in Christ. Potgieter told him this was simplistic and out of touch; 
such things may be possible in other places, but not in South Africa.59  
The matter got somewhat ugly. After Smith refused to apologize, members of the 
congregation published a letter critiquing his sermon. Donors began threatening to 
withdraw their financial contributions from the seminary. Once again, he was called 
before the curatorium. Attie van Wyk, who was a delegate at Cottesloe, had long acted as 
a buffer to defend Smith at these tense meetings, but he had since died. Smith faced the 
full rage of Koot Vorster and van Wyk’s replacement, Ockie Raubenheimer. 
Raubenheimer asked for a copy of the sermon, which Smith gladly supplied. 
Raubenheimer then accused Smith of not giving him the full sermon; he said there were 
“missing points.” Smith was furious. He wanted to know exactly which “points,” and he 
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wanted to take the matter up with Raubenheimer’s informant. Raubenheimer did not 
pursue the matter further. At their meeting, Vorster told him that his sermon was weak, 
poorly constructed, and lacking in Biblical support. Smith responded by saying if the 
sermon was so bad, then the curatorium had nothing to worry about.60  
Smith’s conscience would not allow him to stay out of trouble. He took a group of 
Stellenbosch seminarians to Crossroads, an informal settlement in Cape Town. There, the 
government had attempted to forcibly remove 150 women and children, but they refused 
to leave. Smith’s students wanted to know why the NGK was not doing more to assist 
vulnerable people there. In late September 1981, they met the administrators who were 
responsible for the situation. Ironically, the administrators blamed the crisis on the 
“inhuman government policy.” When a student asked why they were carrying out a 
policy that they found problematic, they gave a bureaucratic shrug—they were following 
orders.61 The administrators also told the students that they ought not visit the women, as 
a visit from NG seminary students might make a very tense situation worse. While the 
students did not meet the women, they saw their miserable situation from their bus 
window. The things they saw left Smith and his students very unsettled. Returning to 
Stellenbosch, Smith suggested that the students reflect on what they had seen and heard 
over the weekend, and they would draft a statement Monday.62  
Before that could happen, Smith received a telephone call at midnight before his 
lecture. He was to report to the dean’s office before class the next day. When Smith 																																																								
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arrived early in the morning, he found Raubenheimer waiting for him. Raubenheimer had 
little patience for the professor’s “political activates.” Smith surmised that a member of 
the Ruiterwag had told Raubenheimer about his plan to draft a statement, and then 
Raubenheimer called the dean. They told Smith that he had overstepped his bounds as an 
academic by taking students to the informal settlement. Smith said that as a professor of 
missiology, he was preparing students for what they might one day encounter. 
Raubenheimer was not impressed with the argument. They told Smith not to make a 
statement, because the NGK needed to speak with a uniform voice. If the students were 
to make their own statement, it would look as though the NGK was divided, which would 
embarrass the church (never mind the students who were embarrassed by the church’s 
silence).63   
Smith left the Dean’s office and went to his lecture. He told the students what had 
happened, and they were outraged. He calmed his class down, and told them that he 
would draft a letter to send to Die Kerkbode in his own name, and if any students wished 
to sign onto it, they could. Die Kerkbode published Smith’s letter on the front page of the 
next issue. The wider press also took interest, and got statements from Smith about his 
intentions.64 They published his statements, saying that he “rapped” the silence of the 
NGK for not speaking out against the injustices.65 Smith and several students went on a 
tour of the Ciskei in the middle of October, after which Smith decried “the 
dehumanization stemming from idleness, inactivity and overcrowding, and the cancer of 
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migratory labor.”66    
Smith was called before the University Board of Curators. They told Smith that he 
was acting irresponsibly. Though they did not want to violate his academic freedom, a 
number of senior NGK ministers were voicing objections to his activities, and donors 
were already withdrawing their contributions from the seminary. A young lecturer spoke 
up, asking what exactly the objections to Smith’s actions were. They talked around the 
matter, until it was agreed to go off the record. The floodgates opened. Smith’s 
colleagues accused him of being a troublemaker, turning his students against the NGK 
and the government. Smith did not defend himself against all the accusations they hurled 
at him, neither did any of his colleagues. Many of Smith’s colleagues found him reckless 
and self-aggrandizing.67 Others called his academic competence into question. Needless 
to say, his once happy life in Stellenbosch had certainly turned sour.   
In early December 1981, Smith was in his study preparing lecture materials when 
he heard a knock at the door. He assumed that a student was coming to discuss a political 
matter. When Smith opened the door, he was handed a telegram that read, “You have 
been called as a Minister of Mamelodi West Dutch Reformed Church in Africa.” (The 
Dutch Reformed Church in Africa was originally the NGK mission for black people). 
That evening, Nico shared the telegram with Ellen. She looked at it, and responded, 
“Nico, you realize that we will have to go.”68  
Smith worried that perhaps the call was arranged by the Broederbond or 
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somebody else seeking to remove him from his position at Stellenbosch, so he went to 
Mamelodi to find out what really happened. A member of the church council, Eddie 
Manyakalla, learned about Smith’s field trip to Crossroads while reading an article in Die 
Transvaler. The Mamelodi West congregation was looking for a pastor, and Manyakalla 
thought that Smith might be a good fit. Some worried that a seminary professor might not 
want to go to Mamelodi, but they left Smith’s name on the list of candidates. When the 
church council voted, Smith was selected.69  
The Smiths decided that they would return to Pretoria. Smith would leave his 
position as seminary professor, and now return to working as a pastor. Yet now, he was 
beginning ministry among black South Africans with a very different perspective than he 
had in the 1950s. Rather than seeking to Christianize the developing “homelands,” he 
said, “I am looking forward to identifying myself with black people and the problems 
they experience as a majority in a country ruled by a minority and to try to serve them 
through the church.”70 Smith was attempting to identify with the concerns of the black 
majority, which drove an even bigger wedge between him and many in the Afrikaner 
community.  
In the wake of the storm 
Stormkompas unleashed a storm of its own. When Johan Heyns read Jaap 
Durand’s response to his “theological perspective,” he was more than a little upset to find 
that Durand said his contribution would have been equally applicable in “say, Lapland.”71 
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For Durand, abstraction allowed theologians to avoid the issues a stake, which was racial 
reconciliation.72 In a statement to the press, Heyns, along with fellow contributor Malan 
Nel, wrote that they objected to Smith’s statements at the end, as they had not been 
consulted.73 The book received very unfavorable reviews in some corners of the 
Afrikaans press. Smith was called “the Afrikaans Huddleston” and accused of assaulting 
“the Afrikaner’s traditional views” as had Beyers Naudé. One review accused him of 
“unprecedented hostility towards white people.”74 Smith began receiving hate calls. One 
caller yelled that he was a “white pig,” while another blasted African music through the 
speaker.75    
 The NGK hierarchy was seething about Stormkompas. They called Smith before a 
meeting of the full curatorium, and he remembered being “roasted.” They accused him of 
deceiving his contributors. He defended himself, saying that every contributor had 
received the same letter, and that because he had pulled the list of statements from the 
contributors’ own work, he did not feel the need to send them to all participants before 
publication. The curatorium also said that his views were not representative of the whole 
church but rather only a marginal group of malcontents. Smith again responded, saying 
that he was sure many NGK clergy agreed with him.  He did not convince the curatorium, 
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who told him, once again, that he needed to be more careful of the example he was 
setting for students.76  
 Smith’s critique of the Broederbond in his 44 statements unleashed another 
controversy. Boshoff, who was still EC chairman at the time, publically defended the 
Broederbond as a “confidential” (vertroulik) organization. For Boshoff, various 
economic, political, and military organizations had to operate confidentially for the sake 
of strategy. Like these organizations, the Broederbond worked confidentially when 
deciding on cultural strategies. He further noted that it was not attempting to manipulate 
people or fix certain outcomes.77 Ben Engelbrecht found this to be duplicitous. 
Engelbrecht was professor of theology at the University of the Witwatersrand. He 
resigned from the NGK in 1965 to become editor of the CI’s Pro Veritate, but he later 
resigned from the CI in 1969 because it became increasingly radical.78 In a letter to the 
evening Beeld, Engelbrecht rhetorically asked Boshoff if he could remember a certain 
time in which the Broederbond manipulated the outcome of an academic job search. He 
asked Boshoff if he remembered a candidate who did not have a doctoral degree, but had 
personal connections to political figures and membership in the Broederbond.79  
Rapport went to Boshoff for comment. When asked what Engelbrecht was 
alluding to, Boshoff simply said, “I think its best that you ask him.” When pressed on the 
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matter, Boshoff defended himself, saying that he was nominated by Groenewald, and that 
the church and the Broederbond operated independently of one another. For his part, 
Groenewald “summarily rejected such allegations.” He continued that the selection 
process was done by secret ballot, and that he had every confidence in Boshoff’s 
competence. Smith felt compelled to speak, stating that his own selection above more 
highly qualified candidates was one of the reasons he had resigned from the 
Broederbond.80 He suggested that there was an unspoken understanding among Broeders 
that they would favor their own. Smith said, “I have no written proof [of Broederbond 
involvement in my selection]. I can only witness what I have seen of the workings of the 
organization.”81  
Nothing but a Heresy  
Bosch also found himself in trouble with the NGK hierarchy. A conference of 
scholars from across theological disciplines met in January 1982 to discuss “the church.” 
In his essay, Bosch spoke on “Church unity amidst cultural diversity.” Bosch noted that 
Protestants, who so successfully adopted indigenous languages and cultural concerns, 
frequently had trouble finding visible expressions of unity.82 He was alarmed by the fact 
that the world over evangelicals were beginning to embrace ethnicity as foundational for 
Christian missionary work. Donald McGavran at the School of World Missions at Fuller 
Theological Seminary in Pasadena, CA frequently argued that the church’s mission was 
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to convert homogeneous people groups, or the “families of mankind—tongues, tribes, 
castes, and lineages of man.”83  
For Bosch, this came dangerously close to the German concept of 
Volkschristenisierung—or the Christianization of the Volk. Indeed, there was certainly a 
connection. Boshoff claimed that he introduced McGavran to the work of Christian 
Keysser while on sabbatical at Fuller in the 1970s.84 McGavran then translated Keysser’s 
A People Reborn into English, hoping it would support his church growth movement. 
According to Bosch, idea of ethnic Christianity had become dominant in Afrikaner 
mission thought, leading the NGK to develop a  “blind spot” when it came to the question 
of church unity. Certainly, the NGK was not alone in this regard, as all churches had 
areas where they were not able to see or address problems. The NGK’s specific problem 
area was that it could no longer see that the Christian religion “transcends the divisions of 
mankind.” Christians were a “third race,” or a new people. The old divisions of nation, 
class, caste, tribe, etc. no longer had any defining significance in the Christian church.85 
This was consistent, Bosch argued, both with broader Christian tradition and reformed 
teaching. He famously wrote, “The Afrikaans Reformed churches have only to return to 
their own [reformed] roots to discover that what they now cherish is nothing but a heresy 
that strikes at the very foundation of the church.”86 This was Bosch’s strongest 
condemnation of the NGKs racial policy to date, and it was very unusual for Afrikaner 
critics of apartheid to use such loaded language. The media found his words provocative, 																																																								
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and they quoted him widely.  
For those who only read the newspaper articles and not the academic paper, it 
seemed as though Bosch was accusing the NGK of heresy. C.I. van Heerden, J.N. van 
Vuren, and A.S. van Staden accused Bosch of breaking his ministerial oath by accusing 
the NGK of heresy in a public gathering. Bosch would have to answer the accusations 
before the Presbytery of Hartbeesspruit, which would decide the verdict. Bosch defended 
himself, stressing that the church’s historic reformed confessions—the Heidelberg 
Catechism and the Belgic Confession of Faith—state that the only qualification necessary 
for membership in a church is faith in Christ. Bosch worried that the NGK was far more 
concerned with race than faith for membership. Because the church seemed to be at odds 
with its own doctrinal statements, Bosch said, “I used the word ‘heresy,’” though he 
noted at the level of theological technicality, it “was not the right word.” Bosch’s own 
defense and several character witnesses led to all charges against him being dropped.87 
Though he found fierce opposition, Bosch would not be censured. Wiets Marais wrote a 
letter to Rapport, dismissing Bosch’s assertion (and the whole “church conference” he 
was a part of) as “only the ghost of Cottesloe.”88 In the same way that the members of the 
NGK had fought the Cottesloe Declaration, Marais said they would now have to fight 
men like Bosch, Smith, and Heyns. By the early 1980s, however, dissenting voices were 
gaining in popularity, and could not be so easily silenced. 
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Letter of 123 
After Stormkompas was dismissed as the grumblings of a few dissatisfied clerics, 
Smith endeavored to show there was broader support for his position. Smith decided that 
he would draft a letter that he would circulate widely among clergy, hoping to obtain 200 
signatures. Smith drafted a letter that clearly laid out an anti-apartheid agenda. The job of 
the church, he wrote, was to change members’ racist attitudes that stemmed from the 
policy of apartheid. He further argued that the various churches in the Dutch Reformed 
family would have to unite before they could play a conciliatory function in society. The 
NGK would have to “repudiate the existing policy of separate development that has led to 
a total polarization of society.” 89  For Smith, the NGK (“more than any other church”) 
needed to directly confront the state, calling on it to “end a policy that is based on the 
irreconcilability…of different races and cultures, and has resulted in terrible suffering and 
frustration on the part of the people of color in South Africa.”90 Smith wanted to be 
absolutely clear that he considered the government’s racial policy to be an affront to 
human dignity, and to stand in the way of justice, peace, and prosperity.  
After Smith drafted the letter, he took it to some of his colleagues for their 
critique. Jaap Durand took the letter seriously, and told him that he would sign a final 
draft without hesitation. Bernard Lategan had no objection, but worried that it would 
cause some outrage in the church. Willie Jonker said that Smith specifically needed to be 
careful, given the fact that he was already on thin ice with the church hierarchy.91 Smith 
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also contacted David Bosch, who was interested in the letter. Bosch invited Smith to 
bring the letter to a study group he was part of in Pretoria, where he might find some 
constructive criticism and a few signatories.92 When study group met, Bosch could not be 
present at the meeting. The other ministers were less enthusiastic about the letter. They 
did not think it would do much good, and they were nearly certain that the NGK 
hierarchy would ignore it. One of Smith’s former students, Jan Nieder-Heitman, was also 
at the meeting. He had recently graduated, and was going to begin work with a black 
congregation. Smith remembered him asking “what hope could he as a young minister 
have for the future of the church if his seniors didn’t think such a letter could do 
anything.” The young man’s words won the meeting over to the letter.93  
 While Bosch and Smith were certainly on the same side of the growing 
ideological divide, there was also some dissonance between the two. While impressed 
with Bosch’s intellectual capacities, Smith found him far too reserved in his criticisms of 
the state. The letter that Smith submitted to the group in Pretoria was heavily edited and 
changed. Willem Nicol later noted that the group never accepted the strong wording of 
Smith’s letter, so they asked Adrio König to draft the document again. It was still not 
quite right for the group, so they gave it to Bosch to edit and rewrite.94 The final product, 
while condemning apartheid, was decidedly more staid than Smith’s original. It also bore 
some marks that were characteristic of Bosch’s theology, no doubt agitating Smith’s ego. 
In Bosch’s letter, the primary task of the church was reconciliation, which bears witness 																																																								
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to new creation in Christ. Christians needed to manifest signs of unity among its diverse 
members. While diversity enriches the church, Christians confess unity as a primary 
theological concern. The primacy of unity, therefore, excluded deference to personal or 
group interests. The church could be “God’s experimental garden in the world,” 
demonstrating what God intended for the wider society by enacting “mutual love, peace, 
understanding, sharing and justice.”95  
 The letter also shied away from using the terms apartheid or “separate 
development.” Instead it denounced “a system which elevates irreconcilability to a 
principle of societal living and which alienates the different sections of the South African 
population from one another.”96 The letter argued that the prohibition of mixed 
marriages, racial classifications, and group areas “cannot be defended scripturally.”97 
Likewise, the letter proclaimed that “incidence of the forced removal of people, the 
disintegration of marriage and family ties as a result of migrant labor, the inadequate 
expenditure on black education, insufficient and inadequate housing for black people and 
the low wages paid to such people cannot be reconciled with the biblical demands for 
justice and human dignity.”98 Thus, while the letter clearly condemned government 
practices and laws, it did not condemn the policy by name. 
 Bosch’s letter was skeptical of Botha’s reforms. He wrote, “all people who regard 
South Africa as their fatherland ought to be included in the process of negotiating a new 
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order for society.”99 Drawing the contours of this new society, therefore, would not be the 
exclusive purview of the National Party or white South Africans. It would also have to 
include a variety of black voices. Likewise, this new society would have to be based on 
justice. While the state used coercion to quell unrest, the new society would strive for a 
peace based on equal treatment and opportunities for all.100 The language was moral and 
pastoral; it did not read as an attack on government policy.  
 When Smith received a copy of this letter, he put his signature on the document, 
though he was certainly disappointed.101 While it is understandable that Smith would 
have been upset, the decidedly more careful wording of the document gave it broader 
appeal. Still, the letter fell short of 200 signatories. Originally, 124 signed the document, 
but later Ferdinand Diest asked that his name be removed without giving a reason. “The 
Open Letter,” also known as the “Letter of the 123,” was published on June 9, 1982 in 
Die Kerkbode. Many members of the church were furious. NGK moderator Kobus 
Potgieter said that it caused “confusion and unrest” among members.102 The moderature 
decided that it would not discuss the letter at the 1982 general synod, because 
procedurally it could only discuss the findings of synodical and general commissions. It 
added that the church literally received hundreds of letters, and they could not possibly 
discuss all of them (though it did not always receive letters with 123 of its ministers’ 
signatures). Heyns, who while sympathetic did not sign the letter, responded that the 
leadership could bury the letter beneath procedure, but they could not ignore its 																																																								
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content.103 Nor could they ignore the fact that such a large group of moral leaders was 
now calling for reconciliation, negotiations, and a new social order; they could only hope 
that this group would remain in the minority. 
 Many corners of the Afrikaans press called on readers to reflect on the issues the 
letters raised. On June 9, Die Volksblad urged its readers, “before their motives are 
questioned, notice should rather be taken of their own esteemed standpoint that it is not 
an attack on the church, nor is it a final word, but only a contribution to discussion.”104 
Likewise, Die Burger stated that while it understood questions of procedure, the contents 
of the letter were too important to ignore. It called on “all members of the NGK will 
carefully study those matters…[and] decide where they stand—and ought to stand.”105 
While the public outcry against the Cottesloe Declaration had effectively silenced NGK 
opposition, there was more openness to discussing alternative ideas. Whether one agreed 
or disagreed with them, Bosch and Smith were among the leaders in this discussion 
within the Afrikaner community.  
Voices from the wider ecumenical community largely praised the letter, which 
was no doubt encouraging to the signatories. Roman Catholic Archbishop Denis Hurley 
called the signers of the letter “courageous.” The Church of England agreed, adding that 
they hoped that the bravery of the 123 would encourage more people to come out against 
apartheid. The British Council of Churches prayed, “that the Dutch Reformed Church 																																																								
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will respond to what the Spirit is saying.” The Netherlands Reformed Church recognized 
the act as courageous, but they also expressed some skepticism.106  They worried that it 
was simply another cosmetic change.  
In South Africa, there were even more skeptics. Some members of the 
Broederkring, an organization of ministers from the Coloured, Indian, and Black Dutch 
Reformed Churches worried that the letter was a ploy. The World Alliance of Reformed 
Churches was due to meet in Ottawa that year, and Allan Boesak was planning to raise a 
motion that the theological justification of apartheid be declared a status confessionis—
that is, a doctrinal matter that the church needed to declare at odds with the gospel. Some 
members of the Broederkring thought the letter would soften the image of the NGK.107 
Other members, including Allan Boesak, applauded the effort, but did not think it would 
change much. He said, “I think that they [the 123] will find themselves at the crossroads. 
I would like to invite them again to join our black churches as other white NGK 
theologians have done.”108  
Bosch, unlike Smith, did not leave the NGK. The letter was an attempt to open 
avenues for dialogue and reconciliation to effect change from within. The object was not 
to defame the church, nor was it to cause trouble for the church, As Bosch insisted, “We 
are all loyal to the church.”109 It is not clear whether Bosch was proclaiming loyalty to 
the NGK or to the universal church in his last statement, but he personally meant both.  																																																								
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Bosch edited a collection of essays further outlining the justifications and various 
perspectives on the “Open Letter.” There were a variety of essays from both conservative 
and liberal perspectives. Theologians defended the positions they took in the letter, 
clarifying their statements.110 Smith did not hear about the project until the book was in 
publication, and he felt slighted and humiliated. Smith was the one who originally wrote 
the letter, and he wanted the opportunity to explain his motivations. Smith further 
believed that he should have been asked to make a contribution because, at the time, he 
was the only theologian at an NGK seminary who had signed the letter (even though he 
had already announced his departure to Mamelodi). Smith later wrote, “Why David 
denied me this opportunity I would not know. Who can indeed fathom the hidden 
considerations of the human heart?” Smith guessed that perhaps Bosch found him “too 
radical.” Bosch’s editorial decision became a sore spot for Smith.111   
 As voices of dissent rose within the NGK, international voices became even 
stronger in their condemnation of apartheid. At the 1982 World Alliance of Reformed 
Churches meeting in Ottawa, delegates not only declared apartheid to be a status 
confessionis, but also elected Allan Boesak as president.112 Returning to South Africa, the 
Dutch Reformed Mission Church held its general synod. While it was clear that they 
were rejecting apartheid, the delegates also wanted to make a positive confession of faith. 
It was decided to draft a new document, which became the Belhar Confession. The 
document affirmed unity as essential to the nature of the church, while “rejecting any 																																																								
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doctrine which absolutizes either natural diversity or the sinful separation of people in 
such a way that this absolutization hinders or breaks the visible and active unity of the 
church, or even leads to the establishment of a separate church formation.”113 In 1986, the 
DRMC would accept the Belhar Document as a confession of faith. It was clear that the 
“daughter church” would now stand with the international community against the 
“mother church.” The question was now where the NGK would go. It would have to 
decide whether it would maintain the conservative position of theologians like Carel 
Boshoff, or follow the suggestions of Smith, Bosch, Durand, and others. Internal and 
external pressure would tip the scale toward the latter, but that would only become clear 
at the 1986 NGK synod meeting.    
How wide the divide 
For Smith, daily life in Mamelodi became proof that the apartheid system, and 
therefore Christian Afrikaners, were responsible for massive human suffering. As a 
pastor, he visited the homes of his congregants. Legally, he was supposed to receive 
permission for each visit, but he “found it disrespectful, not only to mature human beings, 
but also to God to control the movement of citizens to such an extent.”114 He often 
ignored this order. After 5 pm on Fridays, Smith and a church elder visited members of 
the congregation. During his visits, he found as many as 22 people living in one 
overcrowded “matchbox” house. Smith found a world that was covered in “piles of 
rubbish that gave off a terrible stench and were also a huge health risk.” Roads were 
badly maintained—if at all—and access to utilities was uneven at best. Coal fires choked 																																																								
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the air, turning the sun a color he called “blood red.”115 
 Smith also visited single men’s hostels, where he learned their stories. Men tried 
to escape poverty in the “homelands” by seeking work in the cities. When they arrived, 
they were packed into dismal hostels. Smith worried about the effect that this had on 
family life. He commented that men had wives in the “homelands,” who generally 
became pregnant while their husbands were on leave from jobs in the cities, “contributing 
to overpopulation.” At the same time, men had “semi-permanent” mistresses in the cities, 
who also frequently became pregnant. Men wound up supporting two families with the 
meager salaries. Communication was also difficult, as many migrant workers were 
illiterate. They frequently only found out about births, deaths, and other family news long 
after the fact.116 
While some people approached Smith with suspicion, worrying that he might be a 
government informant, he mostly found a world of welcome in Mamelodi. Sharing meals 
with black people became a central part of Smith’s urban ministry. Interracial eating 
became a way of rejecting his past acceptance of apartheid and “separate development.” 
When visiting church elders, Smith would frequently find the table laid with the family’s 
best dishes. The “white Moruti” was invited to sit down to a plate of hearty “boerekos” 
(Afrikaner food) and conversation.117 In spite of his desire to identify with the black 
majority, Smith never learned an African language, so they would have spoken 
Afrikaans, English, or through an interpreter. In mining compounds, as Smith was about 
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to leave, he was frequently told, “No, Moruti, sit down. You cannot leave without having 
had something to eat and drink.” Miners then prepared some black tea on a small stove 
and cut off some pieces of white bread. As they shared the meal, which fellow missionary 
Willie Cilliers called “holy communion with bread and tea,” Smith listened to the 
workers’ jokes. They frequently made jokes at the expense of racist whites, and the 
atmosphere became light hearted.118    
 Smith was not permitted to live in the township as a white person. Instead, the 
white minister’s house was in the white suburb of Meyerspark, about 5km south of 
Mamelodi. He would later write, “Sometimes I felt a bit nauseous when I considered the 
enforced contrasts.”119 Smith had clearly undergone a change: while his stomach had 
once turned because he had to eat with black people, he now felt sick over the enforced 
separation of blacks and whites. As he passed between worlds, Smith remembered 
coming “to the terrible realization of what damage we have done to the black people in 
this whole process.”120 Smith remembered, “The more I listened to them the more 
rebellion grew in my heart.”121  
 Smith began to adopt a great deal of the language of liberation theology in his 
preaching. As he listened to the stories of pain and heartbreak that men in the hostels had 
experienced, he remembered, “all I could do again was to read passages from the Bible 
promising that God is with the suffering and the oppressed and would come to their 
salvation. Eventually, I started doubting the promise myself, but what else could I tell 																																																								
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them.”122 His crisis of confidence grew into a crisis of faith he struggled with throughout 
the rest of his life (hence the title of his memoir The God of my Fathers Died in 
Mamelodi). During his first Easter season, Smith preached that the resurrection was “a 
sign for all the followers of Jesus to join him in his resistance to any form of violent 
oppression.”123  If Christians only understood the resurrection to be salvation from hell or 
some future event, then, Smith argued, they had not understood the meaning of 
resurrection. Admittedly, the sermon was not terribly inspiring to his Mamelodi 
congregation. Whether this was because they had more conservative expectations or 
found a privileged white man’s condemnation of oppression of apartheid insincere, they 
did not say. 
 In the afternoons, Smith preached the same sermon at a service for domestic 
workers in Pretoria. At first, he found this service rather burdensome; as Sunday 
afternoon is prime napping time for preachers the world over. Yet he came to enjoy these 
services. Eventually, he stopped delivering formal sermons and instead opened a space 
for women to talk about their lives in the context of a worship service. Smith later 
remembered, “I tried to make them conscious of their divine human dignity as created in 
the image of God. They were not simply ‘servants’ responding to the whims of others; 
they were adult human beings.”124  
Smith preached his sermon on liberation and resurrection one afternoon with the 
domestic workers. He noticed that Carel Boshoff was in attendance. According to Smith, 
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when the congregation cleared, Boshoff said, “Nico, you are doing nothing else than 
inciting the black people to insurrection. Is that what you came to do in Mamelodi?”125 
Smith protested, saying he was merely addressing the fact that the resurrection had “real 
meaning” for people’s daily lives. Boshoff refused to argue any further, and after 
exchanging a handshake, the two men parted ways. Again, it is hard to say how much of 
Smith’s memory accurately captured Boshoff’s concern, and how much this statement 
was meant to heighten the divide between Smith and his former friend. Smith said, “I 
realized that in my understanding of the Gospel of Jesus I have moved many light years 
away from that of the best friend of my student days.”126 
Politically, Boshoff and Smith had adopted opposite perspectives. While Boshoff 
believed that the National Party had not successfully implemented the policy of “separate 
development,” Smith would come to believe that “the terrible thing is that apartheid has 
worked!” He argued that members of the various racial groups were totally alienated 
from one another, saying, “In South Africa today, we have four different worlds—white, 
black, Coloured and Indian—but economically interwoven. We work together but we 
don’t live together. We see each other but don’t know each other.”127 There were a 
variety of stories that Smith frequently told to demonstrate the extent of the alienation. 
Shortly after arriving at Mamelodi, Smith received a phone call from a white man. He 
told Smith that his “garden boy” had died. Smith asked what the domestic worker’s full 
name was, and the caller did not know. He asked if the domestic worker had any family, 
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where he was from, and what church he attended. Again, the man did not know. When 
Smith asked how long he had employed the domestic worker, the man said 40 years.128 
He received several phone calls to this effect.  
A major part of Smith’s ministry in Mamelodi, therefore, was building bridges. 
To be sure, he encountered a number of obstacles. Many whites found themselves 
completely reluctant to actually sit down, eat with, and talk with black people. After the 
1979 SACLA meeting, a group of participants continued holding meetings in an effort to 
put reconciliation into practice.129 While the meetings were successful, it was clear 
fellowship and reconciliation would require more in-depth contact. These former SACLA 
participants invited Smith to address one of their meetings shortly after he arrived in 
Mamelodi, and they asked him how they could create more meaningful interracial 
fellowship. Smith believed that other whites would have to follow the same path he did. 
He asked the group, “Why not move away from your static social position and enter each 
other’s worlds?”130 For Smith, this would require whites and blacks to move past a 
neutral meeting space and into one another’s homes. It would also require blacks and 
whites to eat at one another’s tables. He gave them a month to think about his proposal.  
Smith wrote that the next month, some of the white people voiced objections to 
his suggestion. One thought it was too dangerous; he had heard that a white man could 
get his throat cut in a township for 50 cents. Another woman said that blacks and whites 
ate different kinds of food. She understood that blacks ate mealie pap and chicken feet, 																																																								
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and she “simply would not be able to swallow it.”131 Finally, another said that language 
barriers would prove too difficult to overcome. Smith brought a black colleague to 
respond to these objections. He was surprised that they believed the first rumor, and 
added that he would guarantee participants’ safety. As to the second problem, Smith’s 
colleague said that he would ensure that black hosts would prepare food that white people 
were known to like. Finally, he said that most people could converse in English and/or 
Afrikaans, as these languages were important for employment in Pretoria. If whites could 
not think of what to say, they could simply try listening.132 Smith’s colleague won the 
group’s confidence.  
Smith took down the names and numbers of two white couples and put them in 
contact with two black couples. He picked the white couples up and drove them to 
Mamelodi, where they would be having dinner. The feeling in the car, he later 
remembered, was that of apprehension. Smith dropped them off, not wanting to be 
present for the conversation. When he picked them up, all the participants were enjoying 
a friendly and lively conversation. On the ride home, one woman told him, “you know 
Dr. Smith, when you brought us here tonight I was afraid as I thought I might be killed. 
But now it was the most wonderful experience instead.”133  For Smith, it demonstrated 
that direct contact between black and white South Africans would clear up false 
conceptions people had about one another, and forge links across the apartheid divide.  
This first meal was the foundation of a new organization called “Koinonia” 
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(Greek for fellowship), which would organize further meal groups. Interest in sharing 
meals grew, and more couple signed up to be members. They gathered as a group once a 
month on Sunday evenings. Smith also pioneered groups for teens. For these meetings, 
Smith was present to help guide conversation. He selected restaurants in Pretoria that 
would seat interracial parties. Other diners had mixed reactions. Some white patrons 
found the sight too much to bear, leaving the restaurant without finishing their food. 
Other patrons were surprised and delighted to see black and white youth getting along so 
well. After dinner, the group went to the cinema. A young black man remembered 
catching the disapproving gaze of a white theatergoer, and he was so afraid that he would 
be beaten up or thrown out that he clutched his armrests and stared doggedly ahead 
during the whole film. During conversations after the films, the young people would 
frequently laugh about these experiences, building a sense of shared experience.134 For 
Smith, it was proof that “both black and white fears and prejudices could slowly but 
surely be broken down.”135 These efforts would grow into a larger interracial network of 
Christians at the grassroots.  
Afrikanervolkswag 
Boshoff could agree with Smith, Bosch, Heyns, and other theologians that “the 
status quo is unacceptable.”136 He disagreed, however, with their solution to the crisis. As 
Smith worked to build bridges between blacks and whites, Boshoff formed an 
organization that aimed to strengthen distinctive Afrikaner identity. Within the NGK, 																																																								
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new pressure was mounting for visible signs of reconciliation. The ecumenical world was 
putting pressure on the NGK to abandon apartheid. The FAK and the Broederbond, by 
and large, supported Botha’s policy of reform. As Boshoff watched these events unfold, 
he worried that Afrikaners had lost their direction, and their self-determination was at 
stake. Boshoff believed that calls for reform in church, society, and politics had placed 
the Afrikaner’s cultural future in danger. In his biography, Boshoff would later write, 
“The authorities tried to prevent the revolution and tried to appease [the black majority] 
with concessions, but the economic, social, and political concessions that could be made 
without conceding power ran out. Only one concession could still be made—conceding 
control of the state.”137 Unlike the leaders of the National Party, Boshoff did not believe 
there was a stable political solution between total apartheid and majority rule. Because 
total apartheid had failed, so too had white minority rule in South Africa. If Afrikaners 
wanted to survive as a distinct people, he argued, they would have to envision a new 
future for themselves in their own homeland or Volkstaat.  
 The Boshoffs went to Verwoerd’s summer home in Betty’s Bay to reflect on the 
Afrikaner’s future. Betty’s Bay was, of course, deeply inspiring for them. Inside, an 
image by the artist Elly Holm hung on the wall depicting an eager little boy, rolling up 
his sleeve; it was entitled, “Skep u Toekoms Self,” or “Make your future yourself.” That 
determined little boy and the motto captured Boshoff’s political vision—he began 
dreaming of an independent, self-made future.138 Boshoff stood on the rocks overlooking 
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the Atlantic Ocean, where he and his father-in-law had fished together. It was, Boshoff 
later recalled, the same spot where “Dr. Verwoerd wrestled with national questions.” 
There, Boshoff came to the conclusion that he would have to form a new cultural 
organization to promote “Afrikaner freedom.”139  
 The Boshoffs used their extensive contacts and administrative skills to build this 
new organization: the Afrikanervolkswag (Afrikaner People’s Watch, or perhaps better: 
Sentinel of the Afrikaner Volk). They held a steering committee meeting at their home in 
February 1984 of roughly 120 people who became regional and national leaders.140 Anna 
promoted the new organization by sending a document to regional leaders and the press. 
Her document was a new manifestation of Christian nationalism. It affirmed “faith in the 
three person God whose word is the highest norm,” the belief that strong family life is 
“the basis of national survival,” a commitment to “the independent survival and unitary 
calling of the Afrikaner volk,” and “the responsibility of each generation to ensure 
survival.”141 The Afrikanervolkswag sought to unite Afrikaner energies and resources to 
strengthen the Afrikaners’ self-consciousness, maintain the Afrikaners’ “Calvinist” 
religious life, and promote the Afrikaans language. The Afrikanervolkswag’s cultural 
vision also encompassed political aspirations, as it would “strive for the Afrikaner’s right 
to be free and white in Africa and to govern himself within his own territory.”142 Boshoff 
was beginning to couch his Afrikaner nationalism in terms of separatism (i.e. “own 
territory”). He did not yet clearly define how that “own territory” would be different from 																																																								
139 Boshoff, Dis nou ek, 310-311. 
140 Ibid., 313-314. 
141 Ibid., 314-315.  
142 Ibid., 315. “Om te stry vir die Afrikaner se reg om vry en blank te wees in Afrika en in sy eie 
grondgebied homself te regeer.”  
		
404 
the older ideas of the “white state.”143 It was clear, however, that he was envisioning a 
markedly reduced territory for whites.    
 Organizers held the founding meeting at the Pretoria Showgrounds on May 4 and 
5, 1984. Boshoff was uncertain how many people would attend, but he became very 
enthusiastic as he saw the rows of cars and the packed hall. On the first day, there were 
between 10,000 and 12,000 people, while the next day there were between 6,000 and 
7,000.144 When Boshoff addressed the crowd, he told them that they were experiencing 
“the song of a volk’s awakening,” and he outlined a four-fold struggle for the 
Afrikanervolkswag. Theirs, he said, was first of all the struggle for a “fatherland.” The 
“white country” had become a myth, because  
the whites are busy becoming an insignificant minority in their ‘own’ country so 
that it has become impossible for him to retain it. The permanent settlement of 
others, which brought the acquisition of permanent rights, including political 
rights, became an unsolvable question in the fatherland.145  
 
The Afrikanervolkswag also struggled, in the second place, for the maintenance of the 
Afrikaner volk. The Afrikaners had been formed as a separate people in the “womb” of 
South Africa, but if they were “thrown in among the greater majority as a minority,” 
Boshoff thought it would only lead to “conflict and obliteration.”146 In the third place, he 
claimed they were struggling for the Afrikaans language. If they allowed Afrikaners to be 
a demographic minority, Afrikaans would not maintain prominence in all aspects of life. 																																																								
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He said, “Afrikaans conquered, but for how long? Are we not busy putting our own 
language in the cellar?”147 Finally, he said their struggle was for political freedom over 
and against a non-racial democracy. He asked rhetorically, “What is the future of this 
freedom in light of the reforms that are leading to majority government?”148 To be sure, it 
was not at all clear at the time that P.W. Botha’s reforms would lead to a non-racial 
democracy.  
 Boshoff emphatically rejected the accusation that the Afrikanervolkswag was a 
“political organization.” He said, “It’s only political for those who want to make 
everything politics.”149 In a technical sense, it was not a political party. It was, however, 
clearly a platform for conservative and/or right-wing political parties and organizations to 
voice their dissatisfaction with the NP and other moderate Afrikaner organizations. A 
slew of right-wing politicians spoke at the founding of the Afrikanervolkswag, including 
Jaap Marais of the HNP, A.P. Treurnicht of the CP, and the notorious Eugène 
Terre’Blanche.  
Terre’Blanche founded the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) in 1973 after 
becoming disillusioned with the “liberal tendencies” of the NP. It quickly became the 
political home for many disaffected Afrikaners. The media was drawn to AWB’s 
Swastika-like flag, its khaki-clad (and frequently out of shape) paramilitary units, and its 
members’ unabashed and crass racism. Above all, the media was drawn to Terre’Blanche 
himself. He was loud and made himself out to be far more important and influential than 																																																								
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he really was. Political Scientist Brian du Toit wrote, “The leader of the AWB is perhaps 
the most emotional and dynamic orator on the South African political scene, who can 
grip a white audience and reach crescendos which remind one of Adolf Hitler at his 
peak.”150  
Those on the right each had their own agenda, but they attempted to make a 
common cause. Boshoff and Terre’Blanche were never close friends, but they had use for 
each other. Boshoff was very different than Terre’Blanche. He was level-headed, 
academic, and soft-spoken. Members of the press considered him to be “such a kind old 
gentleman.” Mariechen Waldner added, “he is not a racist in the ordinary…Afrikaner 
sense of the word. He is one of the few people in the right-wing I have never heard make 
a racist remark.”151 Boshoff had intellectual capacities, moral sensibilities, and social 
connections far beyond the reach of Terre’Blanche. But Boshoff’s gentle and even-keeled 
manner could be rather dull.152 The firebrand Terre’Blanche brought excitement to the 
stage at the Afrikanervolkswag meeting, and his right-wing listeners found him 
energizing. The problem was that Terre’Blanche could hog the limelight. Boshoff later 
noted that when Terre’Blanche entered the hall, the media turned its attention almost 
completely to him, even though he was not even speaking that day.153  
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Treurnicht was building the Conservative Party (CP), and Boshoff’s 
Afrikanervolkswag would provide a group of potential voters. The CP would make 
tremendous gains over the course of the 1980s. In the 1987 election, they became the 
official opposition, gaining more seats than the liberal Progressive Federal Party, and 
they made even further gains in 1989. It was clear that the NP’s greatest challenge was 
not from the left, but the right. While Boshoff publically supported the CP, he later 
admitted that the party lacked a coherent plan for the future. He accused them of wanting 
to turn back the clock to the nationalism of the 1960s, while he, on the other hand, 
wanted to find a new solution for Afrikaner freedom.154  
The gathering also included numerous members of the “Old Guard,” such as 
Henning Klopper and Betsie Verwoerd, as well as other ministers and theologians, such 
as Smith’s former neighbor F.J.M. Potgieter.155 On May 5, University of Pretoria rector 
emeritus E.M. Hamman read a motion to establish the organization, “We, in great 
numbers representative here, establish the Afrikanervolkswag this morning, a non-secret 
cultural organization founded on Christian-national bases and organized on a familial 
basis with no political nature or connection.”156 This language set up the 
Afrikanervolkswag as an alternative to the Broederbond. It was an open organization that 
would not follow the NP’s party platform (though it would support conservative 
opinions). The motion continued that the Afrikanervolkswag would “stand watch over the 
whole extent of the Afrikaner’s distinctive existence and survival and will also engage 
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whites of other languages who identify with the Afrikaner volk” (i.e., English-speaking 
white South Africans).157 In this way, the Afrikanervolkswag set itself up as a 
distinctively Afrikaner nationalist organization, but it also would include English 
speaking whites who supported Afrikaner causes. By implication, it would exclude 
Afrikaans-speaking Coloured people who might also have a vested interest in the 
promotion of their home language. It very much teetered, therefore, on the line between 
“ethnic” and “white” nationalism. “Whiteness” was a defining characteristic of the 
Afrikaner community, and “whiteness” could gain a person entry into that community. 
Hamman’s motion passed, and Boshoff became chairman of yet another organization.  
The Rectors of the University of Pretoria worried that Boshoff was becoming too 
controversial. Their senior mission professor now chaired an organization that had a 
“military image” and associated with Terre’Blanche’s AWB. The University thought 
Boshoff needed to be brought in line before any embarrassments occur. On May 11, 
1984, Vice Rector Piet Oosthuizen asked Boshoff not only to resign as chairman of the 
Afrikanervolkswag but also to resign his membership altogether. Boshoff fought these 
demands with legal help.158  Many theology students came to his support, drafting a 
letter, which stated that his lectures were devoid of political bias (vooroordeel). A 
congregation in Mamelodi added that they did not suspect Boshoff of any racism, and 
they invited him to preside over the Lord’s Supper with them.159 The administration 
relented, but the tension persisted.  
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Numerous organizations hoped Boshoff would resign his membership. Boshoff 
was a director of Perskor, the Afrikaans language publisher responsible for many leading 
newspapers. When he arrived at a meeting, Hilgard Muller asked, “Have you come to 
resign?” Boshoff simply responded, “I see no reason to.”160 Piet Geyer, regional leader of 
the Orange Free State Voortrekkers, went to Boshoff personally to ask him to resign as 
national leader. Many other members joined his voice, including Mrs. A.O. Lemmer, who 
sent him the following telegraph: 
You will show true heroism and demonstrate that you have the Afrikaners’ 
interest at heart if you remove yourself as national leader of the Voortrekkers. 
Thousands of parents will withdraw their children or not let them continue if you 
are chosen again. Many small teams and commandos will lose their viability. It 
will rest heavily on your conscience if you break apart the Voortrekkers.161  
 
Again, Boshoff refused to resign. The debate leading up to his reelection at the 1985 
Voortrekker Congress in Stellenbosch was fierce. In the end, Boshoff won by a slim 
margin of 23 votes. When a reporter asked him how he felt to be reelected by such a slim 
majority, Boshoff simply answered that had he won even by one vote it would still be 
legal.162  
Boshoff’s convictions made him subject to harassment. He remembered receiving 
repeated death threats. One person went so far as to send an undertaker to his house. 
When Boshoff answered the door, the undertaker held out his order form and said, “I’m 
here to collect the body of Dr. Carel Boshoff.” When Boshoff responded that he was both 
in fact Dr. Carel Boshoff and still very much alive, the undertaker told him, “I think 
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somebody is playing a horrible joke on you.”163 In another instance, a car drove at the 
Boshoffs, forcing them to veer off the street.164 One morning, they woke up to find their 
flowerpots smashed in the street. On another occasion, the phone rang all night long 
every half hour. Owing to his self-admitted hard headedness, Boshoff refused to 
disconnect the phone or simply leave the receiver off the hook. Instead, he stayed up all 
night, wondering how much stamina the person on the other end had.165   
In spite of opposition to their activities from moderate and liberal Afrikaners, the 
Afrikanervolkswag’s membership would grow to 50,000 people.166 This growth was 
largely due to the commitment of Afrikaner nationalist women. Anna Boshoff was the 
Executive Under Chairperson, and she assembled an administrative team of women, 
including Dr. Joan Viljoen, Erna Bartleman, and Cecile Schumann.167 Anna Boshoff, 
Kobie Gouws, and Rina Coetzee put together the monthly newsletter, Die Possak. Gouws 
had publishing experience, while Coetzee offered artistic expertise. A husband and wife 
team helped with mailings. Sometimes they produced and mailed as many as 10,000 
newsletters, taking the better part of a weekend. Boshoff’s responsibility was to ensure 
that the industrious group had food.168  
The Afrikanervolkswag sought formal affiliation with the Federasie van 
Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK). It refused the request. The FAK accused the 
Afrikanervolkswag of sowing divisions among Afrikaners and creating doubt about 																																																								
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Afrikaner cultural organizations. FAK leadership believed (with good reason), that the 
Afrikanervolkswag was establishing itself as an alternative to its own organization. They 
accused the Afrikanervolkswag of being overly political rather than cultural. Boshoff, 
who was still an FAK board member at that point, resigned his membership.169 In doing 
so, Boshoff would have even less potential influence over mainstream Afrikaner 
organizations.   
Before he left, Boshoff was active on the planning committee for the FAK’s 
commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the Great Trek. The theme that they had 
selected was “Forward South Africa.” The commemoration would celebrate the sacrifices 
and compromises that the voortrekkers made, and it would even include some space for 
discussing black and Coloured participation in the trek. Boshoff claimed it was an image 
of the Trek that fit very well with the National Party’s rhetoric of “power sharing.” This 
concept upset Boshoff, who was far more interested in highlighting what he saw as the 
voortrekker’s impulse for survival. He also thought that the celebration would be 
pervaded by a casual attitude. He later wrote, “We were living in the middle of a general 
state of emergency in the country, we stood isolated against the outside world, and we 
were involved in a lingering border war; a casual celebration was certainly not 
appropriate.”170  
The Afrikanervolkswag decided to sponsor their own simultaneous 
commemoration of the Great Trek under the theme “On Trek to Our Own” (Op trek na 
ons eie),” which fit more squarely with the idea of Afrikaner independence. The 																																																								
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Afrikanervolkswag decided to have commemoration ceremonies at Vegkop and Cape 
Town in 1986, at Paardekraal near Krugersdorp in 1987, and finally the main ceremony 
would be at Donkerhoek outside Pretoria in December 1988. Concurrently, the FAK 
would be having their commemoration at the Voortrekker Monument.171 Boshoff dryly 
wrote in his autobiography that they selected Donkerhoek because “the amphitheater at 
the Voortrekker Monument would not be available that day.”172 The accusations of 
dividing the Afrikaners would, therefore, prove to be very well founded. While the 
centenary commemoration of the Great Trek unified Afrikaners in 1938, the 1988 
commemoration would show just how divided the Afrikaners had become. Their unity 
had unraveled to such an extent that they could no longer remember their history 
together. 
The Afrikanervolkswag held its first “Folk Festival” on October 10, 1985, 
celebrating Paul Kruger’s commitment to Afrikaner freedom. Anna read and sang, Kosie 
Prinsloo played Kruger, and Prof. Alkmaar Swart portrayed a “bittereinder.” Participants 
were given a document that had a perforated section with a pledge on it. It committed the 
signer to the triune God and the Bible, Afrikaner political freedom, an Afrikaner 
fatherland, the Afrikaans language, Christian national education, Afrikaner economic 
independence, and the spiritual power of the Afrikaners’ “will to survive distinctly and 
free.” The pledge concluded with the line, “Aware of my responsibility before God and 
my volk, I therefore undertake to pray, to work, and to strive for the survival 
(voortbestaan) of my volk in concord with its history, traditions, and values that animated 																																																								
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those who fought this fight before me.”173 After signing the document, participants tore 
off the perforated section, and handed it in before leaving the event. It reaffirmed the 
signers’ commitment to Afrikaner independence, while deriding those (like David Bosch 
and Nico Smith) who sought to make the church “into a tool for integration.”174 
Boshoff’s organizations attempted to reaffirm conservative values (i.e. “biblical” 
Christianity, Afrikaner culture, Afrikaner self-determination, etc.), while at the same time 
reimagining them within the context of a Volkstaat. This vision was also meant to pose a 
challenge to the growing popularity of interracial reconciliation as a moral model for race 
and ethnic relations in South Africa.   
Moving into Mamelodi 
While Boshoff became increasingly convinced that a Volkstaat was the only 
moral solution for white survival in South Africa, the Smiths moved into a black 
township. While attending a lecture by Henri Nouwen in the United States, the Smiths 
were struck by his insistence on truly identifying with the people one serves. While Smith 
worked at Mamelodi, and while Ellen worked at a black hospital, the Medical University 
of South Africa (Medunsa), they both returned to a leafy white enclave at the end of 
every day. As in the days of working on the mission station, they had an ostensibly white 
space to return to at the end of every day, and this put distance between them and the 
people they were serving. They decided that they would leave Meyerspark and move into 
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the township.175  
Smith decided to go through the legal channels to move to Mamelodi. He wrote to 
the cabinet minister for the Department of Cooperation and Development, Piet Koornhof 
(who had been at SACLA). Smith explained his motivation, saying that he felt 
hypocritical not living among the people he was serving. Smith further appealed to 
Koornhof’s family ties, asking what his father, who was a minister, would have done in a 
similar situation. It took a long time for the response to come. Koornhof apologized for 
the delay, but said that due to the unusual nature of the request, he had to consult a wide 
variety of people. The government decided that the matter was up to Mamelodi’s 
management council, and when it voiced no objections, the Smiths were legally allowed 
to move to Mamelodi.176   
There was, however, nowhere for the Smiths to live. Given the severity of the 
housing shortage, they could not expect to occupy a house that was already built. The 
DRCA, however, owned a plot where they could build a manse. They would receive 
financial assistance from American contacts. The Smiths had hosted Frank and Hermenia 
Alton, Presbyterians from California, in 1982. While they were there, it was discovered 
that Hermenia had a brain tumor, and the Smiths provided the Alton with a great deal of 
support through the ordeal.177 While Hermenia passed away in the United States, the 
relationship between the Smiths and Alton remained. Smith turned to Alton’s Bel Air 
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Presbyterian Church for assistance, and they agreed to fund the project.178  
While the Smiths did not want to build “a typical white suburban house” in an 
impoverished black township, they also thought “the common matchbox design of the 
existing houses was totally inadequate.” Much in the same way that Smith had hired a 
white architect to design an African church, he hired an architect to design a house that 
would “fit in better in Mamelodi.”179 It was a geodesic dome inspired by American 
architect Buckminster Fuller. Smith thought it resembled an African hut. It had an open 
plan downstairs to promote openness as well as a bedroom upstairs with study space for 
Ellen. 180 It is ironic that in seeking to identify with the local people, Smith opted to make 
such a unique house. Far from fitting in, it stood out as an anomaly. Local township 
residents called it the “pumpkin house” or the “tortoise house” given its distinctive shape. 
The house also took a great deal longer to build than the Smiths would have hoped, 
owing in no small part to its bizarre shape and to the intricate web of township building 
codes. When Smith described the ordeal of regulations to a black friend, his friend could 
only laugh, saying “Now you’re really becoming a black man—that’s what we go 
through from birth to death.”181 
One of the major aspects of any public ministry is garnering public attention, and 
Smith was no stranger to media grandstanding. That did not, however, preclude the 
sincerity of his actions. He wanted very much to identify with the people of Mamelodi, 
and live as a member of the community. After his move to Mamelodi, Smith told 																																																								
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reporters that he was “an ordinary member of the black community.”182 This, of course, 
was not true. The Smiths had many difficulties adjusting. He later remembered they 
never got used to the design of the house. He said, “it was far too small to our liking and 
there was very little privacy. If we had visitors, Ellen would have to wait in the bedroom 
to be private. This really was a great injustice to her.”183 Unlike “ordinary members” of 
Mamelodi, they stored most of their furniture at the Meyerspark manse, and later at a 
smallholding they purchased outside of Pretoria. Nico tended to drive modest vehicles, 
while Ellen, a successful psychiatrist, drove a Mercedes. When Nico asked Ellen to give 
the car up, she refused. Not only did she believe that she was already giving up enough, 
but the move to Mamelodi meant a longer commute to her job at Medunsa. She would 
keep the Mercedes.184  
The sounds of the township were new to Smith, as he told journalist Allister 
Sparks. He was struck by the fact that in the morning, he did not wake up to bird songs, 
but rather the crowing of roosters. Smith said this was because there were no trees in the 
townships for birds to build their nests, and people kept chickens because the market 
price of eggs was too high. Likewise, Smith added, “I’m sure everyone in Mamelodi has 
a dog.” The Smiths were also struck by the lack of sound in the evenings, saying that 
“everything was so deathly quiet,” because residents had to go to bed early to make it to 
work on time in the morning.185 																																																								
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Proximity to one’s parishioners, while so essential, could be detrimental. The 
Smiths house became a gathering place. People came to Smith in need of urgent care, to 
discuss problems, meet one another, or merely sit together in silence. People also arrived 
at all times of the day, and even late into the night. The fact that their house was much 
smaller than they were used to was compounded by the fact that they frequently had 
guests.186 While they sincerely wanted to better identify with their black parishioners, the 
Smiths found themselves wanting for privacy and unable to live the lifestyle to which 
they were accustomed.  
Conclusion 
 
Moral leaders were attempting to forge paths that would lead Afrikaners to 
radically different places. Boshoff wanted to encourage total separation, but by the 
middle of the 1980s, this hardline position was pushed out of the center of Afrikaner 
moral thinking, cultural movements, and politics. It was clear that many Afrikaner moral 
leaders at the center, like Johan Heyns, were ready to follow new directions. Heyns 
would prove to be, as theologian J.H.P. Serfontein rightly pointed out in 1982, the 
“barometer of change.”187 He stood between Boshoff on the one hand and Smith and 
Bosch on the other. In the early 1980s, he supported moderate reform, but not necessarily 
a totally new South Africa. It is worth noting that Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff all found 
Botha’s reforms wanting. Mainstream Afrikaner thought proved too conservative for 
Smith, who left Stellebosch to work in Mamelodi. He began to see personal connections 																																																								
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between black and white people as vital to South Africa’s future. For his part, Bosch 
remained within the NGK. Though he was no radical, he would not celebrate moderate 
reform. It left too little unchanged, and too many people excluded and dissatisfied. By the 
middle of the 1980s, Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff were using their platforms as academics 
and building institutions that pushed and pulled Afrikaners in different directions. While 
the scales were noticeably tipping toward reconciliation (broadly construed), there was 
the very real possibility that conservatives could organize their efforts to move them back 
again. These conversations would become all the more pressing by the middle of the 
decade, as large-scale protests against the government gained momentum, and the 
government responded with repressive measures.    
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CHAPTER 8: 
DARKNESS BEFORE THE DAWN (1984–1989)  
Botha’s reforms left millions of black South Africans without any real political voice. 
There were widespread protests and coordinated resistance, and Botha’s government 
responded with force. The NP was largely paralyzed, unwilling to take more drastic steps 
in any direction. This created a new crisis of confidence for many of those Afrikaners 
who initially supported reform. They clearly were not working. Very quickly, new issues 
were at stake for Christian leaders. Demonstrating the shift at the center of the NGK, 
Heyns sided more openly with Bosch, and they would promote a negotiated settlement. 
The leading participants in SACLA such as Bosch, Cassidy, and Tutu, gathered in 1985 
to form the National Initiative for Reconciliation (NIR). Unlike SACLA, the NIR would 
call on Botha to release political prisoners and begin negotiations. Heyns not only 
attended the NIR, but he also arranged for a number of NGK ministers to be present as 
well. Signaling its readiness for new directions, the NGK elected Heyns moderator in 
1986. 
For some, however, the NIR did not go far enough. The violence and fear of the 
1980s surrounded Smith in Mamelodi, and in response, he became increasingly radical. 
He signed the “Kairos Document,” which was a theological statement that supported the 
liberation struggle. While he would attempt to bring white and black people together to 
prepare for a new dispensation, he lost all hope that a peaceful settlement would be 
possible. He thought that only a “catharsis of bloodletting” would bring the NP to its 
knees. On the other hand, Boshoff joined the conservative white voices that rejected any 
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movement toward the loss of white minority rule. Conservatives, however, disagreed 
over what alternatives to propose. The newly formed Conservative Party merely 
suggested that it would continue to implement the homeland policy. Boshoff, however, 
recognized that this had not provided a solution. He came to believe that the only way for 
Afrikaners to maintain their power would be to establish a new Volkstaat in the sparsely 
populated Karoo. The decade took its toll on all three men. Bosch became deeply 
skeptical of the prospects for peace, Boshoff was getting older and increasingly isolated, 
while Smith suffered from what today might be termed activist burnout. In the late 1980s, 
Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff worked very hard to build institutions and movements that 
promoted new and competing visions of the future (while at the same time becoming 
deeply worried about what that future might hold).   
The Failure of Reform 
Botha’s reforms were a miserable failure. While they may have satisfied some 
moderate white voters, they upset the white right and left the black majority without any 
real power. The ANC encouraged people to reject all reforms that fell short of majority 
rule and the complete elimination of all apartheid laws. Oliver Tambo sought to mobilize 
mass protests, making 1983 “the year of United Action.”1 Allan Boesak called on various 
resistance organizations to pool their resources, leading to the formation of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF was a loose association that brought together trade 
unions, youth groups, civic organizations, cultural associations, and religious 
communities. At its peak, there were 700 subscribing member organizations. The UDF 																																																								
1 Ineke van Kessel, “Beyond our wildest dreams”: The United Democratic Front and the 
Transformation of South Africa (University of Virginia Press, 2000), 16.  
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coordinated efforts and provided mutual assistance at both the local and the national 
level. Culturally, the UDF evoked many of the songs and language of the 1950s congress 
movement. They adopted symbols of the struggle in the 1950s: the Freedom Charter, 
protest songs, and heroes like Nelson Mandela. Protestors also adopted the toyi-toyi, 
which was a kind of dance used in training ANC guerrilla fighters in exile.2  
For many young black people, the future seemed bleak. The economic growth of 
the 1960s and 1970s had begun to slow down, even without sanctions.3 Inflation and 
unemployment increased and were exacerbated by the rapid growth in population. Rents 
were on the rise, overcrowding was rampant, and the quality of education was low. 
Young black people no longer believed that the government, churches, schools, or 
parents had answers to their most pressing concerns. They began to reject white 
institutions and developed a generational consciousness.4 When Smith began working in 
Mamelodi, he noted that while middle age and older people had “inbred respect for 
whites,” younger people “would often yell at me in a disrespectful way, wanting to know 
why I was there and telling me in no uncertain terms to ‘go home.’”5  
For this young generation of black protestors, participation in “the movement” 
gave life meaning, and it gained its own sanctity. In the mid-1980s, the younger members 
of the movement began to become increasingly iconoclastic, openly aligning with the 
banned ANC, embracing a more robust socialist program, and employing confrontational 
methods. The UDF cautiously followed this youthful energy, though some members still 																																																								
2 Tom Lodge, “Resistance and Reform,” The Cambridge History of South Africa, Vol. 2, eds. 
Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 440-442. 
3 Saul Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994 (Oxford University Press, 2014), 117.  
4 William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (Oxford University Press, 2001), 261. 
5 Nico Smith, “The God of my fathers died in Mamelodi” (Unpublished manuscript, 2010), 88.  
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negotiated with the white government.6 Protesters sought to overthrow township 
government, remove “collaborators,” boycott rents and certain consumer products, and 
replace state institutions with “people power,” which external ANC commentators 
described as “a new type of governability—a people’s government—at an embryonic 
stage.”7 “People power” could be shocking to the wider world. “People’s Courts” were 
set up to try crimes, and those viewed as collaborators were often condemned to die by 
“necklacing,” or execution by burning a tire around a person’s neck.8  
 In the same way that Verwoerd’s government acted quickly to extinguish protests 
in the early 1960s, Botha’s government attempted to quell protests, “people power,” and 
ANC support by quickly applying coercive measures.9 In September 1984, the 
government deployed the SADF (i.e. military) to support police in the townships for the 
first time since 1960. Botha declared a state of emergency in July of 1985, which was 
lifted in February of 1986. During this time, roughly 8,000 people were detained and 
nearly 600 died, half of whom were killed by police. Again, in June 1986, Botha declared 
a second state of emergency, granting security forces even greater powers. The media 
was no longer able to record images in the townships, certain gatherings were banned, 
citizens were subject to curfews, and political funerals were limited. Over the next year, 
around 26,000 people were detained.10 In June 1985, the ANC declared its intention of 
sponsoring a people’s war, and they called for moving the violence from black areas to 																																																								
6 Lodge, 446-448. 
7 Mzala in Lodge, 448.  
8 Beinart, 261.  
9 War and Society: The Militarization of South Africa, eds. Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, 
(David Philip, 1989), 142-143.   
10 Beinart, 265. 
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the hitherto secure white suburbs. In 1985, there were 136 attacks in white areas, and then 
in 1986, there were 228, mostly involving hand grenades.11 It was a violent time that 
eyewitnesses began to describe as a civil war.  
Smith’s ministry in Mamelodi was, in large part, shaped by the violence that 
accompanied widespread protest and state repression. In November 1985, women 
gathered to protest rising rents in Mamelodi. The mayor got into an armored car and 
addressed the women with a loudspeaker. When those in the back of the gathering could 
not hear, they began protesting loudly. The police became anxious, and declared the 
gathering illegal, giving the women five minutes to disperse. As Smith wrote, “ordinary 
members of the Security Forces, mostly young badly-trained and frightened men, did not 
wait five minutes.”12 Instead, they fired tear gas into the crowd. In the mad rush to 
disperse, a woman tripped and fell. According to Smith, a policeman grabbed the woman 
by her hair and shot her in the head. The woman’s mother saw this and went running to 
the scene screaming. As she attempted to be with her daughter, a policeman callously told 
her to “Fuck off!” In the midst of the chaos and confusion, however, she managed to 
collect her daughter’s brain and put it in a plastic bag. She went home as quickly as 
possible.13 Later, she told Smith that she would put the brain with her daughter before she 
was buried. The inhumanity of the situation challenged Smith’s faith immensely. He 
wondered, “How could one continue to believe in God under these circumstances?”14   
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12 Smith, 112. 
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13 women died that day.15 They were to have a funeral at Mamelodi Stadium. The 
police demanded that they be present to maintain “law and order.” The youth found this 
completely unacceptable, and they turned to Smith to act as negotiator. Smith was happy 
to do this, and set up a meeting with the police commissioner and two generals. He asked 
if they would be willing to negotiate with a group of black youth. While they were 
reluctant at first, they decided that if they could get the name and addresses of those on 
the black negotiation party, they would come to the table. When Smith told the black 
youth this demand, they laughed in his face. They told him that they would use the 
information to arrest them. When Smith returned to the police, they pretended to be 
innocent of such intentions. They agreed to unconditional negotiations, which were 
observed and mediated by Smith. The negotiators came to the agreement that there would 
be plain-clothes policemen at the funeral.16  
The stadium was packed with mourners, and it included a number of foreign 
dignitaries and whites from Pretoria. Many ministers took part, and Smith was among 
them. The youth danced the toyi-toyi around the stadium while singing liberation songs. 
Winnie Mandela was present at the graveside service. As the wife of Nelson Mandela and 
a determined freedom fighter in her own right, Winnie Mandela was an inspirational 
figure for those in the movement.17 Smith, however, worried that she might ignite a 
volatile situation. He pleaded with her not to make any speeches by the open graves, but 																																																								
15 “Mamelodi massacre commemorated,” Pretoria East Rekord, November 21, 2014.  
16 Smith, 114-116.  
17 Winnie Mandela was not without controversy. She was accused of the kidnapping and killing of 
Stompie Seipei—a suspected informant. She was also accused of endorsing “necklacing.” A recent 
documentary suggests that Nelson Mandela undermined Winnie Mandela’s radical edge, and that the 
former made too many concessions to the white government. Pascale Lamche, Winnie, Filmed [February 
28, 2017]. 98 min.   
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rather to speak at the stadium instead. He offered to make an announcement to that 
effect.18 Winnie Mandela agreed to Smith’s request, and as the funeral ended, she left 
with a large crowd of singing youth following her. Smith later remembered that her 
speech was well received (though he said it was in “an African language,” so he could 
not understand it). He later admitted, “I was very glad when she eventually drove away 
without any further incident.”19  
Smith’s work in Mamelodi was punctuated by the tragic violence of the time. 
When the Smiths moved to Mamelodi, they quickly befriended their neighbors, Dr. 
Fabian and Florence Ribeiro. Dr. Ribeiro had been established in Mamelodi since 1961, 
when he opened a clinic. He treated a number of people who were victims of police 
brutality and torture. For those active in the struggle, his clinic provided a safe alternative 
to government hospitals. Ribeiro recorded the testimonies of some of these patients, and 
they wound up in the international film, “Witness to Apartheid,” which exposed the 
brutality of the state.20 He was charged with treason in 1980, but famous anti-apartheid 
lawyer George Bizos successfully defended him. In early 1986, their house had been 
totally destroyed by a petrol bomb. Over the course of that year, there were several 
unsuccessful attempts on his life. Ribeiro courageously stayed at his practice, undeterred. 
On the night of December 1, 1986, Smith heard gunshots. He went outside and saw many 
people running toward Ribeiros’ house. He saw a red Volkswagen Golf speeding away 																																																								
18 Smith, 116. 
19 Ibid., 116-117.  
20 “Witness to Apartheid,” dirs. Kevin Harris and Sharon I. Sopher (1986). Sopher’s work was 
also controversial. It was seen in some quarters as sensationalistic and lacked critical distance (it included a 
long animated sequence in which she described her own thoughts and feelings while being interrogated by 
police). It also won her an Emmy in 1986.  
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with several men in balaclavas. Fabian and Florence Ribeiro had been shot and killed in 
their courtyard. Many years later, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission uncovered 
that the Northern Transvaal Security Branch and the Special Forces of the South African 
National Defense Force coordinated their assassination.21 
Though the Ribeiro family was Catholic, they asked Smith to conduct the funeral. 
Denominational differences mattered very little as various churches shared the common 
goal of a free and democratic South Africa. The security forces demanded that Smith 
keep them abreast of all plans. Smith led the service in his preaching robe, walking in 
front of the hearse. Armed soldiers lined the streets, and the mourners were emotionally 
charged. Smith worried that it would lead to greater unrest.22 Smith led the service in the 
Catholic Church, which was attended by various community leaders and foreign 
dignitaries. One of the Ribeiros’ children suggested that the famous Progressive Federal 
Party MP Helen Suzman should speak. When Smith made the announcement, a group of 
young people became incensed. Smith asked one youth leader why they were upset, and 
the young man told him that though she was in the opposition, she was still participated 
with and benefited from the present regime. Smith decided to rescind his previous 
invitation, telling Suzman to stay in her seat. Smith remembered, “It was very difficult 
for me to say this to someone of her stature and it must have been a bitter pill to 
																																																								
21 Smith, 126-127. During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Charl Naude, former 
commander of the South African Defense Forces Special Forces Unit, took full responsibility for the deaths 
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daughter, Jane Ribeiro, later claimed that the TRC was “a sham that left them [i.e. the family] in the cold 
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swallow.”23 Suzman acquiesced to the request. These events and experiences radicalized 
Smith, aligning his sympathies more with the goals of the liberation struggle.  
Apart from witnessing the brutality of the state, Smith also had a first hand 
experience with “necklacing.” After a young man living in a hostel had committed 
suicide, activists organizing the funeral asked Smith personally to conduct the service. At 
the graveside, some young people came up to Smith and said that a suspected impimpi, or 
informant, had been caught, and they were going to necklace him. They asked Smith to 
intervene on the man’s behalf. Smith had absolutely no intention of intervening for this 
person, or going anywhere near the scene. He tried to pretend he was too busy, but the 
group grabbed him by his preaching robe and pulled him toward the hostel where the 
man was being held. What Smith saw terrified him, he said, “I saw a circle of young 
people intent on murder; their eyes looked unseeing as a result of the red veil of absolute 
unbridled anger and bloodlust.”24 In the middle of the circle, a man had a tire around his 
neck. As if pushed by some “unknown power,” Smith felt compelled to shout, “For God 
sake, this is madness—please stop!”25  
Then there was silence. The men looked at Smith. He had interrupted an 
execution, and he had to account for his action. Smith asked them to take the man before 
the people’s court. If he had to die, he told them to base his death on a conviction, and not 
on pure suspicion. The men agreed. Smith wrote, “the danger had been averted. The tire 
was removed from the victim’s neck and he was dragged away into the hostels to be 
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brought before a people’s court sitting that night.”26 Smith never heard about the case or 
what happened to the man, and it could very well be that the man was found to be an 
informant and condemned to death anyway. In many ways, Smith accepted the legitimacy 
of people power while also struggling to be a moral voice in a time of violence and 
upheaval.  
 Bosch and Smith were both increasingly critical of state sponsored violence. 
Beginning in 1967, military conscription was introduced for all white South African men. 
By the mid-1970s, these young conscripts often went to fight in the Border War in 
northern Namibia and southern Angola. Conscripts might also be called into the police 
force, where they would have to respond to black protests. Many young white men found 
this tantamount to taking up arms against fellow South Africans, and perpetrating acts of 
violence on behalf of a system with which they did not agree. When two missiology 
students at UNISA refused to obey their conscription orders, they were court martialed. 
They both asked David Bosch to help them plead their case. Bosch defended civil 
disobedience along biblical lines. Bosch had to argue this case against a number of 
leading NGK theologians, including Johan Heyns and F.J.M. Potgieter.27 Bosch was 
successful, and the two young men were required to do six years of community service 
(twice the length of military service). Bosch would later support a Buddhist’s application 
against military service as well. While the council initially rejected the application, 
saying that Buddhists did not believe in the moral compulsion of a deity, Bosch, 
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(Cluster Publications, 2011), 82-84. 
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however, claimed that the young man was still acting from religious motivation, and 
therefore qualified as a conscientious objector. Bosch’s own son, Dawie, would also be a 
conscientious objector.28  
  Military service took its toll on many white families. Smith told the story of his 
namesake, Nico Smith Olivier. After Smith moved to Pretoria, Smith and Olivier became 
very close. The young Nico helped Smith set up his study. Yet once Olivier was called up 
to military service, his attitude toward Smith changed. His commanding officer told him 
Smith was a communist, and there was nothing Smith could say to change his mind.29 
Olivier rose through the ranks to become a corporal in the SADF’s 1st Parachute 
Battalion. Just weeks before the end of his period of military service (and only a few days 
shy of his 20th birthday), Olivier was sent to Nindango, Angola. There, SWAPO forces 
supported by Cuban tanks and the FAPLA ambushed the SADF. Olivier was shot through 
the heart and killed instantly. He died along with 15 other South Africans, and 67 were 
wounded. At the funeral, some members of the family turned their backs to Smith, but 
Olivier’s mother invited him to sit in the front row with the family. He left after the 
eulogy, opting not to attend the internment at “heroes acre.”30  
 Young white men were conscripted to buttress the same regime that young black 
people struggled to bring down. It was a time of increased violence. Black protests 
against white minority rule became widespread, while state repression became 
increasingly brutal. Deaths of unarmed black people totally shattered the moral 
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legitimacy of the South African government and Botha’s reforms. The reality of young 
men’s dead bodies returning from the border gave a face to the possibility of a civil 
war.31 For many South Africans, the future looked bloody and bleak. The political and 
violent crises of the mid-1980s compelled Christian leaders to look for new solutions.  
NIR and Kairos 
Michael Cassidy called a national meeting to discuss plans for regional follow-
ups to SACLA for August 1985. On July 25, 1985, the government declared a State of 
Emergency, only two weeks after Cassidy sent the invitations. Many would-be delegates 
found themselves unable to travel, while still others were imprisoned. The day of the 
conference, there was also “a violent uprising of Zulus against Indians in Natal.”32 
Cassidy and the 70 delegates who gathered decided that leaders would have to meet 
again, forming an initiative to address the growing unrest and state repression throughout 
the country.33   
 To that end, African Enterprise gathered 400 leaders in Pietermaritzburg in 
September. There, delegates listened to lectures by many South African speakers who 
had taken an active role at SACLA, including Desmond Tutu, Khoza Mgojo, Klaus 
Nürnberger, and David Bosch.34 At the end of the meeting, Cassidy proposed the 
formation of the “National Initiative for Reconciliation” (NIR). While the NIR’s 
foundational documents were rooted in the language of evangelistic mission, the initiative 																																																								
31 Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (University of Virginia Press, 2009), 
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32 Michael Cassidy, “Initiative for reconciliation in South Africa,” Transformation vol. 3 no. 1 
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33 Ibid., 1-4.  
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was clearly aimed at supporting those efforts that brought Christians of different racial 
groups together for “meaningful fellowship, worship and discussion.” The NIR would 
seek to educate South Africans about current events, as well as “prepare people for living 
in a changed and totally non-racial land.” This would include having white people “share 
the South African reality of suffering” by having them spend time in townships. To that 
end, it would support Smith’s Koinonia programs. The NIR would work on a regional 
basis, addressing itself to the grassroots, “to continue this process of reconciliation and to 
initiate concrete changes in South African society.”35  
 After the abysmal failure of the government’s reforms, it was clear that many of 
the leaders who had gathered at SACLA were willing to move in a more radical direction. 
The NIR wanted to send a delegation to the State President, which would call for an end 
to the State of Emergency and the removal of the South African Defense Force and the 
Emergency Police from the townships. While the leadership of the NIR envisioned a 
common society, they did not endorse a political model beyond “equitable power 
sharing” (which would not necessarily mean “majority rule”). However, it was clear that 
the NIR believed that radical black voices had to be included in the negotiating process 
for a new South Africa. They called on the government to begin talks with the “authentic 
leaders of the various population groups,” not just those that were congenial to the state. 
To that end, the NIR would call on the State President to “release all detainees and 
political prisoners, withdraw charges against the treason trialists and allow exiles to 
return home.” It did not name the ANC, PAC, or South African Communist Party 																																																								
35 “National Initiative for Reconciliation: Statement of Affirmation,” Journal of Theology for 
Southern Africa vol. 54 (March 1986), 52.  
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specifically, but those were clearly the parties it had in mind. The NIR would also 
advocate the elimination of all forms of legal discrimination and the establishment of a 
common system of education for all South African youth.36  
While unions and political organizations organized “stay aways,” the NIR called 
for a “pray away.” On October 9, they called on all South African Christians to stay away 
from work to spend the day in prayer and repentance “for those sinful aspects of our 
national life which have led us to the present crisis.”37 They also asked Christian 
employers to encourage their employees to observe the day, shutting down their shops 
and offices.   
There were 60 Afrikaans-speakers among the delegates, including 50 NGK 
ministers. Johan Heyns provided funds for airplane tickets for many of the NGK 
ministers in attendance. Afrikaner delegates issued their own statement at the conference, 
repenting of the support that “our churches gave to apartheid over the decades and 
especially that we even tried to justify it theologically.”38 The Afrikaans delegates also 
repented of the way that they had “violated the unity of the church,” both within their 
own denomination (by forming separate churches for different racial groups) and in the 
wider ecumenical community. As they joined with the wider NIR in promoting a new 
South Africa, the NGK delegates also began to repent of their history of separation.39  
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Image 2: Left to right, Michael Cassidy, David Bosch, and Desmond Tutu. Michael Cassidy and Friends. 
https://michaelcassidyandfriends.org/.  
 
Heyns’ connection with the NIR was significant. In spite of the fact that he judged 
conscientious objector cases for the SADF, he was a verligte voice in the NGK who was 
largely rejected by the conservative wing of the church. While he was open to Botha’s 
reforms in the early 1980s, it was also clear that he was looking for new options by the 
mid-1980s. Interracial missionary gatherings like SACLA and the NIR gave Heyns and 
other Afrikaners new moral language—specifically the language of reconciliation. 
Throughout the second half of the 1980s, Heyns would increasingly advocate for 
negotiation between the NP and political parties representing the interests of the black 
majority. By 1989, he would publically insist that the NP drop its demand that the ANC 
renounce violence before negotiations could begin.40 Heyns’ connection with the NIR 																																																								
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was a clear sign to conservatives that if he ever gained a leadership role in the NGK, he 
would steer the church away from apartheid and closer toward the morality of 
reconciliation.  
In their addresses to the NIR, both Tutu and Bosch wanted to give the concept of 
reconciliation sacrificial meaning. Tutu argued that reconciliation would not be a way of 
avoiding evil, but rather confronting it.41 Those who were to do the work of reconciliation 
needed to be willing to sacrifice their popularity, their security, and even their lives. Tutu 
was also clear that reconciliation could only take place between fully human individuals. 
As long as white people oppressed black people, they could not truly ask for forgiveness, 
as Tutu wrote, “How can you ask forgiveness of someone when you still have your foot 
firmly planted on his neck?”42 He commented that while the banners around the room 
said, “Go first and be reconciled with your brother,” reconciliation could only occur 
when brothers looked at each other face to face; one brother could not be prostrate on the 
floor.43 
 Bosch gave twelve theses on reconciliation, the first of which was that “cheap 
reconciliation is the deadly enemy of the church.” For Bosch, the demands of 
reconciliation could not be separated from justice. Reconciliation required self-
examination, repentance, and forgiveness. For Christians, this would mean a painful self-
sacrifice that would affect “those elements in our lives that touch us most deeply, which 
we are most attached or devoted to, without which—so we believe—we simply cannot 																																																								
41 Desmond Tutu, “The Processes of Reconciliation and the Demand of Obedience,” 
Transformation vol. 3 no. 2 (1986), 6. 
42 Ibid., 5. 
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exist.”44 For Afrikaners, this would mean sacrificing their political and economic 
privilege. He wrote, “I am suggesting that we should begin thinking about the possible 
emergence of a situation where we, as white, Afrikaner Christians, become the 
underdogs.”45 Such a statement was profound. It meant that Bosch was more committed 
to reconciliation than he was to Afrikaners being able to determine their own affairs 
politically, and perhaps even Afrikaner survival. For Bosch, Afrikaners ought to give up 
power for the sake of reconciliation because it would be the right thing to do. This would 
not be easy; on the contrary, it would require nothing short of divine intervention.46    
In the same way that SACLA had drawn criticism from both the left and the right, 
so did the NIR. For conservative Afrikaners like Boshoff, the NIR was advocating a non-
racial democracy and therefore threatening the Afrikaners’ independent existence as a 
volk. For many conservatives, the very presence of Desmond Tutu marked the NIR and 
the “Day of Prayer” as “political.” Michael Cassidy later lamented that the NIR called for 
the Day of Prayer on a weekday. He wrote, “It was what the blacks in the NIR wanted but 
it was difficult for many of the whites to cope with. We felt we were walking the plank. I 
didn’t interpret it as a strike or stay-away. I said people should take a day’s leave, that it 
should be responsibly done.”47 There was some question as to how far white Christians 
were willing to invest in “costly reconciliation.” From the left, reconciliation was 
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increasingly regarded as a white code word for “peace without justice.” It may lead to 
“having a cup of tea and a hug,” while doing nothing to change the political situation.48  
Skepticism about white reconciliation was compounded after the publication of 
the “Kairos Document,” which advocated a more robust theology of liberation. Frank 
Chikane and Albert Nolan gathered a group of ministers in Soweto in June 1985 to 
discuss the church’s response to the growing protests and state repression. Chikane was a 
social activist minister in the Apostolic Faith Mission. Owing to his political activities, he 
was suspended as a minister by his denomination in 1981. Undeterred, he remained 
active in both political and ecumenical circles. Chikane served as vice-president of the 
United Democratic Front’s Transvaal Region from 1983 until 1985. Also beginning in 
1983, Chikane served as director of the Institute for Contextual Theology (ICT), which 
was founded in 1981 to formulate a theological response to the context of black 
oppression and white minority rule.49 Nolan was a white South African Catholic, who 
joined the Dominican Order in the mid-1950s. He rose through church hierarchy, 
becoming vicar general of the Dominican Order in South Africa, and he was elected 
Master of the Order of Preachers in Rome. He turned down the latter job, opting to stay 
in South Africa.50 He worked with Chikane at the ICT.  
 After the Soweto meeting in June, a working committee put together several 
drafts which were circulated for comments. These efforts resulted in the “Kairos 
Document,” which was published by the ICT in September 1985. The document said that 																																																								
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South Africa had arrived at its kairos, that is to say, God was calling God’s people to a 
decisive action. There were, the document said, three theologies at play: state theology, 
church theology, and prophetic theology. State theology blessed the status quo with its 
“racism, capitalism and totalitarianism.” It misused Romans 13 to enforce an unjust law 
and order, while dismissing any oppositional voices “communists.” These theologians 
had constructed a “mischievous, sinister and evil” idol. They wrote,  
It is the god of superior weapons who conquered those who were armed with 
nothing but spears. It is the god of the casspirs and hippos, the god of teargas, 
rubber bullets, sjamboks, prison cells and death sentences. Here is a god who 
exalts the proud and humbles the poor—the very opposite of the God of the 
Bible...The god of the South African State is not merely an idol or false god, it is 
the devil disguised as Almighty God—the antichrist.”51  
 
The Kairos theologians accused the NGK of subscribing to this heretical theology.  
The Kairos theologians accused “church theology” (particularly that of the 
“English-speaking churches”) of only making “limited, guarded, and cautious” critiques 
of apartheid. They “relied on a few stock ideas derived from Christian tradition” which 
they applied to the South African situation, namely: reconciliation, justice, and non-
violence. Reconciliation was not yet appropriate for the South African situation, because 
“one side is right and the other wrong. There are conflicts where one side is a fully armed 
and violent oppressor while the other side is defenseless and oppressed.”52 Black South 
Africans were engaged in a struggle for justice against injustice.53 The Kairos theologians 
argued that there were situations where Christians could use “physical force,” but only if 
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it were 1) a last resort and 2) the lesser of two evils (citing Bonhoeffer).54 There were, 
naturally, excessive forms of violence that the church could not approve of (i.e. 
necklacing).55 Church theology’s insistence on “non-violence” was often hypocritical; it 
demanded that black protesters remain peaceful while tacitly endorsing state violence.    
 Against state and church theology, the Kairos theologians sought to move toward 
a “prophetic theology,” which supported the liberation movement. According to 
prophetic theology, God stood on the side of the oppressed.56 In line with Christian 
tradition, they argued that tyrannical government has no moral legitimacy. A tyrant acts 
as “the enemy of the common good.” Because apartheid sought to promote the interests 
of the white minority, not in the interests of all, it was tyrannical. Any reforms that 
allowed a white minority to remain in power while excluding the majority would 
continue to be tyrannical, and the majority would continue to reject them. Christians were 
called on to love their enemies (i.e. the oppressors), and to care for the oppressed. The 
only way they could do both, the Kairos theologians argued, was to “remove the tyrants 
from power and establish a just government for the common good of all the people.”57 
The struggle would have to intensify, as “there is no other way to remove the injustice 
and oppression.”58  
Against the idea of the church as an “alternative community,” the Kairos 
theologians argued that, “The church must avoid becoming a ‘third force,’ a force 
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between the oppressor and the oppressed.”59 Instead, it was called on to consult, 
coordinate, and cooperate with “the struggle of those political organizations that truly 
represent the grievances and demands of the people.”60 The church was not to cooperate 
with the government, but rather to support the efforts of those working for a new 
government. The church would encourage the oppressed to resist oppression while at the 
same time it would “curb excesses and…appeal to the consciences of those who act 
thoughtlessly and wildly.”61 For the Kairos theologians, the church was to be transformed 
by the liberation struggle. It was to become the spiritual companion to the people’s 
movement for a new South Africa. 
 A group of 156 theologians attached their names to the document. Many were 
prominent members of the ICT, including Frank Chikane and Albert Nolan. Nico Smith 
signed the document, as did his colleague in Mamelodi, Lucas Mabusela. Beyers Naudé, 
who was at that time serving as chairman of the SACC, also signed the “Kairos 
Document.” Many young faculty and doctoral students at UNISA signed the document, 
including Charl Le Roux, Gerrie Lubbe, Bonganjalo Goba, Simon Maimela, Willem 
Saayman, and Klippies Kritzinger. Many members of the Belydende Kring also signed 
the “Kairos Document,” including J.C. Adonis, Nico Botha, Daan Cloeta, Shun 
Govender, and Zach Mokgoebo.62 This group of theologians came from a variety of 
racial and denominational backgrounds. 
A number of notable names were absent from the list of signatories. Desmond 																																																								
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Tutu did not sign the document, because he objected to the “attack on the underlying 
theology of intuitional churches.” He worried that desperate people would use any means 
necessary, leading to a “bloody denouement.”63 Likewise, David Bosch did not sign the 
document. Many of his colleagues and students at UNISA were contributors and/or 
signatories of the document, and they confronted Bosch about his decision not to sign the 
“Kairos Document.” In their David J Bosch: Prophetic integrity, cruciform praxis, 
Kritzinger and Saayman remembered “serious theological discussions” between Bosch 
and his colleagues, but “no clear and satisfactory conclusion was ever reached.”64  
Bosch voiced two main objections to the “Kairos Document.” In the first place, he 
argued that it was too optimistic. He wrote, “There is a quiver of excitement running 
through it, almost as though full-scale liberation is just around the next corner, almost as 
though a few more trumpet blasts would cause the walls of Jericho to collapse.”65 Bosch 
was more skeptical, and worried that oppression could in fact increase. He wondered 
what hope the church offered to people who did not experience immediate liberation. He 
also objected to the “Kairos Document’s” “psychological basis for hatred and its tacit 
support for revolutionary violence, or at least suggesting that responding to violence with 
violence is inevitable.” Bosch thought that if the church followed this path, it would 
simply be embracing the same “evil that characterizes the oppressor.”66 Again, for Bosch, 
the job of the church was not to join the struggle, but rather to provide an alternative. The 																																																								
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church would have to stand in solidarity with the poor and the oppressed, while at the 
same time pursuing reconciliation.   
There was an undeniable degree of tension between the NIR and the Kairos 
theologians. Each side was prepared to endorse different methods to achieve political 
change. The “Kairos Document” attempted to stand in solidarity with the liberation 
movement, while the NIR continued to push the trajectory of racial reconciliation that 
began in the 1970s. The “Kairos Document” was revolutionary, while the NIR was 
evolutionary. The NIR became a home for those who wanted change but were 
uncomfortable with revolutionary violence, while the Kairos theologians wanted to tell 
the oppressed that God was on their side.67    
It is important not to overstate the distinction between the Kairos theologians and 
the NIR. There was a degree of overlap. Indeed, there were those, like Bonganjalo Goba, 
who signed both the “Kairos Document” and the NIR’s “Statement of Affirmation.” 
Smith would sign the “Kairos Document” and at the same time work closely with the 
NIR to organize events with Koinonia. Even though Bosch and Tutu did not sign the 
“Kairos Document,” they agreed with its analysis of South African society.68 Both groups 
believed in justice, liberation, and reconciliation, but they prioritized them differently. 
Kairos theologians believe reconciliation could only come after liberation, while the NIR 
thought that liberation and reconciliation were intimately tied together as part of the same 
process. Neither group supported the political status quo, and both would gladly support 
political negotiations between the NP and the ANC.  																																																								
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Meeting with the ANC 
 Over the course of the 1980s, Smith came to see an unavoidably violent future for 
South Africa. At the beginning of the 1980s, Smith was very nervous about the future. 
Along with notes for a lecture by Henry Nouwen, Smith jotted down a few bullet points 
under the headline, “A Call to Peace Making.” The first point he made was that “it 
becomes clear to me that our whole country is going to be involved in a huge revolution 
that would involve the lives of thousands and thousands of people which will create 
enormous suffering.” Smith had gained the confidence of a number of black youth, and 
he was able to attend various underground gatherings. As he heard about their plans to 
make the country ungovernable, Smith worried that violence would escalate and many 
young people would lose their lives in the struggle. He worried that life was becoming so 
miserable, that young blacks would simply give up the will to live. In the early 1980s, 
Smith was optimistic that something could be done to change this bleak prospect. As he 
wrote, “I cannot but come to you and say, loudly and clearly, as loud as possible: let us 
work for peace—to prevent a revolution.”69 
 Smith came to believe that the only way to avoid violent conflict was for the 
government to begin negotiations with the ANC and the PAC as soon as possible. Smith 
was so eager for meetings to begin, that he decided that he would go to Lusaka with 
several colleagues to meet with the ANC. Through his contacts in Mamelodi, Smith 
arranged a meeting in November 1985. They would ask what the church could do to 
bring about peaceful change. Smith made the mistake of telling a reporter about his plans 																																																								
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before leaving, and the next day, Beeld ran the headline article “NG theologian leads 
deputation to ANC.”70  
 The government was outraged. P.W. Botha said that any such actions would 
“amount to a challenge of the state’s authority,” adding that they were embarrassing to 
the government.71 The Afrikaner Broederbond, the NGK, and the NP could all agree that 
Smith’s actions were “embarrassing.” Perhaps it was embarrassing that an Afrikaner 
could entertain different options apart from these organizations, which claimed to speak 
for “the Afrikaner,” emphasizing the singularity of purpose. Stoffel Botha, the Minister 
of Home Affairs, told Smith that if he planned to proceed, his passport would be 
confiscated. Smith gathered the other ministers in the party to discuss their options. They 
decided not to pursue their plans. The government confiscated their passports anyway, 
and they were issued one-year passports.72  
 Smith found out that the African National Congress (ANC) was still willing to 
meet with him covertly. Smith and his colleague Elia Tema received an invitation to 
attend a conference at Trinity Church in New York.73 While there, they met Thabo Mbeki 
in a hotel room. During their talk, Smith found out that the ANC would be willing to 
engage in a negotiated settlement with the South African government. While they 
doubted whether the armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), had the 
manpower to defeat the SADF, it was clear that protests would continue to grow to such 
an extent that it would have a devastating effect on the country. The ANC did not want to 																																																								
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inherit a broken country. Mbeki stated that the Freedom Charter would serve as the basis 
for negotiation, yet this made Smith somewhat skeptical. The government regarded the 
Freedom Charter as a communist document, and they would not negotiate with 
communists. Finally, Smith and Tema asked what the church could do. Mbeki gave a 
very informed answer that showed his familiarity with the theological discourses in South 
Africa. The ANC did not expect anything of the church, but rather, Smith remembered, 
“all that they asked was that the churches should be faithful to their calling as churches: 
to proclaim peace through justice and to contribute to that in their own way.”74  
 When Smith and Tema returned to South Africa, they did not report any details of 
their meeting to the press. Instead, Tema discussed the meeting with the South African 
Council of Churches and Smith spoke with leaders in the NGK. Both said that the only 
way to avoid a “blood bath was through a call to justice.”75 While their reports were 
received, Smith thought they went nowhere. Government resistance to meeting with the 
ANC, growing dissatisfaction among black urban youth, and the reluctance of Christian 
organizations to take action led Smith to believe violence was unavoidable. He was 
somewhat out of touch in this regard, given the fact that a growing number of Afrikaner 
leaders were endorsing change. Smith did not, however, the changes they supported went 
far enough. In 1987, he told reporter Tony Allen-Mills, “I would be lying if I gave people 
the impression that there could be a peaceful change. People keep saying that a Christian 
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must always have hope, but a Christian also has brains in his head.”76 He worried that 
violence would grow to such an extent that “it won’t be safe for a white person to live 
anywhere in South Africa.”77  
On the other hand, Smith believed that violence could also have a “cathartic 
effect” that would “purify the entire country.”78 What he called a “catharsis of 
bloodletting” would have the potential of shocking the white electorate into the 
realization that they were no longer able to deny black people full citizenship in a 
common South Africa. In both cases, white survival was tied to the acceptance of a non-
racial society on the basis of equal rights—the exact opposite of Boshoff’s view. In the 
latent period before the revolution, Smith would continue attempting to change white 
people’s attitudes. He wanted them to accept black people as “persons of equal status.”79 
For Smith, equality went further than basic civil rights in a liberal society. It 
meant that white interests could no longer dominate politics, but rather whites had to 
identify with the concerns and aspirations of the black African majority. Politicians, such 
as P.W. Botha, argued that white minority rule would preserve “Christian civilization” 
from the advance of “the forces of chaos,” (i.e. communism, dictatorships, coups, civil 
wars, etc).80 There was an implicit argument that whites were better equipped to deal with 
Africa’s problems than blacks, meaning their position of privilege had to be maintained. 
This was a view that Smith endorsed in the 1960s. Even in the 1970s, he wondered if 																																																								
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black people were “ready” to govern.81 By the 1980s, however, Smith came to see that 
self-defense was irreconcilable with Christian service. For whites to survive in South 
Africa, they would have to identify with the causes of the majority, and be prepared to 
serve those causes. Smith came to endorse the idea that “Africa is for Africans,” and if 
whites wanted to continue to living in Africa, then they have to become white Africans.82  
Kerk en Samelewing 
Smith’s portrayal of the NGK as reluctant to make any changes was not exactly 
accurate. Certainly, in the beginning of the decade, conservatives maintained positions of 
leadership and influence. At the 1982 general synod, it was clear that conservative 
opinions held sway. Willie Jonker remembered the 1982 NGK synod as “one of the worst 
experiences of my life.” Ministers gathered in the corridors, loudly expressed their 
disgust with liberals, which “had an intimidating influence.” When Johan Heyns, Willem 
Nicol, and Jonker proposed asking the state to abolish the Immorality and Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Act, they were scornfully dismissed. When Treurnicht appeared, he was 
received with a great deal of acclaim.83 A robust conservative choir had gathered to fight 
“the ghost of Cottesloe.” 
 There was, however, an opening for new options. The moderature established a 
commission to revise the NGK racial policy Ras, Volk, en Nasie. Though Jonker’s 
nomination was shouted down, Heyns was selected to serve on the committee. He would 																																																								
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attempt to point the new racial policy in a verligte direction.84 Yet there was also a strong 
verkrampte contingent on the revision commission, including Carel Boshoff.85 The two 
bodies frequently differed over the revision, and they likewise differed among 
themselves. Other members did not align with either group.86 Where the verligte or 
verkrampte found themselves out voiced, they included a “minority position.”87   
 The document they produced, Kerk en Samelewing (Church and Society), was far 
from a coherent statement. Later, NGK theologian Johan van der Merwe said the 
document was “the result and proof of a struggle in the Dutch Reformed Church which 
lasted for decades and which is still going on.”88 Despite its sundry opinions, all members 
of the commission signed onto it. The 1986 general synod would be responsible for 
making the final policy decisions. Unlike 1982, it was clear that the wind was blowing 
toward the left (ever so gently). The World Alliance of Reformed Church’s 
condemnation of the apartheid and the failure of Botha’s reforms pushed many members 
of the NGK further toward ideas about unity and reconciliation. The final form of Kerk 
en Samelewing would clearly point away from apartheid. The NGK delegates also elected 
Johan Heyns as moderator. While in many ways quite moderate, Heyns was the first 
moderator who would entertain major changes to the racial policy at the highest levels of 
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the NKG. Conservatives would find neither Kerk en Samelewing nor the moderator 
acceptable.89  
The conciliatory nature of the synod became clear when Pieter Potgieter proposed 
adding the following sentence to paragraph 270: “The membership of the NGK is 
open.”90 Unqualified open membership was a decisive break with the NGK’s hardline 
stance on ethnolinguistic specificity. Kerk en Samelewing further stated that the “forced 
differentiation and separation of volks cannot be read as a prescription of scripture.”91 
This was a marked difference from all racial policies since the 1940s (if not the 1850s). It 
contained the statement that “the maintenance of apartheid as a political and social 
system…cannot be accepted on Christian grounds.”92 This statement unseated the 
apartheid orthodoxies of E.P. Groenewald and A.B. du Preez (among so many others). 
Apartheid had done grave injustices to people, unfairly benefited one group, and was in 
conflict with the principles of “neighbor love” and “justice.”93  
Interestingly, however, Kerk en Samelewing did not condemn the idea of 
apartheid, only its effects. According to paragraph 304,  
In South Africa, the idea and the policy of separate development with the ideal of 
territorial separation took form and shape over the course of history. It was seen 
as part of the trusteeship of whites toward the other groups and planned [for] the 
possibility of optimal development of all groups.94  																																																								
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According to this statement, the apartheid ideologues were well intentioned, and 
therefore the church would not apologize for the original idea of apartheid. Clearly, they 
were attempting a compromise between the more conservative faction of the NGK, which 
saw “separate development” as a positive ideal, and the more progressive wing that was 
increasingly disturbed by the violence and injustices of apartheid. Likewise, the 
document was careful to avoid verligte buzzwords like reconciliation. Nevertheless, the 
NGK admitted that the policy of trusteeship had failed, and it had done a great deal of 
harm.         
Once the synod accepted Kerk en Samelewing, a storm broke loose. For many 
conservatives, it smacked of liberal politics. Many ministers and NGK members 
interpreted the document as a policy of integration. Boshoff wrote the booklet Kerk en 
Samelewing in Oënskou in an attempt to answer for the document. In the introduction, he 
argued that Kerk en Samelweing, as it was adopted, had led to a great deal of “confusion 
and unrest” among church members.95 As a member of the revision commission, Boshoff 
said he took a strong stand against what he saw as the “politicization” of the document. It 
was not the intention of the synod to “recognize the creation of independent churches for 
different volks and volk groups as a mistake and now to open the doors to a multi-racial 
church,” nor was it the intention of the synod to “unconditionally judge apartheid.”96 The 
church, he argued, therefore needed to review and better formulate those sections that 
were causing confusion.  																																																								
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For Boshoff, the text of Kerk en Samelewing was unclear and imprecise. Yet more 
than this, he believed that it did not sufficiently answer questions about the position of a 
minority church in an increasingly integrated society. In the second half of the 1980s, 
Botha’s government relaxed the Group Areas Act, which would allow Afrikaans-
speaking Coloured to move into hitherto “white areas.”97 Boshoff wrote, “A mixed 
society makes the exclusion of such members [i.e. Coloured people]…impractical and 
immoral. We feel guilty if we exclude such people from our congregations.”98 At the 
same time, Boshoff noted “Our members place a high value on their ethnic identity 
(volksidentiteit), unique character (eiesoortigheid), values and traditions, and wish to 
protect these and hand them on to their children.”99 Boshoff believed that Afrikaners 
would resist the process of “morally coercive integration,” making the possibility of the 
church splitting even greater.100  
Boshoff believed that “for a volk in a minority position of two and a half million 
against around thirty million,” integration would not simply mean the elimination of 
separate churches, but would also “threaten their volks-identity.”101 For Boshoff, the 
ultimate solution was not necessarily to re-introduce stricter policies of segregation, but 
rather the formation of a new Afrikaner Volkstaat. “Open churches” would not threaten 
Afrikaner cultural identity if Afrikaners were a demographic majority. Racial legislation 
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would not be necessary to protect Afrikaner self-determination and cultural interests, 
because black people would be effectively excluded from the constitution of the 
Volkstaat. To support his arguments, Boshoff often cited articles by SABRA and G.B.A. 
Gerdener that were often over thirty years old.102 
Many conservatives had been threatening to leave the NGK for years, and it 
seemed that time had finally arrived. In November 1986, 2500 conservative dissidents 
met in Pretoria to begin discussing their options, including the formation of a new church. 
Roelf Odendaal came to Boshoff, asking him to participate in the planning. Boshoff was 
a consistent conservative and Afrikaner separatist, and they believed he could make a 
considerable contribution as a theologian. Boshoff, however, was reluctant. Willie Lubbe, 
then editor of Die Kerkbode, was among the dissidents, and he invited Boshoff to talk 
about the new church in an empty office at UNISA. After four hours, it became clear that 
Boshoff would not be leaving the NGK.103  
In his later autobiography, Boshoff remembered having three objections to the 
new church. In the first place, only a clear departure from Scripture or confessional 
writings necessitated a split, and this had not happened in the NGK. Likewise, Boshoff 
believed that churches could only split over theological questions, not social or political 
differences. Finally, Boshoff affirmed his belief that a church may not close its doors to 
people on the basis of race or color. Churches formed separate bodies for practical 
reasons, not for any intrinsic theological reason. Therefore, if a member of a church in the 
NG family moved to an area where there was not a church specific to his or her racial 																																																								
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group, then he or she may attend the nearest church in the Dutch Reformed family. After 
all, this was the case in Botswana, where NG members of all races legally had to belong 
to the same church.104  
On June 27, 1987, conservative dissents founded the Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk 
(APK). Within the first year, over 30 ministers resigned from the NGK to serve as 
ministers in the APK. Boshoff’s brother, Adam, became a member, as did his brother-in-
law Louis Jacobs. Boshoff himself would remain in the NGK, as would his brother-in-
law Cas Jackson.105 During that same time, dissidents formed at least 86 new 
congregations. By 1988, the APK also established a new seminary in Pretoria, the 
Afrikaanse Protestantse Akademie. The NGK only lost a small fraction of its membership 
to the APK.106  
For Boshoff, however, the movement out of the NGK was alarming, so he 
founded another organization: the Gereformeerde Bond. This organization would attempt 
to maintain a conservative voice within the NGK, promoting reformed and Afrikaner 
identity. The Bond hoped to keep disaffected members within NGK, and it also hoped to 
bring those who had left back into the fold.107 NGK leaders like Heyns, Jonker, and P.B. 
van der Watt not only found the Gereformeerde Bond to be counterproductive to their 
agenda, but they also argued that it was a divisive organization which further polarized 
the church. They also accused it of political motivation. Boshoff defended the formation 																																																								
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of the Gereformeerde Bond in a letter to Die Kerkbode. Its purpose was to work for the 
maintenance of the historic character of the NGK as a reformed confessional church 
within the Afrikaner nation (Afrikanervolksverband).”108  
Boshoff turned the NGK leadership’s accusations around. He argued that 
organizations like Reforum and the NIR were clearly motivated by a liberal political 
agenda, and that they were putting pressure on the NGK to become “an agent of change.” 
Reforum was a group of ministers who discussed new possibilities for the church.109 
Bosch was a leading member. Boshoff found it ironic that while NGK leadership said the 
Bond was forming pressure groups within the church, Afrikaans speakers at the NIR 
promised to use their “influence to convince our members work and to vote” for a new 
political system. While they claimed that the Bond was polarizing, Boshoff thought that 
the NIR was polarizing because it forced people to change. Boshoff claimed that he, on 
the other hand, was attempting to keep the church together and bring back those members 
who had already left. Finally, he wrote that while the Bond was charged with being 
“politically motivated,” the NIR encouraged the state president to begin conversations 
with “authentic leaders” to negotiate political options.110  
In reality, both sides were endorsing different moral visions that had profoundly 
different political implications for South Africa’s future. While conservative opinion held 
sway in the NGK throughout the early 1980s, by the middle of the decade, conservatives 
were on the defensive. Verligte thinkers like Heyns were in positions of authority, where 																																																								
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they would begin promoting reconciliation along with groups such as the NIR. This was 
alarming to conservatives like Boshoff, who could feel the shift away from ethnic 
particularity. It was not at all clear, however, that the verligte party would maintain the 
upper hand. While Bosch, Smith, Heyns, and Jonker were attempting to push and pull 
Afrikaners toward a new political dispensation based on reconciliation and unity, 
conservatives like Boshoff and Treurnicht were trying to pull Afrikaners back to a strong 
sense of ethnic distinction.111 Conservatives were losing ground; the scales were clearly 
tipping. In order to tip them back, conservatives would have to organize their efforts to 
create mass appeal among Afrikaners. In the meantime, however, interracial ecumenism 
gained wider appeal at the grassroots.   
Mamelodi Encounter 
Over the course of 1985, Koinonia-inspired groups were formed in Cape Town, 
East London, and Windhoek, Namibia. In February 1986, Smith and others came together 
to form Koinonia Southern Africa as a national movement. Ivor Jenkins became the full-
time National Coordinator in September 1986, and his position was funded by the Swiss 
Christian human rights organization Christian Solidarity International.112 Jenkins was a 
Baptist Afrikaner who had studied at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in 
Louisville, KY. While in the United States, Jenkins and his wife Karin underwent a 
painful reexamination of their racial assumptions and attitudes. They returned to South 
Africa, fully committed to work for “reconciliation, justice, and peace.” While serving as 
national coordinator at Koinonia SA, Jenkins simultaneously earned a Th.D. at UNISA, 																																																								
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studying the role that churches could play as facilitators of social change in South Africa. 
Koinonia SA expanded rapidly, growing to 18 regional branches within two years.113 By 
1989, some 20,000 people would participate in its activities, and it would gain massive 
publicity. That same year, it won the “Beyond War Award.”114   
Smith believed that South Africa was heading toward violent change, and 
therefore Koinonia needed to embrace a revolutionary vision for the country’s future. In a 
statement made in June 1987, Koinonia made it clear that they were prepared to endorse 
far-reaching political and economic changes. Koinonia SA rejected Botha’s reforms as 
“disguised apartheid” and the government as “legal but not legitimate.”115 It embraced 
the language of the Freedom Charter, confessing that South Africa was one country and 
that all the people “have the God-given right to share in the country’s resources and 
wealth, as well as to share in its government.”116 Koinonia also pleaded with the 
government to abandon all discriminatory legislation, and to “involve those who are 
recognized by other groups as their leaders, in the process of creating together … a new 
society (many of these leaders who are in prison, or are being detained, will consequently 
first have to be released).”117 This language echoed the NIR’s foundational documents. 
Koinonia, however, wanted to place more of an emphasis on justice rather than 
reconciliation. While they prayed for peace, it would have to be “a peace founded on 
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justice” (in line with Mbeki’s suggestion to Smith in 1985).118   
While endorsing far-reaching radical change, Koinonia intended to prepare South 
Africans for a non-racial future through small group formation. Meal groups of four to 
eight people served as the backbone of Koinonia. While the system of apartheid had 
alienated blacks and whites, Koinonia would help to overcome this alienation “through 
adopting a non-apartheid lifestyle,” in which black and white participants would become 
intimately involved in one another’s lives.119 While Koinonia leader Francois du Toit 
argued that “it would be naive to think the difference between people and the problems of 
the country could be solved by having blacks and whites meeting for a meal once a 
month,” Koinonia hoped to plant the seeds of a new South Africa. For Smith, Koinonia 
was “hope in action,” rather than waiting for a new South Africa to emerge, Koinonia 
participants were “putting the new South Africa into practice.”120  
Jenkins said that Koinonia focused on meals for four reasons: meals are ordinary, 
they are intimate, Jesus chose a meal to become the focus of his disciples, and for whites, 
eating with blacks can become “an experience of political liberation from inherited and 
ingrained prejudices and taboos.”121 It is worth noting that much of the promotional 
material for Koinonia targeted white people. One gets the sense that the focus was 
changing white attitudes by introducing white people to black people.122 The program 
included a series of dinner parties. Couples met on a set evening over the course of 																																																								
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several weeks, in which they would have increasingly sensitive conversations. On the 
first night, couples simply got acquainted with one another. At their second meeting, they 
shared their “spiritual journeys.” Organizers hoped that white and black Christians would 
begin to find common ground in a shared faith before moving to more difficult 
conversations. The third meeting included an “open and non-judgmental” conversation 
about their views on South Africa’s politics, the economy, and society. On the final 
evening, they discussed hopes, dreams, and desires for the future. The couples then met 
two more times for further conversations.123   
Beyond meal groups, regional Koinonia branches sponsored a variety of regional 
activities, including hiking trips, group singing and choral concerts, sporting events, 
camps, and mutual worship.124 At one camp in Krugersdorp, participants discussed 
“servanthood.” They debated how to serve one’s enemies “whether they be extreme left 
or right-wing.” They discussed questions such as “if a communist or a so-called terrorist 
should seek refuge at my home from the police, should I, as a Christian, give him 
refuge?” And then the question was turned around, “if a councilor or security police 
[officer] should seek refuge from the comrades, should I, as a Christian, harbor him?” 
There was also an activity in which members had to enact the role of servants, which 
according to the newsletter, was difficult for some white people.125  
Koinonia also sponsored various “Encounters,” in which white and black 
Christians came spent a number of days living, learning, playing, and praying together. 																																																								
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The first of these encounters was the “Mamelodi Christian Encounter” in March 1988, 
which Koinonia SA and the NIR planned jointly. Black families hosted around 200 
whites in Mamelodi, while 35 blacks stayed in white suburbs.126 During the encounter, 
participants enjoyed fellowship and conversation stimulated by lectures by Christian 
leaders like Frank Chikane, Michael Cassidy, Fr. S. Mkhatshwa, Nico Smith, and Albert 
Nolan among others.127 The speakers were generally radical in tone, setting the gathering 
at odds with the government. In a statement released at the end of the encounter, 
participants said, “not a single communist was found among us, and the enemy of the 
people has been identified not as the African National Congress or the United Democratic 
Front, or any people’s organization, but apartheid.”128 
Smith’s sermon in no uncertain terms condemned apartheid as contrary to the 
gospel, and it accused the government of seeking a “cheap peace.” He told his listeners 
that Christians, as “servants of God,” were called on to work for the liberation of the 
oppressed, and the “liberation of the repressors from their greed.” They could expect to 
be called Marxists, be put in jail, and lose relationships with friends and loved ones. 
Nevertheless, they had to strive to build a “new South Africa and a new humanity.” He 
concluded his sermon by leading the congregation in Nkosi sikelel’ iAfrika, the Christian 
hymn and anthem of the ANC.129  
Some on the right attempted to stop the encounter before it even had a chance to 																																																								
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start. United Christian Action (UCA) encouraged its members to write letters to the 
mayor of Mamelodi, Bennett Ndlazi, asking him to ban the event. UCA president Ed 
Cain had been a Baptist missionary in Mozambique before being expelled by a Marxist 
regime in 1975. As an avid anti-communist, he saw Koinonia’s calls for negotiations with 
the ANC to be a threat to the future of Christianity in South Africa.130 For his part, 
Ndlaza said he had received roughly 100 letters from whites calling for the banning of the 
Mamelodi Encounter, but he said he would do no such thing. It was his intention to show 
white visitors that “we are a peace loving people.”131  
The Mamelodi Encounter did encounter some government harassment. As 
participants attempted to enter the township, they encountered police roadblocks. After a 
night of “bopping” at a disco and “having his newly-found black friends paying for all of 
his drinks,”132 UNISA lecturer Murray Hofmeyer (and Smith’s future son-in-law) was 
awoken by the sound of knocking on his host Sandy Lebese’s door. Lebese was a field 
worker for the Pretoria Council of Churches and had previously been detained.133 Both 
Hofmeyer and Lebese were taken into custody. Hofmeyer was released later that day, 
while Lebese was released three months later.134    
The Mamelodi Encounter fascinated both the South African and international 
press, which were both overwhelmingly positive. The New York Times, the Washington 
Post, and the Los Angeles Times all featured articles on Koinonia, and small town 
newspapers in places like Staunton, VA and Racine, WI featured pictures of Annemie 																																																								
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and Jacques Bosch eating with their hosts, Betty, Abel, and Mandla Mabena.135 Annemie 
told reporter Charles Mogale, “That fact that you press people are interested in such a 
normal thing [i.e. people gathering to spend the night and eat together] shows what an 
abnormal society we live in.”136 She also argued that the large press presence made the 
event somewhat superficial. She added that the camera crews “make you smile. They tell 
you, ‘Come on, speak to Betty. Do this, do that.’ That is not natural. If they want to catch 
me laughing or speaking to Betty, they must wait for me to do it and then shoot their 
pictures. I don’t want to do things I normally would not do.”137  
Annemie said that she did not have much trouble adjusting to the township, as she 
had visited friends there before. She noted that other whites, however, while they were 
“basically good people at heart,” were “trapped by fear.”138 Indeed, overcoming white 
fear was a major theme of the gathering. One Mr. van der Merwe said that although he 
frequently came to Mamelodi for Koinonia events, he was not totally at ease about 
spending the night. He said, “There is no problem with going into the township. We do 
certain programs there and you quickly feel the degree of acceptance. But one is always 
worried about the irresponsible youth who might throw a stone or do something more 
serious.” Ultimately, Mr. van der Merwe said that such things could happen anywhere, 
and it was more important to spend the night with a host family.139 Chris Oosthuizen was 
also afraid of the township. It did not put him at ease that his host was surprised to 																																																								
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actually see a white person at his home. After not saying much, his host put him to bed, 
where he lay awake listening to people come and go. He remembered thinking, “What’s 
that noise? It’s the comrades … They’re coming to necklace me. And I don’t know where 
I am and there’s not a decent house in sight, only shacks.”140 Yet for the most part, whites 
discovered that their fears were completely unfounded. Carolyn Chatterton said that the 
idea that white people are killed for entering the township was “rubbish.”141  
A number of black people voiced concerns about hosting whites. Joanna 
Tshabalala was worried that her guest might get lost in the confusing network of poorly 
labeled township roads.142 Before the Bosches arrived, Betty Mabena said, “I was 
concerned about what food to serve, [and] what beddings I had.”143 The presence of 
whites would, as Elizabeth Sithole noted, undoubtedly draw a number of curious 
onlookers.144  Some of those onlookers might disapprove of blacks hosting whites, 
thinking they were “sell outs.” Yet, as Sauline Mbokane noted, most of her neighbors 
were in favor of the gathering. She said, “Some black people raised their eyebrows, but 
I’ve never been called a sellout because we realize the importance of making white 
friends. Not all white people are targets because every white person is unique.”145  
Hosts in white neighborhoods had their own concerns. Willem and Cecile 
Saayman’s daughter Helena remembered worrying that her family’s middle-class 
lifestyle would be alienating to black guests. She said, “I felt quite embarrassed. We live 																																																								
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in a small house by white standards yet to them it was big. We had empty rooms, two 
baths and three lavatories and a big yard. I thought maybe they wouldn’t want to be my 
friend anymore.”146 Some black guests likewise found it somewhat uncomfortable to be 
in white homes. Helena remembered that every time a black guest finished a drink, he 
would immediately stand up and wash the glass. She and her family found themselves 
constantly inviting him to sit down, relax, and not worry.147 
Many participants quickly found that their expectations did not meet reality. One 
white man, who was expecting to find squalor, said, “I was surprised at how smart the 
house was that I stayed in…My host works for a big multinational corporation, and he 
has far more modcons than I do.”148 Another white woman, who had very liberal views, 
stayed at a house in which the man worked for the government and his sons worked for 
the police. She said, “I was the one that had to watch what I said as regards politics!”149 
Shai Nkomonde stayed with a white family, and said, “Before the encounter, my only 
contact with whites was at school or at work. And we never talked informally about their 
home lives. What I’ve learnt is that whites suffer too.”150 At a later Encounter in Port 
Elizabeth, Patricia Maikinya said,  
I was scared when I went to stay with my host because I did not know how they 
will accept me, but I was surprised out of my boots to have been received very 
warmly, given a nice room inside the house, not in the maid’s room, seated at the 
table for meals and used the same bathroom facilities as my host. My conclusion 
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was that I was wrong to throw all whites into one box and say the whole bunch is 
bad.151  
 
The encounter was successful in as much as it gave whites and blacks new perspectives 
on each other. Friendly contact among ordinary people could be something profoundly 
new in a society that carefully guarded its racial and ethnic boundaries.  
Interestingly, while participants were eager to make friends across the racial line, 
there was still some reluctance about the idea of “living side by side.” As Minah Nkosi 
said, “I don’t want to live in Menlo Park [an Afrikaans suburb]. I’m a Swazi. If I lived 
next door to you, you’d hear me singing all night. You wouldn’t be able to stand the 
noise. You’d call the police!”152 Sauline Mbokane wanted to stay in Mamelodi, though 
she wanted improvements for her community. She said, “I like Mamelodi. I was born and 
bred here. We don’t want white houses or to live with whites. We want bigger houses and 
communal amenities and services.”153 Chris Oosthuizen said, “I’m still an Afrikaner, I 
will still keep my culture … [but] we have to start accepting people as people.” He also 
rather bluntly added, “It’s all very well for a few days, but what white would swop his 
house with a black man in Mamelodi on a permanent basis?”154 Others were more 
optimistic about the idea of living in a common area. Mary Griffin said, “The encounter 
affirmed my belief that there’s more in the humanity we share to unite us than to divide 
us. I wondered what all the fuss is about in South Africa, why can’t we all live side by 
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side while respecting each other’s cultural differences?”155  
Though South Africa was facing enormous challenges in the late 1980s, there was 
an air of optimism that accompanied Koinonia. For Sauline Mbokane, Koinonia offered a 
way of changing the status quo without facing government repression. She said, “The 
solution to South Africa’s problems is to have meetings like this. If you fight, they kill 
you. You’re arrested if you demonstrate peacefully. Koinonia is safe because it’s 
Christian.”156 Minah Nkosi contended that while she was happy living where she did, she 
believed that whites and blacks needed to talk to each other. Through their conversations, 
like those started at the Mamelodi Christian Encounter, people would be able to work 
past their fears of each other. She said, “I really want peaceful change. I’m looking 
forward to it.”157 Events like Koinonia helped to build a sense that interracial fellowship 
was, at the very least, possible. For these efforts, the United States-based Beyond War 
Organization awarded Koinonia its annual award.158  
The publicity around the Encounter, however, attracted the visceral reaction of 
opponents. When Koinonia began participating in a non-violent attempt to desegregate 
busses, Ivor Jenkins began receiving death threats. One caller, claiming to be associated 
with the “Wit Wolwe,” threatened Jenkin’s family, providing detailed information about 
his wife’s place of employment and where his son went to school. Several nights later, 																																																								
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they woke up to the sound of bullets shattering his front windows.159 In the wake of the 
threats, Jenkins took an administrative position at Koinonia, and Smith assumed the 
position of director.160 While many within South Africa and around the world supported 
interracial initiatives, they were still vulnerable.   
 By the late 1980s, there was a growing concern that the “white right” may be able 
to organize its efforts and obtain power in South Africa. Neither Smith nor Bosch voted 
during the 1987 general election; the former abstained in protest while the later was out 
of the country. The election demonstrated that conservative politics were gaining 
influence. Treurnicht’s conservative party had won 23 seats in Parliament, displacing the 
Progressive Federal Party as the official opposition. It became clear that the NP faced a 
bigger challenge from the right than the left. The NP still had a parliamentary majority, 
but it would have to increasingly bow to right-wing pressure or face losing more seats. 
The NP was also less intent on following its program of reform, and more bent on 
maintain law and order through force. The situation made the future look bleak. Bosch 
said, “To be honest, I have little hope of a political settlement, especially after the 
violence of 1985 and the general election of 1987.”161 
As early as 1986, Bosch worried that Botha’s failed reforms would lead to greater 
interracial conflict. Bosch noted that there was some irony in the fact that as the white 
government seemed to be relaxing its grip, black protests were increasing. He noted 
several reasons for this. In the first place, reforms were piecemeal, and not part of a larger 																																																								
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comprehensive overhaul of apartheid. Bosch also argued that because “black pressure” 
led to the moderate reforms, increased pressure would “wring even more fundamental 
changes from the government.” 162  A great crescendo of protest might even bring the 
government to a point where it would surrender altogether. Finally, Bosch noted that 
none of the reforms suggested that the white minority was actually willing “to jeopardize 
even theoretically its position of power and privilege.” He cited a poll in which 66 
percent of white South Africans claimed to believe that South Africa would never have a 
black majority government.163  
Thus while the government was willing to make certain concessions, Bosch noted 
that it refused to be pushed too far. Even while there were signs that the government was 
“more pragmatic,” he worried that many Afrikaners were developing a Masada 
complex—a desire to fight to the bitter end rather than give up power. Echoing many 
observers, Bosch claimed that the country faced two alternatives: negotiation or civil war. 
He said, “unless all parties can agree to meet around a table and thrash out a new political 
and social blueprint, and do so very soon, the stage is set for a civil war which may last 
decades and leave the entire subcontinent in ruins.”164 Bosch argued that whether there 
would be a negotiated settlement or a civil war was hard to tell, though he admitted that 
“the portents are not too promising; in fact, the gap between white intransigence and 
black demands seems to be widening.” Bosch, however, was a hopeful skeptic. Though it 
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looked bleak, he still contended, “when the night is at is darkest dawn has drawn near.”165 
By 1988, Bosch was even more skeptical. He argued that Botha seemed to be 
moving the process of reform backwards. Referencing a speech by P.W. Botha, Bosch 
wrote, “The Rubicon which was supposedly crossed in August 1985 has turned out to be 
nothing more than a dried up donga. It was very easy to cross back over it again.” At the 
same time, he thought that South Africa’s “democratic traditions were eroding at a rapid 
pace.” During the nearly two-year State of Emergency, Bosch lamented that “press 
control has reached a stage that in earlier years would have been dreamed about only in 
nightmares.”166 Bosch argued that the free press had been replaced by government 
propaganda, filled with clichéd slogans, such as the “ANC-SACP alliance” and “the 
speedy lifting of the state of emergency.” The more these slogans were repeated, “the 
more completely are the whites conditioned to accept that discussion and negotiation with 
the ANC never can or should take place.” Newspapers like Beeld, which were once “the 
great verligte hope,” became involved in petty politics. Bosch argued that its only priority 
seemed to be stemming the growth of the right-wing. Ironically, this was having the 
opposite effect. Bosch wrote, “the more it attacks the AWB, the more free publicity it 
gives them.”167  
Bosch also commented on the state of the National Party and the ANC. The 
National Party, he argued, was “in the doldrums.” It was working hard to exercise the 
ghosts of the party’s historic platform; namely, apartheid and white minority rule. While 
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the policies had become an embarrassment to the NP, they still remained “the cornerstone 
of their policy,” only in a more disguised form. The ANC, on the other hand, enjoyed a 
higher profile among white South Africans than ever before. The fact that the ANC was 
having talks with white people, “particularly Afrikaners,” had given it a tremendous 
boost. It seemed to Bosch that a growing number of white people were comfortable with 
the idea of negotiations.168  
For Bosch, there was little hope of a political settlement because all of the 
political parties were too confident. He quoted Boston University’s Peter Berger, he 
argued that it was not too late for negotiations, but rather too early. Both the NP and the 
ANC still believed that they could win a military victory over the other. Every party 
believed that it had the unique answers for solving South Africa’s problems. He wrote, 
“This is true for the whole spectrum: from the ANC, Inkatha, the PFP, the Nationalist 
Party, the Conservative Party, to the AWB. Each party is the victim of its own utopian 
thinking.” In Bosch’s view, they each said, “just give us a chance and will shall solve 
South Africa’s problems in a jiffy.” According to Bosch, South Africa’s problems were 
far too big to be solved by a single party’s platform. Instead, Bosch believed that South 
African politics would have to continue to be negotiated and renegotiated by different 
stakeholders. He wrote,  
it is my conviction that South Africa’s problems, in the final analysis, are 
insoluble. The best we can expect is an approximation to a solution, a delicately 
precarious balance, a situation continually on the edge of disaster, without any 
long term guarantees or certainties, an ongoing bargaining between power groups, 
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the one compromise after the other, a politics of give and take, a knowledge that 
there is no final answer, only interim answers.169  
 
Thus, Bosch argued that Christians ought not sanction party platforms but rather 
processes—specifically the process of negotiation between various interest groups. The 
new South Africa would be born in negotiation, and negotiation would be its modus 
vivendi.  
Rather than encouraging negotiation, Bosch worried that the NGK was far too 
comfortable with its new position. It was too satisfied with its accomplishments, thinking 
that the 1986 synod had fixed its problems and driven out the “racist dregs.”170 Bosch, 
however, argued that not nearly enough had changed. He argued that the NGK still 
mirrored the NP. The NP eschewed any overtly racist language during the 1980s, instead 
opting to promote a peace through military strength and “order” over “radicalism.” 
Likewise, the NGK no longer publically advocated the separation of various racial 
groups, but it condemned the protests of Allen Boesak and Desmond Tutu. Using the 
NP’s language of “total strategy,” the synodical commission argued that the church must 
obey the laws of the land. The church may not participate in a revolutionary 
transfer of power to another government. Under the cloak of religion, certain 
church leaders are promoting their personal and political goals. This is part of the 
overall strategy against South Africa.171 
 
For Bosch, this was hypocritical. Bosch pointed out that the same men who made this 
statement frequently celebrated their fathers’ and grandfathers’ participation in the 1914 
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Rebellion.172 He also argued that they would “have few problems with disobeying the 
laws of a Marxist government,” or trying to topple a communist regime in the Soviet 
Union or Angola. For Bosch, it was a sign that the NGK, far from being changed, was 
merely legitimizing the current government’s political program of peace through forced 
obedience.173 Bosch did not want the NGK to get too comfortable with the progress it had 
made; the situation was far too dire for the church to stand still.  
“Trekking to our own” 
While Smith and Bosch promoted the morality of negotiation, Boshoff tried to 
coordinate efforts to form a white homeland. On March 21, 1988, the day after the 
Mamelodi Christian Encounter concluded, Carel Boshoff, his SABRA colleague Chris 
Jooste, and other conservative Afrikaner gathered at the Boshoffs’ Brummeria home. 
While Bosch and Smith worried that the NP would never peacefully cede power to a 
black majority government, Boshoff and his colleagues believed that majority rule was a 
fait accompli. For them, it was no longer of question of how to maintain independence, 
but rather how to “win back Afrikaner freedom.”174 Their solution was, naturally, the 
Volkstaat—a new geographic entity that would be occupied by an Afrikaner majority. To 
support this goal, Boshoff would form yet another organization: the Afrikaner 
Vryheidstigting (Afrikaner Freedom Foundation: Avstig), which would produce research 
and proposals for the Volkstaat.175 Boshoff was finding that his responsibilities with the 
Afrikanervolkswag and now Avstig were becoming too difficult to balance with his 																																																								
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teaching position. At the end of March 1988, Boshoff submitted his resignation as 
professor to the University of Pretoria and the curatorium of the church. He was 61 years 
old and had worked as professor of missions for 21 years.176 Resigning from the 
academy, he could focus all his energies on being an Afrikaner cultural leader.  
The Afrikanervolkswag’s commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the Great 
Trek began on October 10, 1988, when 13 different wagon routes began their journeys.177 
The routes converged on December 10, the 13 wagon routes gathered at the Church 
Square in Pretoria. In a dramatic scene, 600 people on horseback in commando formation 
led 16 ox wagons and the 13 ceremonial wagons to the Voortrekker Monument. There, 
they were welcomed to the festival by Anna Boshoff and the festival director. The 
gathering watched a historical play (written by Carel Boshoff) and heard a lecture on the 
history of the horse in the Afrikaners liberation struggle. Retiring from the Monument, 
the gathering took up camp at Donkerhoek.178 The FAK was also undertaking its own 
reenactment. The two events would become a kind of competing political theater. 
Perhaps the greatest irony of the commemoration was that Afrikaner separatists found it 
nearly impossible to unite with other (slightly more moderate) Afrikaners.   
Boshoff would still claim the event as a major success in his later memoir. He 
boasted of Donkerhoek, “It was a town!” Anna had ensured that there would be running 
water, electric power, telephone connections, ambulance services, places for wagons, 
tents, an amphitheater, food stands, and a loudspeaker system. There was a radio station, 																																																								
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horse shows, volksspiele (traditional dances), plays, choirs, mass singing, and on Sunday 
there were baptisms (as at the 1938 reenactment). There were also lectures on different 
aspects of Afrikaner life and history. Every morning, the men rode out on horseback to 
different sites on the Dagbreek commando and returned in time for breakfast.179  
December 16 was a day of reenactments and right-wing politics. After they 
reenacted the battle of Blood River, Eugène Terre’Blanche gave a speech.180 The women 
then offered a short program and P.G. Nel read N.P. van Wyk Louw’s Die Dieper Reg, 
an allegorical play composed for the 1938 trek commemoration in which “the voice of 
justice” pronounces a favorable judgment on the action of the voortrekkers.181 Boshoff 
led a worship service for the gathered body of 60,000 to 70,000 people, and then A.P. 
Treurnicht gave the festival speech. Those in attendance gathered a pile of rocks at the 
site to commemorate their presence there. They renewed Sarel Cilliers’ vow, that if God 
grant them victory over the Zulu, they would keep the day as a Sabbath. By 1pm, the 
ceremony had ended. For Boshoff, the commemoration, like the celebration 50 years 
earlier, was a “wonderwerk.”182 In reality, the two events occurring simultaneously 
illustrated just how divided Afrikaners had become; they were no longer trekking to the 
same endpoint.   
Even those who were gathered at Donkerhoek struggled to find coherent 
discipline, methods, and vision. The AWB had participated in the trek from beginning 
with their own wagons. Even though the planners only allowed the voortrekker flags, 																																																								
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Terre’Blanche wanted to march under the Nazi-inspired AWB flag. Boshoff later wrote 
that between the AWB representatives, Kobie Gouws, and himself, “the matter was 
resolved.”183 Even still, a number of AWB flags made their way into the wagon trains.184 
There was also a rumor that the AWB wanted to stir up a posse at Donkerhoek to go and 
disrupt the FAK ceremony at the Voortrekker Monument, where P.W. Botha would be 
speaking. Anna was a formidable woman, and she decided to guard the microphone with 
stubborn determination all day. Boshoff later remembered “no one risked getting it out of 
her hands!”185 Even though the Boshoffs (especially Anna) were formidable and strong 
willed, they would not be able to unite the right around their vision. This became 
increasingly clear as they discussed the future Volkstaat.  
Planning the Volkstaat 
After the Great Trek commemoration, Boshoff focused his energies on the 
formation of an Afrikaner Volkstaat. Publically, Boshoff stated, “minority domination as 
currently practiced in South Africa is morally unjustifiable.”186 A black journalist asked 
Boshoff if he was not “admitting defeat,” to which Boshoff responded, “No, we must 
realize that we are living in a post-colonial era and it is not possible to dominate others 
forever.”187 For Boshoff, the term “post-colonial” still seemed to carry connotations of 
“internal independence.” In the 1960s, that meant independence for black ethnic groups; 
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in the late 1980s, it meant independence for Afrikaners.    
For Boshoff, the Volkstaat offered a solution for both Afrikaner survival and 
South Africa as a whole. It would remedy the injustice of white minority rule while 
providing Afrikaners with the freedom to democratically govern themselves. There 
would be no need to set racial qualifications for franchise rights, as everyone would be 
white.188 One of the central aspects of Boshoff’s Volkstaat idea was that “the 
economically productive population exists out of members of the volk.”189 According to 
the colonial mindset, blacks (and “non-whites”) performed menial labor, while whites 
performed more “dignified” work. For Boshoff, “this abnormal situation of a nation 
living on an unskilled population doing menial work cannot be prolonged.”190 Boshoff 
came to believe that those who work the land would own the land. Demographically 
speaking, there were more black laborers than white employers in a given area, and 
therefore, when the black workers obtained voting rights, they would have more of a say 
than their white employers. For Afrikaners to determine the course of their own destiny, 
they needed to move beyond the concept of “white man’s work,” not shunning any form 
of labor as beneath them. In order to maintain a demographic majority, whites would 
have to engage in all forms of skilled and unskilled labor. The Volkstaat would also 
eliminate the social and moral problems that Boshoff associated with “migratory 
labor.”191 A homogeneous workforce held the key to maintain a racially homogeneous 																																																								
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state.  
Boshoff also believed that the Volkstaat would create new options for South 
Africa’s most difficult economic question. The South African state had not only legally 
privileged unskilled white labor against unskilled black labor, but it also offered whites 
thousands of jobs as state employees. When a black majority government would come to 
power, these jobs would no longer be reserved for whites, making white unemployment 
rise. These unemployed whites would be able to find work in the Volkstaat.192 Boshoff 
believed that Afrikaners would not be able to compete on an open labor market as a 
minority in a black majority society. Apart from the ideal of “Afrikaner labor,” Boshoff’s 
economic vision was rather thin. Whether or not the Afrikaners could provide the skills 
and labor to build and run a fully diversified economy—which they were hitherto unable 
to do—remained an unanswered question. It would also mean that many skilled workers 
would have to take unskilled (and therefore lower paying) jobs. Afrikaners had already 
proven averse to economic sacrifice for the sake of ethnic survivals.        
For Boshoff, a homogeneous society would be a harmonious society. Where all 
people shared a “confession of faith [defined here as (broadly) Calvinist], language, 
practices, ancestry, history, and state formation,” there would be considerably less 
friction than in a plural society.193 The need to enforce “peace, security, and prosperity” 
through the “sharp security actions” that were common in 1980s South Africa would 
therefore be eliminated. For Boshoff, a Volkstaat was the obvious alternative to “political 
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domination of the RSA by Afrikaners with military power,” which would only lead to “a 
permanent emergency, mandatory service obligations, and cause foreign sanctions and 
ultimately disrupt and impoverish the state.”194 While Boshoff rejected the idea that white 
people could enforce their rule of South Africa through military power, he also 
maintained the assumption that a non-racial state would only lead to a clash of interests 
and violence.  
By 1989, Boshoff was also willing to take a firmer stand on the dimensions of the 
Volkstaat. Boshoff argued that the Volkstaat either had to fall into the area with the most 
Afrikaners, or it had to be located in the least populated portion of the country. Boshoff 
rejected the first option. While most Afrikaners lived in the Transvaal, particularly in the 
major cities of the Witwatersrand, they were still a minority in those areas. Furthermore, 
the black population in that same area was also growing far more rapidly than the white 
population, meaning that whites were destined to make up an even smaller portion of the 
population as time went on. There was also a high concentration of Afrikaners in the 
“South Western Cape,” in the areas around Cape Town and Stellenbosch. Yet the growth 
of the Xhosa population in that area would make Afrikaner governance of the area 
“increasingly difficult.”195 Boshoff instead opted for building a Volkstaat in the thinly 
populated and arid northwestern part of the country.196 Looking at the map, one wonders 
how they could have seriously claimed so much territory. 
In a map entitled Volkstaat Orandee, Avstig proposed a large territory for the 																																																								
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Volkstaat. The western border was the Atlantic coast between Saldanha Bay (140km 
north of Cape Town) and Sandwich Bay, 100km South of Windhoek, meaning the 
Volkstaat would include a strikingly large portion of Namibia. Its southern border 
extended from Saldanha Bay to Graaff-Reinet, where it turned northeast toward the 
Hendrik Verwoerd Dam.  The border then turned northwest, heading far into the 
Kalahari. The Volkstaat would include a small slice of the Orange Free State, a great deal 
of the northern Cape Province (excluding Kimberley and what was then 
Bophuthatswana). The northern border cut across Namibia very near the 23rd parallel. To 
say the least, it was an ambitious plan.197  
Boshoff argued that the Orange River, along with the Olifants and Dorning 
Rivers, would provide “the Afrikaners with a chance to create a future within the 
geographic boundaries of South Africa with technology and urbanization.”198 Boshoff 
believed that the Orange River could become the industrial backbone of the Afrikaner 
Volkstaat in the same way that the Rhine supported German industry. Boshoff envisioned 
new cities of two to three hundred thousand people springing up at “growth points” along 
the rivers. Rivers would irrigate farmland, making the desert bloom. Hydroelectric dams 
would power the Volkstaat’s homes, churches, schools, business, mines, and factories.199 
Boshoff envisioned the growth of a technology sector, leading one reporter to quip that 
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he hoped to create “silicon valley on the veld.”200 The Volkstaat would be connected to 
the wider world through a west coast port, trading with “Europe and the First World” as 
well as “Japan, Taiwan, China, and other Eastern Countries.”201 Boshoff’s colleague 
Chris Jooste wrote about the Volkstaat as a new kind of Israel; the Afrikaners would 
make the desert bloom.202 Boshoff’s vision was quixotic, leading many to dismiss it 
outright as a “pipe dream.”203  
Boshoff did not envision all Afrikaners coming to the Volkstaat at once. Much in 
the same way that Blacks lived in a common South Africa under apartheid, Boshoff 
envisioned many whites remaining within the common area. The fact, however, that they 
would have the option of moving to a Volkstaat would give whites in the common area a 
greater sense of security. Boshoff wrote, “Many will remain in the R.S.A. and continue to 
exist due to the strength they draw from the Volkstaat.” 204 Yet in the same way that white 
minority rule had made the black majority miserable, so too would black majority rule 
make the white minority unhappy. Boshoff told one reporter,  
A Boerestaat must be part and parcel of the solution to South Africa’s problems. 
When Azania (he says with a wicked twinkle in his eye) comes about as it surely 
will, it will act as a stimulus to the whole Boerestaat idea. Sure, there will be vast 
numbers of whites in Azania, but when the reality of life under the new 
dispensation (a black government) dawns on them, they will realize they will be 
better off in their own, free land.205  
 
His use of “Azania,” the PAC’s preferred name for South Africa, implied a reordered 																																																								
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society in which whites were no longer welcome. Boshoff assumed that whites would 
find “Azania” oppressive, and therefore opt to move to their own land.    
 Boshoff’s ethnic nationalism continued to border on a “white nationalism.” While 
he told one reporter that English speakers and Afrikaners needed each other and might 
even form a single volk one day, he rejected the idea that Coloured South Africans were 
in any way Afrikaners. Boshoff certainly admitted that white Afrikaners and Coloured 
people shared significant cultural, linguistic, religious, and economic ties. Yet a shared 
culture did not mean that people would automatically be able to assimilate. After all, 
Boshoff argued, the Germans and the French shared a (vaguely defined) “Western 
culture,” but they still recognized differences among themselves. Afrikaners and 
Coloured people may share a common culture, but Boshoff argued that they had 
remained separate groups throughout their respective histories.206 Boshoff’s example 
actually revealed the racial component of the separation. In his ethnic imagination, a 
Coloured person and an Afrikaner of similar social standing would be irreconcilable on 
the basis of their skin color.   
Boshoff thought that if the Coloured population were to be assimilated with the 
white Afrikaans-speakers, it would mean fighting against all forms of discrimination and 
inequality. While liberals might think that this was a laudable goal, Boshoff feared that it 
would lead to “great opposition, conflict, and even the destabilization of the community 
(gemeenskap).” “Systematic disentanglement” from the whites through the formation of 
their own “communal living area (lewensruimte),” the establishment of their own 																																																								
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symbols, and the election of their own leaders who advocated their own interests would 
make the Coloured people their own volk. While he offered no suggestions as to where 
the Coloured people could find their own lewensruimte to build their own volk, it would 
certainly not be in the Afrikaner Volkstaat. While citizenship in the Volkstaat would 
require assimilation to Afrikaner interests, white skin would certainly facilitate the 
process of assimilation.207   
On speaking tours, Boshoff only had marginal success in winning people over to 
his plan. He remembered one farmer saying, “When I heard about this the first time, I 
thought here is an old man who has gone crazy. Now I think differently.”208 For the most 
part, however, most people did not change their minds about Boshoff. In his later 
account, Boshoff attempted to show that the white community believed the NP would 
maintain control in South Africa. He remembered being laughed out of a town council 
meeting where he suggested that a black gardener could become the town’s mayor in ten 
years. He was also told to stay away from another town because “they want to braai you. 
They said you want to give the country to the blacks.”209 Boshoff included these 
comments in an attempt to highlight the radical edge of his vision. He portrayed whites as 
unaware of the major changes that were about to take place in South Africa.   
Boshoff was finding himself increasingly isolated on the right as well. A.P. 
Treurnicht’s Conservative Party espoused a nationalism of the 1960s. He was vehemently 
against power sharing, but he also accepted the homeland policy as an adequate solution 
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for South Africa’s racial questions. As late as 1987, Boshoff said that “all right thinking 
Afrikaners” ought to vote CP, but he came to think that they were unwilling to entertain 
any new ideas. When the CP distanced itself from the Volkstaat idea, Boshoff said it was 
clear that their party would only wind up following the same path that led the NP to the 
negotiating table. The HNP would also not hear anything of a “reduced state.” By 1989, 
Boshoff found himself without a real party affiliation.210  
Even among those groups who accepted the idea of a Volkstaat, there was no 
agreement as to where the Volkstaat should be. The Oranjewerkers proposed land around 
Pretoria as well as territory carved out of the Highveld and the Bushveld. Their leader 
was Boshoff’s brother-in-law, Hendrik Verwoerd, Jr. (who had incidentally been a 
missionary at Meetse-a-Bophelo). They hoped to build a growth point at Morgenzon, but 
it quickly became apparent that the black population was outpacing the white population. 
When a reporter asked what Morgenzon resident what he thought about the prospects of a 
white homeland, the man simply muttered “bullshit.”211 The AWB claimed most of the 
territory of the former Boer Republics as a Volkstaat.212 Robert van Tonder also made 
proposals that included parts of the Transvaal.213 Boshoff distinguished himself by 
placing his claim in the Karoo. He claimed no territory in the Transvaal, and he was 
insistent upon a white labor policy, believing that labor demographics have major 
political consequences. 
Thus, while Boshoff stood with leading right-wing movements, he very much 																																																								
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stood alone. They had different answers to questions of labor, territory, equality among 
volks, and the ending of discrimination. Boshoff certainly carried the image of an 
archconservative. Yet Boshoff also saw the liberation of the Afrikaners as intrinsically 
linked to the liberation of the African peoples. In the same way that European powers had 
returned to a metropol at the end of the colonial era to allow Africans to govern their own 
affair, the Afrikaners would withdraw to a new homeland, making way for African 
independence. By seeking Afrikaner independence, Boshoff was not opting for a diluted 
form of white power through power sharing, nor was he attempting to chauvinistically 
assert white authority over the black majority. Because of this, he later wrote that he was 
“even closer to the black liberation movements than the National Party and much of 
right-wing thought.”214  
While Boshoff may have been close to liberation movements in some regards, he 
was light years away in others. Boshoff consistently repeated his categorical rejection of 
a non-racial democracy with majority rule, which was the ultimate aim of African 
liberation movements. He wanted to “decolonize” South Africa, but he would struggle 
against becoming a minority whose aspirations were always dwarfed by the will of the 
African majority. For its part, the ANC was emphatically against any plans for partition. 
In spite of their differences, it became clear to Boshoff that no Volkstaat could be secured 
without compromise from the Black majority. Secretly, Boshoff and Jooste began to meet 
with ANC leaders Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma to discuss their ideas.215 If Afrikaner 
nationalism were to survive, it would have to be acceptable to the black majority.  																																																								
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Smith moved into positions of influence, and out of Mamelodi 
 During the late the 1980s, Smith began to gain positions of influence both inside 
South Africa and abroad. In 1987, Smith was elected Actuary of the Dutch Reformed 
Church in Africa (DRCA) at the general synod in Umtata. The moderature reflected the 
growing prevalence of activists in the DRCA. As a leader of the DRCA, Smith worked 
closely on the unification process with the DRMC. 216 The two churches would form the 
Uniting Reformed Church in Southern Africa (URCSA) in 1994. Not only would Smith 
work tirelessly to ensure that various congregations joined the new united church, but he 
also drafted the URCSA’s church order. The new polity contained only 12 articles, and 
reflected concerns about broader church unity. It eliminated any racial or ethnic 
qualifications for membership, making faith in Jesus Christ the only requirement. 217 
Locally, Smith was also hired by UNISA to teach classes in missions part-time.    
 Smith also worked very closely with the ANC. In 1988, Smith went to Gaborone, 
Botswana, from which he secretly travelled to Ndola in northern Zambia, where he would 
participate in an ANC youth conference. He remembered taking the podium as the only 
white speaker, saying it was like walking into a refrigerated room. As he spoke, he felt 
many in the audience warm to him, and he judged his time there a success.218 Smith had 
gained a certain amount of trust with ANC leaders. At one meeting, Thabo Mbeki handed 
Smith R10,000 and told him to wait for an invitation to a church conference, where he 
would hand the money to a certain priest. Indeed, he received the invitation, and found 
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the priest standing with Govan Mbeki. Never one for discretion, Smith handed the money 
over immediately and in the open, much to the chagrin of the priest. Luckily for them 
both, no one reported the incident.219 
 Smith also received many invitations to speak abroad about his work in 
Mamelodi. He was earnest and sincere in his belief that God had changed his heart, 
turning him from racism toward human fellowship. This narrative fit very well with 
Evangelicals, who gave Smith many speaking opportunities. He told his life stories at 
seminaries across the United States, and he appeared in Time Magazine.220 Rebecca de 
Saintonge wrote a biography of his life, praising him for abandoning his privilege and 
moving to Mamelodi. Smith loved talking about himself and getting the international 
attention. 
 His own colleagues in Mamelodi, however, were not happy with him. While the 
local and international attention certainly stoked Smith’s ego, it began to upset his local 
colleagues. In particular, Smith clashed with his clergy college, Edmond Nkosi. They 
frequently disagreed. Smith refered to Nkosi disparagingly as “thoroughly colonized,” 
and they frequently disagreed about control of church funds. Smith kept the money for 
his geodesic home in a separate account, while Nkosi controlled all of the church’s other 
funds.221 Nkosi was also understandably resentful of Smith’s absences. During the last 
five months of 1987 alone he was away for six weeks. Nkosi brought the matter to the 
attention of the NGK, who technically paid Smith’s salary. Smith said that he had 																																																								
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received official permission for all of his absences, but they were not satisfied with his 
answer. Because they paid his salary, the NGK told Smith that he should have fewer 
absences. Smith then turned to the Bel Air Presbyterian Church, which scraped together 
funds for his salary. This allowed Smith the freedom to travel and promote the work he 
was doing.222    
 The nature of the work was becoming exhausting for the Smiths. When they were 
in South Africa, Smith worked constantly, frequently late into the night. The reality of 
violence added a constant layer of tension to their lives. Nico and Ellen were also 
frequently apart, owing to Smith’s extensive travel schedule. Ellen received a bursary to 
work in London, and when Nico went to visit her, he found her too depressed to even 
speak to him.223 Upon their return to South Africa, she underwent electro-shock therapy 
for depression. While a controversial procedure, Ellen and her colleagues embraced it as 
a therapy for depression.224 
 Ellen’s colleagues told Nico that they would have to leave Mamelodi, or he risked 
damaging Ellen’s health.225 As Ellen and Nico spoke, they realized that the scrutiny of 
white opponents, the political turmoil, the presence of security branch, the death threats, 
assassinated neighbors, and the constant stream of people in need at their door at all hours 
of the day proved to be too much. Ellen perhaps noted in her husband what scholars now 
call “activist burnout,” which occurs “when the accumulation of stressors associated with 
activism become so overwhelming they compromise activists’ persistence in their 																																																								
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activism.”226 They decided that they would leave Mamelodi in June of 1989. Ellen spoke 
on the couple’s behalf, saying that they were moving out “so her husband could get a 
good night’s sleep.”227 
Smith was devastated. He knew that white opponents would revel in the fact that 
he could not adapt to life as, in his words, an “ordinary member of the black community.” 
They left as quietly as possible, moving to a small holding farm that they called Klipkop. 
Smith remembered that leaving Mamelodi “landed me in a dark hole,” specifically 
because he felt that he had failed as a missionary. He was preaching a message of radical 
identification with the poor and the oppressed, and now he was retreating. He 
remembered, “My whole understanding of my missionary calling had come crashing 
down around my ears.”228 As exhausting as the work may have been, Smith believed that 
God was calling him to Mamelodi. He believed that the work he did there had profound 
meaning and significance. Smith thought that he could serve the people there, while 
building bridges with the white community. He wanted to prove that Afrikaners could 
live across the racial lines in South Africa. Smith now faced a choice—would he live and 
work where he felt that God was calling him to be, or would he be the husband that Ellen 
needed him to be? He opted for the latter, but became severely depressed. Nico and Ellen 
went through a rough patch in their marriage. Their daughter even remembered that when 
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one entered the room, the other would often times leave. They both underwent 
electroshock therapy.229 
Conclusion 
 Christian leaders worked at a fevered pitch during the 1980s. Bosch would be a 
founding member and then leader of the NIR. Smith would expand Koinonia while 
attempting to live in solidarity with his parishioners. Meanwhile, Boshoff attempted to 
reignite a passion for Afrikaner ethnic distinction. In spite of their hard work, the future 
remained unclear. After all their hours of work, they became increasingly isolated, 
skeptical, and uncertain. From the vantage point of violence and fear, there were few 
hints that the 1990s would mark a major turning point. Many commentators expected 
Afrikaners to form a coalition and wage war into the 21st century. Yet even during the 
late 1980s, a number of factors were aligning that would make change possible. It was 
clear that the NGK was now in the hands of leaders who supported reconciliation and 
negotiation rather than enforced separation. This meant that should the government opt to 
begin the process of negotiation, key Afrikaner church leaders would only offer their 
support. A growing number of intellectuals and business leaders also supported 
negotiation. While there was considerable fear that the white right would stall the 
movement toward negotiation or even turn back the clock, the NP still had a significant 
majority in Parliament. Likewise, a growing number of Afrikaners, including Bosch, 
voiced their support for the Progressive Federal Party (a precursor to the Democratic 
Party), which also supported negotiation. Should the NP pursue negotiation, it could 
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count on the support of an opposition party that was not much smaller than the CP. 
Botha, however, was reluctant to begin negotiations. The political arithmetic and various 
organizations across civil society would allow for reform; all that needed was a change in 
leadership.  
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CHAPTER 9:  
THE HOPE OF RECONCILIATION (1989–1994) 
P.W. Botha suffered a stroke in January 1989. F.W. de Klerk succeeded Botha as 
N.P. leader, narrowly defeating Botha’s preferred successor, Barend du Plessis. As party 
leader, he announced that “now is the time for a great leap forward.”1 Yet de Klerk was a 
noted conservative, while du Plessis had the reputation of being verlig. As de Klerk 
became president in August/September 1989, international observers thought his rhetoric 
was merely a new chapter in the “long and tedious tale of disappointments” in South 
African politics.2 When laying out his agenda, he first spoke in terms of “group rights.” 
He argued that politics in the “new South Africa” would be defined by power sharing 
between groups. He assured the white minority that no group would be dominated by 
another.3 Yet it very quickly became apparent that de Klerk would be different than his 
predecessor. In 1990, he unbanned the ANC, released political prisoners, and allowed 
exiles to return. At long last, the NP would heed the many calls from civil society to 
begin negotiations with the ANC. The ANC and the NP agreed on reconciliation as an 
ideal, though they disagreed on the terms.  
As politicians attempted to move forward with the process of negotiation, 
religious leaders also debated the shape and contours of reconciliation. David Bosch 
continued to defend reconciliation as a process. He would not, however, live to see the 
first fruits of negotiation—the 1994 election. Bosch’s life was cut tragically short by a car 																																																								
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accident. After leaving Mamelodi, Nico Smith became something of an outspoken critic 
of reconciliation. He was skeptical when whites used the term, and believed, like the 
ANC, that reconciliation could only begin in the context of majority rule. Carel Boshoff 
still attempted to promote a separate existence for Afrikaners, but he was unable to form 
a broad coalition on the right. Recognizing that the right was divided, he opted to support 
negotiations with the ANC. In doing so, Boshoff was part of a group that was able to 
transform Afrikaner nationalism to such an extent that it could find a place in a non-racial 
democratic South Africa. The concept of reconciliation, which gained significant moral 
capital through interracial ecumenical and missionary gatherings in the 1970s and 1980s, 
would become a guiding political principle in the 1990s. While the term was contested, 
church and political leaders appealed to reconciliation to help guide South Africa through 
a very tenuous and often violent transition.     
Initial Hope and Skepticism 
From 1988 to 1989, Bosch’s skepticism had fundamentally changed.4 He 
despaired of the chances for a negotiated settlement under Botha’s leadership, but he saw 
the possibility arise with de Klerk. Rather than despair, Bosch now warned against easy 
answers. In June 1989, Bosch went with 115 white delegates to a meeting with the ANC 
in Lusaka. Among them were businessmen, academics, journalists, politicians, ministers, 
and trade unionists. They were influential people who represented various organizations. 																																																								
4 During the late 1980s, Bosch participated in delegations that met the ANC. He worked with 
Roelf Meyer’s Movement Towards Democracy, which included a group of thinkers and activists dedicated 
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Mogoba participated in a teleconference with ANC leadership in Lusaka, Roelf Meyer in Klippies 
Kritzinger and Willem Saayman, David J. Bosch: Prophetic integrity, cruciform praxis (Cluster 
Publications, 2011), 96. 
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One of the main items on the agenda was the discussion of economic systems, 
specifically the question of what form the post-apartheid economy would take. In spite of 
this often tense and difficult topic, Bosch remembered a spirit of euphoria had gripped 
the delegates. They were looking forward to a negotiated settlement and a “fool-proof” 
democracy. Bosch, however, wanted to point out that the movement to democracy would 
not end South Africa’s problems, but only be the first step toward solving them. There 
was no endpoint, but rather a continuous process. Bosch said, 
We should beware of facile optimism. Even if we do get a negotiated settlement, 
our troubles will be far from over. Because of the history of our country and 
because of the incredibly heterogeneous composition of its population, such a 
settlement will remain a very fragile thing for many years to come. We will get up 
every morning, conscious of the fact that we have a hard day ahead of us, a day 
during which we’ll have to do our best to keep our brittle unity alive by means of 
all kinds of smaller and bigger compromises; and we will go to bed every night, 
grateful that, somehow, we have managed to stay together today.5 
 
For Bosch, the arc of South African history would not come to an end after a transition to 
democracy. On the contrary, it would be one more step in a much longer journey. 
Nevertheless, he now thought that a negotiated settlement was a possibility, whereas only 
months before he did not.  
Smith, on the other hand, still did not even envision the possibility of negotiation. 
In July 1989, Smith was part of a press conference on the issue of race at Lausanne II, an 
evangelical mission meeting. There, he sat alongside Michael Cassidy, Caesar Molebatsi, 
and Vinay Samuel. When asked if he had hope for the future, Molebatsi said that there 
was not much hope within the black liberation movement. Yet one sign of hope, he 
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argued, was that the NGK seemed to be changing. The fact that so many people from the 
NGK were now in conversation with the ANC had given him a measure of hope. 
Likewise, he knew that many black people were still willing to negotiate.6 Smith had a 
different kind of hope. He reaffirmed his position that South Africa could not be changed 
without a “catharsis,” which he used as a euphemism for violent confrontation. His hope 
was that God would use violence to create something new. Smith said, “My Christian 
hope is the knowledge that I know God is present in this situation and is going to grant us 
a new opportunity. Something new is going to be born.”7  
Debating the Politics of Reconciliation 
 South African theologians were very fond of saying that they did not have any 
policy “blueprints.” To a large extent, this was true. Both the theologians of ethnic 
distinction and the theologians of reconciliation operated in the realm of moral ideals. For 
those who believed in ethnic distinction, the ideal for an ordered and peaceful society was 
separate nations for different ethnic groups. For those who promoted reconciliation, they 
believed that a single, non-racial state was the ideal order for society. Neither group, 
however, went terribly far toward formulating pragmatic policy suggestions. In the early 
1990s, both the ANC and the NP would adopt reconciliation as a common moral ideal. 
Judith Renner rightly argued that reconciliation became a “hegemonic ideal in South 
Africa, starting with the breakdown of apartheid.”8 While agreeing that a united South 
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Africa was the political goal, the ANC and the NP hotly contested the practical 
implications of reconciliation. 
In Renner’s analysis, reconciliation was an “empty universal” to which various 
leaders could attach their own political agenda.9 In her memoir of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Country of my skull, Antjie Krog likewise noted that 
reconciliation meant different things to different people. For Afrikaner politicians, 
reconciliation was not only used to cover up their shameful past actions, but also “as a 
threat: give us what we want, or we won’t reconcile with a black government.”10 The 
NP’s vision of reconciliation generally entailed amnesty for apartheid-era officials and 
“minority rights” (i.e. privileges for whites). For thinkers like Smith and Bosch, this kind 
of reconciliation was “cheap reconciliation”; it asked the “underdog” to accept his 
position. 
The ANC also attached different demands to reconciliation. After de Klerk chided 
the ANC’s “protest regarding past injustices or alleged injustices” as not being in the 
spirit of reconciliation, Mandela wrote to him, saying,  
It is the Government, and not the ANC, that started civil war in this country, and 
that does not want reconciliation and peace. How does one work for reconciliation 
and peace under a State of Emergency, with black areas under military 
occupation, when people’s organizations are banned, leaders are in exile, prison 
or restricted, when the policy of apartheid with its violence is still being enforced, 
and when no conditions for free political expression exist.11 
 
Mandela in no uncertain terms said that state violence against black radicals was the true 
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hindrance to reconciliation. His language was more in line with discussion of “costly 
reconciliation” that Tutu and Bosch were having at the foundational meeting of the NIR 
in 1985. After demands for democratic reform were met, Thabo Mbeki couched 
reconciliation in terms of social transformation. He said, “true reconciliation can only 
take place if we succeed in our objective of social transformation. Reconciliation and 
transformation should be viewed as an interdependent part of one unique process of 
building a new society.”12 Thus, there was some flexibility in the term reconciliation. All 
parties could agree that they were pursuing the common ideal of reconciliation while also 
promoting distinctive political agendas.  
New geopolitical events provided momentum toward negotiations. The Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Block were failing. When the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, 
De Klerk confided in family members “it was as if God has taken a hand—a new turn in 
world history…We had to seize the opportunity. The risk that the ANC was being used as 
a Trojan horse by a superpower had drastically diminished.” 13  Even devoted South 
African communists admitted as much. In January 1990, South African Communist Party 
chairman Joe Slovo argued that a socialist state in South Africa could only be a very 
distant goal. In the meantime, South Africa would embrace free elections and multiparty 
democracy.14 As socialist giants began to reform, recede, and collapse, it became clear 
that free markets and private property would play a major role in the new South Africa—
a definite advantage for the privileged white minority. 
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De Klerk still moved cautiously. In September 1989, the ANC held its first legal 
anti-apartheid march in South Africa since the 1960s. The march was the product of 
negotiations between Desmond Tutu and de Klerk. Johan Heyns not only mediated their 
initial meeting, but he also ensured that the president did not change his mind. The 
protest was peaceful, allaying any fears that it would trigger mass unrest. De Klerk took 
the next step in October, releasing many political prisoners, but not Nelson Mandela.15  
Believing himself to be in a position of strength, de Klerk began the process of a 
negotiated settlement. On February 2, 1990, de Klerk unconditionally released Nelson 
Mandela from prison, and he unbanned the ANC, the SACP, and the PAC. He would 
allow all political refugees to return to South Africa. While he had numerous reasons for 
taking the actions he did, de Klerk couched his decision in terms of reconciliation. He 
said, “The season of violence is over. The time for reconstruction and reconciliation has 
arrived … Practically every leader agrees that negotiation is the key to reconciliation, 
peace and a new just dispensation.”16 Nine days later, on February 11, Nelson Mandela 
slowly walked into freedom alongside Winnie, their fists raised in solidarity with the 
struggle.17 Mandela would speak in solidarity with the struggle, while also taking a 
conciliatory tone. He related the fruits of reconciliation to the ANC’s political project, 
saying, “Universal suffrage on a common voters’ roll in a united democratic and non-
racial South Africa is the only way to peace and racial harmony.”18   
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Skepticism and Surprise 
Carel Boshoff and Nico Smith responded to the beginning of the negotiated 
settlement with skepticism. For Boshoff, there was nothing surprising about Mandela’s 
release. It was only one step in longer process of reform. Interestingly, de Klerk would 
agree with Boshoff on this point. He understood himself to be furthering NP policy, 
rather than pioneering it.19 Boshoff, however, thought that the NP was in a much weaker 
position than de Klerk thought it was. De Klerk thought the ANC was internally divided 
and weak, which Boshoff later claimed he did not believe. Nor did he believe that power 
sharing would be the hallmark of a new democracy. He certainly did not believe that the 
NP would fare well in a majority election.20  
Nico Smith, who had come to see the NP as a stalwart and intractable bastion of 
white minority rule, was surprised by de Klerk’s actions. He argued that “things are 
happening in South Africa which most people thought would never happen.21” Yet 
Smith’s hope for change was tempered by pessimism. Only days after Mandela was 
released, Smith told a group of students at Wheaton College that he was still predicting a 
bloody future. While the government had created expectations for black liberation, Smith 
still believed that the NP was not prepared to negotiate. He believed that this would lead 
to increased protests, until the country would become almost ungovernable. The 
government would then call in police and troops to stem the violence, which would in 
turn lead to a bloody confrontation. Nevertheless, Smith maintained some hope that such 																																																								
19 Waldmeir, 112.  
20 Boshoff, 427-428.  
21 Nico Smith, “Dr. Nico’s Corner,” Koinonia Southern Africa vol. 4 no. 3 (July-September 1990), 
3.  
		
497 
“a catharsis” would “purify the minds of the people,” leading to a new and just 
dispensation.22  
In spite of his distrust of the NP, Smith would take a position closer to the ANC’s 
party line. Shortly after Mandela’s release from prison, the German ambassador invited 
the Smiths to an intimate dinner. In addition to the Smiths, guests included ANC leaders 
like Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Barbara Masekela, as well as Democratic Party MP 
Helen Suzman, and the famous author Nadine Gordimer. The various participants asked 
Mandela about the ANC’s policy. Suzman was concerned about economic policies, while 
Gordimer discussed cultural diversity.23 Smith asked what role Mandela saw for the 
churches in South Africa after majority rule. Smith recalled, “He foresaw that the most 
important role for the churches would be that they would now have to help lead the 
people of the country to reconciliation. The distances between the different ethnic groups 
in the country were still so great that they in fact could hardly be bridged.”24 The 
churches, Mandela continued, could help build those bridges. Mandela noted that Smith’s 
work in Mamelodi had already made a positive contribution in that direction.  
The 1990/1994 democratic transition was extremely turbulent. While Smith was 
right that there would be violence, it did not take the form of a mass confrontation of 
security forces with protestors. Nor was there anything “cathartic” about it. In early 1990, 
the ANC began mobilizing throughout the country, attempting to rebuild their political 
infrastructure. The highly energized ANC was very threatening to Chief Buthelezi’s 																																																								
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Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which stood to lose quite a bit of support. In Natal, 
confrontations occurred, leading to the tragic “Seven Days War” in Pietermaritzburg, in 
which 200 people died. The IFP recruited Zulu hostel dwellers, who armed themselves 
against the ANC township residents. ANC vigilantes began to attack IFP and government 
targets. In the Witwatersrand, masked gunmen opened fire on commuter trains. It was 
later revealed that state security forces were actively engaged in promoting violence, 
hoping that by creating the spectacle of “black on black crime,” the white minority would 
win a more favorable settlement.25 
In the August 1990 Pretoria Minute, the ANC agreed to suspend all armed 
activity. Many on the left worried that Mandela was “selling out” to the white 
government. Violence escalated, and the fatalities rose to staggering heights. From 1990 
to 1994, roughly 14,000 people died in political violence, many more people than in the 
previous decade. Commentators worried about a growing “Kalashnikov culture” and a 
possible civil war. People drew parallels between South Africa and divided countries like 
Lebanon or disintegrating political entities like Yugoslavia.26 For the right, it was 
evidence that a unitary state would be a failure. Boerestaat Party leader Robert van 
Tonder, speaking at Stellenbosch University, even accused de Klerk and Mandela of 
being politically “backwards.” According to “modern political thought,” van Tonder 
contented, multiple nations could not successfully be fused into one unitary state.27     
Seeking to respond to violence and continue moving toward the process of 
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negotiation, the NP and the ANC signed the National Peace Accord in September 1991. 
The document attempted to establish the various conditions that would facilitate the 
negotiated settlement. The introductory material cited reconciliation as a shared value 
among all participants. It read, “The accord is of such a nature that every peace-loving 
person can support it. The Accord reflects the values of all key players in the arena of 
negotiation and reconciliation.”28 All parties agreed that working for a peaceful 
settlement was preferable to a violent alternative. The fact that key leaders in the 
negotiation rejected violence in favor of reconciliation goes a long way toward explaining 
the miracle of the eventual settlement. They could have fed into the violence, making it 
escalate. Reconciliation provided a guiding moral beacon during a turbulent decade.   
Smith was, however, skeptical of the Peace Accord. He wrote, “To think that the 
Peace Accord will really bring about peace amongst the peoples of South Africa could 
eventually cause severe disillusionment.” Smith believed that “peace is still very far off 
in South Africa” because peace rests on the basis of justice. Echoing the ANC’s 
conditions for reconciliation, Smith said that while the white minority remained in 
control of all positions of power (which they achieved through “an unjust historical 
process”) there would be no possibility of peace. Smith did not think that any South 
African institutions, including the security forces and the churches, had the ability to keep 
peace in the country. Instead, he called for an outside “Peace Force” to monitor the 
violence. In the meantime, he wrote that Koinonia would continue to forge relationships 
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between blacks and whites as “the essential starting point of peace.”29  
Rustenburg 
As political leaders promoted reconciliation in the midst of turmoil, church 
leaders were having parallel conversations. De Klerk came to believe that the religious 
leaders needed to come to a common understanding by holding a gathering. While 
Afrikaans churches welcomed de Klerk’s suggestion, others, especially in the South 
African Council of Churches, were skeptical of de Klerk’s motives. De Klerk did not 
have any direct organizational function, instead passing the initiative to Louw Alberts.30 
The steering committee for the event included a range of leaders who were active in both 
the NIR and the Kairos movement, such as Michael Cassidy, Desmond Tutu, Johan 
Heyns, and Frank Chikane (the latter being a key player). It is important to note that 
many of these them had been in conversation since the late 1970s, debating questions 
surrounding reconciliation and justice. The steering committee gathered 230 
representatives for the National Conference of Church Leaders at Rustenburg in 
November 1990, where they spoke about the current situation in South Africa and their 
hopes for the future. While they did not agree on everything, delegates condemned 
apartheid as a sin and endorsed non-racial multi-party democracy.31  
 Perhaps the most famous event of the Rustenburg Deliberation was Willie 
Jonker’s confession of guilt. Jonker felt authorized to make this confession, because the 																																																								
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1990 NGK synod took a stronger standing against apartheid. It declared that any system 
that enforces separation “must be rejected as sinful.”32 At Rustenburg, Jonker said,  
I confess before you and before the Lord not only my own sin and guilt and my 
personal responsibility for the political, social and structural wrongs that have 
been done to many of you and the results of which you and our whole country are 
still suffering from, but vicariously I also dare to do this in the name of the Dutch 
Reformed Church of which I am a member, and on behalf of the Afrikaner people 
as a whole.33  
 
Desmond Tutu then stood up, asking for just a moment, and said,  
 
I believe that I stand under the compulsion of God’s Holy Spirit to say that … 
when a confession is made, those of us who have been wronged must say, ‘We 
forgive you.’ I cannot, when someone says, ‘Forgive me!” say, ‘I do not.’ For 
then I cannot pray, ‘Forgive as we forgive!’34  
 
For Tutu, forgiveness was the first step toward reconciliation.  
Part of Tutu’s theological project was giving reconciliation and “forgiveness” 
African roots through the concept of ubuntu. For Tutu, Africa had special insight into 
human relations. While western societies sought the good of the individual, African 
societies sought the good of the community. The word “ubuntu” is shared by several 
Nguni languages, and denotes the essential quality of being human in a communitarian 
society: a person is only a person in relation to other people. Tutu would define ubuntu as 
the idea that “my humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours. We belong in 
a bundle of life. We say a person is a person through other persons. It is not I think 
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therefore I am. It says rather: I am human because I belong, I participate, and I share.”35 
Ubuntu required people to forgive their offenders, because when one refuses to forgive or 
even seeks vengeance, then he or she denies their own humanity.  
Nico Smith also attended the Rustenburg Deliberation, and he was decidedly less 
conciliatory. Conservative Baptist Peter Hammond remembered him as “one of the most 
vicious speakers from the floor.”36 Smith was worried that the Rustenburg Deliberation 
might undermine black aspirations during the transition. Smith’s anxieties turned into 
anger when he noticed a car that he had seen many times in Mamelodi. He recognized the 
occupants as well, and knew that they were members of the Security Police. Smith went 
directly to Alberts, asking if he was aware of their presence. Not only did Alberts know 
about their presence, but he had also invited them. Smith was livid, and he immediately 
said that he would make their presence known to all the delegates. Alberts pleaded with 
Smith to discuss the matter with Frank Chikane. Smith aggressively confronted Chikane, 
asking how he could allow security police at the conference, “knowing how black people 
felt about the Security Police.” Chikane was embarrassed by Smith’s aggressive tone, and 
said he agreed to their presence to ensure the participation of several Afrikaner leaders. 
Chikane asked Smith not to pursue the matter further, for the sake of the conference.37  
 Smith did not listen. He thought it would be “an act of treachery” against his 
black brothers and sisters if he did not say something. And so, during the first afternoon 
session, Smith stood up, and announced that the Security Police were present at the 																																																								
35 Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (Doubleday, 1999), 31. 
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request of the organizers. Smith later remembered that this put the “cat among the 
pigeons.” The gathering was furious. Many black delegates stood up and threatened to 
leave. Alberts attempted to calm the crowd, vowing in the name of the Lord that there 
had been no bad intention. He went on ask the members of the police to leave. According 
to Smith, “I could not believe my eyes when I saw how many men stood up and left the 
meeting.”38  
For the organizers, the presence of police may not have seemed altogether 
nefarious. It was a violent and tense time, and there were numerous potential threats from 
both the left and the right. For Smith, however, this was wrong-headed. Smith said, 
“What upset me most was the naivety of people like Louw Alberts and Johan Heyns…in 
thinking that because they enjoyed the protection of the Security Police their black 
brothers and sisters…would be satisfied with such an arrangement.” For Smith, the police 
were not a force for protection, but rather the enemy of black people. Smith argued that 
the committee led by Chikane not only “a traitorous deed against their black brothers and 
sisters but one of utmost dishonesty.”39 
Many white delegates regarded Smith as a “black sheep,” and the Afrikaans press 
painted a negative picture of him. Black leaders were angry with him as well. Smith’s 
posturing toward Chikane was condescending. Chikane was a consistent radical, who had 
numerous run-ins with police for his for political activities. Only a year before, he wound 
up in intensive care after police attempted to assassinate him by lacing his underwear 
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with a nerve toxin.40 Smith, no doubt deeply unsure of his own political credentials after 
leaving Mamelodi, wanted to prove his commitment to liberation. It was not, however, 
appropriate for Smith to accuse Chikane of being a traitor to “his people.” From that 
point forward, they had a very chilly relationship. The Sunday Rapport published a front 
page article, deriding Smith’s actions under the headline, “The Christian leader who does 
not want to reconcile.” David Bosch and Johan Heyns were both deeply upset with 
Smith’s actions. They said that he threatened to upset the conciliatory nature of the 
meeting. For Smith, their concern highlighted a major difference between their thinking. 
He wrote, “David was a man of reconciliation and peace…[while] to me it was all about 
the struggle for justice as being the only means to achieve reconciliation and peace.”41 
Before there could be peace and reconciliation, there would first have to be an end to 
discrimination and oppression, and the establishment of justice. White minority rule had 
to end, then reconciliation could begin.  
For Smith, men like Bosch had remained inside the proverbial “laager.” Smith 
would come to believe that Bosch’s theology and politics failed to sufficiently identify 
with the poor and oppressed black people in South Africa, leading him prematurely to 
speak of reconciliation before addressing justice. Smith wrote, “Because of my being so 
closely involved in the struggle of black people against discrimination and oppression 
(injustice) I was convinced that all attempts to achieve reconciliation and peace in the 																																																								
40 Ole Bubenzer, Post-TRC Prosecutions in South Africa: Accountability for Political Cimes 
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Vlok and head of the South African Police Special Branch Johan van der Merwe were responsible for 
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country were but pious words.” Bosch patently refused to take a side in the “liberation 
struggle,” frequently critiquing both the South African government and the liberation 
movement. Bosch’s academic work, while in dialogue with liberation and contextual 
African theologies, always judged their thoughts according to Western standards. Smith 
pointed out that his magnum opus, Transforming Mission, never addressed the South 
African situation specifically, and it offered no place for the African perspective. As 
Smith wrote, “his book is a vision of missionary practice from a Western perspective.”42 
For Smith, Bosch’s call to reconciliation came from within the white community, and 
failed to address the pressing demands of justice. Smith later came to believe that his 
view of justice “was really the reason for my alienation, not only from David but also 
from Afrikaans society as a whole.”43  
 “The Changing South African Scene” 
For Bosch, however, reconciliation was a process, not an endpoint. Offering 
forgiveness is separate from demanding restitution. Bosch quoted Tutu, saying that grace 
is unconditional, meaning that according to the Christian understanding, one does not say 
“I forgive you if…” To make such a demand would mean that you could never faithfully 
say the Lord’s Prayer, “Forgive us our sins, as we forgive those who sin against us.” In 
the same way that God’s forgiveness of human sinfulness is unconditional, human beings 
forgiveness of one another should also be without condition.44  
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Forgiveness, however, had its own demands. It put the forgiven party “under an 
immense obligation.” Should it neglect to begin the journey toward restitution by 
“demonstrating practically that it has experienced a change of heart,” then it would 
invalidate the forgiveness that it was offered.45 Part of the mission for the church in South 
Africa during the coming years would be “to help White Christians make their repentance 
more audible and tangible.”46 The also NGK had a special responsibility toward those 
who “still cling fanatically to the conviction that there is nothing about which the 
Afrikaner or the Afrikaans churches need to feel guilty or ashamed.”47 Bosch wrote that 
the NGK could not write off this group, specifically because their beliefs had been 
informed by decades of the NGK’s apartheid teaching. Far from letting the oppressor off 
the hook, reconciliation puts the oppressor under obligation to make amends to the 
oppressed. 
Bosch also thought that the call for “justice before reconciliation” was entitled. 
While hesitating “to be too explicit,” he said, “If I am not mistaken, there are Black 
individuals and groups who adhere to the ideology of entitlement.” 48 Victims of 
oppression took the view that because they were not responsible for South Africa’s 
problems, they were entitled to wait for the oppressor to sort out the mess. For Bosch, 
there were two major problems with the “ideology of entitlement.” In the first place, it 
would rob the country of the talents and energies of a significant portion of the 
population who could contribute to finding solutions for the common good. Secondly, 																																																								
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Bosch argued that those who feel entitled often become paralyzed, channeling their 
energy “into bouts of self-pity and paroxysms of putting all blame on the system.” Bosch 
added that very few people seemed to espouse the “ideology” of entitlement—he was 
rightly reluctant to point any fingers. He specifically stated that the ANC was not guilty 
of entitlement. While the ANC was highly critical of the government, it was also offering 
concrete suggestions and working to bring “peace, stability and prosperity to all South 
Africans.”49    
For Bosch, reconciliation between different ideologies was the only way forward. 
There were, he argued, three operative anthropologies in South Africa, and each would 
fail to solve the country’s problems on its own. The first anthropology was that of 
apartheid, which was completely dehumanizing to black people, filling them with self-
disgust and self-hatred (as Tutu noted), leaving them as a shadow of their former selves 
(as Biko noted). Black people were moved around and controlled as though they were 
“things.” Apartheid was an oppressive system that privileged the white minority, and 
Bosch thought that white South Africans would have to deal with the legacy of apartheid 
in much the same way that Germans were “suffering from the after-effects of Nazism.”50  
The second anthropology, liberalism, appeared more human on the surface, 
especially with its insistence on human rights. On the other hand, it tended to push 
individuals apart. It espoused the pursuit of one’s own happiness as the highest good. 
Liberalism could also become condescending. Bosch reiterated that the Black 
consciousness movement rejected liberalism because it was often “a White agenda based 																																																								
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on White values and assumptions,” which demanded Black assimilation. Liberals in the 
NP celebrated the removal of restrictions on black people, saying that now they were able 
to achieve their highest potential. In making these claims, however, liberals often 
overlooked the fact that “where historical handicaps have developed, equal opportunities 
are not enough.” In South Africa, liberalism tended to follow patterns of “classical 
liberalism,” and therefore had a comfortable relationship with capitalism. Bosch worried 
that liberals in South Africa acquiesced to the rich getting richer and the poor getting 
poorer.51 Liberalism would have few tools beyond the free market to address rising 
poverty, unemployment, and income inequality. 
Finally, Bosch argued that traditional African anthropology was at play in South 
Africa. This was specifically the case since the revival of ubuntu as a political concept. In 
the idealized vision of African society, there are no rich or poor people, and everyone is 
cared for “from the cradle to the grave.” Yet Bosch argued that this was an overly 
romantic view of “traditional African society. He said that the solidarities in traditional 
African society were often restricted to family and clan. Likewise, there was frequently 
jealously and suspicion within one’s own group, which manifested itself in accusations of 
witchcraft. Those most susceptible to such accusations included both the weakest and 
most vulnerable members of the community, as well as those who had achieved an 
unusual level of success. While many glorified Africa’s pre-colonial past, Bosch was 
skeptical, arguing, “all human societies have their flaws, and it is no different in the case 
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of traditional Africa.”52  
For Bosch, all three operative anthropologies had fallen short. It is worth noting 
that Bosch neglected various contemporary socialist and communist ideas at play in 
South Africa. The Christian faith, he argued, offered an anthropology “in which people 
count, both as individuals and as communities, in which fears and joys of people are 
taken seriously, in which we will not allow traditions, systems or laws to close our eyes 
to people’s dreams and needs.” Bosch was positing a moral ideal; he was not suggesting 
that if everyone became a Christian then South Africa’s troubles would be over. Bosch 
argued that the church could play the role of “de-ideologizing” people. Christians come 
from a variety of different class, cultural, and ideological backgrounds. In the process of 
meeting one another, Christians from different backgrounds often come into 
confrontation, sometimes leading to schisms. But, as Bosch noted, “the canopy of God’s 
unconditional acceptance, if taken seriously, does not allow anybody to be written off.”53 
Because of their shared faith, Christians from diametrically opposed backgrounds were 
compelled to meet one another. In the process of making personal connections, people 
would begin to see their own ideological distortions. A new group would then emerge 
that is no longer committed to previous ideologies, but rather devoted to finding a new 
way forward. This “new group” was the “alternative community” in its truest form, the 
“in between people.” In Bosch’s vision, Christians could be the ones who seek to build 
bridges “across the crevices of society.”54 This was decidedly idealistic, especially given 
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the history of separation of churches in South Africa. Bosch’s hope, however, was that 
the ecumenical trajectories he was a part of would continue bringing diverse Christians 
together, and they could continue pursuing new moral options.      
In Bosch’s mind, reconciliation was central to the mission of the church. 
Reconciliation went far beyond the axiom “forgive and forget.” Reconciliation was more 
like a journey toward a brighter future. The “in between people” had an enormous task; 
they would have to stand with and between opposing factions, bringing them together, 
highlighting various strengths and weaknesses, and creating fertile ground for new 
possibilities. Bosch believed that this was as necessary in the coming new South Africa 
as it was in the old. There would be times when their efforts would pay off, but other 
times when their work would come crashing down around their feet. To suggest that 
Bosch was ultimately satisfied with the kind of reconciliation that happened at 
Rustenburg is to misread his dynamic understanding of reconciliation.  
Orania 
Though Bosch and Smith debated the shape and priorities reconciliation and 
justice, they both hoped that white and black South Africans would be able to inhabit and 
share the same country. Boshoff, on the other hand, was pushing hard to divide the 
country. Quite tellingly, an interview with Boshoff was published under the name It’s 
partition or black domination.55 In spite of the fact that Boshoff was having trouble 
drumming up support for his far-fetched Volkstaat vision, he had a core of followers who 
were committed to his vision. This group included members of his family, as well as 
																																																								
55 Carel Boshoff, It’s partition or black domination (Monitor Publications, 1990). 
		
511 
colleagues from SABRA (such as Chris Jooste) and members of the Afrikanervolkswag 
(such as Kobie Gouws). They were eager to begin building new “growth points.”  
In August 1990, Boshoff became aware of a town that was for sale on the banks 
of the Orange River.56 Boshoff and several Avstig members went to visit the town, and 
from his biography, one gets the impression that they encountered a kind of ghost town 
on the Karoo flat. Many of the houses had been looted, others were badly damaged, and 
still others had been completely destroyed. There were some promising aspects. It had 
large brick administrative buildings, a school, a church, and a community hall. There was 
also a swimming pool and fields for recreation. The town had solid infrastructure; there 
were concrete streets and systems in place for water, electricity, and sewage.57 Speaking 
to the caregiver, they learned that the Department of Waterways (DWA) built the town 
for people working on the various canal projects. It was laid out in typical apartheid 
fashion, there was a white town with black and Coloured townships. Once its projects 
were finished, the DWA offered it to other departments, including the House of 
Representatives (which was the Coloured branch of the tri-cameral Parliament), the 
prison service, and the police. When no other government organization wanted the town, 
the DWA opted to sell it.58   
On their way home, the group from Avstig stopped at a café for lunch. Highly 
enthusiastic, they decided that they would purchase the town. Boshoff phoned his 
predecessor at SABRA and the Broederbond Gerrit Viljoen, who was working as NP 
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Minister of Constitutional Development at the time. Viljoen assured Boshoff that the NP 
would not stand in his way. On the contrary, buying the property would show all parties 
that he was serious about the Volkstaat. Anna quickly went through her fundraising 
network, collecting funds in R25,000 units. She managed to raise half a million rand, but 
it was not enough. The property was, instead, sold to Johannesburg entrepreneur Jacques 
Pretorius. For the rest of the year, they were deeply disheartened by failing to gain a piece 
of property that suited their vision so well.59  
In December, the Boshoffs went to Douglas to give a speech on the Day of the 
Vow. There, a local lawyer informed them that Pretorius had defaulted on his loans, and 
now there was a chance that they could get the property. They gathered all the necessary 
representatives, and struck a deal with Pretorius. The town, which they called Orania, 
belonged to Avstig’s property development company, the Orania Bestuursdiensete 
Eiendoms Beperk (Orania Property Management Services, Ltd.; OBD).60 In late 
December 1990, Boshoff went on television, publically announcing that Avstig hoped 
Orania would become a new “growth point” for the Volkstaat.61  
Boshoff became the director of the OBD, which then sold R25,000 shares to raise 
funds for the community. The board decided that no payouts would be made to 
shareholders, but rather would go to the development of Orania as a Volkstaat. Naturally, 
this upset a lot of people. Boshoff wrote, “Certain shareholders were apparently recruited 
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with the promise that there was money to be made.”62 Church leaders frequently collect 
funds without any expectation of return (e.g. charity), while investors fund projects with 
the hope of a return. Needless to say, this misunderstanding led to a difficult 
shareholders’ meeting, where the board of directors stalwartly clung to their position.  
Boshoff, in consultation with Pretoria City Council member Paul Fouché, decided 
that Orania would be run as a share block company called the Vluytjeskraal Andeleblok 
Eiendoms Beperk (Vluytjieskraal Share Block Properties, Ltd.). Under South African 
law, developers can run properties as a “share block company,” meaning that residents do 
not purchase properties, but rather shares in a company that owns the buildings and 
land.63 The board of directors can set requirements for shareholders, screen prospective 
residents, and reject applications. The central requirement for living in Orania was 
“identification with the Afrikaner community,”64 which was determined by the judgment 
of the board of directors. Interestingly, there were (and still are) no racial requirements 
for shareholders, but rather cultural requirements. Yet, as had been the case with the 
moral justification for apartheid, the effects of cultural requirements were racial. While 
avoiding racial exclusion, the share block scheme ensured that all members of the 
community would be Afrikaners (and therefore white).65  
The town was not totally abandoned when the OBD purchased the property. In 																																																								
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addition to the white and Coloured caretakers from the DWA, there were also families of 
Coloured and black squatters living in Grootgewaag, the former Coloured township. 
There was considerable confusion among the squatters as to their position. Some claimed 
that there had been verbal agreements with the DWA, that once the work was finished 
they would have the right of occupancy. Likewise, one DWA engineer had suggested that 
the homes of those in the Coloured community should not be sold along with the rest of 
the town. This, however, did not happen. The entire town was sold. It seemed that some 
of the squatters were informed of the sale of the property, and the DWA found new 
accommodations for some residents. Other residents, however, were not informed and 
had no accommodation.66 
In early 1991, Boshoff issued eviction notices, giving those squatters who 
remained until March 31 to vacate. The press reported that the squatters were panicking. 
Mariechen Waldner interviewed a breastfeeding woman who worried that “Carel Boshoff 
is coming to shoot us.” Another young woman said “we need to say to Carel Boshoff that 
we would like to live with him in peace in this beautiful birthplace of ours.” Yet another 
said, “He speaks of Christianity and he says that he is a Christian. How can you be a 
Christian when you are so arrogant.”67 Waldner listened to their heartbreaking stories and 
their uncertainty. She called Boshoff before publishing the story, and she said, “I have 
just listened to these people, and I think that you are committing a sin.” The telephone 
was quiet. After a moment, Boshoff said, “Well, then you must write the story.”68  
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Boshoff argued “he did not purchase a bus with passengers.”69 While many 
former residents found other accommodation, those who did not leave before the deadline 
remembered a harrowing event. In their official statement to the Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights in 2005, former residents said that Boshoff and his friends 
“came on bakkies to order everyone out of the area. They fired guns throughout the 
night.” There were accounts of “beatings, pistol whippings and harassment with dogs.” 
The residents were forced to leave in such a hurry that many claimed to have lost 
property. The next day, they became more violent, and several people were “severely 
assaulted,” including one elderly man “whose leg was amputated after he was 
assaulted.”70   
In order to make a successful land claim against Orania, they would have to prove 
that the removals were the result of a “racially discriminatory law or practice.”  Initially, 
the Commissioner argued that clearing land of people of color in order to make space for 
an Afrikaner state was “in itself a racial practice.”71 AfriForum attorney Willie Spies, 
however, argued that the sale of property from Pretorius to Boshoff could not have been 
deemed a racist transaction. He further claimed that if there was any party at fault, it was 
the DWA, because it did not make adequate provisions for residents before selling the 
land and all of its improvements—first to Pretorius, and then to Boshoff. The 
commissioner agreed with Spies, and the former residents lodged their claim against the 
DWA, and not the residents of Orania. The South African government, now under ANC 
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leadership, awarded the claimants R2.9 million (nearly $650,000 in 2018).72  
In his later autobiography, Boshoff attempted to distance himself from the event 
altogether, saying, “we never dealt with the Grootgewaagd residents ourselves.”73 He 
made no statements to account for the violence in March 1991. Waldner also remembered 
that Boshoff began to say that people must not be forced from their homes, and they must 
not be hurt.74 Boshoff always had the sense that forced removals would need to be done 
to avoid a civil war.75 He also thought those removals could be conducted in a generous 
spirit. He selected the Northern Cape as an Afrikaner homeland specifically to minimize 
such removals. His viewpoint still ignored the fact that had the Volkstaat expanded to 
even a fraction of the size of the proposed “Orandee,” these tragic stories would have 
multiplied into the hundreds of thousands. Boshoff overestimated peoples’ willingness to 
move. Black and Coloured people living in the Northern Cape were not eager to leave 
their homes, nor were Afrikaners living throughout the country eager to build their future 
in the Karoo. While Orania had sparked considerable curiosity, only 200 people attended 
the grand opening in April 1991.76 
Yet it should not be thought that Boshoff was totally irrelevant. In December 
1991, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) opened at the World 
Trade Center in Johannesburg. It was a tense group of political parties with different aims 
and objectives. The ANC and the NP were the major players, but it also included white 																																																								
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liberals and homeland parties. The far left (the Azanian People’s Organization) and the 
far right (the CP) did not attend the meetings, rejecting the whole concept of 
“negotiation.” The PAC likewise did not attend the meetings, believing that they should 
be held outside of South Africa and observed by a neutral party, such as the UN or the 
AU. The Inkatha Freedom Party withdrew from CODESA when Zulu King Goodwill 
Zwelithini and KwaZulu homeland representatives were not allowed to participate in the 
meeting.77   
While De Klerk was not originally going to allow Volkstaat parties to make 
contributions, he changed his mind. Journalist Allister Sparks argued that the inclusion of 
Avstig was a bid “to divide and rule the Far Right.” Sparks wrote, “In encouraging 
secessionists to present their case to the convention, De Klerk is trailing a lure before the 
‘moderates’ in this extremist shoal.”78 One of his most likely catches, Sparks rightly 
guessed, was Boshoff, the “intellectual guru of the far right.”79 The fact that Boshoff was 
willing to work with the NP and the ANC made him increasingly unpopular on the right. 
After joining CODESA, he was voted off the board of directors of the Oranjewerkers.80  
Referendum 
In spite of the fact that there were divisions on the right, there was still fear that if 
it reorganized its efforts, the CP could stall or derail negotiations, leading to further 
violence. It was not always clear that reconciliation would remain a dominant ideal in the 
white community. After the CP won a by-election in Potchefstroom in February 1992, de 																																																								
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Klerk called a referendum on the negotiated settlement. While de Klerk was hoping for a 
mandate, it would also give white South Africans the opportunity to derail negotiations. 
CP leader Andries Treurnicht jumped on the chance to campaign for a “No” vote. He 
argued that Afrikaners ought to consider their future independence, not just their 
economic standard of living.81  
Black leaders, while irked by the very idea of a “whites-only” vote, almost 
universally condemned a “No” vote. Nelson Mandela and South African Communist 
Party general secretary Chris Hani said that a “No” vote would lead to more violence. 
They promised further disruptions and protests, which would make the country 
ungovernable. Frank Chikane agreed, saying the outcome of a “No” vote would be “too 
ghastly to contemplate, because it would strengthen the argument for a violent 
resolution.” It would mean that racist whites would have to be forced to change through 
violence.82  
 De Klerk borrowed a wide range of language in his campaign for a “Yes” vote. In 
part, he argued that the NP would be able to provide Afrikaners with “minority rights.” 
One campaign slogan even said, “Vote ‘Yes’ if you’re scared of majority rule” (implying 
that a “No” vote would leave the Afrikaners with fewer options). Yet de Klerk also 
borrowed the moral language of reconciliation. He said, “I ask a ‘Yes’ vote for survival, 
for the maintenance of norms and standards [i.e. Afrikaans schools and institutions], for 
long-term stability, honest collaboration, reconciliation, peaceful coexistence, for true 
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democracy. I ask a ‘Yes’ for justice…a ‘Yes’ for a better South Africa.”83 Thus, de Klerk 
argued from both a pragmatic standpoint (that some negotiated privileges are better than 
losing all provides) and a moral standpoint (that ending white minority rule and all 
vestiges of apartheid was the right thing to do).  
Various business leaders and the Democratic Party joined de Klerk in his “Yes” 
campaign.84 A number of voices within the NGK also joined the “Yes” campaign. 
University of Pretoria biblical scholars A.B. du Toit and S.J. Joubert as well as 
missiologist J.J. “Dons” Kritzinger published a declaration in which they argued that 
members of the NGK had no choice but to vote “Yes,” given the church’s recent 
condemnation of apartheid. There was quite a bit of backlash to this declaration. P.S. 
Stumpher, for example, argued that it was not the job of the church to get involved in 
politics by telling its members how to vote.85  
There was high turnout, and the “Yes” vote won by large majority of 68.7 
percent. Independent analysts estimated that nearly 62 percent of Afrikaners and 79 
percent of English-speaking whites voted in favor of continued negotiation respectively.86 
While they may have hoped for minority protections, it was clear that the “Yes” vote 
entailed an end to apartheid. De Klerk cast the results in moral terms, saying, “It doesn’t 
often happen that in one generation a nation gets the opportunity to rise above itself. The 
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white electorate has risen above itself in this referendum.”87 For many black South 
Africans, it was a sign that many white people were serious about forming a united 
country. Political scientist Annette Strauss contended that the “Yes” vote “led to 
improved human relations and an attitude of goodwill and reconciliation.”88 For ANC 
negotiator Cyril Ramaphosa, it was an encouraging milestone that showed white South 
Africans were abandoning the racist legislation of the past.89 Social theorist Mahmood 
Mamdani argued that without the referendum, “any talk of reconciliation would have 
been wishful thinking.”90 It was clear that reconciliation would remain a moral ideal, 
political negotiations would continue, and the white right would not gain enough popular 
support to disrupt the process through the ballot box. 
Bosch’s Death 
Shortly after the referendum, the Bosches were spending Easter with their 
daughter Annelise and her husband Leon in Graskop (in the soon-to-be Mpumalanga 
province). While there, he received a message that his good friend W.A. Joubert had 
died. Joubert was a lawyer who developed an anti-apartheid voice throughout his career. 
He cast doubts on the homeland policy at SABRA during the early 1960s, founded the 
Verligte Aksie in the 1970s, and stood for election as a PFP candidate for the Waterkloof 
neighborhood in Pretoria. He also signed onto the UDF’s Million Signature campaign.91 
Joubert received a terminal cancer diagnosis, and he arranged for Bosch and Willem 																																																								
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Saayman to conduct his funeral service.92  
When Joubert’s widow found that Bosch was on vacation, she phoned him, telling 
him not to worry about the funeral. Saayman would be able to do the job himself. Bosch, 
however, wanted to honor the promise that he made to his late friend. During the 
morning, the Bosches shared a picnic with their children, grandchildren, and Lorraine 
Sibuye, their daughter’s friend. After eating by the Lisbon Falls, David noted the time 
and said he had to be going. He embraced Annemie, and she put her head on his chest, 
hearing the steady beat of his heart. She looked up at him and said, “Drive safely, my 
love. I don’t want to come to your funeral.”93 He laughed and smiled down at her, saying 
he would try. While Annemie stayed by the falls with the older children, the younger 
children left with David. As he walked away, she saw her husband between two little 
girls—one black and one white. For her, there was something symbolic in that moment; 
her husband was an “in-between” person.94    
On his way back to Pretoria, not far from the town of Belfast, Bosch attempted to 
pass a truckload of military conscripts, when he collided with an oncoming car. Although 
it was a very serious accident, Bosch remained conscious. Bystanders came running to 
the scene, and Bosch told them his name, his personal details, and he gave them a 
telephone number. Bosch had a broken rib, a bruised lung, and a deep cut just below the 
knee. Onlookers called for help, and they tried to get him out of the car. His legs were 
trapped in the mangled vehicle. The ambulance was dispatched an hour after the incident. 
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In that time, David Bosch bled to death while people stood by, helpless.95  
There are many rumors and conflicting theories about Bosch’s tragic death. Some 
theorized that when the police realized that Bosch was the “troublesome priest” whose 
op-eds frequented the newspapers, they decided to let him die. Saayman and Kritzinger 
note this theory had little evidence. They instead thought it was more likely that they 
were confused about his race, and were unsure of whether to send an ambulance for 
whites or for blacks. After all, when one emergency responder was asked why they were 
so late, he responded that he thought the victim was a black man, and there were no black 
ambulances available. Another emergency responder flatly rejected this version of the 
story. At the very least, the official inquiry came to the conclusion that the ambulance 
services were tardy and inadequate.96  
Bosch’s friend Takatso Mofokeng preached at his funeral. For Mofokeng, 
Bosch’s death was another painful instance of the reality of life in South Africa. He said, 
“David Bosch identified himself with black people throughout his life; he was also 
identified with them in his death, since he died in pain and alone while waiting for help 
which came too late.”97 His words at once captured the tragedy of the moment while still 
embracing him as a fellow Christian across racial barriers. Bosch also died before he 
could witness a democratic South Africa. 
Troubled Negotiations  
By the middle of 1992, the negotiated settlement was in trouble. It became clear 
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that ANC and NP did not agree on the conditions for national reconciliation. The NP had 
promised its constituents some form of protection (or power) for minorities (i.e. whites). 
The NP proposed strong protections for civil and property rights, as well as an 
independent judiciary which would check state power (something that would have helped 
black South Africans tremendously during the apartheid years). The NP also proposed 
enshrining a multi-party coalition in the constitution with rotating leadership. They 
further suggested that certain constitutional legislation should require a 70 percent 
majority, in essence allowing for a “white veto.” Mandela lampooned this as a “loser-
take-all” system of governance.98  
The NP was not able to deliver on these promises. Gerrit Viljoen was chief NP 
negotiator at CODESA. He advocated for “group rights” or “volksregte” saying, “Those 
who want to live, worship, work, or play in specifically defined communities should have 
the right to do so in the new South Africa, but without laws making it compulsory.”99 He 
was, in essence, advocating for de facto “group areas.” Viljoen found the stress of 
negotiations overwhelming, and retired completely from the government for health 
reasons. The next NP chief negotiator was Tertius Delport, but he was not effective 
against ANC negotiator Cyril Ramaphosa. Roelf Meyer would successfully negotiate 
with the ANC, not so much making unreasonable demands, but seeking to obtain 
whatever concessions he could get.100 Conservatives found this disastrous. Boshoff later 
said, “the fate of the Afrikaner volk fell into the hands of am inexperienced and awkward 
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(onbeholpe) youth.”101  
The ANC was having its own troubles. The ANC was finding it difficult to 
organize political infrastructure after so many years in exile. Organizational efforts were 
complicated by attacks directed at ANC supporters, which the police seemed to do little 
to stop. The NP government seemed determined to maintain some form of white veto 
over a new constitution, and they likewise seemed unwilling to stop the violence that was 
largely directed at ANC supporters. Rather than negotiate under those conditions and on 
those terms, Ramaphosa directed CODESA II toward a breakdown in May 1992. Though 
Ramaphosa and Meyer met in secret, official talks were over.102  
The ANC launched a campaign of mass action, directing popular protest toward 
the government. As part of the campaign, ANC leaders led a march to unseat Ciskei 
homeland leader Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, who had come to power through a coup in 1990. 
South African Communist Party secretary Chris Hani, Cyril Ramaphosa, MK intelligence 
chief Ronnie Kasrils, and the ANC women’s league’s Gertrude Shope led the march in 
September 1992. When Ronnie Kasrils managed to break through a fence at the Bisho 
stadium, the Ciskei Defense Force opened fire. 29 marchers were killed, and over 200 
were injured. De Klerk was blamed for the violence.103  
As the violence had reached a fevered pitch, the NP and the ANC decided it was 
time to publically make concessions to one another. The NP was in a weaker position 
than it had previously been. The ANC and the NP signed the Record of Understanding in 																																																								
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late September 1992. They couched their concessions in terms of the moral ideal of 
reconciliation. They agreed, “The two parties…commit themselves to the strengthening 
of the Peace Accord process, to do everything in their power to calm down tensions and 
to finding ways and means of promoting reconciliation in South Africa.” Meyer was 
directing NP leaders away from the idea of minority veto power, and the ANC was 
willing to accept “sunset clauses,” which would not only protecting white civil servants’ 
jobs and pensions, but would also enforce compulsory power sharing in a “government of 
national unity” for a number of years after the adoption of an interim constitution. The 
ANC would get majority rule; it would only have to wait.104  On April 1, 1993, talks 
resumed at the Multiparty Negotiating Forum.105  
Only 10 days later, Chris Hani was assassinated by Janusz Waluz, a Polish 
immigrant working in cooperation with CP MP Clive Derby-Lewis. It was shocking, and 
many worried that this would be the spark that would set off a “race war.” Yet the ANC 
maintained its conciliatory position, immediately stating that violence would not derail 
talks. Mandela appeared on national television, and stated that while “a white man, full of 
prejudice and hate, came to our country” and killed Hani, it was “a white woman, of 
Afrikaner origin,” who ran after the assassins car, took down the registration, and helped 
bring Waluz to justice. Note Mandela’s emphasis on the foreign nature of Waluz and the 
local origin of the woman who reported him. Blending a call for reconciliation and 
liberation, Mandela called for “all South African’s to stand together against those who, 																																																								
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from any quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life for—the freedom of us 
all.”106 Hani’s death was a major blow to black radicals. Yet the violent episode also gave 
the ANC leverage to demand that a date be set for the election. If the ANC was 
committed to continuing the process of negotiation, then it needed to be clear that 
negotiations were moving toward an endpoint.107  
A Dividing Front 
The white right never wanted to arrive at a non-racial democracy. As the way 
toward a negotiated settlement between the NP and the ANC seemed to be clearing, the 
various factions on the right decided they needed to make a common cause. More than 20 
right-wing Afrikaner movements (including the CP, the HNP, the AWB, SABRA, the 
Afrikanervolkswag, Avstig, the Oranjewerkers, the Boerestaat Party, and the Boere 
Krisisaksie) came together under the umbrella of the Afrikaner Volksfront in May 1993. 
It hoped to secure land and self-determination for Afrikaners. Rather than uniting the 
right, outside divisions were simply replicated within the Volksfront. For those who 
envisioned a Volkstaat, there was no agreement on where it would be. Boshoff continued 
advocating for the northern cape, while others claimed territory around Pretoria in the 
former Transvaal Province. The HNP, Boere Krisisaksie, and the CP were reluctant to 
discuss any land concessions. The CP was also weakened by the scandal of Chris Hani’s 
murder. Shortly thereafter, A.P. Treurnicht died April 1993 after heart bypass surgery. 
While the CP wanted to act as the elected representatives of the Volksfront, others 
wanted the organization to take a more militant direction. They were completely 																																																								
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uncoordinated.108  
The Volksfront selected retired General Constand Viljoen (UNISA missiologist 
Abraham Viljoen’s brother) to lead the organization. Though the right was divided, 
Viljoen’s leadership gave those in the negotiating process pause. As a respected general, 
he might be able to gain the support of the military, and then stage a coup, unseating the 
NP government and derailing negotiations. Those who were rearing to fight might gladly 
fall in ranks behind him, leading to a devastating war of attrition. Nevertheless, General 
Viljoen was a sensible man who was not easily provoked; he could be reasoned with.109  
The same could not be said of all members of the Volksfront. The Volksfront 
staged a demonstration against the Multiparty Negotiating Forum at the World Trade 
Center in Kempton Park on June 25, 1993. Viljoen’s intention was to hand a petition over 
to those engaged in the conversation. The various participants in the demonstration 
gathered outside, and Boshoff led the group in prayer.110 Acting on their own initiative, 
the AWB forced the gates of the compound open and began storming the building. 
Viljoen attempted to maintain order, climbing a pole and calling for calm over a 
loudspeaker. His pleas went unheeded. The AWB crashed through the glass façade of the 
building with an armored car. Boshoff remembered watching the consternation of the 
negotiators being evacuated from the chamber. The AWB flooded the negotiating room, 
spray-painting walls with slogans demanding their own land. Several black female 
delegates and a black journalist were beaten. The security personnel were able to regain 
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control, and Eugène Terre’Blanche withdrew his forces once promises were made that no 
AWB members would be arrested.111 Other members of the Volksfront were livid. When 
the Volksfront gathered at its own meeting place, the attack was condemned in the 
strongest terms. Viljoen had intended to publically make a plea for Afrikaner self-
determination in front of the whole world. After such a boorish and undisciplined display, 
he rightly thought that the world was against them.112 It was also clear that they could not 
work as a united front.   
Constant Viljoen’s twin brother Abraham Viljoen was watching the unfolding 
events with some sense of horror, believing that it could escalate into an all out war at 
any point. Abraham hoped that the NGK would be able to influence his brother not to 
cave to right-wing pressure calling for a coup. He also believed that his brother could be 
won over if, through talks with the ANC, the possibility of a Volkstaat remained in play. 
Viljoen knew that he needed some help in arranging the appropriate meetings, and he 
turned to Jaap Durand, who supported Abraham’s idea. Durand spoke with his colleague 
at UWC, Kader Asmal, who had been in exile until the previous year. Asmal arranged a 
meeting with head of ANC intelligence, Joe Nhlanhla. At the meeting, Nhlanhla told 
Durand to assure Viljoen that the ANC would be open to including a discussion of an 
Afrikaner Volkstaat in the new constitution.113 Durand and Abraham Viljoen met with 
Boshoff’s colleague Chris Jooste. Abraham was direct at his meeting with Jooste, asking 
what the attitude of the right-wing would be if they were able to achieve some kind of 																																																								
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constitutional recognition for the possibility of a Volkstaat. Jooste (who had apparently 
already been in talks with the ANC) could not have hoped for better.114  
The CP and the IFP withdrew from multiparty talks in July 1993. They attempted 
to form a common cause in the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG). Avstig also 
participated in this group, and Boshoff later noted that there could have been some 
common ground between the IFP’s federalist vision and the idea of a Volkstaat. 
Nevertheless, the CP was unable to produce a meaningful alternative to the status quo, 
and was therefore accused of wanting to continue apartheid. COSAG ultimately went 
nowhere.115  
With the white right no longer at the negotiating table, it seemed as though there 
was even greater possibility for a coup. At this time, Smith’s former colleague at 
Koinonia, Ivor Jenkins was working with Abraham Viljoen at the Insititute for 
Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (IDASA), where they created a space for 
Afrikaners to voice their fears and concerns about the country’s future. Jenkins 
encouraged Abraham to speak with his brother as soon as possible. Viljoen went to the 
Volksfront’s office in Pretoria, asking to see his brother. He asked, “What are your 
operations,” to which Constand responded, “As things stand now, we have only one 
option, and that is to fight.”116 He estimated that he could have as many as 50,000 men at 
his disposal. Abraham said that he could instead meet with the ANC, and that they might 
be open to a Volkstaat. Many had already offered to introduce Constand to the ANC, 
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including Johan Heyns. Nevertheless, he trusted his brother to set up the meeting. 
Constand later recalled, “I thought Abraham was reasonably objective…We are 
politically far apart, but he is an honest man and I trusted him.”117  
This vast network of people put Constand Viljoen and Mandela in contact with 
one another. Mandela argued that if the general were able to organize a coup, the ANC 
would not be able to win the battle. In the long run, however, any war would turn the 
country into a “living hell for all of us.” Constand agreed that there could be no winners 
in a war.118 The negotiations between the white right and the ANC were tense. While 
they were about to sign an agreement on a Volkstaat, Viljoen pulled out at the last 
minute, accusing Ramaphosa and Meyer of sabotaging the agreement once it became 
public.119  
The undisciplined actions of the AWB brought Viljoen back to the negotiating 
table. Lucas Mangope was the homeland leader of Bophuthatswana, and he announced 
that there would be no national elections in the homeland. In response, civil servants went 
on strike and students began demonstrations. The police also joined them. Desperate for 
assistance, Mangope turned to Viljoen, asking him to send troops. He specifically asked 
that the AWB not be included in Viljoen’s forces. The AWB, however, went into the 
homeland on its own initiative and began shooting innocent bystanders.120 Beeld reported 
that the AWB considered their actions not so much military intervention as a “kaffirskiet-
piekniek.” When they read this, the army of Bophuthatswana was enraged, and they 																																																								
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joined the protests against Mangope.121 Viljoen ordered his men out of the homeland, but 
the AWB felt the need to continue shooting bystanders on their retreat. Three AWB 
members were captured and executed by the police. As Viljoen’s forces and the AWB 
left, the SADF moved into Mmabatho, deposing Mangope. Leaving Bophuthatswana, 
Viljoen decided that the Volksfront could not undertake military action; its members 
were too uncoordinated and undisciplined. No one would support its efforts, and the 
Volkstaat would wind up isolated in the world. He said, “I decided to go for a negotiated 
settlement.”122  
That evening, Viljoen registered the Freedom Front as a political party. It was, 
coincidentally, the last possible day to do so. Terre’Blanche and the Conservative Party 
split from Viljoen, while Boshoff followed him into the elections.123 Viljoen continued 
negotiation with the ANC and the NP, and they agreed to the Volkstaat Accord on April 
23, 1994, only days before the election. Support for the Volkstaat would be measured at 
polling stations, and given enough support, the new government would form a Volkstaat 
Council, which would act as an advisory body to the South African government.124 
Abraham Viljoen acted as a witness to the signing. The idea of self-determination became 
the 34th, and final, constitutional principle in the interim constitution, which Boshoff 
described as “the only point of light” in the new document. The Volkstaat accord led to 
section 235 of the South African Constitution, 																																																								
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The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as 
manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude within the framework of this 
right, recognition of the notion of the right of self-determination of any 
community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial 
entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation.125  
 
Thus, while large-scale territorial partition would not happen, those who aspired to a 
Volkstaat found that they had an opportunity to work with the new majority South 
African government. Boshoff and Viljoen were able to transform the nature of Afrikaner 
nationalism, making it acceptable to the ANC. For its part, the ANC was favorably 
disposed to the Volksfront’s brand of nationalism for two reasons. In the first place, 
getting Afrikaner nationalists to participate in the new dispensation would lessen the 
chances of violent right-wing resistance and discontent. In the second place, the ANC 
could safely bet that the “Volkstaat” would remain marginal and unthreatening; it had 
failed to muster any mass following.  
Melodi ya Tshwane 
 As Boshoff began building Orania in the Karoo, Smith was part of a team that 
established an interracial congregation in the heart of the formerly “whites-only” Pretoria. 
Beginning in the 1980s, Klippies Kritzinger, Lucas Mabusela, and Willem Saayman 
among others had been holding interracial services throughout Pretoria with an eye 
toward greater church unity.126 They worked not only for greater unity among people of 
color, but also hoped that white people would join in the services as well. When Smith 
came to Mamelodi, he enthusiastically joined their group, supporting their efforts by 																																																								
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finding the funds to hire busses for worshippers.127 
 Like Smith, Klippies Kritzinger also refused to take a salary from the NGK, 
opting to leave ministry in the RCA. Supporting himself through his job as a professor at 
UNISA, he ministered to the “Reformed Confessing Community” in Pretoria, which 
would include Christians of all races. Members of the Reformed Confessing Community 
and Smith’s congregation of domestic workers had enthusiastically participated in joint 
worship services.128 As the government relaxed the Group Areas Act, ministers and 
members met to discuss the future. Not only did domestic workers and members of the 
Reformed Confessing Community want to worship together, but Smith also envisioned a 
growing class of black professionals in the hitherto white center of Pretoria who would 
need a church home. He likewise thought that such a congregation could minister to the 
growing number of black students at the previously segregated University of Pretoria. 
They agreed that a new church plant was necessary.129  
 Structurally, the new congregation would be supported as a mission of the 
congregation in Mamelodi. This raised a host of concerns. Smith, along with several 
ministers and congregants, met with a group of white ministers to discuss financing the 
new congregation. Smith was reluctant to participate in the meeting, worrying that the 
ministers thought he was forcing unity on the congregants to serve his own radical ends. 
The dominees spoke with one voice, saying that their congregations were already 
stretched to the limit of their financial abilities. They said that property was very 
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expensive in central Pretoria, adding that not only would they have to buy or build a 
church, but also they would need space for social halls and houses for ministers. As the 
ministers painted a grim picture of the prospects, Smith asked the black members to tell 
their side of the story. A black domestic worker stood up, and said that she could not 
understand the problem. When there is a large group of Christians who want to start a 
church, other Christians should support them. After all, had the Israelites sat around 
discussing potential problems before leaving Egypt, they would still be there today. The 
woman’s sincere faith won the dominees over.130 
 The church council in Mamelodi discerningly endorsed Smith’s vision, after 
which he formally requested that the Presbytery of Tshwane form a new congregation. 
The Elders who sat on the presbytery had some reluctance. While Smith may have 
envisioned a prosperous professional class in the future, for the time being the 
congregation would be comprised mostly of women who worked as domestic workers for 
meager salaries. Beyond financial concerns, Saayman noted that the “very dignified and 
respectable black male elders” thought it “was well known that a group of women could 
not run the intricate affairs of a congregation of the DRCA on their own.”131 The few 
female elders felt rightly slighted by this assertion, and they stood to defend themselves. 
They asked the men a series of rhetorical questions, “Who is it that cleans out church 
buildings and prepares them for weekend services regularly? Who are responsible for by 
far the greatest proportion of the funds collected annually? To which gender do most 
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worshippers belong, week in and week out? Who form the groups that regularly pray for 
the sick?”132 The men who had objected now sat in silence. When the vote came before 
the presbytery to establish a new congregation, it carried unanimously. 
 The congregants then had to choose a name. They wanted to mark the fact that 
their congregation would be the first black church in a formerly white area. The well-
loved evangelist, “Oom” Piet Mabusa suggested “Melodi ya Tshwane,” meaning “the 
Song of Tshwane.” He told a story to explain the name. Shortly after the First World 
War, his father was hired to work on the construction of the Union Buildings. The 
workers did not call the city Pretoria, but rather “Tshwane,” which was the Setswana 
name for the Apies River and the surrounding area. The workers lived in a labor camp on 
the banks of the river, and listened to birds singing as a reprieve from their work. To call 
the church “Melodi ya Tshwane,” therefore, not only paid homage to the previous 
generation, but it also expressed the hope that it would be a place of rest and refuge in a 
challenging world. The name also suggested that Africans were a central part of the story 
of the city from the very beginning, whether they were allowed to live in the “white area” 
or not.133  
 Melodi ya Tshwane had members, official recognition, and a name. It also had 
clergy. The two founding pastors were Nico Smith and Frank Mnisi, and Klippies 
Kritzinger joined them in 1993. In addition to pastors, there were several evangelists, 
including Mabusa and Louis Thobela.134 Melodi ya Tshwane did not, however, have a 
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permanent building. Finding space for the cash strapped congregation was no easy task. 
The leaders of Melodi ya Tshwane were in conversation with a white congregation about 
buying a building, but those talks fell through after they sold the building to another 
group.135 Younger NGK ministers at the Bosman Street NGK, after lengthy negotiations 
with their congregation, offered to sell a half share of their building for R500,000. Smith 
quickly got in contact with foreign donors, and he managed to raise 250,000 from the 
Lutheran Church in Germany and an additional 150,000 from Presbyterians in the United 
States. For its part, the Bosman Street NGK lowered its asking price to R400,000.136  
 The symbolism of the building was immense. It had been used in state funerals as 
well as several presidential inaugurations.137 It was rumored that secret government 
meetings took place in the bell tower. This building, which had once sanctified white 
power structures, was now going to become a place of racial reconciliation and black 
aspirations. Yet before the deal could be finalized, an official at the deeds office decided 
that the white congregation could not sell a share of building. He said that according to 
ancient Greek customs, a building with national significance could not therefore be sold 
to another people group. It was, according to this official’s logic, a place of national 
significance to the Afrikaner nation, and could not, therefore, become property of another 
group. It was a bizarre argument, and it was not hard to suspect that the official was 
merely attempting to keep black people out of the building.138 The council for Melodi ya 																																																								
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can tell, Verwoerd’s funeral was conducted at the Union Buildings. Jan Smut’s funeral had been conducted 
at the Groot Kerk/Melodi ya Tshwane.   
138 Smith, “The God of my fathers died in Mamelodi,” 163.  
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Tshwane simply pointed out that South African followed Roman-Dutch law—not Greek. 
There was, therefore, no legal basis for blocking the transaction. Thus, an interracial, and 
eventually predominately black congregation, came to occupy a space formerly reserved 
for whites-only.    
A New President Comes to Tea 
As Boshoff worked to establish a Volkstaat, and as Smith worked to establish an 
interracial congregation, the Multiparty Negotiating Forum hammered out an interim 
constitution. It included a section on “National Unity and Reconciliation,” which 
authorized the new Parliament to enact amnesty “in respect of acts, omissions and 
offences associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts 
of the past.”139 The NP was insistent on this provision, hoping to shield many state 
functionaries from prosecution in tribunals for crimes they most certainly committed. 
Nevertheless, the provision would also shield freedom fighters. This constitutional 
provision was couched in terms of reconciliation. Renner highlighted the following 
excerpts:  
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and 
peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the 
reconstruction of society…These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a 
need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not 
retaliation, a need for Ubuntu but not victimization.140 
 
This legislation paved the way for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
chaired by Desmond Tutu.  
																																																								
139 “Explanatory memorandum to the Parliamentary Bill,” Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, Republic of South Africa. http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/legal/bill.htm.  
140 Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in Renner, 54-55.   
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 Between April 26 and 29, 1994, South Africa would hold its first non-racial 
election. 19.5 million South Africans of all races voted in the election. The ANC won a 
clear victory, with over 62 percent of the vote. The National Party became the largest 
opposition group with just over 20 percent of the vote, followed by the IFP with 10 
percent. The Freedom Front managed to attract just under 2 percent of the vote, mostly 
from former Afrikaner conservatives. While the ANC was the clear winner, it fell short of 
the two-thirds majority needed to unilaterally draft a new constitution. Thus, they would 
have to make some concessions to opposition groups. The election was heralded as a 
resounding success—even a miracle.141 Yet behind the miracle, there were a multitude of 
leaders from both the political and civil realms, working hard to achieve the ideal of 
reconciliation.  
 Nelson Mandela would breathe new life into reconciliation as President. 
Famously, he would support South Africa’s rugby team, the Springboks, as they won the 
1995 World Cup. Traditionally, rugby was “for whites” and soccer was “for blacks.” For 
Mandela, however, the Springboks were the united country’s team. The ANC left old 
symbols and statues in place; these were not, Mandela argued, a threat to freedom.142 His 
government would also seek to include the aspirations of conservative Afrikaners. The 
ANC passed the Volkstaat Council Act in December 1994, in accordance with the interim 
constitution. The Council would make policy suggestions about the location of the future 
Volkstaat. Its members would include Anna Boshoff and their son Carel Boshoff IV. The 
ANC government also granted Orania a measure of autonomy by establishing its own 																																																								
141 Waldmeir, 261-262.  
142 Ibid., 255.  
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“transitional representative council,” allowing it to decide on its local affairs while also 
expressing its interests to municipal, provincial, and national governing bodies.143 
Afrikaner nationalism would have a place in the new South Africa.     
 In the spirit of reconciliation, Mandela invited Betsie Verwoerd to share a cup of 
tea with him. She responded, saying that she was too sick and old, but if Mandela was 
ever in the neighborhood, he should stop by Orania. Mandela took her up on her offer. 
When his helicopter arrived, the mood was amicable. While some had misgivings, most 
of Orania’s residents were eager to share Mandela’s conciliatory attitude. Boshoff made 
polite remarks about Mandela to a foreign reporter, saying “I know him quite well…He is 
a gentleman.”144 Betsie Verwoerd, who was 94 at the time, said she was glad that 
Mandela had visited her, and asked him to “dispose of the fate of the Afrikaners with 
wisdom.”145 The two also shared a private meeting, although they never mentioned what 
they discussed (if anything). The residents of Orania marked it as a noteworthy occasion. 
The dress she was wearing on that day is still hanging in Orania’s Hendrik Verwoerd 
Museum (next to the one she wore to meet Queen Elizabeth II).146  
Mandela was gracious and positive about Orania. He stated “the way in which we 
were received by everybody in Orania was as if I was in Soweto.” Mandela added, “I 
																																																								
143 Interestingly, Orania is the only place in South Africa that still as an operative “transitional 
representative council.” As the name implies, it was a product of the interim constitution, and the council’s 
status has never been updated or abolished. Edward Cavanaugh, Settler Colonialism and Land Rights in 
South Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). For current discussion, see: Phillip de Wet, “Orania held its own 
election this week, buoyed by a vision of growth and prosperity,” Mail and Guardian August 5, 2016. 
https://mg.co.za/article/2016-08-05-00-it-may-only-have-1-000-residents-but-orania-wants-to-move-from-
dorp-to-city.  
144 Waldmeir, 253.   
145 Boshoff in “Mandela visits apartheid die-hards,” New York Times August 16, 1995. 
146 Waldmeir, 253.  
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didn’t have to ask for permission. I came in. I was not given any pass. It’s not something 
that worries me. They are entitled to run their settlement as they like.”147 Mandela said 
that Afrikaners should hold a referendum on the question of the Volkstaat. Mandela’s 
diplomatic attitude was born of the fact that most Afrikaners were not interested in 
Boshoff’s Volkstaat. Of the Afrikaners who supported the Volkstaat, many hoped it 
would be around Pretoria, and not in the Karoo. Boshoff’s earlier predictions about the 
inevitable failure of a “unitary state” were not panning out. While there was tension and 
changes, most Afrikaners were finding “the new South Africa” welcoming and familiar. 
The prospect of a mass exodus into the wilderness did not seem likely. Mandela could 
safely say that majority of South Africans were heading in the direction of reconciliation 
and nation building. When Boshoff showed Mandela a statue of Verwoerd, Mandela said, 
“you made him very small.” In response, Boshoff could only mutter, “Yes.”148 Even 
Boshoff, an Afrikaner separatist, could not ultimately escape one of Mandela’s enormous 
gestures of reconciliation.   
																																																								
147 Mandela in “Mandela visits apartheid die-hards.” 
148 “Mandela visits apartheid die-hards.” Associated Press, “South Africa: President Renews Plea 
for a United South Africa,” Posted [June 21, 2015]. YouTube video, 2:02 min. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X52FOVkxMGY.  
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CONCLUSION 
	
Image 3: Nico Smith, Willie Jonker, and Carel Boshoff at a class reunion, c. 2005. ACC 417, Nico Smith, 
UNISA Archives, Pretoria, South Africa.  
 
Missionaries were neither uniquely responsible for envisioning the apartheid state, nor for 
envisioning a reconciled South Africa. Yet in each instance, Afrikaner missionaries were 
situated in a position to discuss the morality of race relations. They did not offer policy 
suggestions, but rather espoused ideals and principles for ordering church and society. In 
the 1930s, Afrikaner missionaries argued that churches ought to follow the contours of 
ethnic division; after all, everyone needed to hear the gospel in his or her own language. 
They argued that this same kind of “separation,” which was rooted in the idea of “cultural 
requirements,” could be applied to social spheres as well. Political leaders, intellectuals, 
and academics would cooperate with missionaries to build on this ideal. When David 
Bosch, Carel Boshoff, and Nico Smith were students, they embraced separation as just, 
Christian, and the only possibility for South Africa’s future. As missionaries in the 
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“homelands,” they would also adhere to ethnic boundaries, while cooperating with the 
National Party government to build separate institutions.  
 A missionary describes his or her work as a “calling” from God. Missionaries 
believe that they are put in certain places to do God’s work. This is defined in many 
ways. For the young Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff, it meant working in the “homelands” to 
“win souls for Christ.” Yet their work was never just “spiritual.” There was an ethical 
concern about the bodily integrity of the people among whom they were working, as well 
as their future prospects. In the 1950s and early 1960s, they sincerely believed that 
apartheid or “separate development” would eventually satisfy the needs and aspirations 
of black South Africans. If there were lacunae or even troubling aspects of the policy, 
those would, they believed, be resolved in the future. When it became clear that the initial 
moral vision of the “separate development” did not (and would not) match the reality, 
Afrikaner mission leaders developed crises of confidence.  
For some, this crisis of confidence was a lack of faith in the entire idea of 
apartheid. Bosch was the first of the three to become skeptical. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
he found biblical justifications for apartheid problematic, and he was uncomfortable with 
the decision to remove Coloured voters from the common roll in the Cape Province. His 
graduate studies made his skeptical of nationalism as a Christian project. While accepting 
apartheid for cultural reasons, he found influx controls and other aspects of urban 
apartheid deeply troubling. After hearing the voices of protests from black theologians in 
the 1970s, Bosch made a final break with his older paradigm. Rather than advocate the 
formation of separate churches for separate ethnic groups, he came to believe that 
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different racial groups ought to be reconciled into a single new “alternative community.” 
Reconciliation would gain immense gravitas at missionary gatherings, such as the Durban 
Congress on Mission and Evangelism (1973), the Pan African Christian Leadership 
Assembly (PACLA, 1976), the 1977 meeting of the South African Missiological Society, 
and the South African Christian Leadership Assembly (SACLA, 1979). These meetings 
were interracial and ecumenical. They included a range of voices. The common tenor, 
however, was that reconciliation was a preferable alternative to division.  
Smith also had a growing crisis of confidence in the 1970s. During those years, 
his moral struggle was as much with the Afrikaners as it was in apartheid. He had ethical 
problems with the Broederbond’s manipulative actions. Conversations with foreign 
leaders like Karl Barth gave him pause. Afrikaner intellectuals like Johan Degenaar led 
him to realize that there were alternatives to apartheid. For both Bosch and Smith, the 
crisis of confidence in the morality of apartheid was fueled by a variety of internal and 
external factors, ranging from ecumenical criticism and black protests to economics. 
Boshoff’s crisis of confidence took a different direction. While he believed that 
his father-in-law, Hendrik Verwoerd, could have creatively implemented apartheid, he 
found later NP leaders like John Vorster and P.W. Botha wanting. It is debatable as to 
how much further Verwoerd’s plan would have gone. More likely than not, he would 
have maintained underdeveloped “homelands” and an integrated economy. For Boshoff, 
however, these problems arose only when the NP no longer seriously pursued homeland 
development. He became critical of the government from the right, using his position as 
chairman of SABRA in an attempt to push for further territorial separation. By the 1980s, 
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he had lost all confidence in the government ability to implement apartheid. He too 
searched for new solutions. Rather than finding them in a united and/or non-racial South 
Africa, he pursued the idea of the Volkstaat.     
As protests rose against Botha’s reforms in the mid-1980s, Bosch, along with 
many South African Christians, participated in initiatives that advocated a negotiated 
settlement. Other Christians began to wonder if reconciliation carried enough weight. 
While living in Mamelodi in the 1980s, Smith was radicalized. He came to embrace black 
liberation as central to his understanding of the gospel. Nevertheless, he engaged in 
conciliatory grassroots activities, bringing white and black people together for meals. It 
was not that Smith had rejected reconciliation totally, but rather he argued that justice 
must always come first. For Bosch, however, reconciliation was a process, in which 
various stakeholders would constantly be engaged in “give and take” negotiation. Though 
they might have disagreed over the finer points of “reconciliation,” it was clear that as 
Afrikaner moral leaders, they were endorsing a non-racial and unified South Africa. 
While they may have argued, they were moving in the same direction.  
Boshoff pushed toward ethnic separatism. He attempted to build broader 
conservative and/or right-wing solidarity with figures like Conservative Party leader A.P. 
Treurnicht and the notorious Eugène Terre’Blanche of the AWB. While their efforts drew 
some support at first, it quickly became clear that they lacked a unity of vision. 
Treurnicht was more of an obstructionist than a leader; he hoped to stop the NP from 
moving toward reform while offering no real alternative. Terre’Blanche was pugnacious 
and, in spite of military drills, highly undisciplined. Boshoff and others believed that a 
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Volkstaat would allow the Afrikaners’ to have an independent future, but they could not 
agree on where that territory should be. The right was weak and divided, while those who 
supported reconciliation were able to build ever wider networks.   
Bosch, Smith, and Boshoff did not change their minds all at once. There was no 
dramatic breaking point or turning point. They realized things rather slowly, almost 
unbelievably slowly in hindsight. Bosch later remembered that in the 1960s, the 
government said by 1978, black South Africans would “begin to move back to the 
homelands rather than into the cities. 1978 came and went without any change in the 
overall pattern of black migration.”1 They had a variety of experiences and conversations. 
These experiences included a wide range of events: tears for the sake of interracial 
friendship, a lecture, Henry Kissinger, and a rigged student election all had impacts on 
these thinkers. As they slowly changed their minds, these different experiences added up, 
leading to profound shifts. The same David Bosch who would spout racially charged 
nationalist rhetoric as a student in the 1950s would come to say that Afrikaners needed to 
sacrifice their security for the sake of “costly reconciliation” with black people by the 
1980s. Smith, who refused to eat at integrated dining tables in the 1960s, would put lead 
thousands of black and white couples to share meals in the 1980s. Boshoff, whose family 
and ideological commitments led him into the centers of power in the 1950s and 1960s, 
wanted to leave South Africa behind to find a new homeland for Afrikaners. These men 
underwent profound changes in their lifetime. Their importance lies in the fact that as 
																																																								
1 David Bosch, “Ethics in the Context of Transition,” Journal of Theology for Southern Africa vol. 
57 (December 1986), 20. 
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they saw the world changing around them, they articulated new moral positions, which 
they promoted through their academic work and by building new institutions.  
Legacies 
 David Bosch is frequently remembered not so much for his political theology, but 
for his missiological work. Bosch’s academic work often had few, if any, references to 
South Africa. In fact, he is often chided as being too “Western,” “European,” or even 
“white” in his theological program. Certainly, his magnum opus, Transforming Mission, 
deals extensively with the ideas of western scholars and paradigms.2 Yet Bosch’s 
conciliatory attitude ran through all of this work. Wherever there were divisions, Bosch 
believed in bringing people together. Whether it was black and white South Africans, or 
evangelical and ecumenical Christians, Bosch believed that the Gospel had the power to 
bring people together, discuss their differences, and find new solutions. At the Melbourne 
Conference, a statement was made condemning South Africa. A Pakistani delegate then 
rose, asking for a similar statement to condemn the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Afghanistan. The Russian delegates immediately took objection. They worried that such 
a condemnation would only place the Christians throughout the Soviet Union in the 
sights of an unfriendly government. Bosch, who shared concerns about Afghanistan, 
designed a tactful resolution. It confessed to not being “prophetic as it ought to be,” 
specifically because it did not name specific instances. At the same time, in condemning 
specific situations, the delegates worried that they would “impose martyrdom on our 
fellow believers…from a safe distance.” Nevertheless, the delegates “want to assure our 
																																																								
2 David Bosch, Transforming Mission (Orbis, 1991).  
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unnamed brothers and sisters in many unnamed countries that we have not forgotten 
them; we identify strongly in their suffering for the Kingdom of God.”3     
While the “universal horizon” of Bosch’s missiological work certainly bore the 
imprint of Western scholarship, he was a committed South African citizen. Bosch was 
offered several positions outside of South Africa, first as a professor at the University of 
Leiden in 1974, then as associate director of the Overseas Ministry Study Center in New 
Haven, CT in 1981 and 1982, and finally a position at Princeton Theological Seminary 
first in 1985 and then again in 1987. Such positions would have come with additional 
international contacts, scholarly resources, and certainly a degree of academic prestige 
that matched Bosch’s intellectual abilities.4 Missiologist Gerald Anderson had a long 
conversation with Bosch, encouraging him to take a position at Princeton. Bosch 
seriously considered the offer, and turned it down, saying, “No, I don’t think I can leave 
my colleagues and the struggle in South Africa. It is a critical moment and that is where 
God has placed me.”5 Perhaps Bosch’s greatest contribution to South Africa was what 
might be termed “hopeful skepticism.” He did not think that there were easy solutions to 
South Africa’s problems, but he was hopeful that in coming together, South Africans of 
all backgrounds could attempt to find new answers. Had Bosch lived, it is easy to 
imagine that he would have been supportive of (or even part of) the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, and that he would have encouraged Afrikaners to 
participate.  																																																								
3 Emilio Castro narrated this story in Klippies Kritzinger and Willem Saayman, David J. Bosch: 
Prophetic integrity, cruciform praxis (Cluster Publications, 2011), 126-127. 
4 Klippies Kritzinger and Willem Saayman, David J. Bosch: Prophetic integrity, cruciform praxis 
(Cluster Publications, 2011), 142-143.  
5 Gerald Anderson in Kritzinger and Saayman, 143.  
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Smith retired at the age of 65. He lived on his small holding, hosting friends and 
family, taking an interest in wine and cooking, and operating a tour company that took 
visitors to Mamelodi. Smith could be quite bitter about most of his fellow Afrikaners, and 
he said they had not done enough for the transformation of the country. He argued that 
the Broederbond prevented the Afrikaners from coming of age. It told the Afrikaners 
what to think, rather than allowing them to think for themselves. In the absence of 
apartheid and National Party rule, he said Afrikaners experienced “uncertainty and 
confusion about their own existence.” He argued that they were like “drowning persons” 
who “clutch any possible lifeline thrown out to them.” He was critical of the fact that 
many Afrikaners left “to find new refuge in countries where their own language and 
culture will soon die a slow death.”6  
 While Smith worried about the future of Afrikaner language, he was critical of 
Orania. He wrote, “The absurdity of this [apartheid] thinking, of which I myself was a 
part for so long, eventually led to an even greater absurdity—an own territory for 
Afrikaners within the borders of a legally constituted country!”7 Smith argued that while 
“Carel and his people can indeed manage their own local interests,” their hope to become 
an independent state was “an empty dream.”8 Interestingly, Smith also used the fact that 
more people did not go to Orania as a further criticism of the Afrikaners who left South 
Africa. He wrote, “But even this course [of moving to the Volkstaat]…that has been left 
open to the Afrikaners by a well-disposed South African government is not attractive 
																																																								
6 Smith, “Afrikaner Broederbond, Ch. 5 to end,” 117. 
7 Smith, “The God of my fathers,” 117.  
8 Smith, “In conversation with,” 119.  
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enough to the thousands of Afrikaners who have emigrated or are contemplating 
emigration.”9  
At the end of his life, Smith’s Afrikaner Nationalism had become an African 
nationalism. Smith occasionally attended state events as a functionary. Mandela invited 
him to open an address to a group of Afrikaner leaders in Pretoria with a prayer. It must 
be mentioned that Smith had more trouble arranging meetings with Thabo Mbeki. Frank 
Chikane served as Mbeki’s Director General, meaning that he managed the president’s 
appointments. Chikane was, understandably, in no mood to do any favors for Smith.10 
Regardless of these personal differences, Smith was thoroughly enchanted by the idea of 
being a “white African.” He came to believe that Afrikaners would have to learn how to 
fit into broader South African society “by making themselves available for service to the 
country and its people as a whole.”11 Thus, it seems that Smith still envisioned Afrikaners 
having their own communal life and language, but ethnolinguistic concerns were 
secondary to national concerns. Like Boshoff, he still believed that the Afrikaner faced a 
crisis of survival. He concluded his book on the Broederbond, “How Afrikaners choose 
to venture into the future will determine whether they survive as a people or disappear 
from the pages of history.”12 He felt somewhat isolated by the end of his life as well, 
complaining that so many of his contacts from the struggle days no longer visited him.13 
Smith died of a heart attack in 2010, and the ANC gave him glowing accolades.14 																																																								
9 Ibid., 117.  
10 Smith, “In conversation with,” 201-202.  
11 Ibid., 117-118.  
12 Ibid., 118.  
13 Interview with Richard Elphick, December 2015.  
14 “ANC pays tribute to Nico Smith,” Mail and Guardian, June 21, 2010.  
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There no little irony in the fact that dyed in the wool Afrikaner nationalist Carel 
Boshoff was the only one of the three men who actually entered politics in the new South 
Africa. He became a member of the Northern Cape Provincial Council and served as a 
representative of the Freedom Front. His main objective during that time was to have the 
provincial legislature recognize Orania. Boshoff was an active member of the Freedom 
Front, and also helped to shape its policy. In July 1996, at a meeting in the Hartenbos, 
they discussed proposals for where to locate the Volkstaat. The party decided that it 
would be placed in the “North West Corridor,” i.e. along similar (though much reduced) 
lines to Avstig’s original proposal. Some members of the Freedom Front were less than 
pleased with the plan, saying Avstig hijacked the meeting.15 Boshoff came into some 
tension with Viljoen, who was not as determined to maintain “self-work” as Boshoff was. 
Likewise, Viljoen advocated a Volkstaat in the Eastern Transvaal Corridor. Boshoff did 
not back Viljoen’s leadership, and was instrumental in the decision to replace him with 
Pieter Mulder.16   
 Boshoff ended his career on a positive note. In 2000, he wrote a letter to Die 
Volksblad, in which he argued that everyone seemed to be angry. He himself had been 
angry for many years, watching the National Party enact programs of reform that he 
thought put the Afrikaners future at risk. Yet Boshoff argued, “We in Orania are (no 
longer) angry. We are busy with plans that can work. This is not an easy plan and no one 
would choose it if there were an easy alternative, but it is the only plan.” Orania did not 
become a thriving growth point in an independent Volkstaat. Over 20 years after its 																																																								
15 Boshoff, Dis nou ek, 440-441.  
16 Ibid., 442-443. 
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founding, it resembled most other South African towns, save for the conspicuous absence 
of people of color. Yet Boshoff did not become disillusioned with Orania. Instead, he 
believed that he was working so that he could “have a future again.”17  
Orania has, in many ways, become a watchword for old-fashioned South African 
racism. Many scholars have taken an interested in the town, along with a host of 
documentary filmmakers.18 It is a curiosity for outsiders. Many Afrikaners travel to 
Orania as a holiday destination, staying at the “Aan-die-Oewer Spa” and occasionally 
waxing nostalgic: “all towns used to be built to this standards,” one tourist said.19 Even 
comedians have made jokes about Orania. Kagiso Lediga recently hosted a sketch-
comedy show called “The Bantu Hour,” and in the first episode, he defended his the title:  
The truth is Bantu means people, it doesn’t just mean black people, and it’s not a 
synonym for the “K-word.” It just means people. So that means D.F. Malan, H.F. 
Verwoerd, and Eugène Terre’Blanche, and yo’ mama are all Bantu. Did you hear 
that, South Africa? … Did you hear that? That was the sound of two thousand TV 
sets in Orania being switched off!20 
 
Many documentary filmmakers have found Orania and the Boshoffs in particular to be 
lacking in the kind of crass racist sentiment that other leaders espoused. Residents of 
Orania tend to speak in terms of preserving “culture,” which is the party line.21 Journalist 
																																																								
17 Ibid., 443-444.  
18 For example: Edward Cavanaugh, “The History of Dispossession at Orania and the Politics of 
Land Restitution in South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 39/2 (2013). Kajsa Norman, Into 
the Laager: Afrikaners Living on the Edge (Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2016); Kajsa Norman, Bridge over 
Blood River: The Rise and Fall of the Afrikaners (C. Hurst & Co., 2017). For documentary films, see: 
Orania, dir. Tobias Lindner, 2012 (film). For a more sensationalistic account, see Dark Tourist, Episode 8 
“Africa,” dir. David Farrier and Paul Horan, 2018 (television series).  
19 Comment made by man interviewed in Dark Tourist.  
20 The Bantu Hour, season 1, episode 1, SABC 2015 (television series). 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mxmht4uu3kk.  
21 In Dark Tourist, for example, David Farrier noted that people in Orania avoided all talk of race, 
which he found mendacious. He said, “I feel like I’m not getting the whole truth. That evening, I head to a 
local bar to try to get an uncensored version. … More talk about preserving culture. … But it’s hard to 
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Johnny Masilela noted the welcoming nature of Boshoff and many people at Orania 
(though one white non-resident refused to shake his hand).22  
The Boshoffs, and now many of their children, embraced a kind of “congenial 
nationalism.” Part of the legacy of Boshoff was the transformation of Afrikaner 
nationalism into a form that has endured in a non-racial and democratic South Africa. 
While previous generations of Afrikaner nationalists attempted to maintain a separate 
existence by dominating the black African majority, Boshoff would attempt to maintain a 
separate existence by negotiating with the majority. This outlook and ideal led Boshoff to 
accept a visit from state president Jacob Zuma, during which the two men held hands—
an African symbol of unity. Likewise, when Julius Malema took a hard stand against 
Orania, he was also welcomed for a visit and conversation. Orania, while small, 
continues to emphasize “culture” not “race” as the core of its existence, and it advocates 
for itself with wider South African society along these lines. Yet their definition of 
“culture” always has racial implications. Its leaders tacitly continue to make the claim 
that one cannot be Afrikaans while living in a non-racial society, which is not what the 
vast majority of Afrikaners have found. This vision, with its emphasis on moral language, 
has the potential to lend support to “white homeland” visionaries the world over. While 
the Boshoffs make careful distinctions and promote peaceful parallel existence, many do 
not. Fortunately, without popular appeal or access to mechanisms of power, these 																																																																																																																																																																					
ignore the white elephant in the room—that this is about color and race. It’s clear no one here is going to 
mention those words.” Farrier had to go to a different group to get the type of extremism he was looking 
for. He said, “But off camera, some locals tell me if I’m looking for real Afrikaner extremists, I should 
check out a group called the Suidlanders.” This survivalist group talks about “self-defense” in the face of a 
“white genocide.” They blatantly say they arm themselves against “the blacks.”      
22 Johnny Masilela, “Orania leader true racists love to hate,” IOL September 27, 2015. 
https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/orania-leader-true-racists-love-to-hate-1921468.  
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movements remain marginal.  
While Bosch and Smith made the call to interracial church unity throughout the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, this would not become one of their legacies. Decades after 
majority rule, Durand continues to lament that the church does not provide South Africa 
with an example of unity.23 Smith ended his career working feverishly for unity. 
Alongside his colleague Jacob Nthakhe and others, Smith would travel throughout the 
country promoting the formation of the Uniting Reformed Church (URCSA), which 
would bring together the DRCA and the DRMC.24 The white NGK was not part of this 
process, and many congregations in the former mission churches resisted becoming part 
of the URCSA. There have been halting and often stumbling conversations about 
institutional unity between the NGK and the URCSA, but those have been plodding on 
for decades. In the meantime, it seems that the NGK continues to adhere more closely to 
Boshoff’s vision. As late as 2007, Boshoff argued that the NGK had the responsibility to 
preach the gospel to white Afrikaans speakers. Expressions of broader unity could 
include joint worship services, but they need not proceed to institutional unity.25 Boshoff 
suggested that if the church did not follow this course, it would “just get irrelevant and 
disappear.”26   
																																																								
23 Specifically, Durand and I were talking about my time at the Company Garden in Cape Town. I 
noted that it struck me that it provided an example of what South Africa could be: a beautiful place where 
people of many races, languages, and socio-economic backgrounds come together to live in (relative) 
harmony and peace. He looked at me, and said, “Imagine if that were the church.” Interview with Jaap 
Durand, March 2016.  
24 Interview with Jacob Nthakhe, February 2016.  
25 Boshoff included the full text of his submission (on behalf of the NGK Congregation in Orania) 
to the NGK, “Die eenheid van die Kerk en die Eenwording van die NGK, VGK, die DRCA en die RCA,” 
in Dis nou ek, 529-539. Interestingly, he cited Smith’s doctoral work to support his point.  
26 Bsohoff, 243.  
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None of these men triumphed in their lives. On the contrary, Bosch, Smith, and 
Boshoff would find themselves deeply disappointed or even disillusioned at various 
times. One remarkable similarity that they shared, however, was the ability to imagine 
new options. They were willing to make sacrifices for their ideals, though their efforts 
often pointed in different directions. They shared a deep love for South Africa and a 
concern for its future, but they would come to express these sentiments very differently. 
They were part of a generation that shifted from carefully guarding its privilege to 
negotiating it away. In their own way, they all demonstrated that ethnic division does not 
necessitate conflict. They would ultimately show that avoiding conflict takes years of 
conversation and building trust. Bosch and Smith worked hard to bring South Africans 
together. When he realized that South Africans would not remain separate, Boshoff 
worked with the majority. This study ends on a hopeful note: reconciliation, not division 
and conflict, won the battle. Apartheid ended in negotiation, not civil war. However, 
reconciliation requires sacrifice and work, and division proves remarkably resilient and 
adaptable. The peace that they achieved in their generation is not guaranteed to this one. 
If the conversation continues, and if people continue listening to each other’s needs and 
aspirations, there will be hope. 
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